Guest guest Posted May 3, 2004 Report Share Posted May 3, 2004 Hi Bill. My perspective: You sense a thought, no moreso or less so than you sense an apple. So thought is phenomenal. Maybe that's not the usual way to use the term phenomenal, but then, that usual usage infers a subject/object split, with the subject being located as a thinker. A construct, in my view, is anything that is put together, which comes apart. Constructs aren't physical as opposed to mental, nor vice versa. Physical and mental are constructs. A rock isn't less of a construct than an idea. Registration involves memory function. Memory needs to be able to formulate an image that can be recalled, that can be placed within its process in terms of past, to be stored and recalled later. Registration involves placing an image in a psychological process of storage and retrieval with respect to time and place. The unconstructed truth, then (now), isn't mental or physical, isn't located in terms of place and time, doesn't register, isn't a sensory experience, nor a sensed object within an experience. However, being unconstructed, this truth isn't apart from sensing and time -- as to be separated in such a way would require *this* to be constructed. That's why the construct of " noumenon " isn't adequate for understanding, nor the construct of any subjectivity existing apart from an object, or thinker or knower apart from the thought or the known. One must understand the dissolution of anything constructed, such that the construction and dissolution are not-two. Thus, there are the teachings " form is emptiness, emptiness is form, " and " nirvana is samsara. " One shouldn't take those teachings as a rationale for not inquiring, not opening to/as *this* because one assumes " everything is *this* anyway, so there's no point to inquiry, everything is perfect as it is. " Everything is *this* as is, and *this* is all, but only if clarity of nonseparation is one's being aware now. In other words misperception and erroneous beliefs (e.g., relying on registered phenomena for an anchoring of reality, considering objects and selves to have their own separable existences and innate characteristics) do distort awareness and perception, and it usually makes no sense to try to postulate that " distortion also is *this* " -- typically, that's just a rationalization. The whole point of talking about distortion is that investment in self apart, self as existing and as being in relationship with objects, is that distortion it doesn't allow the knowing that *this* is *this* - as is. -- Dan (nothing new below) Nisargadatta , " Bill Rishel " <plexus@a...> wrote: > Dan > > I am interested in making a careful reply to this last post of yours. > However, I would like to seek clarification on two terms. > > ONE: " phenomenon " > > I wrote: > > > When's the last time you experienced a brain as a phenomenon? > > That means you had direct sensorial experience of a brain. > > You wrote: > << > You think an apple is concrete, you can touch it, so you think > it's a phenomenon, and something else isn't, like an idea > of justice. > > Both of them are constructs. The apple just as much as the idea > of justice. > >> > > But Webster wrote: > phe·nom·e·non > n. pl. phe·nom·e·na (-n) > An occurrence, circumstance, or fact that is perceptible by the senses. > > [Note that Webster doesn't say *object*.] > > As I understand the term, " phenomenon " does not refer to a concept, or > (in your parlance) a " construct " , because such is not perceptible by > the senses. > > > TWO: " registration " > > You use the term " registration " . What do you mean by that term? > > I will reply more fully to your post as am interested in your > comments on " emptiness " , but first would like to hear your responses > re the above two terms. > > Bill > > > > > - > dan330033 > Nisargadatta > Friday, April 30, 2004 2:06 PM > Re: The hunt for Pete's brain / Pete > > > Nisargadatta , " Bill Rishel " <plexus@a...> > wrote: > > > When's the last time you experienced a brain as a phenomenon? > > When I took anatomy class. > > > That means you had direct sensorial experience of a brain. > > [Am picturing someone holding a human brain in his hand.] > > Yes, I've done that. Sorry you've been deprived. > > > As for a collection of cells working cooperatively, you couldn't > > have experienced it as cells except via a microscope, and even > > then you couldn't have experienced it as cells working > > cooperatively in a phenomenal sense. The working cooperatively > > is necessarily an inferred abstraction. > > Man, are you always this picky? When you get this involved, > then I have to give an explanation. Are you always so > greedy for explanations? Okay, Bill, here