Franklin Merrell Wolff:Commentary on Aphorism 3 Con.w/oObject

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3.Though objects seem to exist, Consciousness-without-an-objectis.

 

This aphorism relates to that state wherein objects, in any sense,

appear to consciousness now, whereas the preceding aphorism refers to

that which seems to be before the present appearance. All existence

that objects may have is for the " now " only, though we may

distinguish phases of the " now, " such as existence in memory,

existence as given in the present presentation, and existence in the

imagination as future. There is a recognizable qualitative difference

between these three phases of the " now, " but no phase can be actually

isolated from the " now " of consciousness and still have existence, in

any sense, predicated of it. For predication is a present act within

consciousness itself.

In the first part of this aphorism, the crucial word is " seem. " No

object requires more than seeming in order to exist for

consciousness. Existence conceived in any other sense, than as for

consciousness, is entirely meaningless. For that existence is found

to be dependent upon being conceived, which, of necessity, is a

conscious act or state. In the strictest logical sense, therefore,

all objects rest upon the same base, i.e., that of seeming. To be

sure, purposive interest will lead to the abstraction of certain

objects as being important, while others will remain in greater or

less degree irrelevant. Relative to purpose, then, degrees of reality

or unreality may be predicated of the manifold of all objects. But

this predication is valid only in relation to the given purpose, and

confusion arises when this is forgotten. Thus, for some purposes, the

dream-object may be more real than the objects of our so-called

waking consciousness. For the purposes of our scientific culture, a

certain class of objects belonging to the waking state is

significant. We have formed the habit of calling these real, and of

thinking of them as being real in some nonrelative sense. In this we

forget that the reality that they possess is relative only to our

specific scientific purpose. Our psychologists tend to distinguish

between this class of objects and all, or nearly all, other objects

by calling the latter phantasy. This is a terminology that is

prejudicial to the latter class and is not logically justified,

unless the condition is ex-plictly implied that they are phantastic

and unreal with respect to a certain scientific interest. Considered

as such, apart from any purposive motive, we cannot distinguish any

relative difference in degree or reality as attaching to any class of

objects when contrasted to other objects. All objects are equal in

that their existence is a seeming to consciousness and no more. But

whether there is one kind of purpose or another, or a complete

absence of all purpose, consciousness, per se, is an indisputable

reality. This Consciousness is a Reality that unites, on the one

hand, the youngest child, the idiot, or the insane, with the wisest

and most developed intelligence, on the other. The differences that

mark the gulf between these extremes are differences in content only,

and not of Consciousness taken apart from content.

There is no doubt but that a valid significance attaches to

difference in valuation of the various contents of consciousness. But

these valuations are always relative to purpose and level, and not

significant out of relation to all purpose or perspective. Thus

valuation, itself, is but one of the derivative contents of

consciousness, subject to development and decay. Beneath valuation,

as the substratum that makes it, as well as all else, possible, is

pure Consciousness apart from content.

 

posted April 3, 2006.........bob