Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -3

[Guest guest]

3. Knowledge is Continuous

 

{we are discussing the topics as they appear in the Vedanta paribhASha of

Dharmaraja

Advarindra}

 

Continuity of the Knowledge: According to advaita Vedanta, knowledge of an

object

perceived via the senses is considered as ‘vRitti’ or mental state’ in the mind,

which

gets illumined by the consciousness. Similar to the idea that an object outside

is seen

due to the reflection of some light falling on the object, the mental state is

also

‘seen’ , when it is illuminated by the light of consciousness. These statements

are made

intentionally in passive voice, since consciousness while it is self-luminous,

does not

actively illumine anything. On the other hand, objects in its presence get

illumined.

It is similar to moon getting illumined by the Sun, while the self-shining Sun

does not

actively do illumination of anything. Knowledge of the object ‘out there’ is

complete,

when the associated ‘mental state’ gets illuminated. That constitutes the

objective

knowledge. When we are knowledgeable, we say, ‘I am conscious of the object’.

Hence

objective knowledge is defined as being ‘(a) conscious of object’s existence and

(b)

conscious of the attributes of the object that are perceived through sense

input’.

Objective knowledge is only attributive knowledge since senses can measure only

the

attributes of the object and not substantive. Substantive for all objects

according to

Vedanta is Brahman only. Objects are only naama and ruupa (ruupa includes all

other sense

perceptions) projected on Brahman. In fact, it is important to recognize that

the

existence of an object is also confirmed by the knowledge of its existence.

Until a

conscious entity establishes the existence of an object, object’s existence is

not

established. Object is not a self-existent entity, since it is not

self-conscious. Does

the object exist if I am not conscious of it or if I have no knowledge of it?

Who is

going to establish its existence if no conscious entity is conscious of it?

Hence we can

say existence of such an object is anirvachaniiyam or mathematically an

inderminate

problem. The reason is simple. We have already defined that knowledge of an

object

involves removal of ignorance that is coving it. Until the ignorance is removed,

the

knowledge of its existence is also not established. Ignorance is removed only

when it is

illumined by the light of consciousness. Hence conscious entity has to be there

to

recognize its existence and have its knowledge. Ignorance is anirvachaniiyam or

indeterminate. It is again similar to the pitch dark room case where the

existence of any

object is not established until one turns the light on and see. Existence of

any object

in a dark room is an indeterminate problem until one turns the light on to see

and

establish its existence.

 

Hence, the perception of an object external to the mind is the same as the

illumination

of the resulting ‘mental state, vRitti’. The illumination of an object continues

until

another object is perceived or its ‘mental state’ is known. Perception of next

object

brings in its associated ‘mental state’ into the light of consciousness. Thus,

the light

of consciousness continues to illumine the sequential objects or more correctly

the

sequential mental states, that come in its preview. It is similar to the light

shining

on the stage continuously as the scenes continue to change. The objects are in

sequence

but the illuminating consciousness is continuous. Knowledge and consciousness

are

considered identical in Advaita Vedanta. Knowledge is therefore continuous and

hence

eternal too. If it becomes discontinuous, it absence, for it to be known, has to

be

illumined by consciousness. That is I have knowledge of the absence of objects

too. The

last statement will have a bearing when we examine the deep sleep state. When

there is no

objects to be perceived, either darkness is perceived as in the case of a pitch

dark room

or ignorance that covers the knowledge of the objects is perceived, since we

have already

stated that knowledge of every object is covered by ignorance. Knowledge

continues as

knowledge of objects or knowledge of darkness or knowledge of ignorance. Even

when

Objects change, the vRittis assocated with the objects change, but knowledge

remains the

same and continuous. As discussed before continuity is not a concept of time, it

is

beyond the time concept. It is ever present, eternal ‘NOW’. Knowledge is ever

existent

Now.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

>

> Similar to the idea that an object outside is seen

> due to the reflection of some light falling on the object, the

mental state is also

> `seen' , when it is illuminated by the light of consciousness. These

statements are made

> intentionally in passive voice, since consciousness while it is

self-luminous, does not

> actively illumine anything. On the other hand, objects in its

presence get illumined.

 

Sri Sadaji,

 

This statement seems to say: Objects are there outside and they get

illumined by consciousness.

