: Object and Consciousness of the Object

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--- snsastri <sn.sastri wrote:

 

But what Sada-ji seems to say is that

> the existence of an object is not established before some one

> becomes conscious of it and not that the object itself does not

> exist before that.

 

Sastriji - PraNAms

 

Yes that is correct. Also I am saying unless some one is conscious of it - from

the

jiiva's point - since the whole discussion is only relevant from that - the

existence of

an object is anirvachaniiyam - in the sense that it is mathematically

indeterminate

problem. That is why I keep giving example of some gaagaabuubu if it exist or

not in the

universe. Iswara my be knowing it since it is His creation. From jiiva's point

it

remains not as existent nor as non-existent but remain as his ignorance whose

nature is

anirvacaniiyam only.

 

That is what my statement means -Existence of an object is not established (does

not talk

about its creation or noncreation) until the knowledge of its existence is

established.

This seems to be a simple commonsense statement which Vedanta cannot deny unless

there is

binding reason. I cannot talk about from Iswara's point - I know He is all

knowledge -

the existence of the objects has to have his knowledge of their existence -

which one

thinks carefully comes down to the same statement as I made - some conscious

entity has

to have the knowledge of its existence! We all agree that Iswara is conscious

entity and

He knows all that exists.

 

I also said advaita is not idealism either - I do not know if Michael is

interpreting it

in that sense all the time. My statement is embedded in jagat mithyaa - as

advaitic

fundamental statement. Hence I also said if dvaitins do not agree it is not the

fault of

advaita.

 

I hope I am clear.

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

 

The difference between the two is clear. All

> things of empirical reality (vyAvahArika) exist before they are seen

> by any one, but their existence is known only after some one has

> seen it. But things which have only prAtibhAsika reality, like rope-

> snake, have no existence before they are seen by some one, and they

> wxist only for the person who sees them. One man may see a rope as a

> snake, but another man may see the same rope under the same

> circumstances as a rope itself.So the snake comes into existence for

> the man who sees it only when he sees it. But the rope, which has

> empirical reality was there even before any one saw it.

> S.N.Sastri

> >

>

>

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