Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 7

[Guest guest]

> Namaste Sada-ji,

> The vritti (mental modification) cannot be a

> representation of the sense data that is collected for the simple reason

> that we could in that case never be said to know the object.

> The knowledge of the object would be mediated to us by the mental

> modification. The mental modification *is* the object because it is the

> same pure consciousness that has taken form internally and externally.

> " Without the interior and the exterior " (Brh.Up. II.v.19)

 

Michael – PraNAms.

 

The second part I agree. And that is basis for the consciousness of the

object

is the

same as the consciousness of the subject – the unity is emphasized and

will be

explained

further.

 

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Namaste Sadaji,

 

I suppose by this that you are loth to part with the idea of

representation. Would you be able to say where it first struck you that

this theory was viable and what text and what authority sanctions it?

Have a look at 'Methods of Knowledge' pg. 72 " The Metaphysical Background "

section 5 where Swami Satprakashananda discusses such ideas. His heading

is clear:

" The theory of representation, ancient or modern, is not consistent with

the nature of sense-perception " .

 

His main point of variance is this - inference is a separate means of

knowledge and it plays no part in perception. The implication of the

representation theory is that we only infer the existence of the external

object by means of the internal object. I have added to this difficulty

the further one that we cannot know whether the internal object matches up

to the external or whether indeed there is an external object at all.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

> Namaste Sadaji,

> The implication of the

> representation theory is that we only infer the existence of the

external

> object by means of the internal object. I have added to this

difficulty

> the further one that we cannot know whether the internal object

matches up

> to the external or whether indeed there is an external object at all.

>

> Best Wishes,

> Michael.

>

 

 

Sri Michaelji, did you not argue before that objects have their own

existence independent of our knowledge of them? You also showed a

quotation of Shankara to this effect. Are you still holding to that

idea? I ask because such an idea would imply the representation

theory, that what appears in the mind is a representation of what

exists outside.

 

Also are we able to define " object " , " external " , " internal " when we

use them? The usage of these words may imply a certain

dualistic-standpoint for the discussion, and the conclusions to be

understood as relative to that standpoint.

 

Finally, your point appears to be along the lines of " if silver is

perceived, then that *is* the object of perception (relative to the

mind that perceives). " If later we see that it is not silver but nacre

(?), then the object relative to that mind is nacre (for there is no

real object but the appearance in consciousness). I recall glancing at

such an argument in the Swami's book. One wonders whether this is

idealism. When the rope-snake analogy is used, it is clear that the

real object is snake and not rope, at all times of perception: maybe

analogy for another purpose?

 

(I think it is in the context of the latter analogy that we typically

use the word " object " , where the subject-independent existence of a

definite entity is preaffirmed in the discussion, as with 10 blind

people describing an " elephant " .)

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

 

> I suppose by this that you are loth to part with the idea of

> representation. Would you be able to say where it first struck you that

> this theory was viable and what text and what authority sanctions it?

> Have a look at 'Methods of Knowledge' pg. 72 " The Metaphysical Background "

> section 5 where Swami Satprakashananda discusses such ideas. His heading

> is clear:

> " The theory of representation, ancient or modern, is not consistent with

> the nature of sense-perception " .

>

> His main point of variance is this - inference is a separate means of

> knowledge and it plays no part in perception. The implication of the

> representation theory is that we only infer the existence of the external

> object by means of the internal object. I have added to this difficulty

> the further one that we cannot know whether the internal object matches up

> to the external or whether indeed there is an external object at all.

 

Michael - PraNAms.

 

Looks like there is problem with the word representation. I do not mean in the

same

sense as Swami Satprakashanandaji uses. I did study what he said and I have no

disagreements, in general what is said there. Specifics I did not pay to much

attention.

I will have to look again to see what he meant by representation.

 

The only difference between conventional understanding and current understanding

is only

in terms of how senses and mind work - the rest, everything else, is the same.

 

In conventional understanding also the pramANa of pratyaksha is not mind

directly but

through the sense organs - the mind rides along with the sense organs and grasps

the

object – without the sense organs mind cannot go. It is via sense organs and it

is the

senses that measures the attributes - the degree and kind depends on the

capability of

the sense only. (In other darashanas the substantive is also grasped by the

senses along

with attributes). When the vRitti is formed even in the conventional approach,

it is

based only on sense input - in the conventional approach, only two of the senses

rush to

the object, while the rest three remain where they are. Mind cannot go

independently

without riding on senses.

 

It is the normal experience of everyone that they see the objects as they are

based on

their sense input since each individual sense capabilities in grasping the

attributes are

different. Please look at the Prof. T.P. Mahadevan's comment on the introduction

that I

quoted before how senses come in between in the direct perception. What the

senses read,

that is the object that is seen - it is not representation but it is as they

see. No one

says I am seeing the representation of the object there. Everyone's assertion is

I am

seeing that particular object as he sees. Other fellow may be able to see more

clearly

and report. These disparities are not in the object but in their sense data,

which are

the contents of the VRitti. The vRitti to be directly cognizable as an object

'out

there', its contents have to have attributes as measured by senses only.

Otherwise senses

have no other role in direct perception.

 

Actually there is no difference in the conventional and the current approach

other the

mind going out vs. mind receiving. What is pertinent for the perception is, how

far

vRitti's content is exact. Defects in perception become obvious.

 

There is no reason for me to see a snake where there is a rope. We can account

that the

sense data is defective either due external causes or defects in the senses

themselves.

It is not that snake is representing rope - it is a snake period only because

the sense

data are not adequate enough to distinguish snake from a rope. Process in

recognition

becomes fuzzy due to incomplete or inadequate sense input. Anyway when we come

to that

section we can discuss.

 

Hence from my understanding the difference is very minimal - I think the sense

data

reaching the mind is more based on our current understanding of how senses

perceive.

PramaaNa for pratyaksha is senses only. Mind comes after the sense data.

 

In the perceptuality section VP discusses the criteria again - that part has to

be met

for direct and immediate knowledge. I will be posting that slowly.

 

Keep watching though.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda