Franlin Merrell Wolff: Commentary on Aphorism 1 Con.w/oObject

April 2, 2006

I ... Consciousness-without-an-object is.

The fundamental principle underlying all the aphorisms is that

Consciousness is the original and self-existent Reality. This

Consciousness is both Substance and Life. It would be possible to

view the Primordial Principle in terms of Life or of Substance, as

well as in terms of Consciousness, but I approach the subject from

the standpoint of Consciousness for the reason that this is the phase

of Reality of which we are most immediately certain. Consciousness,

Life, and Substance are not to be regarded as three distinct

realities, but as merely three facets of the nondual Reality, as the

latter appears to the analytic consciousness.

The Primordial Consciousness is not to be regarded as the

consciousness of some transcendent being who is aware of some

content. Herein lies, perhaps, the main difficulty with respect to

understanding the idea contained in the symbol of Consciousness-

without-an-object. We are in the habit of regarding consciousness as

something derivative—a quality possessed by something else or a kind

of relationship. It is necessary to abandon this view if the

aphorisms are to be understood. Let this Consciousness be considered

as original, and then both the subject and object become derivative.

That which is primary and original, then, is a Great Void of

Consciousness, to all consciousness of the type that depends upon the

subject-object relationship. It is as though that Consciousness were

nothing, while actually It is the all in all.

This Absolute Consciousness is, from the relative standpoint,

indistinguishable from unconsciousness. Most generally, philosophy is

written from the perspective that views the ultimate as unconscious,

whether of psychical (e.g., von Hartmann's view) or non-psychical

(e.g., the view of materialists) nature, and thus has taken the

relative consciousness as the ground of approach, but the aphorisms

are written as from the ultimate Transcendental Base, and then, from

that viewpoint the problems of relative consciousness are approached.

We are following a deductive process of descent from the most

universal to the concrete or particular, rather than the inductive

method that is so characteristic of physical science and much

philosophy, including that of von Hartmann.

An inevitable question is: How can this Primordial Consciousness be

known? To this it is answered, " Through a Recognition transcending

the Nirvanic State. " Complete verification of the validity of the

aphorisms requires this. However, a partial or pragmatic verification

may be achieved through willing to accept them as though they were

true symbols of the Reality, and then drawing the consequences that

follow from them, finally noting how they affect the problems of life

and thought as practically experienced. If the investigator finds

that they tend to simplify the problems and to bring the self into

more harmonious adjustment with the not-self, then they prove to be

an orientation that enriches life, and are thus pragmatically

justified.

Naturally, it is implied that Recognition is a human possibility.

Otherwise, the aphorisms would have to rest upon one or the other of

two bases: (a] intellectual speculation grounded exclusively in

relative consciousness; or (b) external superhuman revelation beyond

the possibility of human verification. Both these standpoints are

denied here, especially the latter. The notion of external superhuman

revelation, when subjected to analysis, does not possess any really

intelligible meaning, and belief in this tends toward both

intellectual and moral suicide. From this belief follows the attitude

made famous in the words of Tertullian: " I believe because it is

against reason. " Such a viewpoint is utterly foreign to the spirit in

which the aphorisms are written.

It is affirmed that the aphorisms mean a content given through

immediate Knowledge, and that for the Realization of this content the

functioning of a generally latent organ is the proximate means. Hence

they are not to be viewed as metaphysical speculations of which the

concepts would have no real content, as Kant pointed out in his

Critique of Pure Reason in relation to metaphysical subject-matter.

Thus it is maintained that the aphorisms are not mere developments of

the pure reason, and accordingly, avoid the challenge of the Kantian

criticism. Therefore, philosophic criticism of the present

philosophy, in so far as it is strictly philosophical, must assume

the actuality of the inner organ.

The critical problem takes the form: Does the inner organ or

Samadhindriya—as it is known in Sanscrit-exist? This is a

psychological, or rather, metapsycho-logical question. I have

explored with care the possibilities of logical proof that such an

organ must exist, but have been forced to conclude that no such

demonstration is possible. Yet logical disproof is equally

impossible. The only possible proof depends upon immediate experience

of the activity of the organ. On the other hand, empiric disproof is

impossible, since empiric disproof of any supposed psychical function

or organ presupposes demonstrably complete knowledge of every

psychical possibility. I am not aware that any psychologist lays

claim to such omniscience.

Now, if any individual should have immediate acquaintance with the

functioning of a psychical organ, which with most men either lies

wholly inactive or functions in such a way as to be unrecognizable to

the relative consciousness of the individual, he would know as a

matter of genuine private knowledge that the function or organ is an

actuality. But if he sought to prove this actuality to those in whom

the function was wholly latent, he would face serious difficulties.

Anything that he succeeded in introducing into the consciousness of

the latter would, of necessity, be in terms of the functions that

were already active in them. In general, this means in terms of the

so-called five-sense rational consciousness. Anything more that was

strictly peculiar to the new organ would stand in incommensurable

relationship, and therefore, be ineffable; it could not be

communicated at all. But that which could be communicated would be,

as said, in terms of the usual five-sense rational content. And this

could always be explained away by the appropriate ingenuity, so that

it would appear to the unawakened consciousness that the hypothesis

of a new organ was unnecessary. The inventive ingenuity of the human

intellect is, undoubtedly, quite capable of inventing the appropriate

hypotheses. But if, for instance, the born-blind could invent

hypotheses that would explain everything that the seeing ones could

convey to their consciousness, in terms that could dispense with the

hypothesis that anybody had sight, this might be quite convincing to

other blind men, but it would leave those who had sight quite

unimpressed. The result would be a stalemate.

That the conception of a latent mystical sense, active in some

instances but inactive with most men, can be interpreted in such a

way as to supply a sufficient explanation of how a transcendental

knowledge can be, I have not yet found questioned by anyone. It is

the question of necessity that is raised. Now, if we assume the

actuality of the mystical sense in an active state in a given case,

then, although the content that could be conveyed into the zone of

the ordinary five-sense rational consciousness would not necessarily

require the predication of the mystical sense for its interpretation,

yet there would remain the incommensurable or ineffable portion of

the original content or state, which still would require explanation.

So far as I have found, the hypotheses of the five-sense rational

consciousness imply that the ineffable content or value is pure

illusion. To the mystic this is proof of the insufficiency of all

such hypotheses, since he claims a greater reality-quale for the

content or value realized through the mystical sense than for that

possessed by all the other senses. Now, how is the five-sense

rational consciousness going to challenge this? By basic assumption

the mystic has the five-sense rational consciousness plus all the

consciousness-value realized through the mystic sense, and therefore,

is in a position to establish a comparative valuation; and this the

exclusively five-sense rational consciousness cannot do. At this

point the less gentlemanly of the psychologists descend to the street

urchin's device of labeling the other fellow with bad names, though

usually highly technical language is employed. I submit that this is

beneath the dignity of true scholars and gentlemen.

It is a principle of logic that a rigorous argument shall satisfy the

categories of both necessity and sufficiency. But this perfection is

attained only in pure mathematics. No inductive, hence no scientific,

hypo-perceptual values from one individual to another only to the

extent that the two individuals have a commonality of perceptual

experience. Since the referents are in common the concepts convey

meaning, but otherwise they do not. Now, the mystic knows an

ineffable content or quality in the case of communication to a

nonmystic, but in general, the concept, the sign, or symbol will

convey this content, more or less adequately, to a fellow mystic. It

is just a case of the concepts, signs, or symbols having a different

kind of reference and of two or more individuals having common

acquaintance with the relevant referents. .

In the highest sense of Transcendental Consciousthesis satisfies both

these conditions. There is no scientific hypothesis that is necessary

in the logical sense, since other hypotheses could be invented. But a

scientific hypothesis must pass the test of sufficiency, i.e., it

must be such as to incorporate all relevant facts into a systematic

whole. Now, if we are to leave out mutual name-calling as a valid

line of argument as between the possessors of the mystic sense and

those of the exclusive five-sense type, then it is the five-sense

type of interpretative theory that fails to satisfy the canons of

scientific hypotheses. For these hypotheses do not satisfy the

condition of sufficiency.

As to the ineffable content or quality of mystical states of

consciousness, it may be pointed out that there is nothing at all

strange about this. " Ineffable " means unspeakable or incommunicable.

But incom-municability is not at all strange, for such a limitation

attaches even to sense-experience. The peculiar quale of one sense

cannot be communicated in terms that are understandable with respect

to another sense. And indeed, there is something fundamentally

ineffable in the relationship between percepts and concepts. Concepts

convey perceptual values from one individual to another only to the