Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -8

[Guest guest]

[We are covering the Vedanta ParibhASha text by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, based on

my

understanding.]

 

8. Some Clarifications Regarding Internal Perceptions

 

Q. If happiness is a mental mood that is perceived directly, then the

recollection

of that happiness, etc., from one’s own memory should also be considered as

perception of happiness directly and immediately.

 

If we recall the definition of a pramANa when recollection is allowed – it says

‘abAdhita arthaviShayaka jnAnatvam’ (a) ‘non-negatable’ and (b) objectifiable

entity. However the question here is, does this recollection of happiness come

under

direct and immediate perception, since there is no object out side and

recollection

involves some kind of mental mood or vRitti which is perceived as it forms. It

is

somewhat similar to the original vRitti that is formed when we perceive the

happiness. Since the original mental mood of happiness that was perceived is

stored

in the memory, question pertains to the recollection of that also involves a

vRitti

jnaanam or knowledge of mental mood, although this vRitti is recollection of the

precious mental mood or to say correctly it involves knowledge of recollected

mental

mood.

 

A. VP says that is not so. The recollection of the mental mood is not the same

as

the experience of the original mental mood. The recollection involves

recollection

of previously collected event. Recollection is occurring in the present while

the

object of recollection is from the past. There is no corresponding

‘object’(state of

happy mental mood) for the recollected vRitti. The recollection is always ‘I

was

happy’ than ‘I am happy’. To state clearly, the limiting adjuncts for the

recollected mental vRitti and the limiting adjunct of the happy mental mood when

it

was experienced belong to two different times. Hence the corresponding limiting

consciousnesses of two vRittis are different. Therefore, the criterion for

perception is the two limiting consciousnesses must occupy the same space and

time,

for the union of the two to take place.

 

As we discussed before, the experience of happiness as a mental mood is

immediate

and direct. The vRitti that is formed is lllumined and the limiting reflected

consciousness is the knowledge of that vRitti – contents of the vRitti is

attributive for anger and hatred etc the contents are those emotional feeling

themselves. For happiness which is conditional happiness – where I am happy

because.. conditional happiness is limiting happiness as reflected consciousness

or

reflected happiness itself at its attribute. Expression of these feelings in

thought

forms is different from that the feelings themselves. That is, being happy is

different from stating or thinking that I am happy. The recollection of

happiness

can only be a vRitti in the thought form since one cannot regenerate the same

mental

mood via recollection. This is viewed by VP as non-unity of the limiting

consciousnesses of the two vRittis, the past and the present since unity of

limiting

consciousness is the criterion for direct perceptual knowledge.

 

Here we raise an important issue – If we consider that emotions are some kind of

mental perturbations expressed as vRittis in a general sense, then how these

emotional feelings in terms of vRittis are stored in the memory, for one to

recollect back in the future? I recognize that some of the discussions can

border to

speculation since I do not know if we know how mind stores the information in

the

memory that it can recollect later. The same problem how the genetic information

is

coded in genes and stored to pass on to the next generation. We just marvel at

the

programmer and bow down at this intelligence and speculate how it is done. For

the

case of perception of objects outside – this is jar –that is a cow, the

attributive

knowledge is stored as information in the memory stamped along with time and

space

as conceived by the mind (in relation to previous or subsequent events). In

terms

of emotions of happiness, fear, anger, etc, it is our experience that we store

not

those mental perturbations directly but thoughts associated with those feelings.

However, thoughts are not feeling per sec. Hence the thought that I am happy is

not

the same as being happy. It is our experience that we cannot be happy by

recollecting I was happy since recollection of I was happy does not generate the

same mental emotional happiness that I was at that time. The same is true for

anger

and other emotions. Hence it appears what is stored in the memory is not the

exact

contents of emotional moods of the mind as such but knowledge as a subsequent

thought of those moods. The recollection therefore involves the recollection of

the

thought of happiness and not the state of happiness experienced in the past.

Hence

we can say that the contents of ‘I was happy’ thought and the mental mood of

happiness that existed when I was happy are different – there is no unity in

contents. Essentially VP says is that by recollecting that I was angry, I cannot

be

angry now. I can again be angry now, if I recapitulate all the thoughts or

situations that caused that original anger and still feel that those accounts

have

not been settled. This time the anger could be even more or less intense

depending

on how strong the rekindled emotions are. Negative emotions like anger, hatred,

or

frustrations etc can be stronger since they are intense and continuous

recollection

would only reinforce those emotions. One can get cocooned in those repeated

emotions

and frustrations that one can become neurotic or mentally depressed. In such

cases,

it is not the recollection of the emotions but recreation of those emotions,

which

are perceived immediately as they rise in the mind.

