Sri Vyasaraja Theerthara Compositions - Volume 13.0 / by Sri NAPS Rao

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Thirteenth Instalment

 

Dear People,

 

 

Here is the thirteenth installment. Do send back your reviews, comments and feedback.

Thanks

NAPSRao

 

 

SathhAthraividyabhangah - rejection of three states of reality

 

 

Advaitha says that there are three levels of reality as follows:

Absolutely real (never sublated) - Brahman

Vyavahariks reality - World excluding Brahman and the next category - which will get sublated by Advaitha jnana eventually.

Prathibhasika reality - congnised to be real for some time (in the Vyavaharika world) and sublated there itself - silver-shell etc

The second is a lower order of reality than the first, and the third is also further lower than the second.

 

Sri Vyasaraja rejects this classification. First he points out, that with the same premises, more than three types could also be stipulated as under:

Silver superimposed on shell as seen in a dream - to be lower than even Prathibhasika

 

Destruction of Ajnana which is not Vyavaharika and also not Paramarthika will have a status higher than Vyavaharika, but will not be paramarthika.

 

Sri Vyasaraja is making the point that the arbitrary division based on three examples from the real world, without any defining basis is invalid, as more examples could be found for other types of Sathva.

 

This division itself can not be absolutely real, as by definition only Brahman is such in Advaitha. It can not be unreal, as then Brahman also will become Athathvika or not absolutely real (because there will be no way of distinguishing the reality of the Brahman from that of the world). The Shruthies which are used to establish this distinction would also become Athathvavedaka _ conveying unreal things.

 

It should be noted that this division of reality if it exists must be true for all times, even if the lower orders of reality, like Vyavaharika and Prathibhasika cease to exist in future and hence it can not be assigned any status other than that of Paramarthika. This reality is not identical with Brahman, who has also the same order of absolute reality and it can not be any part of him as He does not have any parts or qualities (Nirvishesha and Nirdharmaka).

 

Sri Vyasaraja asks the question - Is it that with Paramarthika (absolute real) clearly defined as Sath (Real), the other two being different from reality (Vyavaharika and Prathibhasika) differ from each other by the duration of persistence of the Illusion or they are also other kinds of Sath (reality). It can not be the first alternative as in Advaitha just as there can not be cognition of silver in the absence of silver, there can not be cognition of Sathva or reality, in its absence. Further, in the absence of reality some where in slver, there can not be its creation, or Arthakriyakarithva (its ability to produce action). in the case of long persisting illusion, there is a possibility of invalidity of knowledge as in the case of the Blueness of the sky. In the second alternative, the not real (Asath) can not cause any cognition, irrespective of its being Aropitha or otherwise.

 

Sri Vyasaraja makes a detailed list of Paramarthika and Vyavaharika entities as well as Prathibhasika entities to show that sublation etc have no tangible differences relating them to their own prescriptions and definitions. A detailed study and analysis would not only be very long, but would need introduction of many other concepts, which are not called for here. Finally he concludes that there is no valid Pramana, clear concpets and definitions etc for the three kinds of Sattha postulated by Advaitha.

 

 

It would be noted that there are two extreme and unsupported theories for explaining Illusory knowledge in Advaitha.The first is to stipulate the actual but temporary presence of the Drishya object (silver) superimposed on the real object acting as a substratum, like the shell. What is missed out here by them is that an incorrect conclusion of whatever was seen (Drishya) was drawn that the object seen was silver because of similar properties (like reflecting light, silver colour, shining etc), where as there is no physical change in the object seen. The error in the cognition, a purely sensory and mental aberration is transferred into a change in the characeristic of the external object with regard to its reality, without any justification and against common sense. With such a small but lethal erroneous assumption, the whole edifice of Prathibhasika and Paramarthika is built up, by using a defective logic

