Issues in Classical Indian Philosophy #6

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Dear Friends:

 

Here is Issue #6 of the series " Issues in Classical Indian

Philosophy " . This particular one deals with the phenomenon of

recognition (pratyabhijn~A). Below is the opinion of the Indian

systems on this particular issue.

 

ISSUE #6

THE NATURE OF PRATYABHIJN~AA (RECOGNITION) IN THE SYSTEMS OF

CLASSICAL INDIAN THOUGHT:

 

 

I. JAINISM:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is a unitary and unique psychosis

produced by the compounded combination of perception (pratyakxa)

and recollection (smRti). It apprehends the identity of the

object simultaneously in the present (through pratyakxa) and in

the past (through smRti).

 

 

II. BUDDHISM:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is a mechanical association of two

distinct psychoses, i.e. the presentative perception and the

representative recollection. Recognition takes place when two

discrete psychoses, i.e. the sense-organ (which presents the

object) and the memory (which represents the object),

mechanically associate with each other to effect the phenomenon

of recognition. The two psychoses remain discrete and at no

point do they combine and compound together into a unitary

psychosis.

 

 

THE HINDU SYSTEMS:

 

III. NYAAYA-VAISHESHHIKA:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is a single synthetic cognition in

which the object presented is qualified by the past cognition

of it. In the process, the identity of the known (jn~eya) is

directly perceived while the identity of the knower (jn~AtA) is

indirectly inferred. Also, perception holds the upper-hand over

memory in the recognitive process.

 

 

IV. SAANKHYA-YOGA:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is a unitary cognition which takes

place when the presented object triggers an impression (vAsanA)

in the mind (manas) of a previous cognition of that object.

In the process, both the identity of the known (jn~eya) as

well as the identity of the knower (jn~AtA) are directly

perceived. Also, memory holds the upper-hand over perception in

the recognitive process.

 

 

 

V. MIIMAAMSAA:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is a certain type of perception

where there is a recollection of an entity caused by a

peripheral stimulation between the sense-organ and the object.

In the process, the identity of the known (jn~eya) is directly

perceived while the identity of the knower (jn~AtA) is

indirectly inferred. Also, perception holds the upper-hand over

memory in the recognitive process.

 

 

 

VI. SHANKARA (ADVAITA) VEDAANTA:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is end-result of the complete and

complex fusion of two psychoses, i.e. peripheral stimulation and

subconscious impressions (vAsanAs). In the process, both the

identity of the known (jn~eya) as well as the identity of the

knower (jn~AtA) are directly perceived. Also, memory holds the

upper-hand over perception in the recognitive process.

 

 

 

VII. RAAMAANUJA (VISHISHHT.AADVAITA) VEDAANTA:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is the re-perception (punassanikarSha)

of the self-same object from the second time onwards which is

aided by sensory contact and subconscious impressions (vAsanAs).

In the process, both the identity of the known (jn~eya) as

well as the identity of the knower (jn~AtA) are directly

perceived. Also, perception and memory are equal partners in

the recognitive process.

 

 

 

VIII. MADHVA (DVAITA) VEDAANTA:

 

Pratyabhijn~A (recognition) is a variety of perception wherein

the sense-object contact is coupled with the revival of

previous impressions (vAsanAs). In the process, both the

identity of the known (jn~eya) as well as the identity of the

knower (jn~AtA) are directly perceived. Also, perception and

memory are equal partners in the recognitive process.

 

 

 

A. GENERAL COMMENTS: There are three important issues involved

in the doctrine of recognition among the Indian philosophical

systems.

1. Whether the act of recognition is a unitary psychosis or

whether it involves two discrete psychoses. As can be discerned

from the aforesaid views, all the systems, with the sole

exception of the Buddhists, to the first view, while

the Buddhists alone remain the advocates of the double

psychoses view.

2. Whether in the act of recognition the identity of the

known (jn~eya) alone is directly perceived or whether the

identity of the knower (jn~AtA) is also directly perceived. In

this case, the NyAya-VaisheShika and the MImAmsA systems uphold

the first view, while the SAnkhya-Yoga and the 3 VedAntic

systems espouse the second view.

3. Whether perception or memory holds the upper-hand in the

recognition process or whether both are equal partners in the

process. In this case, the NyAya-VaisheShika and the MImAmsA

systems uphold that perception has primacy over memory, while

the SAnkhya-Yoga and Advaita (Shankara) VedAnta advocate the

view that memory has primacy over perception. The third

standpoint, i.e. that perception and memory are equal partners

are upheld by the VishiShTAdvaita and Dvaita schools of

VedAnta.

 

B. COMMENTS ON THE RAAMAANUJITE VIEW: The RAmAnujites have

come crashingly close in their definitions of determinate

perception (savikalpaka pratyakxa) and recognition (pratyabhijn~A).

If one scrutinizes them both carefully, one discovers there is

hardly any difference between the two. In order to maintain a

technical distinction between the two, they regard determinate

perception as perception of the generic object from the second

time onwards while regarding recognition as perception of the

specific object from the second time onwards. It is an

unnecessary technical " hair-splitting " distinction. While their

definition and notion of recognition is at least acceptable

from the common-sense viewpoint, their definition and notion of

determinate perception must be changed. It is a strange

definition that none of the other systems see eye to eye

with. There is no point in being different without reasonable

grounds for doing so.

 

 

regards,

Hari-vAyu smaraNa

B.N.Hebbar