Perception in VP

[Guest guest]

Dennis wrote:

Hi Michael,

 

I'm not entirely sure that I do see what you are getting at (my own

thinking

is certainly muddy at the moment!)

 

What I *now* see, I know to be a rope. When I saw it earlier, I thought it

was a snake. I presume that I can now say that 'What I was really seeing,

when I thought I saw a snake, was in fact a rope'? I presume you (VP) are

not suggesting that what I saw might actually have been a snake after all?

But, yes, one must concede that, at the time that I saw the <what I now

know

to be a rope>, there was no mental state corresponding to a rope.

 

But, supposing that someone else had already confirmed it to be a rope and

told me so while I was seeing what I thought to be snake. Would I then not

be able to say correctly that 'What I am seeing is really a rope'? (I

suppose you could argue that this is pratyakSha versus shabda but let's not

confuse things further!) To extrapolate this to the time when I myself have

verified that it is a rope, cannot I then say that 'at the time that I saw

what I thought was a snake, what I was really seeing was a rope'?

 

The interesting question seems to be, when can I ever be really, really

sure

that I know what I am seeing? Are you in fact suggesting that everything

that we claim to see is really only inference?

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

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Hi Dennis,

I did say that the locution 'what I was really seeing' is

fine for ordinary purposes as long as you do not put any epistemological

weight on the seeing part. I think perhaps this is what you are doing so

because you agree with Sadanandaji's idea of their being an overlap which

is the veridical part of what you saw ie. 5ft. long coiled.

 

Our seeing/perception is not in sections or parts.

 

This section from VP pg.144 may be relevant:

" That validity is due to the totality of causes producing knowledge in

general, and does not depend on extra merit, for there is no merit that

abides in all valid knowledge. Nor is the contact *with_a_large_number_of

parts (of the object) a merit of valid perception, for it is absent in the

perception of colour etc. as also of the self, and in spite of the

contact, the perception, " The conch is yellow " is an error. "

 

What VP is saying here is that there is no mark of validity that is

apprehended by virtue of parts.

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Namaste Srinivasji,

If you are saying that validity is the

assumed mark of perception or that there is a default acceptance of what

you are seeing then that would be what I take VP to hold also. " The

validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended " . I will write a

further note on this tomorrow.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Steve-ji,

 

 

advaitin , Steve Stoker <otnac6 wrote:

>

> Hello!

>

> The judgment that `this

> world is real' may be mistaken, but any correction,

> according to

> svataHprAmANyavAda, must be learned only later.

>

> I'm satisfied in this area with the concept of

> relative and absolute, irrespective of perception. The

> world is real from the relative point of view and

> unreal from the ultimate point of view (which is no

> point of view at all, I think!). Being " double-minded "

> in this tricky area keeps one from the extremes of the

> pairs of opposites, I believe.

>

 

You mean to say concept of relative-absolute (vyavahAra-pAramArtha)

framework is not epistemologically established truth, but mere a

hypothesis?

 

That boils down to the question, is relative-absolute framework

proven by pramANas (epistemologically established and known) or the

very mechanism of epistemology (pramANa-vichAra) is under relative

point of view?

 

Acharya Shankara seems to hold the later position, when he says ;

 

`sarvE pramANapramEyavyavahArA loukikA vaidikAscha pravrutaH sarvANi

cha ShAstrANi vidhipratiShEdamOkShaparANi'

 

Here meaning is quite evident that " All conventions of the means

(pramANa) and objects (praMEya) of right knowledge-whether loukika

or vaidika - & all the ShAstrAs dealing with injuction (vidhi) &

pratishEda (prohibition) or final release'deliverance (mOkSha) are

in the realm of avidya "

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

PraNAms to all.

 

Just some general comments.

 

I think there is confusion in cognitive process to recognition process.

 

Cognition occurs immediately based on the input from senses, whatever that input

is -

that is whether it is complete or partial- forms and colors come first before

sounds etc.

