Status of knowledge of an object in V.P.

[Guest guest]

Namaste All,

 

From Vedanta Paribhasa pg. 146: Chap. Non-Apprehension (of Existence)

 

" The validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended. Spontaneous

apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality of causes that

apprehend the substratum of the validity, provided no defect is present.

The substratum of the validity is the Consciousness manifested as the

mental state, and the cause of its cognition is the Consciousness

designated as the witness. That too, when it apprehends the Consciousness

manifested as the mental state, apprehends the validity of the latter as

well. It cannot be urged that in that case there cannot be any room for

doubt about the validity of knowledge. For in order that doubt may arise,

there must be some defect also in such a case, and therefore, owing to an

absence of the totality of causes of apprehending the substratum of the

absence of defects, there would be no apprehension at all of the validity

of the knowledge. Or spontaneity (self-evidence) is the capacity of being

cognised by all that apprehends the substratum of the validity. In a case

of doubt, although the validity may possess that capacity, yet it is not

apprehended on account of some defect. Hence there is a reasonable chance

for doubt. "

 

The first sentence has a note from Swami Madhavananda. " That is,

self-evident. Not as in Nyaya, to be established by inference. " From the

Nyaya point of view full knowledge of the object as such is an inference

from the mental modification as such. As an inference it differs from

perception in that it is a movement of the mind.

 

What is meant by the phrase 'the substratum of the validity'? It is the

very thing that is valid or invalid, viz. the knowledge e.g. 'this is a

jar'. Totality of causes would be good light, good eyesight, presence to

the object that is recognised and known, the object itself as the primary

cause. The substratum of the validity is the mental modification itself.

 

The doubt arises only on the basis that the initial knowledge is sound.

That is the default position. If doubt were built in then no sense of

validity would ever arise. Mental modifications cannot just be the

self-luminous knowledge of themselves as the Vijnanavada hold. The notion

of validity could not apply to such arisings.

 

Validity trumps doubt which there is always a reasonable chance of.

However that doubt is not given with knowledge whose default status is

validity. It is due to what V.P. calls " adventitious defect " . These are

the things that arise in a haphazard manner from without and which of

course we do not know about i.e. the Rumsfeldian things that we don't know

that we don't know. However we can come to know about them, like the

drunk in the toddy shop that tried to purchase grog with a piece of

shell. " Sorry said the vendor " I don't have change for that " .

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

Michel - first thanks for taking up the analysis.

Please bear with me and with my questions - I am

trying to comprehend.

 

I wish you do this from the beginning of VP since some

of the definitions are too abstract and need lot more

explanations to comprehend fully. I read again again

but could not comprehend even the head and tail. Can

you expain in plain english what the concepts are? I

have a feeling that I am not the sole person who did

not understand what is written.

 

 

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

> Namaste All,

>

> From Vedanta Paribhasa pg. 146: Chap.

> Non-Apprehension (of Existence)

>

> " The validity of knowledge is also spontaneously

> apprehended. Spontaneous

> apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the

> totality of causes that

> apprehend the substratum of the validity, provided

> no defect is present.

 

If defect is present then what happens in terms of

substratum of vaidity. If I say 'this is a snake'

where there is rope, now how does the validation or

invalidation takes place? In dvaita, saakshii

validates, I am not sure how and that statment of

dviata also does not make any sense to me.

 

> The substratum of the validity is the Consciousness

> manifested as the

> mental state, and the cause of its cognition is the

> Consciousness

> designated as the witness.

 

What this tell me is the knowledge of the object is

nothing but consciousness manifested as the mental

state and (I am not sure cause of cognition designated

as witness)- Does it means - the pramaata or knower

of the known or the substratum of validity, is

saakshii? - what it tells me is both the pramaata and

prameya are consciousness - is that right?.

 

Now what happens when it is defective - Like 'this is

a snake' and obviously that is the knowledge of the

object there as far as my cognition goes. As for as I

am concerned it is a valid knowledge, since I am not

conscious of the defective understanding. Then

substratum of validity - is it not the snake knowledge

still valid for that pramaata.

 

Now who validates as pramaa or bhramaa? Witness should

only be witnessing whatever the cognition be - is it

not?. If you give more role to the witness, then he

becomes an active participant of the crime!

 

 

>That too, when it

> apprehends the Consciousness

> manifested as the mental state, apprehends the

> validity of the latter as

> well.

 

The second part is not clear. It appears to be a

statement of declaration - Is comprehension of the

snake where there is rope, is validated or invalidated

by tthe consciousness manifested as the mental state-

I assume that is the witness. Why does witness

validate it or invalidate it other than witnessing it?

 

 

It cannot be urged that in that case there

> cannot be any room for

> doubt about the validity of knowledge. For in order

> that doubt may arise,

> there must be some defect also in such a case, and

> therefore, owing to an

> absence of the totality of causes of apprehending

> the substratum of the

> absence of defects, there would be no apprehension

> at all of the validity

> of the knowledge.

 

Looks like there seems to be some answer in the above

- I am just thinking loud for others to hear! There is

a double negative statement! If there is no doubt -

would that be considered as valid knowledge - I know

the double negative is deliberately used to circumvent

the answer!

 

I gather that for the doubt to arise, the totality of

causes should have defect. But if I as pramaata does

feel that the totality of the cuases do not have

defects (even thought there may be, as in earth is the

center of the universe, etc for many centuries), does

it make the cognition a valid knowledge?

 

 

Or spontaneity (self-evidence) is

> the capacity of being

> cognised by all that apprehends the substratum of

> the validity. In a case

> of doubt, although the validity may possess that

> capacity, yet it is not

> apprehended on account of some defect. Hence there

> is a reasonable chance

> for doubt. "

 

I am not sure I understand the statements clearly.

First statement - does it refer the spontaneous mental

modification as the cognition of the object - and by

all means what constitutes all - the totality of

causes? How is that spontaneously valdated means? and

by whom. If it is not based inference as per

Madhavananda, spontaneous validation seems to imply

some god given gift! - As I see, I assume that

knowledge is valid (like in American court systems

not guitly until it is proven otherwise)unless a doubt

arises due to another contradictory pramaaNa.

If I already know that all causes are not proper, then

even when I see a rope as a rope, the knowledge need

not be validated!

 

-and it is not apprehended due to some kind of defect?

who knows that there is a defect in perception? If one

does not know that there is a defect, then there is no

doubt about any doubt existing. I get the feeling that

the last conclusion appears to be somewhat circular

argument.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

>

> The first sentence has a note from Swami

> Madhavananda. " That is,

> self-evident. Not as in Nyaya, to be established by

> inference. " From the

> Nyaya point of view full knowledge of the object as

> such is an inference

> from the mental modification as such. As an

> inference it differs from

> perception in that it is a movement of the mind.