Guest guest Posted February 28, 2005 Report Share Posted February 28, 2005 In a message dated 2/28/05 4:33:29 AM, ombhurbhuva writes: > Your throw, > Michael. > P: You just went yada, yada down the same old winding road without defining consciousness. I asked you to define it because otherwise I have no idea what you are talking about. Some people use the term as the faculty which knows in one sentence and then, without warning, as the ultimate cause of phenomenality in the next. It's like playing baseball with a pitcher who feels free to switch the ball from a baseball, to a football, to a golf ball with every throw. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted February 28, 2005 Report Share Posted February 28, 2005 Pete wrote:In a message dated 2/26/05 2:15:27 PM, ombhurbhuva@e... writes: > Hi Pete, > I've just finished Domasio's 'Looking for Spinoza' and all the time > I > was wondering because of its philosophic tendency when he would approach the > 'hard question'. On page 198 he finally does. Let me quote - " There is a > major gap in our current understanding of how neural patterns become mental > images. The presence in the brain of dynamic neural patterns (or maps) > related > to an object or event is a *necessary* but not sufficent basis to explain > the > mental images of said object or event. We can describe neural patterns - > with > the tools of neuroanatomy, neurophsiology and neurochemistry - and we can > describe images with the tools of introspection. How we get from the former > to > the latter is known only in part..... ((He gives a general picture of what he > believes to be the current situation and finally he states)) But I fall > short > of suggesting, let alone explaining, how the last steps of this image-making > process are carried out " . > > > He draws back from suggesting that consciousness is created by living cells > because the monism that he proposes is more profound in that in conformity > with > the ideas of Spinoza he holds that both matter and mind are attributes of a > single substance which he calls God. This obviates the problem raised by > Descartes when mind is viewed as non- extended substance and matter is > extended > substance. As Aristotle first pointed out in De Anima interaction presumes > commonality. > > This thinking in terms of Matter and Mind is a totally natural reflex of the > human being. Shankara in his Preamble to the Brahma Sutra Bhyasa (Vedanta > Sutras) spoke of cit(consciousness) jada (the inert). Taking that > bifurcation > as an apparent given we are drawn into the paradox that this would make > awareness impossible. How could that jada(object) become cit(conscious) in > me > the subject when they are opposed as night the day. How is what is > inconceivable the case? How does the jada (object) become superimposed on > the > cit (subject). That leads Shankara to consider the common forms of > superimposition to gain some analogical leverage. > > The monism that Spinoza proffers is conceptually prior to the matter and > mind > divide. Incidentally Thomas Nagel (What its like to be a bat) has an > admiration for the Spinoza thesis. > " My own instincts are in the direction of a Spinozistic monism, which will > reveal both the mental and the physical as incomplete descriptions of a more > fundamental reality that explains them both, as well as their neccessary > connection - but of which we have at present no conception. " > (from an essay Consciousness and Objective Reality publ in a book 'The Mind- > Body problem , a guide to the current debate publ.Blackwell. I recommend > it, > the luminaries are all there) > > So Pete because of the problem of causal closure the idea of matter > generating > consciousness via micro tubules or whatever is strictly inconceivable and > even > absurd. No evidence could support it and to say as Galen Strawson does that > it > simply must be the case because matter is really all that there is seems to > me > to be doomed. " So they are obliged to hold that experiental phenomena just > are > physical phemomena, although current physics cannot account for them " . In a > way Shankara is saying the diametrically opposite in his account of > superimposition. > > Michael. > Hi Michael, Glad to see you stood up to dance this song. You are the ideal partner for this dance because you are truly curious about the subject, without being emotionally involved, as most are. First, let's see if we can come up with a definition we both can agree with. Would you say that to be conscious goes beyond perceiving, that to truly call an act of perception conscious there most be a knowing of the of the stimulus. For example when my wife snores, and I touch her lightly, she stops snoring, yet she doesn't wake up or knows I touched her. Next morning, if I say that I hope I didn't wake her up. She neither knows I touched her, or that she was snoring. Some could say she simply forgot. But, some people who suffer injury to the connection between the vision center and the frontal lobe looses all consciousness of seeing, yet can walk around a room without bumping into furniture, yet if you ask them what was the object they just avoided they have no idea unless the y touch it. These proves they can perceive without being aware of perception, just as robots equip with a camera can also walk around obstacles. So in this way we could define consciousness as knowledge of perception. So, perception without knowledge triggers a single act (avoidance) and vanishes, while in knowing perception the perception is catch in a hold of mirrors which multiply its effects. Well, let me stop here. Later we can discuss whether assigning nerve cells as the most immediate cause of consciousness precludes it from having other more ultimate sources, such as quantum fields, or even the primal void. *********************************** *********************************** Hi Pete, Your wife's reaction to your touch is a good example of those things that we experience but are not conscious of. We drive along, our mind on other things and are evidently experienceing all the twists and turns without full on phenomenal consciousness. That autonomic corner of the mind/body is doing it all which is an elegant and adaptive process because there is a great deal that we don't need to know about. What needs a decision is what we need to know about. At this point in the evolutionary ladder there is a high level of complexity and it is tempting to hold that this level of complexity is what gives rise to consciousness. We, so to speak, become able to talk into our own ears and create a centre of consciousness in this way. The annals of biology hold many examples of extraordinary specialisation and virtual intent, even the bacillus moves from the sour end of the solution to the sweet end. We now know in the way that we know that there is such a force as gravity that we as humans came from simple cells in a primal soup. Such considerations led to the early monistic speculations. Put at its broadest, we ask whether consciousness always irradiated reality and greater complexity only reflects more of what is already there. In this view the dualism of brain/mind is avoided and we get the nondualism of cit and jada. What is now regarded as jada is the brain/mind/body complex. Consciousness is not just linked to a brain but permeates the whole body. From this sort of thinking the theory of cakras emerges as a practical technology. From the practical interaction with the world the idea of Jiva or individual person emerges corrosponding to the whole range of activities of the incarnate entity from the routine that we don't need to know, to 'can we have a decision on this please ASAP. That in essence is the nondual position. Is there anything that can confirm this experientially? At the extreme end of reality are there limit cases that suggest that the pervasion of the Jiva by consciousness can become expressed as contiguity. In other words, can we directly know things in a quasi perceptual way when we are in no physical position to do so because our body is not there. I speak of precognition. You Pete will perhaps consider this a kick to touch i.e. leading to a temporary suspension of the game; but for others it is a factor which determines their judgement. Your throw, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted February 28, 2005 Report Share Posted February 28, 2005 Nisargadatta , Pedsie2@a... wrote: > > In a message dated 2/28/05 4:33:29 AM, ombhurbhuva@e... writes: > > > > Your throw, > > Michael. > > > > P: You just went yada, yada down the same old winding road > without defining consciousness. I asked you to define it > because otherwise I have no idea what you are talking about. > Some people use the term as the faculty which knows in one > sentence and then, without warning, as the ultimate cause > of phenomenality in the next. It's like playing baseball with > a pitcher who feels free to switch the ball from a baseball, > to a football, to a golf ball with every throw. > > There is the subjective experience of consciousness and there are physical measurable correlates to thoughts e t c in the form of brain-scans e t c. According to Ken Wilber; only relying on one of these types of descriptions will not give us the whole picture. Therefore it is very difficult to give a clear definition of consciousness using mere words, if not downright impossible. /AL Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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