 

Question related to dharma and adharma:

 

Q. What about then the merits and demerits, dharma or adharma or righteous and

unrighteous. One may be righteous and unrighteous in himself as his character,

but

consciously become aware of it only through other’s verbal testimony as- “you

are

righteous,” or “you are unrighteous,” - or by subsequent reactions that the

righteousness or unrighteousness cause in terms of pleasant or unpleasant

situations

in one’s life. In these cases, the verbal testimony of others occurs at

different

times and places in relation to the acts of righteousness or unrighteousness.

Similarly, the reactions in terms of good and bad occur at different times and

places. Thus in relation to the mental moods of righteousness and

unrighteousness

and the verbal testimony or its reactions in terms of good and bad, there is a

unity

in the limiting consciousnesses of the past and present since one become

conscious

of these only by the testimonies and reactions. There the requirement of

perception

is being fulfilled – that is the requirement of the unity in the limiting

consciousnesses – yet there is no direct and immediate perception of

righteousness

or unrighteousness. Hence the objection is that requirement of unity of limiting

consciousnesses is not sufficient for perceptual knowledge or unduly extensive

for

perceptual knowledge.

 

Note: Questions involved extension of the concept of perception to abstract

ideas or

‘objects’ whose attributes are not well defined, but normally known through

Agama

pramANa or shabda pramANa or through moral established codes of conduct. They

are

not tangible like objects or experienced like emotions. That righteousness or

unrighteousness form mental moods need to be established first before one

inquires

of the unity of limiting consciousness of these with that of verbal testimony or

good and bad effects in life.

 

A. VP answers in specifying what constitutes the perception in more solid

ground.

For perception, the object perceived must have attributes that qualify the

object –

hence we stated before that all objective knowledge is attributive knowledge and

that is formulated on firmer grounds here. Those attributes must also be

perceptible

either through the senses or through the mind. Even if one considers the

righteousness and unrighteousness are attributes of the mind, they are not

perceptible. They can be known only though their effects or by verbal

testimony.

VP says certain attributes are perceptible and certain others are not and that

depends on the intrinsic nature of the object they qualify. For example, we

learn in

Chemistry that water is colorless, odorless, tasteless, liquid which are

actually

non-perceptible attributes that do not identify what water is but identify what

is

not water. Vedanta uses the similar language in indicating Brahman, starting

from

imperceptible, infinite, non-dual, unthinkable, etc. Nyaaya system of philosophy

considers that righteousness and unrighteousness are attributes of the self,

similar

to happiness. In Advaita, Self has no attributes, and happiness is not attribute

of

the self but its intrinsic nature – which is limitless; and limitlessness is

happiness, anatam eva anandam.

 

However, the verbal testimony can lead to direct perceptual knowledge under

certain

cases, says VP, if the object that is being indicated is right there being

experienced. For example when one is happy and if another says, ‘you are

happy’,

the knowledge arising from the verbal statement coincides with the knowledge of

the

mental mood that is present. This becomes clearer in the example of the missing

tenth man story, where the verbal testimony can lead to direct perceptual

knowledge

of the tenth man, who is experienced right there. When ten people crossed the

river

and each one counted to make sure everyone in the group has crossed the river.

Each

one came up with only nine when he counted, and everyone concluded that the

tenth

man is missing. A wise man came to their rescue and asked them to count again

and

when the counting stopped at nine, the wise man said – ‘you are the tenth man’ –

Thus although all the ten were there, each one was missing to count himself and

therefore coming up one short. Here the verbal statement – you are the tenth man

–

immediately and directly leads to perceptual knowledge, since the object that is

pointed is right there in front, which is immediately accessible ether to the

senses

and/or to the mind. Hence verbal testimony can lead to direct and immediate

perceptual knowledge if the object of perception is direct and immediately

perceptible.

 

We already discussed about the composite perceptual and inferential knowledge

involved in the knowledge taking the example of -there is fire on the distant

hill.

The hill and the smoke are directly perceived by the senses, while the fire is

inferred using logic of cause (hetu) and effect (sAdhya) relationship (vyaapti

jnaanam). The hill is on fire is an inferential knowledge while that the hill

and

the smoke on the hill are direct perceptual knowledge. Thus there is a

combination

of mediate and immediate knowledge.

 

In many instances the inferential knowledge is based partly on perceptions.

Take

the example of a statement after seeing a piece of sandal wood from a distance –

‘that is a fragrant piece of Sandal wood’ - in this statement what is perceived

is

only the sandal wood and based on prior experience one is making the statement

that

the sandal wood has fragrance, although the fragrance is currently not perceived

by

the nose. Here we have both immediate knowledge – which is the perception of

the

sandal wood and mediate knowledge that it is fragrant based on previous memory

involving experience of the connecting link - sandal wood and its fragrance.

Thus we

know from the past experiences that if it is sandal wood it must have fragrance

–

That is the concomitant relation between sandal wood and its fragrance is

already

established before using past experiences. If one never had that experience,

then

he cannot make a statement ‘that is a fragrant piece of sandal wood’ – all he

can

say is ‘that is a piece of sandal wood’. If he does not know that how sandal

wood

looks like, then he can say ‘that is the piece of wood’. VP makes a distinction

here of imperceptible attributes which are different from the above cause where

the

fragrance is not perceptible, not because it is imperceptible but because the

object

is too far for the ocular knowledge to take place. In contrast there are certain

imperceptible attributes. Imperceptibles are when they are beyond the capability

of

the instruments of perception – like eyes can see only the visible spectrum,

etc. –

X-rays cannot be seen by the eyes, they are imperceptible.

 

Question related to Jaati:

 

In the example of ‘this is a fragrant piece of a sandal wood’ – there is mixture

of

both immediate and direct as well as mediate and indirect knowledge. That is

considered in Nyaaya philosophy as defective and is called ‘sankara’ – a cross

between two diagonally opposite entities – direct and immediate on one side and

indirect and mediate on the other. Hence the next objection is based on

position of

Nyaaya philosophy.

 

Q. If we admit the cross between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge as in

the

example above then we have problem of discarding or rejecting jaati or genus as

distinct category.

 

The objection is based on the philosophical position of Nyaaya which admits that

jaati as fundamental and eternal category which does not allow co-existence of

mutually opposite characteristics – in our case the immediate on one side and

mediate on the other related to objective knowledge. We discussed jaati before

as

general characteristics of given species like jaati of cows is different from

that

of horses. Jaati corresponds to generic characteristics that are common for all

cows which make a cow a cow and not a horse. Hence jaati of cow is different

from

that of horse. Suppose we find an animal that has some of the cow

characteristics

and some of the horse characteristics, then it can be called cow and horse

simultaneously or neither a cow nor a horse. We are now violating the jaatis of

both. That is we are putting mutually exclusive characteristics in one locus,

i.e.

jaati of cow excludes jaati of horse. More importantly, we have a problem of

separating cow jaati from horse jaati. If we have animals that have grades

between

the cow and horse, the naming of cow jaati separate form horse jaati becomes

meaningless. Hence this cross between diagonally opposite entities makes jaati

a

non fundamental and non-eternal category. There is a problem and hence an

objection.

 

A. A simple answer by a Vedantin is – So What? – The reason is advaitin does not

admit jaati as fundamental and eternal category. He is only concerned about the

attributes and if they form into a class or jaati, let that be so, but if they

do

not form then there is no violation. The necessity or requirement for the

attributes to fall into categories (jaatis), for perception to be valid is the

problem. Adviata take the attributes as they exist – we cannot force the

attributes

to fall into categories that we have set a priory. Hence if the objection is

that

jaati as fundamental category is being compromised, the answer is that is good.

It

only shows that jaati is not a fundamental eternal category. VP says in the

perception of an object ‘this is a jar’ there is already proof of existence of

an

attribute ‘jarhood’ which makes a jar a jar and not a flower vase. We have no

preset jarhood category into which all jar have to belong. There is no

requirement

that for the perception to be valid there has to be also some generic attribute

for

it to be a jar. Hence generic attribute as an entity itself is a fictitious. Not

only such a generic attribute cannot be perceived but it can not be inferred

either.

 

 

Relation between an attribute and its substantive:

 

