Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Aphorisms 2

[Guest guest]

Aphorism 1-10 about Meaning

 

1. Every word has a meaning. Learning association from parents.

The meaning is in a process of education correlated with the word. It

is the object for which the word stands.

2. Meaning is created by primitive language functions.

3. 'Language' is a personal game. I.e. when I think of 'tree' it is

completely different from yours

4. Because considering 'language as a straightforward script is

personal over-simplification

5. Language is not 'learned', but trained. (remark Henk Tuten: That

should revolutionize education, because similar is: Math can be trained)

6. Teaching words: associating the word " slab " with a shape

( " ostensive definition " ).

The picture of reality " slab " is linked to the sound.

Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the

imagination.

It is (in aphorism 2) not the purpose of the words to evoke images,

that only the effect of a personal ostensive training.

Much more different association is needed to come to 'understanding'

(henk tuten: that only means complex association offering after much

training a basic intuition).

7. " Language-games " : acting on words, repeating words etc.

8. Language1= { block, pillar, slab and beam}

An expansion could be any form of numerals. Say the alphabet. An other

expansion two words as " there " and " this "

Order = " d---slab---there " , while showing a colour sample, and when

saying " there " pointing to a destination.

Result: pupil takes similar d objects from stock and brings them to

'destination. And so on.

9. Ostensive training of numerals is for instance pointing to 3

similar slabs and say: " c slabs " .

Children do learn the use of the first or six cardinal numerals in

this way.

" There " and " this " are also taught ostensively, but in this case the

pointing gives a clue about the use of the words too.

10. What does " slab " mean? Manipulating slabs does not take

'understanding'.

That takes some statement like: " The word . . . .signifies . . . . "

And what is the meaning of the noise " four slabs? "

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 11-20 about Language as a Tool

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

11. Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a

saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screw.---The

functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.

(And in both cases there are similarities.)

 

12. It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. All handles

(words) looking more or less alike.

 

13. The statement: " Every word in language signifies something "

exactly shows that it can mean anything.

14.Nonsense to say: " All tools serve to modify something. That is a

statement without content.

 

15. Naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

 

16. Colour not necessarily part of language.

 

17. Words can be classificated in any way

 

18.Any language is incomplete. Don't worry about it

 

19. Slab! Similar to " Bring me a slab " .

 

20. Most sentences are 'elliptical', because they are shortcuts---in

comparison with a particular paradigm of our grammar.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 21-30 about Tools having multiple purposes

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

21. Tone can completely change meaning.

Order: (get) " Five slabs " . Report: (there are) " Five slabs! "

22. Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption is just a

concept, you might as well say: " the sky is blue "

Reading aloud a written sentence between Frege's assertion sign marks

is like singing a song. You must know beginning and end, and

everything in between.

23. There are countless kinds of sentences. As many as learning processes.

" Language " is a form of life.

Some examples:

- giving orders, and obeying them

- describing the appearance of an object

- constructing an object from a description

- guessing riddles

- making a joke

- asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

24. Language in itself says nothing about thinking or believing

25. Many animals do not use language. Period.

26. Language is labelling. But what isn't?

27. We do the most various things with our sentences.

Language is not just the uttering of words. It is the use of words in

the activity of language. And there are countless activities.

28. However clever defined, the object being pointed to with words is

ambiguous.

29. Every sentence has multiple interpretations

30. One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to

be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 31-40 about Rules being Abstract, saying nothing about 'the

total' of a studied phenonomen

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

31. Recognizing the king in chess only helps if you already know the

rules of the game

You can learn the rules of chess without shapes

You can also capture chess by watching.

Learning chess normally supposes knowing playing games. We may say:

learning is quicker when already knowing something, if at all possible

32. Languages can be totally different logics. Like Enlish and Chinese.

Then your only start advantage is talent in in logic and association

33. Pointing at things is ambiguous

- is this blue the same as the blue over there?

- do you see any difference?

- it's turning fine, you can already see blue sky again.

- what's this blue called.'-Is it 'indigo'? "

34. Possible interpretations of any language are ALWAYS multiple.

35. Learning is a tuning of interpretation between 2 persons

36. Learning is only clever guessed repetition.

37. Learning is only clever guessed repetition

38. The word " This " is connected with the conception of naming as, so

to speak, an occult process.

Naming is as a queer connexion of a word with an object.

