Jain & Buddhist philosophies

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I. Hindu philosophy: Samkhya | Nyaya | Vaisheshika | Yoga | Mimamsa | Advaita

Vedanta | Vishishtadvaita | Dvaita | Carvaka | Logic | Idealism

 

II. Jain philosophy: Anekantavada

 

III. Buddhist philosophy. Shunyata

 

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II. Anekantavada is a basic principle of Jainism dealing with the fact that

reality may be perceived differently from different points of views.

 

'Ekanta' is one-sidedness. Anekantavada is literally the doctrine of

non-onesidedness. Jain philosophy accepts the relativistic view of looking at

things from all points of view.

 

Anekantvada requires us to consider others views or beliefs. One should not

reject a view simply because it uses a different perspective. We should to

consider the fact there may be truth in other’s views too.

 

In this world of humanity, there are many religions, doctrines, sects and

philosophies. No philosophy should insist that their perspective is the only

true one.

 

III. Sunnata in presecular Buddhism, in the Nikayas

 

Sunnata. " Emptiness " in Pali contexts is not the metaphysical Zero (Nonbeing

as the principle of Being, Infinite Possibility as distinguished from Indefinite

Actuality), but a characteristic of this world, as in S IV.295 96, where it has

been explained that when the Almsman returns from a deathlike Contemplation in

which consciousness and feeling have been arrested, " three touches touch him,

" emptiness " " formlessness (animito) " and " making no plans (appanihito phasso), "

and he discriminates (viveka) accordingly; and the meaning of " emptiness " 'is

explained at " emancipation of the mind by Emptiness (sunnata ceto vimutti) being

consequent upon the realization that `this world is empty of spirit or anything

spiritual " ; sunnata is synonymous with anatta; of which it really only

paraphrases and isolates the privative It is no doubt in the same sense that in

" the texts are coupled with `emptiness´ (suttanta . . . sunnata patisannuta) " ;

there is, in fact, nothing more characteristic of Buddhist teaching than its

constant resort to negatives (above all in the sense of the word anatta), which

even some contemporary hearers found perplexing.

 

The denial of spirituality to contingent things in particular is a denial of any

real essence to these things in themselves, and thus forms the basis of the more

sweeping sunyavada doctrine which in the Mahayana denies not any " value " but any

essence to even the Buddha´s appearance and to the promulgation of the Dhamma

itself. If such a doctrine disturbs us, it may be found more palatably expressed

in the Vajracchedika Sutra thus, " Those who see me in the body (rupena) and

think of me in sounds (ghosaih), their way of thinking is false, they do not see

me at all . . . . The Buddha cannot be rightly understood (rjuboddhum) by any

means (upayena). Not that " means " are not dispositive to a right understanding,

but that if regarded as ends, even the most adequate means are a hindrance.

 

In such a radical iconoclasm as this all traditional teachings are finally

agreed. What is true of ethics is also true of the supports of contemplation: as

in the well known Parable of the Raft, the means are of no more use when the

goal has been reached

 

from wikipedia

 

is Jain close to Niz ¿

 

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