Sevenfold Reasoning of Selflesness

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An nother kind of Self-Inquiry: Chandrairti Sevenfold Reasoning of Selflesness

 

 

1.      The self is not inherently the same as the parts of the body/mind.

2.      The self is not different from the parts of the body/mind.

3.      The self is not dependent upon the parts of the body/mind.

4.      The self is not inherently the substratum upon which the parts of

the body/mind depend.

5.      The self is not inherently the possessor of the parts of the

body/mind.

6.      The self is not inherently the mere collection of the parts of the

body/mind.

7.      The self is not inherently the shape of the parts of the body/mind.

Taking these one at a time,

 

1.   The self is not inherently the same as the parts of the body/mind.  If we

understand the parts as various groups of physical, mental, and psychological

factors, we ask:  Is the self equal to these things?  Is it equal to them

individually?  If it is, then certain counterintuitive results apply.  The self

would be equal to each body part or each thought individually.  The self would

be many just as the parts are many. 

 

But we don't think of the self as many, so it cannot be found in all the parts

taken individually.  How about the parts taken as a whole?  This is also not

what we think of when we conceive of the inherent existence of the self.  If the

self is equal to the parts and the self is single, then the parts must be one

single entity.  This is clearly not the case.  Also, if the self is equal to all

the parts, then we could never get our hair cut, or lose a finger or gain a new

thought.  For that newly missing or added element changes the overall parts.  If

the self is equal to all the parts, this new addition or deletion would mean

that we have a new self.  But our strong intuition is clearly that the self can

undergo change.  So the self cannot be equal to all the parts.  It is not just

that we have not looked hard enough.  We have looked at the possibility of the

self being the parts.  In the parts we have found the lack of inherent existence

of the self.  It cannot be there.

 

2.    The self is not inherently different from the parts of the body/mind.  If

the self were inherently different from its parts, then too odd things result. 

You would be able to apprehend the self somehow in total isolation from the

parts.  Conceptually, you would be able to strip away the elements of the

body/mind until none are left but nevertheless still be able to point to the

self.  You would have to still be able to distinguish this partless self from

someone else's self.  Where would this partless self be?  It must be able to

have a different location from the body. As they might say in Missouri, " Show me

that self with no parts. "   The self would be one thing and the parts would be a

totally separate thing.  So the self is not inherently different from the parts

of the body/mind.

 

3.    The self is not inherently dependent upon the parts of the body/mind.  Is

the self inherently dependent upon the parts?  Sometimes we think so.  Sometimes

the self appears as something above and beyond the parts, but somehow supported

or buoyed up by the parts.  This relation of dependence is another case of (2)

above, the self being a different entity from the parts, which has been

refuted.  If the self is dependent on the parts, it must be different from the

parts.  Why is dependence given as a separate meditation in addition to mere

difference?  So we can gain insight on the falsity of the sense we often have

that dependence on the body/mind is a special way that the self truly exists. 

It is almost is though the sense of inherent existence is hiding out in the

sense we have of dependence. 

 

Besides the problem that dependence entails difference, which was refuted, there

is another problem with dependence.  That is, what is the link between the self 

in question and this particular set of parts such that this self is dependent

upon the parts?  Why isn't another self dependent upon the parts?  Conversely,

why is the self in question dependent on these particular parts and not my

next-door neighbor's parts?  Two more odd consequences follow if there were

inherent existence of the self in dependence on the parts.  (a)  The self

related to these parts… What makes that self my self? 

This supposedly inherently existent self fails to satisfy the criteria that

would make it my self.  I would need another self to bind the parts and the self

together under the auspices of " mine, " but this second self does not exist. 

Even if it did, there would need to be yet another self to make that one mine,

and so on ad infinitum.  And (b), why is there not more than one self dependent

upon the same set of parts?  Why not? This is consistent with the conditions

given.  Since this self is totally different from the parts, I cannot see this

self; other selves can be supported by the same parts.  These are all natural

conclusions if there is a self different from the parts that is inherently

dependent upon the parts.  In a search for the inherently existent self which

depends on the parts of the body/mind, this self has proved unfindable.  

 

4.    The self is not inherently the substratum upon which the parts of the

body/mind depend.  Do the parts inherently depend upon the self, which serves as

their substratum?  This is another case of the refuted alternative (2) above,

the self being inherently different from the parts.  And it is similar to

alternative (3) above, with the dependence running in the opposite direction. 

Similar consequences occur with this alternative. 