Don't try to explain it philosophically

39. A 'real name' replaces a 'label name'. It supposes a virtual

existence independent of real existence. Excalibur is sharp still has

meaning if this sword actually is blunt.

40. " meaning " supposes a " correspondence " between word and object.

When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not

that the meaning dies. Thus the name still functions as a name.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 41-50 about being Abstract studied further

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

41.The order " Give me N " has still meaning when the object named N is

broken

 

42. Give me X has meaning even when the name X is never used before

 

43. SOMETIMES the word " meaning " it can be defined thus: the meaning

of a word is its use in the language.

And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its

bearer.

 

44. The sentence " Excalibur has a sharp blade " is nonsense if

Excalibur is present and blunt.

 

45. The demonstrative word " this " always has a bearer, even if it hasn't

 

46. A primary element has " per definition " no description. It just is.

Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractatus Logico-

Philosophicus) are such primary elements.

 

47/48/49. Simple and composite are agreements.

A primary element per definition cannot be defined. It is simple by

agreement

 

50. Primary elements are ABSTRACT, or virtual.

I.e. we can attribute neither being nor non-being to them

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 51-60 about Abstract Notions

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

51. To prevent mistakes when connecting signs and say colours, we must

focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them from close to.

 

52. Mice are obviously more than grey rags and dust. Let's go into

details.

 

53. A table CAN serve as the expression of a rule of the

language-game, it can be said that what we call a rule of a

language-game may have very different roles in the game.

 

54. when we learn to play say the games " Monopoly " or " Risk " then

rules are used as an aid in teaching the game.

'Players' have characteristic behaviour.

 

55.The names in language are 'indestructible'. Abstract notions are

indestructible, they are paradigms used in connexion with the name in

the language-game.

 

56. A sample is some Picture of Reality

 

57. " Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed

 

58. A metaphysical statement (abstract) . " Red exists " only is a

statement, but says nothing about " red " .

 

59. A name signifies only an abstract indestructible property of. It

can be any Picture of Rality

 

60. Logic: a composition is made in parts of an object. This process

is called " analysis "

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 61-69 about Agreeing

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

61.If 2 objects contain the same parts, in the same order , the we

might AGREE that they are partly similar.

 

62. There is not always a sharp distinction between essential and

inessential properties of an object. Being called partly similar might

be tricky.

 

63. An analysed subject might be analysed in a seducing way. Then

being similar in those aspects is inessential.

 

64. Symbols might represent anything.

 

65. Language = a bunch of agreed relationships

 

66. Games are similar in being networks of 'properties'

 

67. Games might have " family resemblances " ; You might say: 'games'

form a family.

 

68. The concept 'game' is 'open'. Rules can always be added

 

69. When might a process be called a game?

 

70. Don't accept any pictures as exact definition a a game (henk

tuten: absolutism)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 71-79 about any concept being only 1 explanation

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

71. A 'blurred' view is a concept anyway, and is only blurred compared

to some other concept. (henk tuten: relativity)

Any general definition might be misunderstood.

The point is that this is how we play the game.

72. Generalizing is dangerous. Like: " The colour that these things

have in common is what I call 'blue' " : .

73. Take care, pictures always might be misleading.

For instance: Everybody draws different trees. You never know for sure

that they all mean the concept 'tree'.

74. Every rule can be interpretated in many ways.

75. Knowledge is personal

76. One picture of the same game might have sharp borders, the other

none at all

77. ' Sharp' might be dined as 'blurred', and vice versa. As well

'good' as 'bad'

78. You can know something in limitless ways.

79. The statement " Moses did not exist "

- the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from

Egypt ?

- their leader was not called Moses or, ?

- there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible

relates of Moses -- ?

or: etc. etc.-- ?

Moses might have limitless meanings. And the different properties can

be interpretated in limitless ways. For instance what do you mean by

leader?

(henk tuten: scientific defining doesn't exist)

80. Any statement has also a statistic side. It might be TRUE a% of

time and FALSE (100-A)% of time

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 80-89 about Logics as Sorting Methods

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

81.Looking for logic in use of language, supposes that there IS logic

in language. It is idealizing language. But here the word " ideal "

doesn't mean ideal. Language might be differing from idea.

 

82. A language rule is only a hypothesis

 

83. Games might change while being played. Languages are 'living' systems.

 

84.Language is personal and not totally defined.

