Why morality is dualist

[Guest guest]

> gary,

>

> I enjoyed your rhetorical flourish on dualism in an earlier posting, as did

> others. I understood those dualisms you described to be mostly politcally,

> culturally, maybe even popularily driven. In your reply to Zach you wrote

> that you consider morality to be inherently dualist. I am puzzled by that

> claim. I don't understand why moral considerations cannot also enhance

> enlightenment, integration, and liberation. Wanna try it? I'm in no rush,

> just reflecting on moral and ethical thought and waiting for Ashcroft's next

> terrorists to hit.

>

> John Lounibos, CA 54-71

>

Thank you for catching my drift. Cato thought I said duelist.

 

I take dualism to be a lack of psychological integration. Therefore, the

ordinary meaning of " moral " is dualist in that it concerns what we " ought "

to do independently of what we want or desire. It therefore implies inner

conflict between what we believe we ought to do and what we want to do. For

example, we might believe that we ought to use military force against

terrorism in spite of our wanting not to kill anyone; or we might believe

that we ought not to use military force against terrorism in spite of our

wanting vengeance.

 

This moral conflict is of two kinds, categorical and conditional.

 

The conflict is categorical if we believe that what we ought to do is

independent of *any* of our desires. Since Hume's argument that there can be

no such categorical oughts, and Kant's failure to establish otherwise,

contemporary intellectuals have generally rejected categorical moral issues

as illusory. Based on this perspective, Freud explained that when we ask

ourselves what we ought to do, we are really asking ourselves what we must

do to gain the approval of others. That is, we develop our personal moral

standards by internalizing what others expect of us. Our lack of

self-knowledge about what we are doing -- internalizing the expectations of

others and seeking their approval -- creates the illusion of categorical

morality, the illusion that what we ought to do is based on " reason " rather

than on our goals or desires.

 

In contrast to categorical morality, which deludes itself that it is based

on reason, conditional morality is aware that its oughts are based on goals

and desires. In this framework, moral issues (as opposed to mere preferences

or ordinary projects) have to do with achieving particularly deep and

generally held human goals and desires; and conditional moral conflict is

the experience of conflicting desires. For example, we may want to use

military force to win the war on terrorism, but we may also want to avoid

killing anyone. Assuming for the sake of argument that these two desires are

incompatible, which one will we choose? Here there is a dualism in the sense

of conflict between two desires.

 

Enlightenment, on the other hand, is non-dual and therefore beyond morality

in the following two senses.

 

First, as we grow in enlightenment, we awaken to our mental processes and

realize that our oughts are based on our desires, not our reason.

Enlightened moral reflection therefore prompts us to become increasingly

aware of what we really want from life. At the deepest level, what we want

is indistinguishable from what life is asking of us -- or what, at our

deepest level, we are being impelled to do. At this level there is no

dualism, no conflict between what we want and what we " ought " to do

(thinking about what we " ought " to do therefore becomes irrelevant,

nonfunctional).

 

Second, as we grow in enlightenment, we experience less and less conflict

among our desires. That does not mean that our desires necessarily become

more simple. In this complex world, we still are very complicated people and

experience many desires that are mutually incompatible. However, *we do not

experience conflict if we are able to choose one of the incompatible

desires, then let go of the others, and move on*. To the degree that we are

unenlightened, we experience conflict among our incompatible desires because

we cling to what we cannot have.

 

In sum, let's return to the example above, where we have two desires

concerning terrorism, one to wage military war and the other to refrain from

all killing. If we are categorically unenlightened, we will have a crisis of

conscience and reflect endlessly and fruitlessly for some moral principle

(grounded in reason) to resolve the issue. If we are only conditionally

unenlightened, we will know enough to forget about " reason " and reflect on

what we really want -- both to wage war and to avoid killing -- but we will

be unable to let go of one desire and choose the other. If we are

enlightened, on the other hand, we will be aware that we are facing a choice

about what we really want from life; we will acknowledge that our two

fundamental desires (in this case) are incompatible; we will choose one and

let go of the other; and we will pursue our freely chosen goal without

guilt.

 

Sorry for the long and dry analysis, but I am unable to sort all this out

more briefly.

 

Gary

 

Gary Schouborg

Performance Consulting

Walnut Creek, CA

garyscho

 

Publications and professional services:

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