it is: > everything we think of as phenomena are constructions. > Immediacy, now, has no objects in it, or to which it is > what it is. So, every object is a past impression, involving > time, being constructed. There is no actual past. > > It doesn't matter whether it's a second ago, a millisecond ago, > or ten thousand years. > > You think an apple is concrete, you can touch it, so you think > it's a phenomenon, and something else isn't, like an idea > of justice. > > Both of them are constructs. The apple just as much as the idea > of justice. > > If I hold a brain in my hand, that is just as much a construction > as is a more abstracted idea of what a brain is -- which is > experienced as a thought. > > A thought about a brain being a collection of cells is every > bit as phenomenal as a brain you hold in your hand. > > A memory of an elephant with pink skin that you imagined > when you were five is just as phenomenal as the immediate > sensation you have of pain if you are pricked with a needle. > > <I read other stuff you wrote, and enjoyed it, but am snipping > for the sake of brevity, hope you don't mind.> > > > You have clarified your position for me in this post. > > I continue to be on the fence on this topic. > > Okay, it's a chicken and the egg thing, anyway. > > To me, it's more important to understand that chicken > and egg mutually co-determine and interpenetrate, > than to try to figure which came first. > > > A question that comes to mind is this: > > Is the " emptiness " that I experience now the same > > emptiness that I experienced a few minutes ago? > > > > How could I possibly compare? > > Right. > > What is involved with " registration " ? > > There has to be comparison, there has to be movement > in time. > > If you understand comparison and time as constructs, > then registration depends on those constructs. > > This opens up the unconstructed truth as nonregistering, > not recalled, not of time, not mine. > > > Similarly with " silence " . As I write this there is a > > deep silence that pervades. Is the silence as I write > > this sentence the same as the silence when I wrote the > > previous sentence? It seems that to ask if the silence in > > the two case is the same is a grammatical error. > > Okay. > > In other words, the silence is the now, the now is the silence, > there is nothing existing outside, upon which the now > could register. > > > Also, and this may be a digression, it seems that > > at times the silence gets deeper somehow. It is not > > that it gets " more quiet " . > > That has to involve the comparative mind, the self-reflective > mind that knows it is having an experience and uses > memory to compare. > > In other words, construction within and of constructions. > > What isn't constructed can't be reflected about or upon, > can't be compared, is this timeless now undivided. > > Not the teddy-bear concept of it, as Pete might say, > but as it is, naked now. > > I guess what I'm saying is that if I self-consciously know > that I'm experiencing silence, that isn't the same thing > as the silence in which I'm swallowed, which I can't have > as mine, which I can't reflect about, make comparisons > about and so on. > > -- Dan > > > > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted May 4, 2004 Report Share Posted May 4, 2004 You say to me: " You sense a thought... " I say to me: " I do? " This notion of sensing a thought seems odd to me. Perhaps if I can conjure a thought, I can perform a " thought experiment " to test what you are saying. But how to conjure a thought? I can *infer* that I had the thought to conjure a thought to test what you are saying. So supposedly I had a thought there. However there was no " sensing of a thought " involved. Only in retrospect could I look back and say, " Hmmm, must have been a thought there. " It seems to me that " the thought to conjure a thought to test what you are saying, " is not an object. It is not something I can contemplate. It does not exist per se. I could also be said to have had " the thought to perform a thought experiment to test what you are saying " . I could be said to have had *that* thought as well. The " thought to perform a thought experiment to test what you are saying " is more general than " the thought to *conjure a thought* (as a thought experiement) to test what you are saying " . So can it be said that I had two different thoughts, or is it that the more general thought is " entailed in " the more specific thought? Following this kind of analysis it seems clear that " having a thought " is a manner of speaking and does not entail the existence of an object corresponding to the substantive " thought " . I.e. to assume that there *is* such an existent corresponding to the substantive seems to be a commission of the classic " reification error " . At any rate, the notion that apparently is important to you is the notion of " construct " , not the notion of phenomenon. Apparently to you anything nameable is a construct. Also, apparently to you constructs can be " sensed " . But as I indicated above, the notion of " sensing a thought " does not make sense to me. So I seem unable to relate to your terminology here. Nevertheless, it seems that we might be able to find common ground as follows: 1. All experience is reducible to subjective mental phenomena. 2. There are no independently existing mental phenomena; rather all such are " co-arising " . Experience always and only consists of everything-all-at-once. 3. Hence the only thing that ever happens is everything-all-at-once. 4. Everything-all-at-once can be called 'nothing', 'everything', 'emptiness', etc. Whatever term is chosen matters little. In any case, everything-all-at-once is without attributes. Also, it is the nature of everything-all-at-once to be uneventful. 5. The appearance of anything happening is always utterly illusory and is a consequence of embracing a co-arising as independent, while in actuality such is never the case. As for your notions of " construction " and " the unconstructed " , it seems that a " construction " that is *taken as such* is inherently illusory in that any construction so regarded is inherently considered as independent, which violates 2) above. Your notion of " the unconstructed " seems to represent the state of not being " captivated " by any construction, and so corresponds to *not* experiencing any construction as independent, i.e. corresponds to the " real state " of recognizing experience as consisting of everything-all-at-once. Bill - dan330033 Nisargadatta Monday, May 03, 2004 1:21 PM Re: The hunt for Pete's brain / Dan Hi Bill. My perspective: You sense a thought, no moreso or less so than you sense an apple. So thought is phenomenal. Maybe that's not the usual way to use the term phenomenal, but then, that usual usage infers a subject/object split, with the subject being located as a thinker. A construct, in my view, is anything that is put together, which comes apart. Constructs aren't physical as opposed to mental, nor vice versa. Physical and mental are constructs. A rock isn't less of a construct than an idea. Registration involves memory function. Memory needs to be able to formulate an image that can be recalled, that can be placed within its process in terms of past, to be stored and recalled later. Registration involves placing an image in a psychological process of storage and retrieval with respect to time and place. The unconstructed truth, then (now), isn't mental or physical, isn't located in terms of place and time, doesn't register, isn't a sensory experience, nor a sensed object within an experience. However, being unconstructed, this truth isn't apart from sensing and time -- as to be separated in such a way would require *this* to be constructed. That's why the construct of " noumenon " isn't adequate for understanding, nor the construct of any subjectivity existing apart from an object, or thinker or knower apart from the thought or the known. One must understand the dissolution of anything constructed, such that the construction and dissolution are not-two. Thus, there are the teachings " form is emptiness, emptiness is form, " and " nirvana is samsara. " One shouldn't take those teachings as a rationale for not inquiring, not opening to/as *this* because one assumes " everything is *this* anyway, so there's no point to inquiry, everything is perfect as it is. " Everything is *this* as is, and *this* is all, but only if clarity of nonseparation is one's being aware now. In other words misperception and erroneous beliefs (e.g., relying on registered phenomena for an anchoring of reality, considering objects and selves to have their own separable existences and innate characteristics) do distort awareness and perception, and it usually makes no sense to try to postulate that " distortion also is *this* " -- typically, that's just a rationalization. The whole point of talking about distortion is that investment in self apart, self as existing and as being in relationship with objects, is that distortion it doesn't allow the knowing that *this* is *this* - as is. -- Dan (nothing new below) Nisargadatta , " Bill Rishel " <plexus@a...> wrote: > Dan > > I am interested in making a careful reply to this last post of yours. > However, I would like to seek clarification on two terms. > > ONE: " phenomenon " > > I wrote: > > > When's the last time you experienced a brain as a phenomenon? > > That means you had direct sensorial experience of a brain. > > You wrote: > << > You think an apple is concrete, you can touch it, so you think > it's a phenomenon, and something else isn't, like an idea > of justice. > > Both of them are constructs. The apple just as much as the idea > of justice. > >> > > But Webster wrote: > phe·nom·e·non > n. pl. phe·nom·e·na (-n) > An occurrence, circumstance, or fact that is perceptible by the senses. > > [Note that Webster doesn't say *object*.] > > As I understand the term, " phenomenon " does not refer to a concept, or > (in your parlance) a " construct " , because such is not perceptible by > the senses. > > > TWO: " registration " > > You use the term " registration " . What do you mean by that term? > > I will reply more fully to your post as am interested in your > comments on " emptiness " , but first would like to hear your responses > re the above two terms. > > Bill > > > > > - > dan330033 > Nisargadatta > Friday, April 30, 2004 2:06 PM > Re: The hunt for Pete's brain / Pete > > > Nisargadatta , " Bill Rishel " <plexus@a...> > wrote: > > > When's the last time you experienced a brain as a phenomenon? > > When I took anatomy class. > > > That means you had direct sensorial experience of a brain. > > [Am picturing someone holding a human brain in his hand.] > > Yes, I've done that. Sorry you've been deprived. > > > As for a collection of cells working cooperatively, you couldn't > > have experienced it as cells except via a microscope, and even > > then you couldn't have experienced it as cells working > > cooperatively in a phenomenal sense. The working cooperatively > > is necessarily an inferred abstraction. > > Man, are you always this picky? When you get this involved, > then I have to give an explanation. Are you always so > greedy for explanations? Okay, Bill, here it is: > everything we think of as phenomena are constructions. > Immediacy, now, has no objects in it, or to which it is > what it is. So, every object is a past impression, involving > time, being constructed. There is no actual past. > > It doesn't matter whether it's a second ago, a millisecond ago, > or ten thousand years. > > You think an apple is concrete, you can touch it, so you think > it's a phenomenon, and something else isn't, like an idea > of justice. > > Both of them are constructs. The apple just as much as the idea > of justice. > > If I hold a brain in my hand, that is just as much a construction > as is a more abstracted idea of what a brain is -- which is > experienced as a thought. > > A thought about a brain being a collection of cells is every > bit as phenomenal as a brain you hold in your hand. > > A memory of an elephant with pink skin that you imagined > when you were five is just as phenomenal as the immediate > sensation you have of pain if you are pricked with a needle. > > <I read other stuff you wrote, and enjoyed it, but am snipping > for the sake of brevity, hope you don't mind.> > > > You have clarified your position for me in this post. > > I continue to be on the fence on this topic. > > Okay, it's a chicken and the egg thing, anyway. > > To me, it's more important to understand that chicken > and egg mutually co-determine and interpenetrate, > than to try to figure which came first. > > > A question that comes to mind is this: > > Is the " emptiness " that I experience now the same > > emptiness that I experienced a few minutes ago? > > > > How could I possibly compare? > > Right. > > What is involved with " registration " ? > > There has to be comparison, there has to be movement > in time. > > If you understand comparison and time as constructs, > then registration depends on those constructs. > > This opens up the unconstructed truth as nonregistering, > not recalled, not of time, not mine. > > > Similarly with " silence " . As I write this there is a > > deep silence that pervades. Is the silence as I write > > this sentence the same as the silence when I wrote the > > previous sentence? It seems that to ask if the silence in > > the two case is the same is a grammatical error. > > Okay. > > In other words, the silence is the now, the now is the silence, > there is nothing existing outside, upon which the now > could register. > > > Also, and this may be a digression, it seems that > > at times the silence gets deeper somehow. It is not > > that it gets " more quiet " . > > That has to involve the comparative mind, the self-reflective > mind that knows it is having an experience and uses > memory to compare. > > In other words, construction within and of constructions. > > What isn't constructed can't be reflected about or upon, > can't be compared, is this timeless now undivided. > > Not the teddy-bear concept of it, as Pete might say, > but as it is, naked now. > > I guess what I'm saying is that if I self-consciously know > that I'm experiencing silence, that isn't the same thing > as the silence in which I'm swallowed, which I can't have > as mine, which I can't reflect about, make comparisons > about and so on. > > -- Dan > > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted May 4, 2004 Report Share Posted May 4, 2004 Bill, It's obvious to me that thought is sensed. That's it's not obvious to you is something I can't help. But to me, realizing the equality of thought objects and other sense objects undercuts the whole notion of dividing thought-construct from material-construct as if those are two different worlds, with the first making commentary about the second, as if existing apart. That's the main thing I was offering to you, as my response to what you wrote. I'm glad you found we have common ground. To me " this unspeakable " is understood first-hand, as is. There's no divided me from you here, so it's not quite true to call this common ground. But certainly, as there is no other here, what else could it be but common ground! :-) -- Dan (nothing new below) Nisargadatta , " Bill Rishel " <plexus@a...> wrote: > You say to me: > " You sense a thought... " > > I say to me: > " I do? " > > This notion of sensing a thought seems odd to me. > > Perhaps if I can conjure a thought, I can perform > a " thought experiment " to test what you are saying. > But how to conjure a thought? > > I can *infer* that I had the thought to conjure a thought > to test what you are saying. So supposedly I had > a thought there. However there was no " sensing of > a thought " involved. Only in retrospect could I look > back and say, " Hmmm, must have been a thought > there. " > > It seems to me that " the thought to conjure a thought > to test what you are saying, " is not an object. It is > not something I can contemplate. It does not exist > per se. > > I could also be said to have had " the thought to perform > a thought experiment to test what you are saying " . > I could be said to have had *that* thought as well. > The " thought to perform a thought experiment to > test what you are saying " is more general than " the > thought to *conjure a thought* (as a thought experiement) > to test what you are saying " . So can it be said that > I had two different thoughts, or is it that the more > general thought is " entailed in " the more specific > thought? Following this kind of analysis it seems > clear that " having a thought " is a manner of speaking > and does not entail the existence of an object > corresponding to the substantive " thought " . > I.e. to assume that there *is* such an existent > corresponding to the substantive seems to be a > commission of the classic " reification error " . > > At any rate, the notion that apparently is important to > you is the notion of " construct " , not the notion of > phenomenon. Apparently to you anything nameable > is a construct. Also, apparently to you constructs > can be " sensed " . But as I indicated above, the notion > of " sensing a thought " does not make sense to me. > So I seem unable to relate to your terminology here. > > Nevertheless, it seems that we might be able to find > common ground as follows: > > 1. All experience is reducible to subjective mental > phenomena. > 2. There are no independently existing mental phenomena; > rather all such are " co-arising " . Experience always and only > consists of everything-all-at-once. > 3. Hence the only thing that ever happens is > everything-all-at-once. > 4. Everything-all-at-once can be called 'nothing', 'everything', > 'emptiness', etc. Whatever term is chosen matters little. > In any case, everything-all-at-once is without attributes. > Also, it is the nature of everything-all-at-once to be > uneventful. > 5. The appearance of anything happening is always utterly > illusory and is a consequence of embracing a co-arising > as independent, while in actuality such is never the case. > > As for your notions of " construction " and " the unconstructed " , > it seems that a " construction " that is *taken as such* is > inherently illusory in that any construction so regarded is > inherently considered as independent, which violates 2) above. > Your notion of " the unconstructed " seems to represent the > state of not being " captivated " by any construction, and so > corresponds to *not* experiencing any construction as > independent, i.e. corresponds to the " real state " of > recognizing experience as consisting of everything-all-at-once. > > > Bill Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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