the idea of existence and me

[Guest guest]

As he listened to his brother's argument with the professor, he

noticed that they connected these scientific questions with those

spiritual problems, that at times they almost touched on the

latter; but every time they were close upon what seemed to him

the chief point, they promptly beat a hasty retreat, and plunged

again into a sea of subtle distinctions, reservations,

quotations, allusions, and appeals to authorities, and it was

with difficulty that he understood what they were talking about.

 

" I cannot admit it, " said Sergey Ivanovitch, with his habitual

clearness, precision of expression, and elegance of phrase. " I

cannot in any case agree with Keiss that my whole conception of

the external world has been derived from perceptions. The most

fundamental idea, the idea of existence, has not been received by

me through sensation; indeed, there is no special sense-organ for

the transmission of such an idea. "

 

" Yes, but they--Wurt, and Knaust, and Pripasov--would answer that

your consciousness of existence is derived from the conjunction of

all your sensations, that that consciousness of existence is the

result of your sensations. Wurt, indeed, says plainly that,

assuming there are no sensations, it follows that there is no

idea of existence. "

 

" I maintain the contrary, " began Sergey Ivanovitch.

But here it seemed to Levin that just as they were close upon the

real point of the matter, they were again retreating, and he made

up his mind to put a question to the professor.

 

" According to that, if my senses are annihilated, if my body is

dead, I can have no existence of any sort? " he queried.

 

The professor, in annoyance, and, as it were, mental suffering

at the interruption, looked round at the strange inquirer, more

like a bargeman than a philosopher, and turned his eyes upon

Sergey Ivanovitch, as though to ask: What's one to say to him?

But Sergey Ivanovitch, who had been talking with far less heat

and one-sidedness than the professor, and who had sufficient

breadth of mind to answer the professor, and at the same time to

comprehend the simple and natural point of view from which the

question was put, smiled and said:

 

" That question we have no right to answer as yet. "

 

" We have not the requisite data, " chimed in the professor, and he

went back to his argument. " No, " he said; " I would point out the

fact that if, as Pripasov directly asserts, perception is based

on sensation, then we are bound to distinguish sharply between

these two conceptions. "

 

Levin listened no more, and simply waited for the professor to

leave.

 

-Leo Tolstoy

Anna Karenina

(from an old translation)

[Guest guest]

There is another way to answer this, if thought

is taken as sensed.

 

In that case, thought can't comment about

what sensation is or is not, because thought

depends on being sensed in order to appear.

 

If we then realize that we can't use thought

to comment about the relationship between

sensation and existence, we realize that

thoughts about sensation and existence are

objects being sensed. The idea that there is

an existent awareness which senses things, is

merely another thought that is sensed.

 

We then observe that the senses and the sense objects

are the same process of sensation. The idea of

someone who senses is also a sense object.

 

Sensation, then, isn't at all what it appears to be,

when it is considered as an activity that is being

apprehended by an observer located apart from

the sensing.

 

Sensation has no way to sense itself.

 

Sensation appears only as a thought about

sense activities, but this thought must

be sensed in order to appear.

 

One needn't wait until one dies to try to deal

with this issue. In fact, the idea that one

would wait until one dies to have no senses

or no sense objects is merely another thought

which arises as it is sensed.

 

Right now, we can look into this fact, that

sensation cannot sense itself, cannot comment

about itself, cannot know what it is or is not.

 

What is revealed here is that sensation is

only appearing as sensing when sense objects

are being recorded as observed experiences.

 

The phenomena cannot grasp themselves.

 

-- Dan

 

 

 

 

Nisargadatta, " Hur Guler " <hurg> wrote:

> As he listened to his brother's argument with the professor, he

> noticed that they connected these scientific questions with those

> spiritual problems, that at times they almost touched on the

> latter; but every time they were close upon what seemed to him

> the chief point, they promptly beat a hasty retreat, and plunged

> again into a sea of subtle distinctions, reservations,

> quotations, allusions, and appeals to authorities, and it was

> with difficulty that he understood what they were talking about.

>

> " I cannot admit it, " said Sergey Ivanovitch, with his habitual

> clearness, precision of expression, and elegance of phrase. " I

> cannot in any case agree with Keiss that my whole conception of

> the external world has been derived from perceptions. The most

> fundamental idea, the idea of existence, has not been received by

> me through sensation; indeed, there is no special sense-organ for

> the transmission of such an idea. "

>

> " Yes, but they--Wurt, and Knaust, and Pripasov--would answer that

> your consciousness of existence is derived from the conjunction of

> all your sensations, that that consciousness of existence is the

> result of your sensations. Wurt, indeed, says plainly that,

> assuming there are no sensations, it follows that there is no

> idea of existence. "

>

> " I maintain the contrary, " began Sergey Ivanovitch.

> But here it seemed to Levin that just as they were close upon the

> real point of the matter, they were again retreating, and he made

> up his mind to put a question to the professor.

>

> " According to that, if my senses are annihilated, if my body is

> dead, I can have no existence of any sort? " he queried.

>

> The professor, in annoyance, and, as it were, mental suffering

> at the interruption, looked round at the strange inquirer, more

> like a bargeman than a philosopher, and turned his eyes upon

> Sergey Ivanovitch, as though to ask: What's one to say to him?

> But Sergey Ivanovitch, who had been talking with far less heat

> and one-sidedness than the professor, and who had sufficient

> breadth of mind to answer the professor, and at the same time to

> comprehend the simple and natural point of view from which the

> question was put, smiled and said:

>

> " That question we have no right to answer as yet. "

>

> " We have not the requisite data, " chimed in the professor, and he

> went back to his argument. " No, " he said; " I would point out the

> fact that if, as Pripasov directly asserts, perception is based

> on sensation, then we are bound to distinguish sharply between

> these two conceptions. "

>

> Levin listened no more, and simply waited for the professor to

> leave.

>

> -Leo Tolstoy

> Anna Karenina

> (from an old translation)