At this juncture VP addresses another philosophical aspect that concerns about

the

relation between attribute and it substantive. Here I am providing some

background,

although this will be discussed in detail again. Suppose we say this is a blue

lotus. General understanding is blue is an attribute or visheShaNa and lotus is

substantive or visheshya. A question is posed in philosophy – how is the

attribute,

blue, related to its substantive, lotus. The first assertion is they are

inseparable. I cannot remove blue from the lotus. If they are two separate

objects,

the relation between the attribute and the substantive is called samyoga – that

is

temporarily joining together which are separable. For example, consider a ‘book

on

the table’. The table qualifies the book since book on the table is different

from

the book on the floor. In this case even the book qualifies the table too as

table

with a book on it compare to another table without a book on it. They have

samaana

adhikaraNa – each equally qualifies the other and therefore separable. samyoga

brings two dravyas or substantives together. These are called incidental

qualifications or taTastha lakshaNa. However if we talk about blue lotus, I

cannot

remove blue color from lotus. In addition blue cannot exist without a locus for

its

existence while lotus can exist without being blue although we cannot call it

anymore as blue lotus. Hence for blue lotus to be blue lotus, the two are

inseparable. Also blue is not the same as lotus and lotus is not the same as

blueness. Although they are mutually exclusive, one depends on the other and

they

remain inseparable. How are the two related, that is how is blue connected to

the

lotus, since they are two distinct entities? (We are using the term ‘entity’

loosely, since blue cannot be a substantive of its own and always need a locus.

That

is blue color cannot exist separately without being associated with some noun or

substantive like blue powder, blue pencil, blue car, blue sky, etc. One is a

dependent entity while the other is independent entity) According to Nyaaya

vaiseshikas or tarkikas (Indian logicians), the two – the inseparable but

distinct

attribute and substantive - are related by what they call samavaaya, meaning

inherence. The blue color is inherent in the blue lotus since they are

inseparable.

Like jaati that we discussed above, this ‘inherence’ or samavAya’ is considered

by

Logicians as fundamental eternal relation relating visheShaNa and visheShya or

attribute and its locus. Other philosophers criticize this concept heavily using

dialectic arguments. The normal objection is that bringing a separate relation

to

relate attribute and substantive would result in infinite regress, since we need

to

bring in another samavaaya to relate this samavaaya relation, and so on, while

the

Nayyayikas claim we do not need another samavaaya to relate samavaaya. Then how

do

the other philosophies address this relation between attribute and its noun or

substantive? VishiShTAdvaita contends that there is no need to have a separate

relation to relate the two – since they are inseparable –and that is how they

are

related - they call it as apRitak siddhi – essentially means inseparable

relationship. Actually this is not saying much other than stating the fact.

But

the problem comes if we ask a more pertinent question – what is a lotus or how

one

defines a lotus. Blue lotus can be defined a lotus with a blue color. However,

the

term blue lotus becomes relevant only if there are other lotuses that are not

blue.

If there is no other lotus that has color different from blue, then calling it

as

blue lotus is more or less unnecessary – like calling my daughter as my first

daughter when I have only one daughter. The definition of any object should be

such

that it distinguishes uniquely from all other objects in the world. All

definitions

are only attributive in the sense we define an object using its attributes. This

implies that without those distinguishing attributes one cannot define an object

uniquely to separate it from others. Here we arrive at attributes that are

swAbhAvikam or inherent – that is attributes that are inherent with the object

in

contrast to tatasta lakshaNas which are incidental attributes, like book on the

table, etc. These inherent attributes cannot be separated from the object that

they

define. Even in these inherent attributes, swAbhAvika, we can make further

distinctions – those that are necessary and those that are necessary and

sufficient.

Since both are necessary to define the object, they are swAbhAvikam but among

these,

there are those that are necessary and sufficient to define the object

unambiguously. This can be illustrated by taking example of Sugar. We know

that

Sugar is sweet; the sweetness is its attribute. Hence sweetness is its inherent

qualification or swAbhAvika lakshaNa. It is also a necessary qualification

since if

it is not sweet it cannot be sugar, even if it looks like one. Yet, sweetness is

necessary but not sufficient qualification to define sugar. To qualify it as

necessary and sufficient qualification, it has to satisfy a converse statement.

Converse of ‘sugar is sweet’ is ‘sweet is sugar’. The converse statement states

that

if something is sweet, it has to be sugar – if that is applicable at all times

then

sweetness becomes both necessary and sufficient qualification to define sugar.