 

For the question " Whose consciousness? " , should we say: the jiva's?

For it is the jiva who is conscious and can possess knowledge and

ignorance.

 

>In fact, it is important to recognize that the

> existence of an object is also confirmed by the knowledge of its

existence. Until a

> conscious entity establishes the existence of an object, object's

existence is not

> established. Object is not a self-existent entity, since it is not

self-conscious. Does

> the object exist if I am not conscious of it or if I have no

knowledge of it? Who is

> going to establish its existence if no conscious entity is conscious

of it?

 

But when the jiva is the starting point, the limiting adjuncts have

already been admitted, as far as mind, senses, etc. So why can we not

say that Brahman exists as objects to that jiva, independent of

whether the jiva is conscious of them? The reference frame of jiva

will correspond with a referential version of Prakrithi. So if I say I

am a man in a universe, then I must say that there are potentially

objects out there which I am not conscious of now but if I were to go

there, I would be. The answer exists based on my reference-frame

rather than my capacity to know that answer. Or why not?

 

Should I think " Whether there is a person called Sadaji writing these

emails is an anirvachaniya problem. The only reality from my

standpoint is that there is a computer in which these words appear to

my consciousness and these meanings are associated; that meaning

includes the idea that there is a person called Sadaji writing all this. " ?

 

Rather I would say: Given I am starting as a person, Brahman

corresponds to me as a world with other persons, and Sadaji is one

such writing these emails.

 

I think this is the pramaana of inference at work; something accepted

in Advaita (?). So my second logic is correct, and the problem is not

anirvachaniya, given my present starting point of jiva.

 

Is this correct? THanks.

 

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " putranm " <putranm wrote:

>

> advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

> <kuntimaddisada@> wrote:

> >

> > Similar to the idea that an object outside is seen

> > due to the reflection of some light falling on the object, the

> mental state is also

> > `seen' , when it is illuminated by the light of consciousness. These

> statements are made

> > intentionally in passive voice, since consciousness while it is

> self-luminous, does not

> > actively illumine anything. On the other hand, objects in its

> presence get illumined.

>

> Sri Sadaji,

>

> But when the jiva is the starting point, the limiting adjuncts have

> already been admitted, as far as mind, senses, etc. So why can we not

> say that Brahman exists as objects to that jiva, independent of

> whether the jiva is conscious of them? The reference frame of jiva

> will correspond with a referential version of Prakrithi. So if I say I

> am a man in a universe, then I must say that there are potentially

> objects out there which I am not conscious of now but if I were to go

> there, I would be. The answer exists based on my reference-frame

> rather than my capacity to know that answer. Or why not?

>

> Should I think " Whether there is a person called Sadaji writing these

> emails is an anirvachaniya problem. The only reality from my

> standpoint is that there is a computer in which these words appear to

> my consciousness and these meanings are associated; that meaning

> includes the idea that there is a person called Sadaji writing all

this. " ?

>

> Rather I would say: Given I am starting as a person, Brahman

> corresponds to me as a world with other persons, and Sadaji is one

> such writing these emails.

>

 

 

Sorry for multiple emails. This is actually the gagaabubu point when I

left last time. And I do not mean to mix improperly the issue of

inference.

 

But why do we ask a question of existence of an object, if it was not

produced somewhere or in some mind? Our question implies the potential

for its existence, and we must infer on the basis of further evidence

whether to prefer existence or nonexistence. So the child might infer

existence of gagabubu and the adult might do otherwise.

 

In particular, the question implies that the answer *exists* as yes or

no. Perhaps we cannot *consciously know* (at best inferentially

believe) the answer and it is subjectively anirvachaniya. But from the

jiva standpoint, where the question is able to arise, there must be a

corresponding objective answer parallel to that standpoint that exists

independently of the jiva.

 

Is Advaita opposed to this logic? (My intent here is to figure out the

philosophy's position, not establish mine.)

 

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

 

 

 

PS This point is relevant as to how one approaches Advaita. One of

these positions is like the eka-jiva thing, where it is me and Brahman

as He reveals. It is very difficult. The other is more digestible

where we allow for existence of duality independent of actual

consciousness, based on our present state of duality (as jiva).