 

85. Rules might be interprated in many ways.

 

86. Completeness of rules is only an abstract idea. Complete rules

don't exist in practice

 

87. Explanations are PER DEFINITION incomplete. But in order, if

serving their purpose

 

88. Let's define as " inexact " something that has multiple interpretations.

But if it works, then fine

 

89. Logic only claims something to remain ' within rules that are 'open'.

Logic tries to explain something empirical.

 

90. Logics don't penetrate phenomena. Only gives a structure to some

part of a phenonomen.

Logic is grammar, structured life.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Aphorism 90-100 Warning against being dazzled by (your own) Ideal

Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

 

91.Logic only eliminates mis-'understandings', i.e. false intuitions.

There is no final analysis

 

92/93. Logic makes surveyable by a rearrangement, but says nothing

about 'essence'.

And logic might be misunderstood

 

94. Logic: 'A proposition is a queer thing!'

 

95. 'Understanding' is abstract, it is a paradox

(The Joker: it is a reaching a new basic intuition after much TRAINING

with complex manipulation using already accepted basics.

Accepted basics are neither 'right' nor 'wrong', just accepted. It is

very well possible to make an ethics based on dubious basics.)

 

96. Thought is a language game. A picture of the world.

 

97. Thought is a fractal engine. It is as process EXTREMELY simple and

results in beautiful crystals.

(The Joker: Compare it to water made into ice)

 

98. Logic simulates 1 of limitless orders in reality

 

99. A sentence PER DEFINITION makes sense, you should find out which

sense in this PERSONAL case.

 

100. Games are dirty, only we are dazzled by the ideal.

 

 

good stuff too.....

 

..b b.b.

[Guest guest]

Food for mind

 

Not for soul

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nisargadatta , " .b bobji baba "

<Roberibus111 wrote:

>

> Aphorism 1-10 about Meaning

>

> 1. Every word has a meaning. Learning association from parents.

> The meaning is in a process of education correlated with the word. It

> is the object for which the word stands.

> 2. Meaning is created by primitive language functions.

> 3. 'Language' is a personal game. I.e. when I think of 'tree' it is

> completely different from yours

> 4. Because considering 'language as a straightforward script is

> personal over-simplification

> 5. Language is not 'learned', but trained. (remark Henk Tuten: That

> should revolutionize education, because similar is: Math can be trained)

> 6. Teaching words: associating the word " slab " with a shape

> ( " ostensive definition " ).

> The picture of reality " slab " is linked to the sound.

> Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the

> imagination.

> It is (in aphorism 2) not the purpose of the words to evoke images,

> that only the effect of a personal ostensive training.

> Much more different association is needed to come to 'understanding'

> (henk tuten: that only means complex association offering after much

> training a basic intuition).

> 7. " Language-games " : acting on words, repeating words etc.

> 8. Language1= { block, pillar, slab and beam}

> An expansion could be any form of numerals. Say the alphabet. An other

> expansion two words as " there " and " this "

> Order = " d---slab---there " , while showing a colour sample, and when

> saying " there " pointing to a destination.

> Result: pupil takes similar d objects from stock and brings them to

> 'destination. And so on.

> 9. Ostensive training of numerals is for instance pointing to 3

> similar slabs and say: " c slabs " .

> Children do learn the use of the first or six cardinal numerals in

> this way.

> " There " and " this " are also taught ostensively, but in this case the

> pointing gives a clue about the use of the words too.

> 10. What does " slab " mean? Manipulating slabs does not take

> 'understanding'.

> That takes some statement like: " The word . . . .signifies . . . . "

> And what is the meaning of the noise " four slabs? "

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 11-20 about Language as a Tool

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 11. Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a

> saw, a screw-driver, a ruler, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screw.---The

> functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.

> (And in both cases there are similarities.)

>

> 12. It is like looking into the cabin of a locomotive. All handles

> (words) looking more or less alike.

>

> 13. The statement: " Every word in language signifies something "

> exactly shows that it can mean anything.

> 14.Nonsense to say: " All tools serve to modify something. That is a

> statement without content.

>

> 15. Naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

>

> 16. Colour not necessarily part of language.

>

> 17. Words can be classificated in any way

>

> 18.Any language is incomplete. Don't worry about it

>

> 19. Slab! Similar to " Bring me a slab " .