that the world seen is like the false silver "seen" in the shell. No wonder that when the sublating knowledge is grasped we realise that the object was always the shell and never silver _ nEdam rajatham, shukthih.. The other theory is that there is no real external world at all - as all that is seen is within the mental and sensory realm of the observer (a sort of mirror image of the the earlier transfer) just to show that the external world which our senses, mind, logical faculty and Sakshi emphatically tells us as real and enduring is condemned without proof into an entity which will disappear after sublating knowledge, like Dream objects. Acharya Madhva says in Dvadasha sthothra - "VyavaharabhidApi gurOrjagathAm etc". quoting Vedavyasa in his Brahma suthras and other authoritative compostions rules out Vyavaharika status for the world. In fact all of us perform all our actions based on the reality of the world, which is amply supported by science,

history, arts and other humanities. The processes of nature like creation of new entities, their growth, and decay, including that of our own body continue relentlessly based on laws over which we have no control, often with out our knowledge. Therefore, it is inconceivable that all that exists is only based on our cognition.

 

While we discuss the reality of the world, one point is worth noting. What we see of the world is through very small apertures in the elctromagnetic spectrum which scientific instruments are already extending. Similarly, the sense of touch, hearing, smell etc also have severe limitations, being essentially designed for the environment where we live and preservation of the body in good condition. One could conceive of other senses or extensions of these senses to "cognise" other forms of energy like Xrays, Ultrafviolet rays and even cosmic radiation, which are presently known by ther effects on suitable sensitive instrumentation, desgined by us. Similarly, the data received by us, is "processed" by our sensory equipment including the Brain, and is analysed into final results which we "cognise". The actual data received which is yet to be processed may be larger in scope and quantity. as in the case of the

optical sense. But what is to be noted is that while we may not "know" all, what we know from the outside world is real and not just fabricated inside a complex brain.

 

 

BhedapanchakE prathyakshavivaranam - explanation of Prathyaksha in the five fold differences

 

One of the most fundamental tenets of Tatvavada is the doctrine of Difference (Bheda) between the Supreme being (Isha), the Jiva aspiring for liberation from samsara and Jada (insentient) principle. The 5 actual differences (Bhedapanchaka) betwen

1. Isha and Jiva,

2. Jiva and Jiva

3. Isha and Jada

4. Jiva and jada

5. Jada and Jada constitute the five Differences whch are part of the essential nature of the entities and will never get sublated. Advaitha considers that Isha and Jiva constitute a single entity in the Paramarthika (absolute) plane of reality and all other entities and differences are pertaining to the Vyavaharika plane. As Jada is the subject of sensory Prathyaksha, Jiva is the subject of sakshi Prathyaksha and Ishwara is not an object of Prathyaksha, they argue that the fivefold differences can not be subject to verification by Prathyaksha pramana. This is a strong argument as Agama Pramana is in any case, a disputed area, where both sides produce and interpret Agamas to support their positions and Anumana is also indecisive. Just as in the case of the reality of the world, the role of Prathyaksha is vital. Sri Vyasaraja deals with this problem in his inimitable style.

 

Sri Vyasaraja says: Poorvapaksha is that Bhedapanchaka is invalid on the ground that as Iswara is not cognisable by Prathyaksha, both the Dharmi (possessor of the attribute) and Prathiyogi (the referent to assigned feature) are non-existent. Anumana is also not useful, as any Anumana such as - Jiva and Iswara are absolutely different from each other like Fire and Snow - is invalid. Here, both the objects of comparison in the illustration are not themselves absolutely real, being only Vyavaharika in nature. If it is argued that the conclusion is also not absolute but Vyavakarika only, this proves the

 

Advaitha view. (Note that any example from the world which is itself Vyavaharika, given in favour of Difference, can be rejected by the same argument). The difference between Jiva and Iswara on the ground that one is subject to Misery etc and the other is not, is also not accepted on the ground that Misery etc do not apply to the Jiva being only the properties of Anthahkarana ( a jada entity). If it is argued by Vyathireka Anumana, that they are different form each other as Iswara is Sarvajna (all knowing) etc. while Jiva is not (by universal experience), Advaitha says that the assgnment of Sarvajnathva is unknown to them - as we have no such entity in the world (Iswara is still unproven). Sri Vyasaraja gives many other Anumanas to prove the Difference between Ishwara and Jiva, all of which are shown to have some defect and thus can not be accepted. In all these Anumanas Prathyaksha figures as

Drishtantha or example. Finally, the Shruthies such as "DvA suparnA" which proclaim Difference are considered as Anuvadaka (re-stating a poorvapaksha for subsequent refutation and hence not to be accepted as having the purport of Bheda (Difference).

