Phenomenology and ontology

[Guest guest]

Nitin,

 

> Dear Libniters, After reading Gary's incisive analysis (Libn 96 & 98) I

> thought I would present my own impressions using Gary's tools.

>

> I agree that most sages confuse the phenomenological (description of actual

> experience, ie descriptional or experiential) with the ontological

> (theoretical) in their explanations. Perhaps J.Krishnamurti was a rare

> exception.

>

> But I would say that it is the average person who confuses the two in actual

> living with dire consequences.

 

I find this a helpful distinction. It is not the sages' understanding, but

their formulations, that I disagree with. Their ambiguities allow some

non-sages to take them in non-constructive directions, as Wilber, Engler,

and Epstein have nicely identified.

 

> As Gary has justly observed, the inner agent,

> the " doer " is an illusion. But the average person does not see it that way,

> although the sage does. Thus the average person confuses what is actually

> known ( " there is awareness, " " this is being done " ) which is phenomenological

> with what is subconsciously believed (that there is an " I " who is aware, or

> who is the doer). Actually this is a mere conscious or subconscious

> assumption, a mental extrapolation (or 'intrapolation') based upon social

> conditioning helped by erroneous symbolic thinking, and therefore

> ontological. (Erroneous symbolic thinking because the symbol is mistaken for

> reality, the 'me' a symbol used for convenience, is taken for a separate

> entity by itself). This subconscious error then leads to a host of secondary

> " me-based " conditioning which almost entirely colors the way life is lived

> and experienced.

 

I like Jack Engler's " you have to be somebody before you can be nobody " . You

don't replace self with nonself; you add nonself to self. That is,

developmentally, we must be able to build representations of ourselves

(self) in order to function. Psychoanalysis has stopped there in its

developmental theory. Buddhism supposes a functioning self and is interested

in the next stage: realizing that however we have represented ourselves to

date (whatever picture of self we have painted for ourselves), it does not

capture the whole reality and will have to change as future demands are

placed on it (nonself).

>

> The sage on the other hand, lives in actuality alone and has no use for

> ontology, and so is free from this type of conditioning. He is one who has

> delved deep into his own psychology and seen that there is no inner agent,

> no " me " except as a convention used for convenience.

 

Within the phenomenological level, we need to distinguish between " me " as a

heuristic device, a pointer, and " me " as a representation ‹ and " you " the

same way. " Gary " as a representation is anything you can say about me,

including the psychotic delusions that Cato has about me. " Gary " as a

heuristic device is a pointer to me, the mystery that is more than the sum

of all the attributes that can and will ever be given me. Similarly, I have

a representation of " Nitin " that is the sum of all my correspondence with

him. More importantly, " Nitin " functions as a heuristic device, a pointer,

to a mysterious reality who is more than all that I will ever attribute to

him. To function, Nitin and Gary must deal with their representations of

each other. But to be present to each other, Nitin and Gary must understand

the names as heuristic pointers. They must be open to the ever-evolving

reality that each individual is. Is there a Nitin-self and a Gary-self?

Definitely, in both the representational sense (self) and the heuristic

sense (nonself). The former is pragmatically functional, the latter makes us

present to each other, damn the 12,000 miles between us.

 

> As for the references to deep sleep, that is the only time that the average

> person is without his " me " sensation and that is why the sages refer to it

> as an example. That is the time there is awareness without the " I am aware "

> feeling. (That there is awareness can be deduced from the fact that after

> waking up one is aware of having been asleep).

 

This is an entirely different issue from the one above, on which we

substantially agree. The hypothesis that my knowing I was asleep means that

I was somehow aware when I was asleep runs into three difficulties.

 

The first is that it is phenomenologically false. I can tell you honestly

that I was asleep last night and I was not aware of it.

 

The second problem arises if you challenge my report that I was not aware

that I was asleep. If you say I was aware only I wasn't aware in the

ordinary sense, then you are playing with words.

 

The third problem arises from a different challenge: you say that I was

aware while asleep, only I've forgotten. The support for this claim is that

I MUST have been aware or I couldn't know I'd been asleep. But this

explanation is unnecessary. A better and more obvious explanation is that I

know I was asleep because I experienced going into sleep and coming out of

it. And I know that in-between I was asleep, because I've been taught since

I was child that that was what I was doing ‹ sleeping ‹ and I've seen others

do it. Further, there's a whole science of this behavior, reporting the time

that various individuals have spent between going into and coming out of

sleep, and recording various psychophysiological and behavioral measures

associated with it. In short, my saying that I slept last night does not

reference an awareness I had while asleep, but a whole complex of waking

experiences that surround the state called sleep.

>

Best to all,

 

Gary Schouborg

Performance Consulting

Walnut Creek, CA

garyscho

 

Publications and professional services:

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