[Guest guest]

--- putranm <putranm wrote:

 

>

> Sri Sadaji,

>

> But when the jiva is the starting point, the limiting adjuncts have

> already been admitted, as far as mind, senses, etc. So why can we not

> say that Brahman exists as objects to that jiva, independent of

> whether the jiva is conscious of them?

 

Yes – Admitting that Brahman is everything only implies that everything is

nothing but

Brahman as its material cause or to say there cannot be anything with out

Brahman as its

substratum – and that Brahman is existence itself. This statement, however, does

not

admit existence of any particular thing, such as gaagaabuubu. You can say it is

potentially there provided your statement involves knowing gaagaabuubu in its

potential

form – that is its lakshaNas or predominant qualifications that makes

gaagaabuubu

different from chaachaachuuchu.

 

When I say pot was not there before, but it was there in the clay in potential

form, I

have already defined what that pot would be at least in my mind. That is what

Brahman

does before he starts creating – tad aikshata – He visualizes what should be the

creation

like based on the last creation or last samskaaras before the world got

dissolved into

him during pralaya.

 

A particular thing has to be cognized by a mind that is supported by

consciousness to

establish its existence as well as its knowledge. That is the reason why,

things are not

seen in deep sleep state since there is no mind to cognize them. I can have an

imaginary

object with certain attributes and create one using the materials outside. But I

have

already defined its attributes and the object knowledge is attributive knowledge

anyway.

 

The reference frame of jiva

> will correspond with a referential version of Prakrithi. So if I say I

> am a man in a universe, then I must say that there are potentially

> objects out there which I am not conscious of now but if I were to go

> there, I would be. The answer exists based on my reference-frame

> rather than my capacity to know that answer. Or why not?

 

To put it correctly, jiiva is with reference to particular prakRiti that he

identifies

with and not with total prakRiti – then he becomes Iswara.

 

I can say potential objects are there provided I can define them in some form –

I can say

there are thousands of people there in a planet up in the skies. No problem.

What it

establishes is a live forms that I already well defined –for example live

involves its

capacity to duplicate, etc, and when we say people, it involves with some mind

and

intelligence – Hence conceptually I have qualified the people based on the

knowledge of

existence of such people. I can imagine them in some distant planets and look

for them.

Here potentially implies entities with attributes prescribed. In fact that is

how

creation is also defined – vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam – potential

attributes

can become localized when they get created or discovered. It is like black hole

that

scientists discovered. The potential was formulated mathematically even before

they were

found. Hence the statement ‘existence of the object is established by the

knowledge of

its existence’. Now can you formulate logically existence of gaagaabuubu and

not

chaachaachuuchu. If you can, then they exists at least in your mind! – and if

you can

convince the others through logic, then they will start existing at least

potentially in

others too. If that logic is fools proof, then they should exist some where in

the

universe that one can look far. Potential can be at the level of praatibhaasika

or

vyaavahaarika. For prAtibhAsika, your mind needs to be convinced and for

vyAvahArika,

other logical minds as well.

 

 

> Should I think " Whether there is a person called Sadaji writing these

> emails is an anirvachaniya problem.

 

No – you have already defined two things concretely – one is Sadaji either via

anumaana

pramaaNa or shabda pramaaNa and the second thing is writings which is pratyaksha

pramaaNa

– since writing normally do not descend from no where, and there has to be

intelligence

behind it, at least in some of those emails – the experiential knowledge and

anumaana

pramANa establishes the existence of both Sadaji and the corresponding emails.

This is

different from some gaagaabuubu sending some emails that you have not yet

received. If

you do receive some junk emails and you can attribute to some gaagaabuubu – you

have used

both pratyaksha pramaaNa (seeing emails) and anumaana pramaaNa inferring some

dude has

send it. In all these knowledge of existence is established by existence of the

knowledge. If you do not know any sadaji or any other dude and if you have not

received

any mails then you can not say there is some potential sadaji sending some

potential

emals- that is potentially in correct!

 

 

> Rather I would say: Given I am starting as a person, Brahman

> corresponds to me as a world with other persons, and Sadaji is one

> such writing these emails.

 

Brahman is a cause for all objects is the generic statement applicable for all

objects,

potential or otherwise. When you are talking about particular objects, then you

are

already defining the particular from the general, other wise particular has no

meaning.

Hence particulars about that particular you must formulate it to ask the

question whether

that particular object exists or not. Objects you do not know to define it

cannot have

even potential existence in your mind and therefore in Brahman too.

 

------------

The below is more recent email – P and S are separated.

 

P:

 

But why do we ask a question of existence of an object, if it was not

produced somewhere or in some mind? Our question implies the potential

for its existence, and we must infer on the basis of further evidence

whether to prefer existence or nonexistence.

 

S:

Potential for existence, as we discussed, involves defining attributes of that

object –

that means knowledge of the object exists in potential form. Knowledge of its

existence

establishes the existence of the object – that object can remain as prAtibhAsika

- but

if the potential for existence is established in all minds then it becomes

vyAvahaarika

potential – which one can look for outside to see such an object can exist –

like we

discovered black holes which were existing potentially in the minds of

scientists.

 

p:

So the child might infer

existence of gagabubu and the adult might do otherwise.

 

S:

possible – but who ever does in whatever form – he has to formulate it – that is

the

knowledge of its existence has to be formulated that will establish the

existence of the

object at least in the child’s mind. If the child can logically convince the

adults then

it can exist potentially in the adults too. Since convincing involves vyaapti or

cause-effect relations if it becomes vyaavahaarika potential one can actually

look for

such an object and discover it.

 

The bottom line is potential for any object involves clear description of its

attributes.

The more clear all the attributes are more potential!

 

Potential can become real at praatibhaasika level or vyaavahaarika level – it

all depends

on whether it is only an imagination of the child (praatibhaasika reality) or

imagination

based on objective logic or vyaapti (vyaavahaarika reality). In either case the

problem

is the same – knowledge of its existence establishes the existence of the

object.

 

Anirvacaniiyam operates if I do not have the knowledge of its existence –

provided there

is no self-contradiction – that is vandhyaaputraH – son of a barren woman -where

the word

itself negates the existence of the object

 

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

 

PS This point is relevant as to how one approaches Advaita. One of

these positions is like the eka-jiva thing, where it is me and Brahman

as He reveals. It is very difficult. The other is more digestible

where we allow for existence of duality independent of actual

consciousness, based on our present state of duality (as jiva).a.

 

S:

As I see your PS is different from the above logic. Jiivas are multiple as we

can see.

But the essence is one – Jiiva is reflected consciousness in the subtle body or

bodies;

just as I see many jiivas in the dream world. But consciousness is one. Jiiva

has to

realize that I am not the reflected consciousness (RC) but I am the original

consciousness (OC) which is one without a second.

 

Hope this helps.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

 

> S:

> possible – but who ever does in whatever form – he has to formulate

it – that is the

> knowledge of its existence has to be formulated that will establish

the existence of the

> object at least in the child's mind. If the child can logically

convince the adults then

> it can exist potentially in the adults too. Since convincing

involves vyaapti or

> cause-effect relations if it becomes vyaavahaarika potential one can

actually look for

> such an object and discover it.

>

> The bottom line is potential for any object involves clear

description of its attributes.

> The more clear all the attributes are more potential!

>

> Potential can become real at praatibhaasika level or vyaavahaarika

level – it all depends

> on whether it is only an imagination of the child (praatibhaasika

reality) or imagination

> based on objective logic or vyaapti (vyaavahaarika reality). In

either case the problem

> is the same – knowledge of its existence establishes the existence

of the object.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

>

> Anirvacaniiyam operates if I do not have the knowledge of its

existence – provided there

> is no self-contradiction – that is vandhyaaputraH – son of a barren

woman -where the word

> itself negates the existence of the object

>

 

Sri Sadaji, Thanks for your long explanation. I am still tempted by my

past understanding and getting a little confused on this concept of

knowledge. Can you clarify below, where necessary? Thanks.

 

 

 

As I understand from your post, " Knowledge of existence of object "

includes pratibhasika and vyavahaarika knowledge. It can be within

one's own mind, in potential form, and need not be associated with the

senses (in order to be called knowledge of existence).

 

Would it be correct to say: whatever objective knowledge I become

aware of now or ever after (through any pramaana), the knowledge of

its existence was already within me in potential form, or more

precisely, the potential for knowing that object was within me even if

the mind was not thinking of it.