>

> 20. Most sentences are 'elliptical', because they are shortcuts---in

> comparison with a particular paradigm of our grammar.

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 21-30 about Tools having multiple purposes

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 21. Tone can completely change meaning.

> Order: (get) " Five slabs " . Report: (there are) " Five slabs! "

> 22. Frege's idea that every assertion contains an assumption is just a

> concept, you might as well say: " the sky is blue "

> Reading aloud a written sentence between Frege's assertion sign marks

> is like singing a song. You must know beginning and end, and

> everything in between.

> 23. There are countless kinds of sentences. As many as learning

processes.

> " Language " is a form of life.

> Some examples:

> - giving orders, and obeying them

> - describing the appearance of an object

> - constructing an object from a description

> - guessing riddles

> - making a joke

> - asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

> 24. Language in itself says nothing about thinking or believing

> 25. Many animals do not use language. Period.

> 26. Language is labelling. But what isn't?

> 27. We do the most various things with our sentences.

> Language is not just the uttering of words. It is the use of words in

> the activity of language. And there are countless activities.

> 28. However clever defined, the object being pointed to with words is

> ambiguous.

> 29. Every sentence has multiple interpretations

> 30. One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to

> be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 31-40 about Rules being Abstract, saying nothing about 'the

> total' of a studied phenonomen

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 31. Recognizing the king in chess only helps if you already know the

> rules of the game

> You can learn the rules of chess without shapes

> You can also capture chess by watching.

> Learning chess normally supposes knowing playing games. We may say:

> learning is quicker when already knowing something, if at all possible

> 32. Languages can be totally different logics. Like Enlish and Chinese.

> Then your only start advantage is talent in in logic and association

> 33. Pointing at things is ambiguous

> - is this blue the same as the blue over there?

> - do you see any difference?

> - it's turning fine, you can already see blue sky again.

> - what's this blue called.'-Is it 'indigo'? "

> 34. Possible interpretations of any language are ALWAYS multiple.

> 35. Learning is a tuning of interpretation between 2 persons

> 36. Learning is only clever guessed repetition.

> 37. Learning is only clever guessed repetition

> 38. The word " This " is connected with the conception of naming as, so

> to speak, an occult process.

> Naming is as a queer connexion of a word with an object.

> Don't try to explain it philosophically

> 39. A 'real name' replaces a 'label name'. It supposes a virtual

> existence independent of real existence. Excalibur is sharp still has

> meaning if this sword actually is blunt.

> 40. " meaning " supposes a " correspondence " between word and object.

> When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not

> that the meaning dies. Thus the name still functions as a name.

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 41-50 about being Abstract studied further

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 41.The order " Give me N " has still meaning when the object named N is

> broken

>

> 42. Give me X has meaning even when the name X is never used before

>

> 43. SOMETIMES the word " meaning " it can be defined thus: the meaning

> of a word is its use in the language.

> And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its

> bearer.

>

> 44. The sentence " Excalibur has a sharp blade " is nonsense if

> Excalibur is present and blunt.

>

> 45. The demonstrative word " this " always has a bearer, even if it hasn't

>

> 46. A primary element has " per definition " no description. It just is.

> Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' (Tractatus Logico-

> Philosophicus) are such primary elements.

>

> 47/48/49. Simple and composite are agreements.

> A primary element per definition cannot be defined. It is simple by

> agreement

>

> 50. Primary elements are ABSTRACT, or virtual.

> I.e. we can attribute neither being nor non-being to them

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 51-60 about Abstract Notions

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 51. To prevent mistakes when connecting signs and say colours, we must

> focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them from close to.

>

> 52. Mice are obviously more than grey rags and dust. Let's go into

> details.

>

> 53. A table CAN serve as the expression of a rule of the

> language-game, it can be said that what we call a rule of a

> language-game may have very different roles in the game.

>

> 54. when we learn to play say the games " Monopoly " or " Risk " then

> rules are used as an aid in teaching the game.

> 'Players' have characteristic behaviour.

>

> 55.The names in language are 'indestructible'. Abstract notions are

> indestructible, they are paradigms used in connexion with the name in

> the language-game.

>

> 56. A sample is some Picture of Reality

>

> 57. " Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed

>

> 58. A metaphysical statement (abstract) . " Red exists " only is a

> statement, but says nothing about " red " .

