AchArya on the Objects of the Waking State (B.S. II.2.29)

[Guest guest]

Dear Advaitins,

 

While commenting on the aforementioned sutra AchArya makes the

following comment:

 

||jAgaritOpalabdham vastu na ksyAmchidapyavasthAyAm bAdhyatE||

 

" Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our

waking state, such as posts and the like, are 'never' negated in any

state "

 

What is he exactly conveying by this statement? Aren't waking

objects are negated in the dream and sushupti/samadhi state? Can

anybody elaborate this abstruse topic which is seemingly

contradicting the mAndUkya kArika(In my understanding/mis-

understanding?)? I am giving the full commentary along with the

sUtra for reference which is as under:

 

29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the

waking state) are not like those of a dream.

 

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the

Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are

conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external

objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.--The

two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same

footing, on account of the difference of their character. They

differ as follows.--The things of which we are conscious in a dream

are negated by our waking consciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I

had a meeting with a great man; no such meeting took place, but my

mind was dulled by slumber, and so the false idea arose.' In an

analogous manner the things of which we are conscious when under the

influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our

ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we

are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are

never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of a dream are

acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts

of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance

and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as

being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for

instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly

perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the

distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is

impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is

false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming

consciousness; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers

to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just

because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to

themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the

baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas

themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain

attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if

some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's

own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having

certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is

felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of

its having attributes in common with water. And the difference of

nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already

shown.

 

Yours in Sri Ramakrishna,

 

Br. Vinayaka.

[Guest guest]

That which is not present in deep dreamless sleep is not real.

 

Ultimate reality must be fully present in deep dreamless sleep and

anything not present in deep dreamless state is NOT the ultimate

reality.

 

 

 

 

advaitin , " Vinayaka " <vinayaka_ns wrote:

>

>

> " Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our

> waking state, such as posts and the like, are 'never' negated in

any

> state "

>

 

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