Perception in VP

February 6, 2008

Sadanandaji wrote:

Michael and Dennis - the error is defined as 'mixture of truth and

untruth' -

satya and asatya mithuniikaraNam adhyaasam.

Para.A.

It is true I do not see a rope - if I see a rope - there is no further

mistake since the knowledge is a valid knowledge.What I see is an object -

'there is' - the existence in the form I do see. That is the truth part.If

it is 5 feet long it will remain as 5 feet long. If it is coiled one, it

will remain as coiled one, etc.

Para B.

Since all the attributes of the thing that is there are not perceived due

to

defect in the conditions, the vRitti associated with the object is not

exactly the object 'as it is'. In fact do see the attributes that are

common to both snake and the rope, but do not see those attributes that

differentiates the two.

Para C.

'There is a snake' - in that cognition, 'there is' part is still correct

only

snake part is incorrect. - When advaita Vedanta says the vRitti takes the

shape of the object in forming the knowledge, there is really a problem -

what it takes is the shape of the object as perceived by the senses not as

it is. Hence there is possibility of an error. I will address these issues

slowly. When I get real knowledge of the object â€“ the statement is â€˜there

is a ropeâ€™ â€“ â€˜there isâ€™â€“ remains the same only snake knowledge is

replaced

by rope knowledge. Hence I do see a rope but not as a rope become

incomplete or even erroneous attributes gathered by senses since all the

secondary conditions for pramaaNa to work are not there. It will be still

5 feet long or coiled roop now instead of snake. The attributes that are

common still remain. Now I have received additional attributes by further

inquiry that can differentiate rope from snake.

Michael - please continue your series - Also I suggest that you title the

subject title with

numbers so that we know the sequence and what we are responding to. I am

going

to have a more critical view of VP from my perspective based on my

understanding of

epistemological issues.

Hari Om!

Sadananda

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Namaste Sadandaji,

Thank you for your scrutiny. First on some

technical points about posting. If I number the series in the subject

line then a search will bring out only that post. I have numbered the

series in the body of the post right at the top to distinguish them from

each other. May I make a suggestion to you? You will notice how I

reformatted your post to be rid of broken lines. You have been using the

enter key to change to a new line. This is retained in the post and shows

up as a broken line. Try writing your post in WordPad using a 'shrunk'

window. This automatically limits the number of words per line. Then copy

and paste into your mail programme. I use Opera mail and perhaps your

broken lines are a result of Outlook Express. Worth a try for readability.

Para A.your post:

This an analysis of what you are seeing. Suppose I am looking at a field

and say to my companion ' I see a number of white objects that appear to

be sheep'. Is that supposed to be a more epistemologically precise way of

talking about my perception? Here I think the language of 'appearing'

must give way to 'I see sheep yonder'. Appearing is derived by

psudo-analysis from seeing. Sankara makes this point when he likens this

to saying that 'Viswamitra appears to be the son of a barren woman' is

just as much a compounding of a contradiction in terms as saying

'Viswamitra is the son of a barren woman' (B.S.B. II.ii.28)

Para B. your post:

" not exactly the object 'as it is'. Are you trying for some half-way

house between illusion and perception or in other words attempting to

retain the correct portion of your 'appearing'. This is not in accordance

with the simpler analysis of the validity of knowledge (cf.pg.146 trans).

I will post on this next.

Para C your post:

Again you are trying for an in between 'knowledge' which is certain and

sure? What Sankara says is that even the illusion viewed simply as

consciousness is not sublated i.e. that much is true. He is not concerned

with what can be 'saved' within the error. cf.B.S.B.II.ii.29

I am open to correction from the members,

Best Wishes,

Michael.

February 6, 2008

Hi Michael,

I'm not entirely sure that I do see what you are getting at (my own thinking

is certainly muddy at the moment!)

What I *now* see, I know to be a rope. When I saw it earlier, I thought it

was a snake. I presume that I can now say that 'What I was really seeing,

when I thought I saw a snake, was in fact a rope'? I presume you (VP) are

not suggesting that what I saw might actually have been a snake after all?

But, yes, one must concede that, at the time that I saw the <what I now know

to be a rope>, there was no mental state corresponding to a rope.

But, supposing that someone else had already confirmed it to be a rope and

told me so while I was seeing what I thought to be snake. Would I then not

be able to say correctly that 'What I am seeing is really a rope'? (I

suppose you could argue that this is pratyakSha versus shabda but let's not

confuse things further!) To extrapolate this to the time when I myself have

verified that it is a rope, cannot I then say that 'at the time that I saw

what I thought was a snake, what I was really seeing was a rope'?

The interesting question seems to be, when can I ever be really, really sure

that I know what I am seeing? Are you in fact suggesting that everything

that we claim to see is really only inference?

Best wishes,

Dennis

**********************

Hi Dennis,

Yes it is a matter of language but language can deceive

us and lead us into an epistemological stance that is not warranted. You

may have come to know that what was before you was a rope but to translate

that into " what I was seeing was really a rope " is not correct because you

were not seeing a rope or you did not perceive a rope. An inference is

not the same as a perception, you have inferred that the rope was the

substratum of your illusion. May I suggest that while 'what I was really

seeing ' is an acceptable summary for ordinary purposes it has the

tendency to blur the distinction between inference and perception.

February 6, 2008

Hi Sada-ji,

I have no problems with any of this explanation. As usual, we seem to be on

the same wavelength!

Best wishes,

Dennis

******

Michael and Dennis - the error is defined as 'mixture of truth and untruth'

- satya and asatya

mithuniikaraNam adhyaasam.

It is true I do not see a rope - if I see a rope - there is no further

mistake since the knowledge

is a valid knowledge.

