Guest guest Posted January 5, 2008 Report Share Posted January 5, 2008 Srinivasji writes: When an absence is grasped immediately without any dilemma or doubt, it said to be by absence by pratyaksha. Example, absence of a pot at an space-time locus. Sadananda-ji example of absence of pot on the table best describes absence-by-pratyaksha. ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Namaste Srinivasji, In the example offered you have made the error of saying that there is perception of non-existence. That cannot be correct as an absent thing cannot be an object of the senses because it does not present itself to any of the senses. In this instance you should speak of the non-apprehension of the existence of the pot where you might have expected it. This is a direct, non-inferential, non-perceptual knowledge. Those of you who read light fiction might recall Sherlock Holmes and 'The dog that did not bark in the night-time'. Conclusion: the dog must have known the murderer. Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted January 5, 2008 Report Share Posted January 5, 2008 Namaste Michael-ji. advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote: > Namaste Srinivasji, > In the example offered you have made the error > of saying that there is perception of non-existence. That cannot be > correct as an absent thing cannot be an object of the senses because it > does not present itself to any of the senses. In this instance you should > speak of the non-apprehension of the existence of the pot where you might > have expected it. This is a direct, non-inferential, non- perceptual > knowledge. Those of you who read light fiction might recall Sherlock > Holmes and 'The dog that did not bark in the night-time'. Conclusion: the > dog must have known the murderer. > No, it is not correct to say `non-apprehension of existence of pot'. When see at the table you don't see void at the locus, instead you do `see' an empty table at the locus. This seeing empty table is the hEtu in deducing the absence of the pot (if that is what expected there) or all objects in general. When you see an empty table, you don't just conclude absence of a pot but absence of all other objects too. If it were to be, as you hold, just an non-apprehension of existence of pot; then you wouldn't be in position to assert absence ( or presence) of any other objects at that locus. In order to overcome this difficulty, you need to infinitely keep saying `non-apprehension of jar', `non-apprehension of apple' ... so and so forth. It is my pleasure discussing epistemology with you. Regards, Srinivas > Best Wishes, > Michael. > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted January 5, 2008 Report Share Posted January 5, 2008 --- Srinivas Kotekal <kots_p wrote: .. > > If it were to be, as you hold, just an > non-apprehension of existence > of pot; then you wouldn't be in position to assert > absence ( or > presence) of any other objects at that locus. In > order to overcome > this difficulty, you need to infinitely keep saying > `non-apprehension > of jar', `non-apprehension of apple' ... so and so > forth. > PraNams I think Sreenivas is correct - What I wrote was 'pratyabhijna is required for anupaladbhi to operate as pramaaNa. Non-apprehension of a pot implies the attributive knowledge of the pot from previous perceptions or from the memory - or samskaara which is what pratyabhijna stands for - is the basis on which I say, ‘I do not see pot there on the table’. That is why I gave another example - gaagaabuubu - if I have no prior samskaara of that, there is no way anupalabdhi can operate as knowledge its abhaava. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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