 

" Why these parts? Why this particular self? Show it to me in isolation from the

parts.   No!   Not that one over there, this self! "

In addition, since we are looking for the substratum in this case, trying to

isolate it as the inherently existent self, it is especially instructive to

meditate on this?  Can more than one substratum support the same set of parts? 

Either simultaneously or in succession over time?  Assume for the moment a

relation of  an inherently existing self as the substratum of the parts of the

body/mind.  Is it the same at time T1 as at time T2?  Going by the reasoning of

case (4), there is no reason it cannot be a different self and no proof that it

is the same self.  But if it is different, then we have the absurd conclusion

that the same body/mind is supported by two selves over time.  Then, I would be

an inherently different self at T2 than I am at T1.  And if the body can depend

on two selves simultaneously, then I am different from myself even now! 

Therefore, the inherent existence of the self cannot lie in its being the

substratum on which the parts of the body/mind depend.

 

5.    The self is not inherently the possessor of the parts of the body/mind.

 This is yet another case of (2), the self being different from the parts, as

well as a bit of (1), where the self is the same entity as the parts.  But it is

very fruitful to go though this meditation completely on its own, since we have

often have a strong conception that the self possesses the parts of the

body/mind.  This alternative deserves its own meditative refutation. 

 

Perhaps the self possesses its parts in the way that I possess my hand.  This

would be a case in which I am the same entity as my hand (as in (1) above.)  If

this alternative is gone into, it becomes quite doubtful, since for me to

conceive strongly of possessing my hand, I must mentally pull away from the hand

for the moment at least, and conceive of myself as something other than the

hand.  For me to be truly the same entity as the hand, I cannot possess the

hand.  A thing cannot possess itself.  So the self cannot possess the parts in

this way.

 

Or, perhaps I possess my hand in the way that I possess the car.  This is a case

of (2) above, the possessor and the possessed as two separate entities.  In

addition to the impossibility of the self being a different entity from its

parts, what is there in common that links the parts and the self as possessor

and possessed?  Just what is it that serves as the possessor of the hand?  It is

not the hand or any other part of the body or mind.  Where is it?  We can only

come up with a vacuity, the emptiness of the inherent existence of such an

inherently existing self.

 

6.    The self is not inherently the mere collection of the parts of the

body/mind.  Perhaps the self is inherently the mere collection of the parts of

the body/mind.  The falsity of this one is a little harder to realize.  Our

sense of inherent existence of the self seems to put a little distance between

the parts and the self. We seem to conceive of a bit of a gap between

appropriator and appropriated, between agent and action, between " my " and

" body/mind. "   In this alternative, all there is, is the body/mind.  Why even

talk about the self?  There would be no need to have something called " the self "

which is exactly the parts of the body/mind.  Agent and action would be one. 

Self and body/mind would be one.  The self would be redundant, and unfindable. 

 

Also, in the Middle Way schools of Buddhism that employ the Sevenfold Reasoning,

it is said that the conventional self is not the parts themselves, but is

posited on the basis of the parts.  Based on apprehending those particular

parts, a designated self is said to exist conventionally.  It is not the parts,

but is based on the parts.  The appropriator and appropriated are slightly and

subtlely different.  There is room to make sense of " my life, " " my actions. "   A

self redundant with the parts cannot exist inherently. 

 

7.    The self is not inherently the shape of the parts of the body/mind.  This

alternative investigates whether the self is inherently the shape of the parts

of the body/mind.  Can this be?  According to this, self would be a physical

thing.  Non-physical components such as a mind and thoughts and values do not

have a shape.  Even though these non-physical things are not inherently the self

(as we saw in (1) above), it certainly makes no sense for them to be totally

irrelevant to the self, as they would be if the self were merely the shape of

the parts.  Also, if the self is the shape, then this allows no change in shape

without a corresponding change in identity of the self.  Over time the shape of

the body changes.  People grow, gain weight, perhaps take up yoga or

weightlifting and tone up.  Perhaps they lose a limb, lose their hair, become

bent with age.  Even in the absence of these kinds of shape changes, there are

the perceptual shape changes due to changes in posture, standing vs. sitting. 

There are other shape changes due to the angle from which the parts are viewed. 

From the left or the right, from near or far, the appearance of the shape

changes.  The shape criterion misses the point of our conception of the inherent

existence of the self, since according to that conception, the inherently

existing self is able to persist through changes in shape of the parts.  So the

self is not inherently the shape of the parts.

 

long article by Greg Goode Phd

 

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Era