mithyA

[Guest guest]

Madhusudana Sarasavati has, in Advaitasiddhi, given five definitions of

mithyA taken from the works of different AchAryas. Of these, the definition

which appealed to me most is the following :--

pratipannopadhau traikAlikanishedhapratiyogI mithyA--

" mithyA is that which is negated in all the three periods of time in the

locus in which it appears " .

Silver appears on nacre, but it is found to have not existed in any of the

three periods of time in the place in which it appeared. . It is

prAtibhAsika while the substratum, nacre, is vyAvahArika. When it is said

that the silver does not exist in all the three periods of time it is to be

understood that it does not exist with the same level of reality, i.e., the

same ontological status as its substratum, nacre.

Similarly, the world appears on the substratum, brahman, but it has no

absolute reality. It does not have the same ontological status as its

substaratum. It is neither real like brahman, nor is it unreal like the horn

of a rabbit. so it is said to be 'sattvena asattvena vA anirvacanIyA', what

cannot be described as either real or unreal. It is vyAvahArika satya while

the substratum, brahman, is pAramArthika satya.

Both vyAvahArika satya and prAtibhAsika satya are mithyA. The former is

negated only by the knowledge of brahman while the latter is negated by the

knowledge of its substratum.

When it is said that the world is negated by the knowledge of brahman, it

does not mean that the world disappears. The jnAni continues to see duality,

but he knows that it is not real and is not affected by whatever happens. He

becomes free from the notions of being a doer and an enjoyer and free from

likes, dislikes, etc., which are the cause of all suffering.

S.N.Sastri

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " ஜயராமன௠"

<vaithikasri wrote:

>

> Sir

> I have a query. Pardon my ignorance.

 

> I now ask...

>

> What about the vedas? Are they " mitya " or " sathya " ? Because, if

> vedas are mithya, then it can't be a proof for brahman. If vedas are

> " sathya " , then this is another sathya apart from brahman, which is not

> possible (to have 2 sathyas).

> How does advaita address this paradox?

>

 

Namaste Vaithikasri-ji

 

Your statement " If vedas are mithya, it can't be a proof for brahman "

is faulty. For we know the mirror reflection is only an appearance,

mithya, it is not as real as we are. Still it gives us a proof whether

we have a tilak on our forehead or not. So even 'mithya' can offer a

proof for something of a higher order of truth.

 

PraNAms to all adaitins.

profvk

[Guest guest]

Similarly, the world appears on the substratum, brahman, but it has no

absolute reality. It does not have the same ontological status as its

substaratum. It is neither real like brahman, nor is it unreal like the

horn

of a rabbit. so it is said to be 'sattvena asattvena vA anirvacanIyA', what

cannot be described as either real or unreal. It is vyAvahArika satya while

the substratum, brahman, is pAramArthika satya.

 

praNAms Sri Sastri prabhuji

Hare Krishna

 

That is beautifully said. Hope with this definition of *mithyA*, we can

contextually equate this mithyA with *mAya* also. Ofcourse, we know this

concept of mAya is the very effective tool which advaitins used to

satisfactorily explain the phenomena of life while keeping the advaitic

absolute reality. And shruti tells this mAya is prakruti (mAyAntu

prakrutiM vidyAM - vide shwetAshwatara shruti), so, in strict philosophical

sense, prakruti in reality only mithyA, it is not a power of Ishwara which

does the creation work...Shankara says in sUtra bhAshya that this mAya is

*fictitiously imagined* by avidyA & this mAya has been equated with

*prakruti*(avyAkruta rUpa - the original state of the world before

creation)... which, as you said above, cannot be defined to be identical

with brahman nor a quite distinct entity from brahman.

 

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar