What did Sankara really teach! - Is “Anupalabdhi� a “ Pramana� According to Sankara?

[Guest guest]

Srinivasji writes:

 

No, it is not correct to say `non-apprehension of existence of pot'.

 

When see at the table you don't see void at the locus, instead you

do `see' an empty table at the locus. This seeing empty table is the

hEtu in deducing the absence of the pot (if that is what expected

there) or all objects in general. When you see an empty table, you

don't just conclude absence of a pot but absence of all other objects

too.

 

If it were to be, as you hold, just an non-apprehension of existence

of pot; then you wouldn't be in position to assert absence ( or

presence) of any other objects at that locus. In order to overcome

this difficulty, you need to infinitely keep saying `non-apprehension

of jar', `non-apprehension of apple' ... so and so forth.

 

It is my pleasure discussing epistemology with you.

 

Regards,

Srinivas

 

|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

Namaste Srinivasji,

 

I think the confusion that arises is from the use of the word 'see'. Let

us suppose that I ask you to bring me the book that is on the table in the

kitchen. You say 'I don't see a book on the table'. Obviously you are

looking at the table but is the knowledge that you convey to me perceptual

or even an inference from the perceptual? The means by which you gained

that knowledge is direct i.e. non-apprehension of the existence of the

book that you were expected to see. Your knowledge or the knowledge you

have gained is about the book and not about the table as such. You cannot

be expected to see a book that isn't there but neither is the

non-existence of the book an inference from the expected sight of the book.

 

The observations about elephants, apples, etc is purely logical. You had

no expectation of seeing them there so as observations they do not

represent empirical knowledge.

 

Best Wishes,

Michae.

[Guest guest]

Sadanandaji writes:

I think Sreenivas is correct - What I wrote was

'pratyabhijna is required for anupaladbhi to operate

as pramaaNa.

 

Non-apprehension of a pot implies the attributive

knowledge of the pot from previous perceptions or from

the memory - or samskaara which is what pratyabhijna

stands for - is the basis on which I say, ‘I do not

see pot there on the table’. That is why I gave

another example - gaagaabuubu - if I have no prior

samskaara of that, there is no way anupalabdhi can

operate as knowledge its abhaava.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

Namaste Sadanandaji,

What you propose is the Nyaya thinking

on the matter which differs from the Advaitic view. The Nyaya view is

characterised by the notion that one can both perceive the existence and

the non-existence of the expected object. As Swami Satprakashananda

delineates they believe that " the non-existence of the a jar on the floor

is different from the floor. It is related to the floor as an attribute

(visesana). The floor can be regarded as characterised by the

non-existence of a jar on it. The organ of vision has a special kind of

contact (sannikarasa) with the non-existence of a jar in such a case.

Thus, the non-existence of a jar on the floor is perceived as the

attributiveness of the floor, which is conjoined with the eye. " (pg. 166

Methods of Vedanta)

 

Advaita Vedanta rejects this. Their view which is simple and clear and

oft repeated in V.P. is that there is no way that the organ of vision can

come in contact with a non-existent object. What possible mysterious

conjunction can there be between a non-existent object and its locus? How

can that which is not in place have a place in that locus (latin for

place) where it is not? Clearly some other form of knowledge is operating.

 

As stated in V.P. quote follows:

" Thus, the mental mode corresponding to the non-existence of a jar and the

like (in a locus) is not generated by the sense-organ, which is not in

contact with the object (non-existence of a jar and the like), but is

generated by a distinct means of knowledge, viz.; a non-apprehension of

the jar and the like. Hence non-apprehension is a distinct means of the

valid knowledge (of non-existence).

 

The highest form of non-apprehension is that of realisation where there is

non-apprehension of diversity.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael

[Guest guest]

Namaste Michael-ji.

 

You are an indefatigable vedantin. Really commendable that you

reached the fantastic conclusion that " the highest form of non-

apprehension is that of realisation where there is non-apprehension

of diversity " by ruminating the very obstruse text of VP from which I

usually shy off.

 

To my lay mind, your arguments about non-apprehension of objects also

seem plausible. The non-apprehension of the existence of the pot is

per se when it occurs. That it should have been on a locus is a

separate apprehension that follows. The apprehension of that locus

(floor or table) is yet another apprehension. Things look simple

that way. I don't know if I understood you all well and if I am

thinking on right lines. I have been closely following this thread

and this is what I understand.

 

By the way, if realisation is non-apprehension of diversity, is it

permanent or temporary? To make the question clearer, the pot is not

found on the table. Yet, we may double or triple check to make sure

that it is not really there. Is such repeated checking required in

the case of non-apprehension of diversity in realisation?

 

PraNAms.

 

Madathil Nair

______________

 

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva

wrote:.......

> Advaita Vedanta rejects this (nyAya view). Their view which is

simple and clear and

> oft repeated in V.P. is that there is no way that the organ of

vision can

> come in contact with a non-existent object. What possible

mysterious

> conjunction can there be between a non-existent object and its

locus? How

> can that which is not in place have a place in that locus (latin

for

> place) where it is not? Clearly some other form of knowledge is

operating.

>

> As stated in V.P. quote follows:

> " Thus, the mental mode corresponding to the non-existence of a jar

and the

> like (in a locus) is not generated by the sense-organ, which is not

in

> contact with the object (non-existence of a jar and the like), but

is

> generated by a distinct means of knowledge, viz.; a non-

apprehension of

> the jar and the like. Hence non-apprehension is a distinct means

of the

> valid knowledge (of non-existence).

>

> The highest form of non-apprehension is that of realisation where

there is

> non-apprehension of diversity.