What I see is an object - 'there is' - the existence in the form I do see.

That is the truth part.

If it is 5 feet long it will remain as 5 feet long. If it is coiled one, it

will remain as coiled

one, etc.

February 6, 2008

Namaste Dennis-ji,

My two cents, if I may ...

advaitin , " Dennis Waite " <dwaite wrote:

>

> Hi Michael,

>

> I'm not entirely sure that I do see what you are getting at (my

own thinking

> is certainly muddy at the moment!)

>

> What I *now* see, I know to be a rope. When I saw it earlier, I

thought it

> was a snake. I presume that I can now say that 'What I was really

seeing,

> when I thought I saw a snake, was in fact a rope'? I presume you

(VP) are

> not suggesting that what I saw might actually have been a snake

after all?

> But, yes, one must concede that, at the time that I saw the <what

I now know

> to be a rope>, there was no mental state corresponding to a rope.

>

> But, supposing that someone else had already confirmed it to be a

rope and

> told me so while I was seeing what I thought to be snake. Would I

then not

> be able to say correctly that 'What I am seeing is really a rope'?

(I

> suppose you could argue that this is pratyakSha versus shabda but

let's not

> confuse things further!) To extrapolate this to the time when I

myself have

> verified that it is a rope, cannot I then say that 'at the time

that I saw

> what I thought was a snake, what I was really seeing was a rope'?

>

> The interesting question seems to be, when can I ever be really,

really sure

> that I know what I am seeing? Are you in fact suggesting that

everything

> that we claim to see is really only inference?

>

This is a good question.

But may I remind that inference or `anumAna' is itself not an

independent means of knowledge? It has to `follow' ('anusAri'

hence 'anu' prefix) either pratykaha or Agama to be called it as a

pramANa.

Then, how are sure of anything?

Here is my understanding.

The correcting knowledge `this is rope' is as much perceived as

earlier wrong knowledge `this is snake'. In both the knowledges, raw

perception itself has to occur and in itself is not at fault. But

how did we characterized the perception `this is rope'

as `real/correct' one vs. other perception?

When I gained the knowledge `this is snake', how did I gain that

knowledge? Obviously by perception.

So also, when I gained the `correct' knowledge `this is not a snake

but a rope' it is again by one or more perceptions. Let us call such

perceptions which are responsible for apprehension of correct

knowledge as `correcting perceptions'. These correcting perceptions

may include going `near' or shedding `more light' on the object

or `poking' the object to be tested with stick etc etc.

Here one thing we all must admit is that these so called `correcting

perceptions' are themselves are accepted as `real' or `correct'

apriori. How did we decide them to be correct apriori? Here comes

the doctrine of svataH pramANya.

All raw perceptions are, by default, admitted to be valid and

correct unless contradicted by another perception. But how do we

trust that second raw perception? It could be as well first one is

correct and the second one is not? In order to understand this

dilemma, we need to understand the whole mechanism of knowledge

building. Within us we have built up, during course of time (from

the very moment of birth), a consistent model of knowledgebase. This

knowledgebase contains both the correct knowledge and means which

are responsible for these correct knowledges. If a given raw

perception does not contradict this knowledgebase, it is admitted to

be valid. The consistency criteria is the key for accepting a

perception as `prama'. This is what we call `pramANya svataH,

aprAmaNya paratarH' (validity is intrinsic, invalidity is

external).

Even in order to invalidate first one by external perception, we

have to be sure about validity of that second one. That's the

reason, when we are in doubt, we always test with `known' methods.

We never test with unknown methods or hypothesis.

This is how we develop build this knowledgebase over the course of

time. What is prama and brama for an adult is not so for an infant,

for an infants knowledgebase is so small that there is hardly any

correcting mechanism or consistency criteria available in order to

differentiate prama from brama.

There is new field (founded by Hegel?) of epistemology called

Phenomalogy in the West. It deals with raw perceptions and its

validity. In the similar way, in my school we do not consider the

raw perception (drishtvAt) in general is incorrect or illusory. If

one were to be doubting so, then we would not have any correcting

methods at all and it is impossible to gain any correct knowledge.

This exactly is your question, I believe.

Regards,

Srinivas.

February 6, 2008

Dear Srinivas-ji,

Thank you for the memory trigger 'svataHprAmANyavAda'! In fact, I did write

about this in 'Back to the Truth' and quoted the following excellent extract

from Eliot Deutsch's 'Advaita Vedanta: a philosophical reconstruction':

" An idea is held to be true or valid, then, the moment it is entertained (in

the context of the theory no distinction is made between " truth " and

" validity " ), and it retains its validity until it is contradicted in

experience or is shown to be based on defective apprehension. For example,

according to the theory, if under the conditions of normal light and good

eyesight I see an object and judge it to be a table, I immediately and

rightfully trust my judgment that the object is a table and that I may

safely place a book or a glass upon it. Whenever a cognition arises or a

judgment takes place, it generates assurance about its truth. The judgment

may be mistaken, but this is learned only later (e.g., the book falls

through the " table " ). svataHprAmANyavAda is thus a kind of perverse

pragmatism. Instead of " truth " happening to an idea, it is " falsity " that

happens. A cognition, in other words, is like the accused in court who is

considered innocent until proven guilty; it is considered true until it is

shown in experience to be false. "

And I subsequently pointed out that: " Ultimately, all knowledge proves to be

sublatable, and therefore, untrue or invalid. The only knowledge that could

not be sublated would be the knowledge of reality itself - and reality is

not amenable to being " known " in any objective sense since that would make

it dual. "

Best wishes,

Dennis

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf

Of Srinivas Kotekal

06 February 2008 19:23

advaitin

Re: Perception in VP