>

> 59. A name signifies only an abstract indestructible property of. It

> can be any Picture of Rality

>

> 60. Logic: a composition is made in parts of an object. This process

> is called " analysis "

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 61-69 about Agreeing

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 61.If 2 objects contain the same parts, in the same order , the we

> might AGREE that they are partly similar.

>

> 62. There is not always a sharp distinction between essential and

> inessential properties of an object. Being called partly similar might

> be tricky.

>

> 63. An analysed subject might be analysed in a seducing way. Then

> being similar in those aspects is inessential.

>

> 64. Symbols might represent anything.

>

> 65. Language = a bunch of agreed relationships

>

> 66. Games are similar in being networks of 'properties'

>

> 67. Games might have " family resemblances " ; You might say: 'games'

> form a family.

>

> 68. The concept 'game' is 'open'. Rules can always be added

>

> 69. When might a process be called a game?

>

> 70. Don't accept any pictures as exact definition a a game (henk

> tuten: absolutism)

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 71-79 about any concept being only 1 explanation

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 71. A 'blurred' view is a concept anyway, and is only blurred compared

> to some other concept. (henk tuten: relativity)

> Any general definition might be misunderstood.

> The point is that this is how we play the game.

> 72. Generalizing is dangerous. Like: " The colour that these things

> have in common is what I call 'blue' " : .

> 73. Take care, pictures always might be misleading.

> For instance: Everybody draws different trees. You never know for sure

> that they all mean the concept 'tree'.

> 74. Every rule can be interpretated in many ways.

> 75. Knowledge is personal

> 76. One picture of the same game might have sharp borders, the other

> none at all

> 77. ' Sharp' might be dined as 'blurred', and vice versa. As well

> 'good' as 'bad'

> 78. You can know something in limitless ways.

> 79. The statement " Moses did not exist "

> - the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from

> Egypt ?

> - their leader was not called Moses or, ?

> - there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible

> relates of Moses -- ?

> or: etc. etc.-- ?

> Moses might have limitless meanings. And the different properties can

> be interpretated in limitless ways. For instance what do you mean by

> leader?

> (henk tuten: scientific defining doesn't exist)

> 80. Any statement has also a statistic side. It might be TRUE a% of

> time and FALSE (100-A)% of time

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 80-89 about Logics as Sorting Methods

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 81.Looking for logic in use of language, supposes that there IS logic

> in language. It is idealizing language. But here the word " ideal "

> doesn't mean ideal. Language might be differing from idea.

>

> 82. A language rule is only a hypothesis

>

> 83. Games might change while being played. Languages are 'living'

systems.

>

> 84.Language is personal and not totally defined.

>

> 85. Rules might be interprated in many ways.

>

> 86. Completeness of rules is only an abstract idea. Complete rules

> don't exist in practice

>

> 87. Explanations are PER DEFINITION incomplete. But in order, if

> serving their purpose

>

> 88. Let's define as " inexact " something that has multiple

interpretations.

> But if it works, then fine

>

> 89. Logic only claims something to remain ' within rules that are

'open'.

> Logic tries to explain something empirical.

>

> 90. Logics don't penetrate phenomena. Only gives a structure to some

> part of a phenonomen.

> Logic is grammar, structured life.

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

>

Aphorism 90-100 Warning against being dazzled by (your own) Ideal

> Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

>

> 91.Logic only eliminates mis-'understandings', i.e. false intuitions.

> There is no final analysis

>

> 92/93. Logic makes surveyable by a rearrangement, but says nothing

> about 'essence'.

> And logic might be misunderstood

>

> 94. Logic: 'A proposition is a queer thing!'

>

> 95. 'Understanding' is abstract, it is a paradox

> (The Joker: it is a reaching a new basic intuition after much TRAINING

> with complex manipulation using already accepted basics.

> Accepted basics are neither 'right' nor 'wrong', just accepted. It is

> very well possible to make an ethics based on dubious basics.)

>

> 96. Thought is a language game. A picture of the world.

>

> 97. Thought is a fractal engine. It is as process EXTREMELY simple and

> results in beautiful crystals.

> (The Joker: Compare it to water made into ice)

>

> 98. Logic simulates 1 of limitless orders in reality

>

> 99. A sentence PER DEFINITION makes sense, you should find out which

> sense in this PERSONAL case.

>

> 100. Games are dirty, only we are dazzled by the ideal.

>

>

> good stuff too.....

>

> .b b.b.

>