 

Then the existence or nonexistence of objects is independent of my

thinking of it, since the potential of knowing the object (if it were

to exist at vyavahaarika level) would be in me.

 

This is important to distinguish since the concept of " knowing " is

usually understood as an active process of the mind. Here the

suggestion is that " thinking/remembering " and " knowing " are different.

The clay has the potential for appearing as pot; if one conceives of

the attributes of clay, all the potential forms are also implicitly

known (though not mentally formulated).

 

So if the jiva identifies with particular individual-prakrithi, then

in potential, a corresponding universal-prakrithi is also identified

though the jiva may not be actively aware of all that exists: their

potential knowledge exists in the jiva's own reference frame. That

frame also includes the past and future: though the jiva may never

mentally know all of it, its present identification includes all that

knowledge in potential form.

 

However if one were to ask of questions beyond the jiva's prakrithi

standpoint, the issue becomes anirvachaniya. Perhaps an example is

quantum mechanics' uncertainty principle, or the cat-in-box. There may

be other questions for which the jiva (by definition) can never answer

(i.e. the potential for knowledge is absent.) but only Ishvara knows.

But this again confuses against my last paragraph: if the past which I

can never mentally-know of still defines my present and hence is

potential knowledge (at least, that the past existed). Can you clarify

on what exactly is anirvachaniya and cannot constitute potential

knowledge? (For Hiranyakasipu, Narasimha avatara was like the son of a

barren woman, beyond all expectation/knowledge. Yet he saw Him thus.)

 

 

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

--- putranm <putranm wrote:

 

> As I understand from your post, " Knowledge of existence of object "

> includes pratibhasika and vyavahaarika knowledge. It can be within

> one's own mind, in potential form, and need not be associated with the

> senses (in order to be called knowledge of existence).

 

I did not say that it is not associated with senses - the qualities or

attributes of an

object comes from the sense input. Mind does not create the attributes that you

see.

Hence mind does not create an object out there with the qualities of such and

such.

 

You question is something different. About gaagaabuubu - since there is no

object out

there to gather attributes, you are imagining attributes based on the memory -

Tallness,

sweetness etc all based on memory input - you can not imagine gaagaabuubu with

taataatuutu quality, can you? unless you again define that quality in terms of

known.

 

I can even imagine rabit with horns - since I am mentally assembling them

bringing rabit

knowledge from one side and horns knowledge on the other - and thus create an

rabit with

horns - that is praatibhaasika -reality,

 

Now if you look for a rabit with horn - you will be disappointed - at least in

this

earth. May exist elsewhere in the universe.

 

Hence mind does not create sense input - That is the reason why advaita differs

from

vijnaanavada or Realisms or idealism theories.

 

>

> Would it be correct to say: whatever objective knowledge I become

> aware of now or ever after (through any pramaana), the knowledge of

> its existence was already within me in potential form, or more

> precisely, the potential for knowing that object was within me even if

> the mind was not thinking of it.

 

No - That is not what I described. You can create a gaagaabuubu by providing

attributes

that you are already familiar - based on memory.

 

In principle all creations are assemblage - Vedanta provides an exhaustive

discussion of

how subtle elements and the gross elements formed by divisions and

recombinations - in

effect just assemblage. Only thing that is basic and fundamental is - your self

or

Brahman - pure consciousness. Not the mind - mind is also an assemblage.

 

 

>

> Then the existence or nonexistence of objects is independent of my

> thinking of it, since the potential of knowing the object (if it were

> to exist at vyavahaarika level) would be in me.

 

No - potential is maayaa - that is beginningless - comes from previous

samskaaras and

previous has no beginning. In one of the mind series I have described that.

 

>

> This is important to distinguish since the concept of " knowing " is

> usually understood as an active process of the mind. Here the

> suggestion is that " thinking/remembering " and " knowing " are different.

> The clay has the potential for appearing as pot; if one conceives of

> the attributes of clay, all the potential forms are also implicitly

> known (though not mentally formulated).

 

I just posted the 4th part - knowledge comes from consciousness. Mind gets the

borrowed

capacity to know in the presence of consciousness - called witnessing

consciousness. I

suggest that you keep reading the series since VP makes these thing clear

slowly.