VRitt is formed based on the sense input up to that point. That is cognition,

that is

immediate.

Recognition is not immediate but has to occur based on the memory - It can still

be

immediate since recognition can be fast and it is not based on inference from

what is

perceived - inference involves deductive thinking involving cause-effect

relation ships-

When a first time cognition of a new object occurs, there is no recognition - I

see that

but what is that? will be there. Fuzzy recognition can occur if there is some

resemblance to previously perceived objects.

 

When I see an object and say it is a snake - Prior samskaara of the snake (that

is

memory) is involved to recognize that it is a snake. Shankara provides analysis

in the

adhyaasa bhAshya - why snake and not an elephant? If I have no prior samskaara

of a snake

then I would not jump saying that there is a snake - I would say I am seeing

something -

what is it? – He raises a purvapaksha and answers in terms samksara and

saadRisyam

(similarity of snake and a rope).

 

Error occurs in the recognition when the cognition is not based on sufficiently

discriminative attributes of the senses.

 

Invalidity of the knowledge, as stated by the commentator to VP, comes from

contradiction

in the subsequent experience. In validity is not immediately recognized.

Hence error in cognitions is based on invalidation which is again based on

contradictory

experience. This has to be understood clearly.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

--- kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote:

 

Just an addition. There has been lot of work on the recognition process. It

appears that

neural network operates in parallel processing mode and not in series processing

mode.

That is mind examines simultaneously the several options that are available in

the

recognition process and does the process of elimination quickly to arrive at

recognition

of the perceived object. That makes the recognition almost immediate, although

context is

given some weight in the screening and in elimination process.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Dear Srinivas-ji and Michael-ji,

 

 

 

Getting out of my depth here - I'm afraid I did not follow your latest VP

excerpt at all, Michael.

 

 

 

In what is said below, is this not where faith in the scriptures/teacher

enters into it? Although I currently see what I think is a snake, the

scriptures/teacher tells me that it is in fact a rope. I have faith that

what they say is true now, in the present and then later, upon enlightenment

in the future, I see the truth for myself. This is a perfectly valid way of

acquiring knowledge in advaita epistemology, isn't it?

 

 

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf

Of Srinivas Kotekal

06 February 2008 21:34

advaitin

Re: Perception in VP

 

 

 

The judgment that `this

world is real' may be mistaken, but any correction, according to

svataHprAmANyavAda, must be learned only later. Forward thinking

in the sense that correcting knowledge of this " falsity " would

occur in future is, in spistemologically speaking, itself an untrue

proposition.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Namaste to all.

About five years ago I took up the study of Vedantaparibhasha and

since I found it difficult to understand, I prepared a summary to

enable me to understand it. This was posted on my website and can be

accessed at

www.geocities.com/snsastri/vedantaparibhasha1.html

I do not know whether I have been able to make it more intelligible.

Regards,

S.N.Sastri

 

 

In advaitin , " Madathil Rajendran Nair "

<madathilnair wrote:

>

> Namaste Dennis-ji.

>

> VP needs another bhAshya at our level. The language is unkindly

> unyielding. I never knew English could be so hard on us. I admire

> Michael-ji's ability to relish this type of a cup of tea!

>

> >

> >

>

[Guest guest]

This is in continuation of my previous post on this subject.

The link for Vedantaparibhasha on my website may please be read as

http://www.geocities.com/snsastri/vedantaparibhasha1.html

 

S.N.Sastri

 

 

 

>

>

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis-ji,

 

>

> In what is said below, is this not where faith in the

scriptures/teacher

> enters into it? Although I currently see what I think is a snake,

the

> scriptures/teacher tells me that it is in fact a rope. I have

faith that

> what they say is true now, in the present and then later, upon

enlightenment

> in the future, I see the truth for myself. This is a perfectly

valid way of

> acquiring knowledge in advaita epistemology, isn't it?

>

>

 

Faith is never a pramANa in vEdAnta. Faith is one thing and

epistemology is another thing.

 

Speaking of myself, for me the validity of scriptures (particularly

vEdas) is not based on faith, rather it is based on aspects of

epistemology. This is where the vEda apoUrushEya vAda comes into

picture. This vAda is so profound that it has very solid

epistemological basis. This vAda is tightly coupled with

svataprAmANya vada along with svaprakAshatva vAda of sentients. For

example, with this vAda one can make a person, who was non-believer

of the validity of vEdas such as a bhOudha or a jaina, accept it at

the end based on the inescapable logic of epistemology. All

schools of vEdAnta accepts this vAda (they have to if they want to

call themselves vEdAntins). The only difference is the degree to

which they understood this vAda and explored in their classical

texts.

 

Look at this way, if faith were to be allowed in one case, another

case which is of diametrically opposite position will also claim the

validity for their position under the guise of faith. If we keep

doing this, finally, we'll end up in accepting various claims of

truth which may be mutually contradicting to each other. The

position of Hindu vs. bhOudha-s or Jaina-s or Abrahamic claims of

truth is the case in point.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

Dear Srinivas-ji,

 

 

 

Cannot 'shabda' be translated/understood as 'verbal testimony, authority or

evidence'? I.e. is it not the case that A tells B something and B thereby

gains knowledge as a result of shabda pramANa? Is it not therefore true to

say that, in order for B to accept the new information as knowledge, B has

to believe that A is trustworthy? Is this not equivalent to saying that B

has faith in A's reliability as a witness?

 

 

 

I don't follow your argument about Buddhists versus Jains etc. Obviously

Buddhists have faith in their doctrines and Jains have faith in theirs.

Neither of these facts affect whether or not I have faith in either.

 

 

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf

Of Srinivas Kotekal

07 February 2008 16:47

advaitin

Re: Perception in VP

 

 

 

 

Faith is never a pramANa in vEdAnta. Faith is one thing and

epistemology is another thing.

 

...

 

Look at this way, if faith were to be allowed in one case, another

case which is of diametrically opposite position will also claim the

validity for their position under the guise of faith. If we keep

doing this, finally, we'll end up in accepting various claims of

truth which may be mutually contradicting to each other. The

position of Hindu vs. bhOudha-s or Jaina-s or Abrahamic claims of

truth is the case in point.

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Namaste,

 

For those who would like to delve further into this subject,

here are a few pointers:

 

"

Vedanta Paribhasa of Dharma-Rajadhvarindra

 

by N.S. Anantakrishna Sastri

 

Year of Publication : 1993

 

About the Book :

Dharmaraja`s work ( c. 17th century A.D.), is an excellent manual of

Advaita logic and metaphysics. While the author accepts the

conclusions of the Advaita philosophy, he finds it necessary to use

the language of the Nyaya system by the special circumstances of his

time and the society in which he lived. No system of metaphysics can

be considered to be complete, if it does not set forth an adequate

logical doctrine.

 

There is no doubt that other works on the Advaita system as

Sriharsa`s Khandanakhandakhadya, Citsukha`s works, Madhusudana

Sarasvati`s Advaitasiddhi, discuss logical problems with great skill

and dialectical power but it is not their intention to give a

systematic exposition and defence of the Advaita theory of knowledge.

It is this task which the Vedanta-paribhasa undertakes.

 

It has eight chapters of which the first six deal with pratyaksa

(perception), anumana (inference), upamana (comparison), agama

(scriptural testimony), arthapatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-

apprehension), respectively.

 

The last two are more metaphysical in character and discuss visaya or

the subject-matter and prayojana or the purpose of investigation.

All the more important problems of the Advaita philosophy, such as

the nature of the pramanas, grades of reality or to be more accurate,

unreality, the relation of Brahman, Isvara and jiva, the nature and

status of the world, the relation of maya and avidya, salvation and

the way to attain it, are discussed with great care and cleverness.

 

Ramakrsna`s Sikhamani is the well known commentary on it,

Amaradasa`s Maniprabha is a useful gloss on the latter.

Asubodhini by Krsnanatha Nyayapancanana,

Jivananda Vidyasagar`s commentary and another work

`Arthadipika` are other treatises on the subject.

 

All these are much influenced by the Nyaya logic and

Mr. Sastri`s Paribhasaprakasika attempts to interpret the

Paribhasa more from the standpoint of the Advaita philosophy. "

 

 

Regards,

 

Sunder

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennis-ji,

 

advaitin , " Dennis Waite " <dwaite wrote:

>

> Dear Srinivas-ji,

>

>

>

> Cannot 'shabda' be translated/understood as 'verbal testimony,

authority or

> evidence'? I.e. is it not the case that A tells B something and B

thereby

> gains knowledge as a result of shabda pramANa? Is it not therefore

true to

> say that, in order for B to accept the new information as

knowledge, B has

> to believe that A is trustworthy? Is this not equivalent to saying

that B

> has faith in A's reliability as a witness?

>

 

In order to accept A's words as valid, B has to make several

assumptions -- such as A himself knows the truth to begin with, even

though A knows it he is telling that truth only, A has no intension

to hide any aspects of truth (i.e revealing in full) etc etc.

Having said that, the validity of A's word is as good as validity of

underlying assumptions. They may be correct or may be wrong, it is

a gambling. The problem is, validity of such underlying assumptions

are unknown unless they themselves are known to you independent of

A's or someone else's words.

 

If you were to attest (for yourself) the validity of underlying

assumptions based on the proven track of epistemological

expositions, then the words of A can be trusted as pramANa. In

shAstra also we consider the verbal testimony of a person as

pramANa. What we call them is `Apta vAkyas' or `pourushEya agamas'

collectively. Here the Aptatva of a person is first established on

the objective way and then consider his words as pramANa.

 

When it comes to claims of extrasensory truths, such as metaphysical

realities, that objective criteria (to accept a persons text or

words) used is the apourushEya shruti. If a authored text (or words

for that matter if author is living) is considered pramANa only if

it is aligned with shruti. If it is not, it is not a pramANa.

 

Say for example, Bhagavat Gita is Krishna's words. Geeta is pramANa

(it is one among prastanatrya) not because we have faith in it. It

is pramANa because we have known the fact that Krishna's omniscience

(sarvajnatva) is affirmed on the basis of impersonal testimony of

vEda, who's validity itself was established apriori based again on

the infallible epistemological grounds of apourushEatvam. It is the

same case with other authored texts like rAmAyaNa, mahAbhArata, 18

purANas etc.

 

The point I have been stressing in all my writings over the internet

is that vEdAnta is NOT a faith based system unlike all other systems

out there. It is not mysticism either (believe me there are so many

private ideas being pushed in the name of mystery of Brahman into

the system of vEdAnta). In my opinion, the reason of sanAtana

dharma (so called " Hindu " ) being oldest living system is because at

it's core, which is vEdAnta, it is standing on infallible grounds of

epistemological certainty.

 

>

>

> I don't follow your argument about Buddhists versus Jains etc.

Obviously

> Buddhists have faith in their doctrines and Jains have faith in

theirs.

> Neither of these facts affect whether or not I have faith in

either.

>

>

 

Having or not having faith in them is not the point here. The point

is, if I accept a particular claim of truth on the basis of faith

alone, I will not be in a position to deny or refute other claims.

This is because, the other claims are equally founded on their

respective faiths.

 

This is not a problem when such claims are about `taste' or such

subjective ideas of everyday living, such as they `like' Beethoven,

I like Thyagaraja etc etc kind. On the other hand, it will be

philosophical stalemate when such claims is about the objective

metaphysical truths.

For example, vEdAnta claims ultimate truth is non-dual, where as

Christianity claims ultimate truth is dual. It can not be both. So?

Are we suppose to go in our own way? What if I am wrong and they are

right? Do I have to play this gambling?

 

Historically speaking, Acharya Shankara has to take time and effort

to refute other positions. Why do you think he did so? If he has

base his siddhAnta on just faith, he would have no philosophical and

moral grounds to denounce others. Don't you think so?

 

I hope I made my point clear.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

Dear Srinivas-ji,

 

 

 

Apologies if I appear to be being stupid here but it seems the case that all

of your certainty is resting on the apauruSheyatva of the shruti. You say

for example that: " AchArya Shankara has to take time and effort to refute

other positions. Why do you think he did so? If he has base his siddhAnta on

just faith, he would have no philosophical and moral grounds to denounce

others. " In my understanding, Shankara's arguments are referred for their

authority to backing statements of shruti so that my understanding of what

you are saying is supported.

 

 

 

But how does this differ from Christianity for example. Do they not say that

the bible is the (literal) 'word of God'?

 

 

 

When the Christian tells me that his 'unauthored' source of knowledge says

such and such, and the Vedantin says that shruti makes this contrary

statement, how is one to differentiate initially if not using faith?

Shankara was able to argue with the other Astika-s because they accepted the

same material as truth, (relying on reason alone to refute the nAstika-s).

 

 

 

Surely those who accept the shruti rather than another source do so

initially because of faith until such time they are able to recognize the

truth for themselves. (Unless they accept it provisionally because it seems

reasonable - this was rather the case for me.)

 

 

 

So, when you say: " The point is, if I accept a particular claim of truth on

the basis of faith alone, I will not be in a position to deny or refute

other claims. This is because, the other claims are equally founded on their

respective faiths " . I would argue that this is precisely how it is in the

beginning. This is why we have religious wars. Eventually, once one has

seen the truth for oneself and has become familiar with the teaching, then

one is able to reason with the other and (possibly) bring them round.

 

 

 

Best wishes,

 

Dennis

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf

Of Srinivas Kotekal

07 February 2008 18:46

advaitin

Re: Perception in VP

 

 

 

The point I have been stressing in all my writings over the internet

is that vEdAnta is NOT a faith based system unlike all other systems

out there. It is not mysticism either (believe me there are so many

private ideas being pushed in the name of mystery of Brahman into

the system of vEdAnta). In my opinion, the reason of sanAtana

dharma (so called " Hindu " ) being oldest living system is because at

it's core, which is vEdAnta, it is standing on infallible grounds of

epistemological certainty.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Hello Dennis and all,

 

how is one to differentiate initially if not using

faith?

 

The alternative I see is this:

 

People BELIEVE something first, whether religious,

philosophical, political, or whatever and then AFTER

the belief develop logic to support the belief. No one

starts with logic. There is nothing to start with

unless there is an image, thought, word, whatever that

comes FIRST. People anxious to continue with or

preserve their beliefs may not see this, it may be

unconscious, the belief coming first and the logic

coming second--but if you examine the matter you may

see the logic in it!

 

What I'm saying applies only to those intangibles

mentioned above, not the world of matter, science,

math etc. THERE we can legitimately apply logic. But

logic in the intangible realm just won't do. The proof

of that IS the various religions, all claiming to have

the " right " way, the " right " logic. None of them ever

wins out against the others and really, that is the

realm of politics when those of one sect or religion

tries to win logically against the others.

 

That's why we call them " religious beliefs " . We don't

say religious " facts " . Maybe unconsciously we know

we're dealing with belief and not fact.

 

The Roman Catholic catechism says or used to say that

it was the " one true religion " and then went on to

provide " proof " !!!! from the Bible and from

" tradition " . I don't see any difference in that and

any other tradition trying to prove its " rightness " .

They will all have some basis for their logic and all

of those logics rest on belief...at least that's one

guy's view of it, one opinion. And what is there in

the metaphisical realm except opinion/belief.

 

Maybe some have faith in logic?

 

 

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