[Guest guest]

Dear Michael,

 

 

 

A very clear explanation of the situation and I was with you all the way up to

the last sentence. Do you not mean “The highest form of non-apprehension is

that of realisation where there is non-apprehension of *non-duality*? (Or am I

getting my double negatives mixed up?)

 

 

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

 

 

 

P.S. I don’t know how the Greek entered into the subject heading!

 

 

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf Of

ombhurbhuva

06 January 2008 21:51

advaitin

Re: What did Sankara really teach! - Is

“Anupalabdhi� a “ Pramana� According to Sankara?

 

 

 

The highest form of non-apprehension is that of realisation where there is

non-apprehension of diversity.

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Dear Michael,

 

 

 

Having thought further about it – I am getting my double negatives mixed up

– sorry!

 

 

 

Dennis

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf Of

Dennis Waite

08 January 2008 17:04

advaitin

RE: Re: What did Sankara really teach! - Is

“Anupalabdhi� a “ Pramana� According to Sankara?

 

 

 

Dear Michael,

 

A very clear explanation of the situation and I was with you all the way up to

the last sentence. Do you not mean “The highest form of non-apprehension is

that of realisation where there is non-apprehension of *non-duality*? (Or am I

getting my double negatives mixed up?)

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

 

P.S. I don’t know how the Greek entered into the subject heading!

 

advaitin <advaitin%40>

[advaitin <advaitin%40> ] On Behalf

Of ombhurbhuva

06 January 2008 21:51

advaitin <advaitin%40>

Re: What did Sankara really teach! - Is

“Anupalabdhi� a “ Pramana� According to Sankara?

 

The highest form of non-apprehension is that of realisation where there is

non-apprehension of diversity.

 

 

[Guest guest]

Namaste Micheal-ji,

 

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

 

> Namaste Srinivasji,

>

> I think the confusion that arises is from the use of the

word 'see'. Let

> us suppose that I ask you to bring me the book that is on the

table in the

> kitchen. You say 'I don't see a book on the table'. Obviously

you are

> looking at the table but is the knowledge that you convey to me

perceptual

> or even an inference from the perceptual? The means by which you

gained

> that knowledge is direct i.e. non-apprehension of the existence of

the

> book that you were expected to see. Your knowledge or the

knowledge you

> have gained is about the book and not about the table as such.

You cannot

> be expected to see a book that isn't there but neither is the

> non-existence of the book an inference from the expected sight of

the book.

>

 

The contention between us is as follows;

 

Your position --- abhAva is non-apprehension of existence

 

My position – abhAva is apprehension of non-existence.

 

 

Your `non-apprehension' itself an abhAva (abhAva of apprehension to

be precise). How did you know that abhAva? For that you need another

non-apprehension of existence of first `non-apprehension'. This

second one is also a abhAva. Again you need third non-apprehension

to address second 'non-apprehension'. Thus, this will lead to

anavasta.

 

To avoid this anavasta, at one point you need to admit that somehow

you can positively apprehend the non-apprehension. If that were the

case, why not admit apprehension of non-existence at the first

instance?

 

Also in alternate analysis;

 

According to your position, is non-apprehension due to ;

 

1. You attempted to apprehend but still it was non-apprehended?

 

2. You did not attempt at all?

 

In the first case, your attempt is itself a positive cognition. Your

attempt to cognize at the locus is indeed a pratyksha. Any positive

assertions of negation, such as `pot does not exist' etc, always

implies negation at a certain locus. Negation does not mean pot

does not exist elsewhere (such as in shop etc). Therefore, for the

negation to be true, one has to at least positively cognize the

locus. This cognition of bare locus is the work by five external

senses. The absence of pot (or anything else) is directly perceived

by manas (manasa-prathyaksa) (btw manas must be accepted as internal

sense organ. Otherwise, smaraNa fails to be pramANa and subsequently

it has implication on anumAna's validity. We will discuss it

separately).

 

Therefore, case of attempted but not apprehended is the positive

knowledge of absence of object at the locus. Since this knowledge

is produced by combination of five external and a internal sense

organs, this abhAva can be classified as pratyaksha only.

 

On the other hand if it is later case (not attempted at all), it is

the case of ignorance. In certain stages such as mUrchAvasta or in

sleep or in coma etc, one is also not apprehending existence of pot

on the table (or any object for that matter). Then does it mean one

can claim absence of pot at the locus? Also in some other cases, one

is also not apprehending some objects when they were concealed by

obstructions such as curtain, wall, fog etc. Then does it mean one

can claim absence of objects at the locus behind concealment?

Therefore, the definition of abhAva as `non-apprehension of

existence' wrongly applies to above cases and thus suffers from

ativyApti fallacy.

 

 

> The observations about elephants, apples, etc is purely logical.

You had

> no expectation of seeing them there so as observations they do

not

> represent empirical knowledge.

>

 

If that were the case, how do you address following case?

 

When I ask you `was there a pot on the table?' , your reply would

be `no'.

 

Then if I ask you `was there a elephant on the table?', what would

be your reply without going back to table and perceive it again?

 

You can not say `no elephant', because since your position is `non-

comprehension of existence of pot' only, you have not `non-

comprehended' the existence of elephant there. So, neither you can

deny nor attest the existence of elephant (or anything else other

than pot) at the locus. But this kind of stalemate is not the case

in our daily experience.

 

Therefore, in order to negate anything (including the pot) at that

locus, you need perceive non-existence of anything. This exactly is

my position of `comprehension of non-existence'.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

 

 

> Best Wishes,

> Michae.

>