 

 

> So if the jiva identifies with particular individual-prakrithi, then

> in potential, a corresponding universal-prakrithi is also identified

> though the jiva may not be actively aware of all that exists: their

> potential knowledge exists in the jiva's own reference frame. That

> frame also includes the past and future: though the jiva may never

> mentally know all of it, its present identification includes all that

> knowledge in potential form.

 

I am not sure I follow all the logic you have.

Suppose I know chemistry. But you do not know it but you know physics. These are

limiting

consciousnesses identified with local minds. Total mind is omniscient - there

cannot be

anything in the universe that total consciousness does not know. Consciousness

has to be

conscious of the existence of any thing and everything - that is omni potency.

From the

jiiva's point if he does not know that it exists then he also does not know that

it does

not exist. It becomes anirvachaniiyam or an indeterminate problem. Hence

existence

definite can be established only by the knowledge of its existence. As our

Michael says I

keep repeating it and I will be doing it eternally! Since that is the truth

supported by

logic - until some one proves me that I am wrong.

 

I am reminded of funny statement - this is just to relax the mind from some

serious

discussion- The statement is: King can do no wrong - becuse he is the king. If

he chages

his opinion, he was right before and he is right now - why ... because King

cannot be

wrong at any time. Not that I am a king, although my wife call me raja meaning

as one,

whenever she wants some favor that I have to do and I would not do otherwise- If

she

wants some big thing then I am become mahaaraaja - only thing is she forgets

that king

does not do anything!

 

>

> However if one were to ask of questions beyond the jiva's prakrithi

> standpoint, the issue becomes anirvachaniya. Perhaps an example is

> quantum mechanics' uncertainty principle, or the cat-in-box. There may

> be other questions for which the jiva (by definition) can never answer

> (i.e. the potential for knowledge is absent.) but only Ishvara knows.

 

Yes- If I understand what you are saying correctly - I agree.

 

> But this again confuses against my last paragraph: if the past which I

> can never mentally-know of still defines my present and hence is

> potential knowledge (at least, that the past existed). Can you clarify

> on what exactly is anirvachaniya and cannot constitute potential

> knowledge? (For Hiranyakasipu, Narasimha avatara was like the son of a

> barren woman, beyond all expectation/knowledge. Yet he saw Him thus.)

 

About the last point - I do not think there was a barren woman standing there to

claim

Narasimhaji as her son!

 

You know your past from your memory - Otherwise the whole knowledge of things

will go

down the drain. What you may mean in the past life - its samskaaras are left

behind for

you know quickly now. I forgot all my chemistry that I studied 30 years ago -

but some

students keep coming to me with chemistry questions - which I have to look at

the books

and quickly learn and then teach. Since you are beginningless - you do not

remember what

all you learned in the past.

 

Anirvachaniiyam obviously as the word indicates cannot be explained! Maaya is

anirvachaniiyam - it is that power because of which one appears to become many.

Now what

is the nature of that maaya - that is anirvachaniiyam. The product the apparent

plurality

is also anirvachaniiyam - that is we cannot say it exists nor we cannot say it

does not

exist. Here is where you go from praatibhaasika to vyaavahaarika satyams. Now is

ring

real or unreal - not real since it can be negated and not unreal since it is

experienced

- hence it is mithyaa and all mithyaa is anirvachaniiyam only. There are two

sloka in

VivekachUDAmani - about maaya - starts with

sannnapyasannat .. and

avyaktanaamnii ...

 

I think some of these get slowly clarified as we study the VP.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

 

> >

> > This is important to distinguish since the concept of " knowing " is

> > usually understood as an active process of the mind. Here the

> > suggestion is that " thinking/remembering " and " knowing " are different.

> > The clay has the potential for appearing as pot; if one conceives of

> > the attributes of clay, all the potential forms are also implicitly

> > known (though not mentally formulated).

>

> > So if the jiva identifies with particular individual-prakrithi, then

> > in potential, a corresponding universal-prakrithi is also identified

> > though the jiva may not be actively aware of all that exists: their

> > potential knowledge exists in the jiva's own reference frame. That

> > frame also includes the past and future: though the jiva may never

> > mentally know all of it, its present identification includes all that

> > knowledge in potential form.

>

> I am not sure I follow all the logic you have.

 

 

 

Ok. I will read more as time permits. I cannot actively participate

due to time-crunch (as usual) but can hopefully revisit my doubts.

 

Also, if you are not already doing so, if possible, please highlight

wherever an important concept comes up, why it is of practical

importance to an Advaitin's perspective and how to incorporate it into

one's daily life, etc. Such would be useful and readers can focus the

theory into right perspective.

 

Finally, I believe the Br. Up. has things like " If one catches the

ear, one catches all sounds. " That is similar to what I am trying to

say: that if one catches the jiva (our common vyavahaarika starting

point), corresponding prakrithi (and its existence) is simultaneously

established. All possible sounds are already known to the ear though

not actively hearing them (through memory or anything else). The

not-knowing is like the QM example where even if senses are present,

one cannot know.

 

There is some conflict apparently; I can clear it later. Thanks.

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

> I am not sure I follow all the logic you have.

> Suppose I know chemistry. But you do not know it but you know

physics. These are limiting

> consciousnesses identified with local minds. Total mind is

omniscient - there cannot be

> anything in the universe that total consciousness does not know.

Consciousness has to be

> conscious of the existence of any thing and everything - that is

omni potency. From the

> jiiva's point if he does not know that it exists then he also does

not know that it does

> not exist. It becomes anirvachaniiyam or an indeterminate problem.

Hence existence

> definite can be established only by the knowledge of its existence.

 

Sri Sadaji,

 

Regarding above, the " anirvachaniyam " is stated from the jiva's

standpoint whereas the " existence " truthvalue is assessed from the

total-mind's standpoint. Thus it comes down to merely " I, as jiva,

don't know if something exists, if I don't know through any valid

pramaana. "

 

It is not a statement of " Nothing exists unless I know of its

existence " , rather just " I don't know " means " I won't affirm existence

or non-existence " either. This seems a reasonable subjective position

for the jiva to take.

 

In the case of the ear-sounds analogy, the fact of our present

capacity to hear vocal sounds may be pramaana to infer further

possibilities of hearing, which would then exist at the prathibhasika

level.

 

The possibilities are in maaya (as per your statement " maaya is

potential " ) and known to the " total-mind " . Some may be beyond what the

jiva can possibly infer,etc. from its present knowledge; such cases if

the jiva were to consider must be assessed as anirvachaniya.

 

(As example, I must say Frank Maielloji's psychic capacity 39490 would

have been quite anirvachaniya to my scientific mind (being biased, I

would have refuted it outright, but if impartial, it is anirvachaniya

problem.). Now he becomes the shabdha evidence for it; if I were to

trust the evidence, it becomes vyavahaarika reality and maaya's

potential is revealed further. If science were to prove it with more

accessible pramaana, then it becomes established fact!!)

 

Ok. Thanks for the input; I think I am following this point and will

read other parts in passive mode when time permits (hopefully).

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

--- putranm <putranm wrote:

 

>

> Regarding above, the " anirvachaniyam " is stated from the jiva's

> standpoint whereas the " existence " truthvalue is assessed from the

> total-mind's standpoint. Thus it comes down to merely " I, as jiva,

> don't know if something exists, if I don't know through any valid

> pramaana. "

>

> It is not a statement of " Nothing exists unless I know of its

> existence " , rather just " I don't know " means " I won't affirm existence

> or non-existence " either. This seems a reasonable subjective position

> for the jiva to take.

>

 

Yes Putranmji - PraNAsm

 

You got it. Yes anirvacaniiyma is from the jiiva's point only .

From Brahman point - there is not even maaya.

From Iswara's point - maaya is his power - He is the weilder of maaya - he is

called

maayavi.

From jiiva's point - it is the same as avidya -ignorance - and ignorance is sat

asat

vilakshaNam -it is not sat nor asat.

Hence if I do not know -It exists or does not exist I would not know

(expresssion of

ignorance) - Hence mathematically it is inderminate. Deterministic in science it

invovles

definiteness - which reduces to definability. Hence existence can be established

by

knowledge of its exisence - in the proces - I lend the existence to the object.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda