Adhyaasa

[Guest guest]

Thanks Eric, for the link to that site.

 

From that site and in relation to the popular snake-rope symbology to point to

the illusoriness of what is seen, perceived, experienced......an interesting

account.

 

" Adhyaasa " means ignorance.

 

" Aatman " or " Aatma " refers to the Self.

 

 

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Definition of adhyaasa

Shankara gives two definitions.

 

The simpler is that it occurs when the attributes of one thing are superimposed

on another. Thus a snake is seen instead of a rope or silver is seen on the

inside of a shell.

 

The second suggests that it occurs when a previously experienced object is seen

instead of the actual. This accounts for the fact that a snake could not be seen

instead of the rope unless the observer knew what a snake was and had previously

seen a real one (or an image of one).

 

A third indirect definition is the one mentioned earlier; that it occurs when

real and unreal are mixed up.

 

Objections to the theory

Other systems of philosophy claim that, although the rope-snake error is

acceptable, the superimposition of anything onto the aatman is not possible.

 

The argument is that any superimposition requires four conditions to be

satisfied.

 

1. Perception. The object being covered must be directly perceivable, as is the

rope in the rope-snake example. The aatman is not an object and cannot be

perceived.

 

 

2. Incompletely known. The object must be incompletely known, as one is ignorant

of the fact that the rope is a rope. In the case of the aatman, however, the

advaitin accepts that the aatman is self-evident and always conscious - how can

there be ignorance with regard to something that is self-evident?

 

 

3. Similarity. There must be some similarity between the actual object and its

superimposition, just as a rope and snake have a basic similarity (one could not

mistake the rope for an elephant, for example). But there is total dissimilarity

between the aatman and anything else. E.g. aatmaa is the subject, anaatmaa is

the object; aatmaa is conscious and all pervading, anaatmaa is inert and limited

etc.

 

 

4. Prior experience. In order to make the mistake, we must have had prior

experience of that which is superimposed. We could not see a snake where the

rope is unless we knew what a real snake was. Whilst this is possible in the

case of the rope-snake, it is not possible in the aatmaa-anaatmaa case because

we would have to have prior experience of a 'real' anaatmaa and it is part of

the fundamental teaching of Advaita that there is no such thing; there is only

the aatman.

 

Accordingly, in the case of the aatmaa-anaatmaa, not one of these four

conditions is satisfied. Therefore superimposition of anaatmaa onto aatmaa, the

fundamental cause of our error according to Shankara, is not possible - so says

the objector.

 

 

Answers to these Objections and Showing the possibility for adhyaasa

1. " The object must be directly perceivable. "

 

This is not strictly true. It is certainly the case that the object must be

known. It is not possible to make a mistake about something about which we know

nothing at all but it is not necessary that the object be immediately in front

of us. This first condition should be restated as 'the object must be a known,

existent entity'. Now, there is no problem since the aatman is known even though

it cannot be seen (we know that we exist).

 

2. " The object should be incompletely known. "

 

This is equivalent to saying that we should have partial, but not complete

ignorance about the object. This is precisely the case with the aatman. We know

that we exist (sat) and are conscious (chit) but we do not know that we are

bliss (aananda). We have partial knowledge. Thus there is no valid objection.

 

3. " There must be a similarity between the object and its superimposition. "

 

The counter-argument here is that this is a general rule and that exceptions are

possible. E.g. it is a general rule that the intelligent cause or creator is

different from the material cause just as a potter is different from the clay

from which he makes his pots. However there are exceptions such as the spider

and its web. Here the material for the web comes from the spider's own body.

Similarly a dreamer creates her dream from the thoughts and memories in her own

mind. Shankara argues that this is such an exception to the general rule and

that it is not necessary for similarity to exist.

 

This argument on its own may seem a bit feeble. Shankara says that we know of

cases where adhyaasa takes place when there is no similarity and gives an

example to support his claim. We know that the sky is really colourless but

nevertheless we see it as blue. We might also claim that it is polluted. But

these are superimpositions by us of 'blue' or 'polluted' upon a sky which is

without colour or form. This error takes place without there being any

similarity between 'sky' and 'blue' or between 'sky' and 'pollution'. (As

written, this argument carries little conviction . It is slightly better if

'air' or 'space' is understood rather than 'sky' - the Sanskrit word 'aakaasha'

can mean either sky or space.)

 

4. " We must have had prior experience of that which is superimposed. "

 

Shankara agrees that, in the rope-snake analogy, we must have had prior

experience of a snake but says that it does not have to be a real snake;

experience of a false snake would have left a suitable impression, too (e.g. we

might have seen the snake in a movie). Another analogy encountered in the

scriptures is seeing a ghost instead of a post and we all accept that we do not

have to have seen a real ghost for this since we mostly do not believe such a

thing exists. It is sufficient to have read about them.

 

Similarly, in the case of aatmaa-anaatmaa, we project an unreal anaatmaa. And

where did we encounter the unreal anaatmaa before? In a previous adhyaasa, says

Shankara! This leads to an infinite regress, of course, and Shankara claims that

'we never talk about the beginning of adhyaasa' - it is beginningless!

 

Therefore (he says), there is no real anaatmaa and it is not necessary for there

to be a real one for adhyaasa to occur.

 

Thus all conditions are effectively fulfilled. In the first, the object is

evident rather than actually perceived; in the second, the object is partly

unknown; the third condition is not compulsory; the fourth condition is

effectively fulfilled because we have prior experience of an unreal anaatmaa.

Therefore the objections are not valid and the adhyaasa is possible.