What did Sankara really teach

[Guest guest]

Srinivasji wrote:

 

The contention between us is as follows;

 

Your position --- abhAva is non-apprehension of existence

 

My position ? abhAva is apprehension of non-existence.

 

 

Your `non-apprehension' itself an abhAva (abhAva of apprehension to

be precise). How did you know that abhAva? For that you need another

non-apprehension of existence of first `non-apprehension'. This

second one is also a abhAva. Again you need third non-apprehension

to address second 'non-apprehension'. Thus, this will lead to

anavasta.

 

To avoid this anavasta, at one point you need to admit that somehow

you can positively apprehend the non-apprehension. If that were the

case, why not admit apprehension of non-existence at the first

instance?

 

Also in alternate analysis;

 

According to your position, is non-apprehension due to ;

 

1. You attempted to apprehend but still it was non-apprehended?

 

2. You did not attempt at all?

 

In the first case, your attempt is itself a positive cognition. Your

attempt to cognize at the locus is indeed a pratyksha. Any positive

assertions of negation, such as `pot does not exist' etc, always

implies negation at a certain locus. Negation does not mean pot

does not exist elsewhere (such as in shop etc). Therefore, for the

negation to be true, one has to at least positively cognize the

locus. This cognition of bare locus is the work by five external

senses. The absence of pot (or anything else) is directly perceived

by manas (manasa-prathyaksa) (btw manas must be accepted as internal

sense organ. Otherwise, smaraNa fails to be pramANa and subsequently

it has implication on anumAna's validity. We will discuss it

separately).

 

Therefore, case of attempted but not apprehended is the positive

knowledge of absence of object at the locus. Since this knowledge

is produced by combination of five external and a internal sense

organs, this abhAva can be classified as pratyaksha only.

 

On the other hand if it is later case (not attempted at all), it is

the case of ignorance. In certain stages such as mUrchAvasta or in

sleep or in coma etc, one is also not apprehending existence of pot

on the table (or any object for that matter). Then does it mean one

can claim absence of pot at the locus? Also in some other cases, one

is also not apprehending some objects when they were concealed by

obstructions such as curtain, wall, fog etc. Then does it mean one

can claim absence of objects at the locus behind concealment?

Therefore, the definition of abhAva as `non-apprehension of

existence' wrongly applies to above cases and thus suffers from

ativyApti fallacy.

 

 

> The observations about elephants, apples, etc is purely logical.

You had

> no expectation of seeing them there so as observations they do

not

> represent empirical knowledge.

>

 

If that were the case, how do you address following case?

 

When I ask you `was there a pot on the table?' , your reply would

be `no'.

 

Then if I ask you `was there a elephant on the table?', what would

be your reply without going back to table and perceive it again?

 

You can not say `no elephant', because since your position is `non-

comprehension of existence of pot' only, you have not `non-

comprehended' the existence of elephant there. So, neither you can

deny nor attest the existence of elephant (or anything else other

than pot) at the locus. But this kind of stalemate is not the case

in our daily experience.

 

Therefore, in order to negate anything (including the pot) at that

locus, you need perceive non-existence of anything. This exactly is

my position of `comprehension of non-existence'.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

 

|||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

Namaste Srinivasji,

In the first place we are talking about

something eg. jar, book etc which is supposed to at some locus or other.

Our non-apprehension of it is because we expected it to be there and it

was not. There is thus no infinite regress involved. How are we supposed

to apprehend a specific non-existence which has no identifying marks.

Non-apprehension is the only method of knowledge left open to us (re the

book or jar) because it is direct and non-sensorial.

 

V.P. rejects the idea that manas/mind is an organ - Quote from Chap.1 on

Perception: " And the mind is not an organ is evident from such Sruti texts

as, " Higher than the organs are the objects; higher than the objects is

the mind " (Ka.Up.III.10).

 

The non-apprehension of some specifically sought after item follows the

same line of reasoning as any other sought after item. There will be

either of two things (a) an apprehension of its existence i.e. knowledge

via perception or (b) non-apprehension of its existence. Both ways are

modes of knowledge; simple, direct and different.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Michael-ji

 

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

> Namaste Srinivasji,

> In the first place we are talking

about

> something eg. jar, book etc which is supposed to at some locus or

other.

> Our non-apprehension of it is because we expected it to be there

and it

> was not. There is thus no infinite regress involved. How are we

supposed

> to apprehend a specific non-existence which has no identifying

marks.

 

I am not saying `non-existence' is some kind of physical object to

have identifying marks neither. My position seems so is just a

perception and therefore an illusion!.

 

All I am saying is `non-existence' is *knowledge* only.

 

> Non-apprehension is the only method of knowledge left open to us

(re the book or jar)

 

Non-apprehension is in itself an abhAva. Logically speaking, since

the very notion of abhAva is not settled between us, you are not

expected to use such unsettled concept as premise to support the

theory. But such strict rule of logic can be set aside for this

dialog.

 

>because it is direct and non-sensorial.

>

 

Direct agreed, but not agreeable that it is non-sensorial.

 

How do you account for generation of `non-apprehension' in your

model? There is nothing to account for.

 

Non-apprehension is indreeya jannya jnyAna. It is

triggered/generated by indrIyas. It can be generated by eyes (if a

person can see) or by touch (if a person is blind) etc. These

indrIyas are karaNa-s (instruments) to apprehend the knowledge of

absence.

 

So, what problem is in admitting abhAva is pratyksha?

 

If it is non-sensorial at all, then what is the difference between

abhAva and hallucination?

 

> The non-apprehension of some specifically sought after item

follows the

> same line of reasoning as any other sought after item. There will

be

> either of two things (a) an apprehension of its existence i.e.

knowledge

> via perception or (b) non-apprehension of its existence.

>

 

This so called `sought after' is, after all, by any one of our

sensory organs. Since these organs are instruments in such `sought

after', non-existence knowledge is indreeya jannya and hence can be

brought under pratyaksha.

 

 

>Both ways are

> modes of knowledge; simple, direct and different.

 

Position of `abhAva is by pratyksha' is also simple, direct but

*one* pramANa only. No need for separate anupalabdhi pramANa.

Economy of entities in the system.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.