 

 

After making out a very convincing case for Advaitha poorvapaksha, Sri Vyasaraja starts with "Ucchyathe" - will be stated:

(It will all be explained now).

 

Prathyaksha is a valid pramana for the Difference between Jiva and Brahman. Just as it is for a more mundane - "the Pot is not a piece of cloth" - we have the Prathyaksha Anubhava (experience) that we are not Sarvajna (all knowing) or not without sorrow etc. Just because Brahman is not subject to prathyaksha, it does not follow that the Difference between us and him is also not subject to Prathyaksha. What is relevant is not that the Prathiyogi (referent) should be a subject of Prathyaksha, but its absence (Abhava) should be so or negation of its existence in the locus. For instance, when we see a pillar and conclude that it is not a spirit (pishacha) by Prathyaksha, our conlusion is quite valid - though a Pishacha is itself not subject to Prathyaksha (would not be seen there if it was there). By seeing the Pillar, our negation that it is not a Pishacha is also valid. We should decide on the pertinent factor

based on our knowledge cognition. Otherwise, the Shruthi which states the difference between Jiva and Ishwara will be invalid negating something which is not on the discussion table

 

- Jiveshwara Bheda. Advaitha also postulates that the Bheda shruthi like Dva suparna, is only restating whatever is already known by Prathyaksha - and is thus an Anuvadaka. For Ishwara's Difference from Jiva, there are statements like "ThAnyaham vEda sarvAni na thvam vEttha paramthapa" (Geetha) etc which contain His statement about His prathyaksha. (Note the subtle distinction here

 

- Difference is stated by many shruthies like the one quoted as a sample. If these are considered as valid, the Abheda shruthies like Neha nanasthi kinchana (discussed earlier) which oppose these will become invalid or atleast indecisive being negated by equally strong shruthi pramana. To get around this difficulty, Advaitha stipulates that the Bheda shruthies are Anuvadaka and are stating Bheda only as a Poorvapaksha for being negated by the Abheda shruthies, which are the real purport of the Vedas as a whole. If the Bheda shruthies have to be treated thus, Bheda should be known to us, by a Pramana otherwise giving the knowledge than by themselves. Thus Prathyaksha is stipulated by Advaithin himself as the means to know Difference at a primary level. If this Difference can not be cognised by Prathyaksha, the whole chain comes down and we are in the position that Bheda shruthies are no longer Anuavadaka.

So Advaitha should be the last to argue that Prathyaksha can not cognise Bheda. We, the Tatvavada do not have that difficulty, as we do not stipulate any Anuvadaka nature of any shruthi (all are considered as relevant to the purport of the Vedas provided they are interpreted according to the canons of interpretation).

 

Advaitha offers another explanation - But Difference thus cognised is between the Soul which is the result of Avidya acting on the Chethana - called Anthahkarana (which is known as Aham - artha) and the pure Nirdukha Brahman who is free of all misery. This is acceptable to us also. What is not accepted is the difference between the pure unqualified chethana and the Nirdukha Brahma. This is not correct according to Sri Vyasaraja. When we wake up after a deep sleep, and say that I had a very sound and blissful sleep, what we are referring to by "I" here, is not the qualified avidyaic Anthahkarana, (which is a facet of the Mind which was totally at rest) bur the pure chethana (soul) denoted by I. By Prathyabhijna (I am the same person) I know that I am not free from misery, am embedded in Samsara (cycle of births and deaths), know vey little etc. It is the difference between that I and Shuddha Brahma, who is

free from all these defects, that is ths subject of our debate. We (Sri Vyasaraja) have already shown that what you call Aham artha is pure chethana and has no mixture of any insentient entity like Avidya (else where). Even the Pot (an insentient entity) is free from misery and is also a product of Avidya. The criterion of being free from misery by itself can not be the criteria for Difference. It can not be accepted in Advaitha also, that just because Jiva is miserable, Brahma who is non-different from him, is also miserable. (Advaitha have two internal schools of thought called Yekajivavada and Bahujivavada). In the latter, different Jivas can continue to exist and also attain Identity with Brahman gradually till infinite time, while in the former, all the different Jivas, Iswara, External world etc are due to the action of Avidya on a single Brahma chethana. Sri Vyasaraja says that in both of these vadas, Brahman can not ever be accepted as

miserable and a locus for the observed misery of the chethanas has to be found. This has also been discussed in some length in the section called Avidyashrayabhanga - rejection of the theory of locus for Avidya).

 

Sri Vyasaraja also says that in the context of discussing the nature of Prathyaksha pramana, it has already been shown that only ordinary Prathyaksha may get sublated and never Sakshi Prathyaksha. Due to the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the Difference between Jiva and Ishwara is cognised by Prathyaksha. Similarly, "I am not Maithra" is known by Chaithra (Jiva-JIva bheda) and "I am not a pot" is aslo known by him. Ishwara's difference from non-sentient world is also cognised by Parthyaksha aided by Anumama or Shabda or Shruthi. Thus all the fivefold Differences are congised either directly or with the help of other pramanas by Prathyaksha.

 

 

ShAbdaprathyakshabhangah - rejection of Shabdaprathyaksha

 

This is an important section where Sri Vyaasraja examines the crucial theory of

 

Advaitha that Shabda (knowledge received through Vedas) can generate Aparoksha jnana (direct cognition of knowledge through the mind without any contribution from the sensory apparatus). This theory forms the bedrock of Advaitha's path to Salvation and hence its rebuttal would leave Advaitha without any valid route to Moksha.

 

This Shabda-prathyaksha is not the usual Prathyaksha jnana, but has been included in this study as it is also mental Prathyaksha which is based on knowledge understood thorugh the medium of shruthies. After rejecting Prathyaksha on various grounds, of both the sensory variety as well as the Sakshi variety (which is also internal), Advaitha has perforce to fall back on this variety - created by true knowledge assimilated in the mind.

Sri Vyasaraja states the purvapaksha first - It is said that texts like Thathvamasi produce Aparoksha jnana. This is based on a shruthi statement - "ThaddAsya vijagnau, thamasah pAram darshayathi" - which shows that Aparoksha jnana is attained by Upadesha (teaching) by a Guru. In the text - "vEdanthavijnAnasunishchithArthah" - the qualifying Su denotes Aparoksha as Vi had already conveyed that the subject is something very special.

 

This is also proved by the Anumana - that Shabdajnana (knowledge produced by Shabda) is of the Aparoksha type as it has the subject is of Aparoksha type - like Sukha (Happiness). He also gives other Anumanas to support the proposition and to rebut possible objections. When one is told when counting a group (leaving himself out) that "you are the tenth person" - you get the

 

Aparoksha jnana about yourself being the tenth - by the statement which is in words. Even in great darkness and even for a totally blind person, the cognition that I am the Tenth person arises when he hears these words.

After fully stating the Purvapaksha form Advaitha, Sri Vyasaraja proceeds to demolish it equally thoroughly. The statement "ThaddAsya" etc will be fully meaningful even if it is explained as Paroksha Jnana and Aparoksha jnana being produced by Shabda is not needed to justify this statement. When one says "Darshayathi" - (will show) - the intention could well be that it will eventually give that result, as one who is explaining the way to a village to another would say - this will show (take) the village. There are shruthies - "manasaiva anudrashtavyam" - which also can be interepreted only by saying that it will eventually lead to the goal. In the text Vedantha.. etc (see above), the preposition Su is used to show clear understanding without doubts and may not mean Sakshathkara. The Anumanas offerred by Advaitha are defective with Vyabhichara, Asidddhi and Abhasasamya etc (The detailed derivation should be

studied separately).

 

Further, with the production of Aparoksha jnana by the shabda the latter may have to be integrated into Prathyaksha as one subdivision (which is against the pramana classification as separate entities). There is no case where Shabda can generate Aparoksha jnana (as by Prathyaksha). For instance, when one says "This pot" when seeing a pot, it could be wrongly inferred that the knowledge of the pot conveyed by the words (which is paroksha - or indirect) could be confused with the direct knowledge being received from vision. Similarly, "Dashamah thvamasi" is still giving Paroskha jnana itself, combined with Prthayksha jnana. Even if there is no vision accompanying the jnana from the words, these continue to give Paroksha jnana only. If Advaitha argues that it could still maintain its position that it is the words that gave the Aparoksha jnana, Sri Vyasaraja asks : What is the determinant that makes words

(Shabda) produce Aparoksha jnana. It could not be the natural property of the words - as it will lead to absurdity in conclusions such as - let other words also lead to Aparoksha etc. If they lead to Aparoksha as they concern a subject which is itself about Aparoksha, there could be many sets of word propositions such as "Jivas are non-different from Paramathma because of .." , or going through Vedantha without the benefit of a formal Shravana with a Guru etc can also lead to Aparoksha jnana. The meaning of Aparoksha of an entity could be any of the following : aparoksha jnana about the swaroopa of the entity, its being the subject of vyavahara (transactions) or something which produces Aparoksha jnana. All these defintions are untenable for the reasons given in Nyayamrutha. If it is held that it is something which leads to Aparoksha jnana, there is the defect of mutual dependence. By analysing the nature, causes, method of generation of both Paroksha

and Aparoksha jnanas, Sri Vyasaraja concludes that the two are two different and non-congruent types of jnanas, which have different Loci for their existence, even if the subject of the knowledges is common. The determination of the type of knowledge is entirely dependent on the capacity of the organ, which is used to comprehend the Jnana. Sri Vyasaraja analyses the various examples taken by Advaitha and finally concludes:

"Shabdena drishyathe brahma ithyathra mAnam na drishyathe

manasA drishyathe brahma ithyathra mAnam thu drishyathe"

 

There is no valid proof that Aparoksha jana of Brahman arises as a result of Shabda (spoken word), but there is proof that Brahma is cognised by the Mind (by suitable procedure like Shravana, Manana, Dhyana etc.)

 

The insightful and meticulous anaysis by Sri Vyasaraja of the nature of Paroksha Jnana, and Aparoksha jnana etc needs to be explained in much greater detail by studying Nyayamrutha with a qualified scholar with full familiarity of Nyaya Shasthra.which was my privilege. Unfortunately, I am incapable of transferring all that I thought I had understood at the time and also to go into the details of all the various concepts and resources involved in this discussion. If any one finds errors in what I have said, I would not be too surprised, though to the extent of my limited capacity, I have tried to make it true to my understanding of the subject. The biggest problem that I have faced is how to explain the important points without too much details and elaboration to an audience assumed to be beginners and also where to stop. Please forgive me if any of you have felt lost or misled - it is far from my

intention. I have been motivated entirely by my reverence for the Genius of Sri Vyasaraja, who has composed this work with such a vast knowledfge of not only Vedantha schools, but also Mimamsa, Nyaya Shasthra and above all with his feet firmly on the ground - and never abandoning his students midway - he is always very clear himself..

 

The next instalments will be from a publication of a seminar on Prathyaksha held in Poornaprajna Vidyapeeta a few years back, where a comparitive picture of different schools can be obtained.

 

.......To be contd

NAPSRao