The

necessary and sufficient qualification is called swarUpa lakshaNa. SwarUpa

lakshaNa

forms a very rigorous definition for any object to distinguish uniquely that

object

from the rest of the objects in the universe. We find that sweetness is not a

swarUpalakshaNa for sugar, since if something is sweet it could be many other

things

as well, besides sugar – like glucose, fructose, aspartame, etc. Hence sweetness

is

not swarUpa lakshaNa although it is swAbhAvika lakshaNa. Then what is the

swaruupa

lakshaNa of sugar? According to Chemistry the unique definition of sugar or

sucrose

is C12H22O11 – the chemical structure, perhaps to be written in correct format

to

distinguish it from its isomers. Sugar is C12H22O11; and C12H22O11 is sugar,

and

there are no two ways about it. It is necessary and sufficient condition to

qualify

as swarUpa lakshaNa of sugar. SwarUpam also means its intrinsic structure and

rightly its chemical structure defines it swarUpam. In fact in any chemical

analysis, if an unknown compound is given, chemists arrive its chemical

structure or

swarUpa lakshaNa by evaluating all its physical and chemical properties along

with

its molecular weight. Once the structure is determined, all its intrinsic

qualities

are known. To recapitulate again, the swarUpa lakshaNa is determined by applying

a

converse statement – In the case of sugar example the direct statement is ‘sugar

is

C12H22O11’ and the converse statement is ‘C12H22O11 is sugar’. Similarly H2O is

water, NH3 is ammonia, etc.

 

Looking at swarUpa lakshaNa or intrinsic structure, it is also clear now that

every

object is made up of components arranged in a particular order. In the case of

sugar, the components are Hydrogen, Carbon, and Oxygen. Further examination

reveals

that each one of them is again made up of smaller components but arranged in

each in

some fixed order. For example, the constituents of sugar, Carbon, hydrogen, and

Oxygen are made up of electrons, protons and neutrons, but organized in a

particular

order. This is true for any object. Since each object is divisible into finer

components and each component has its own swarUpa lakshaNa – it implies that

every

object is only relevant with its intrinsic structure until is further divided

its

constituent objects. Hence no object is final or in philosophical terms is

absolutely real. They have only validity in their sphere of application or

transaction. The relative realities are called vyaavahaarika satyam or

transactional

reality.

 

Hence every object in the universe is made of finer components. If so, what is

the

fundamental basis or material cause for the whole Universe? Science has yet to

find

the ultimate particles. According to Vedanta, consciousness alone is the

ultimate

and it is part-less that is it is not made of any further components. That is

defined as Brahman. Interestingly Vedanta defines Brahman using the converse

statement ‘consciousness is Brahman’, prajnaanam brahma, instead of stating

directly

that Brahman is a conscious entity. Converse statement is rigorous statement and

as

discussed above it defines the intrinsic structure or swarUpa lakshaNa, that is,

both necessary and sufficient qualification for the object defined. It means not

only Brahman is consciousness, consciousness is Brahman and there are no two

ways

about it. Implication is that if there is consciousness anywhere, by definition

it

has to be Brahman – similar to the fact that if there is H2O anywhere it has to

be

water. Vedanta defines Brahman using three converse statements – Satyam,

jnaanam,

anantam brahma –existence-consciousness or knowledge and limitless is Brahman.

Since

they are defined conversely they form the swarUpa lakshaNas for Brahman. Hence

wherever there is existence – that existence part is Brahman. Wherever there is

knowledge, that knowledge part is Brahman – a statement that parallels to the VP

declarative statement related to perceptual knowledge is pure consciousness.

Finally, wherever there is limitless which expresses as happiness, that is

Brahman.

 

All this discussion is intended to arrive at fundamental level that the

substantive

for any object in this universe is nothing other than Brahman. If the

substantive

is Brahman and attributes belong to the object, then the question is how the

attribute is related to its substantive? Hence according to Advaita Vedanta,

there

cannot be any valid relation. One can talk about relation only for entities that

are

ontologically the same. But for objects where there is no fundamental

substantive

other than Brahman, and there cannot be any valid relation between Brahman and

the

attributes of the objects that I perceive. Taking the example of snake that is

projected where there is a rope, what is the relation between the rope that is

three

and snake that I see? There cannot be any valid relation between the two –

other

than saying it is an error of superimposition or adhyaasa. When all pervading

existence-consciousness Brahman is seen as varieties of objects just as gold is

seen

as verities of objects, the relation between the forms and the names is only

adhyaasa, an error of superimposition. What is the relation between ring and

the

gold? Gold has nothing to do with ring or bangle, since it exists just as Gold

all

the time without undergoing any mutations. Ring is just form for a name; the

relation is adhyaasa, a superimposed form on gold and name for that form.

 

Coming back to topic, NyayavaisheShikas consider samavAya that relates an

attribute

to its substantive as fundamental eternal entity. VP dismisses this as

baseless. VP

says the whole universe is transitory, that is, it keeps changing continuously.

If

something is changing continuously, then there has to be some substantive that

remains changeless in the changing things. If ring changes into bangle, and

bangle

into necklace, there has to be a substantive that is different from a ring or

necklace that remain as changeless in all these changes. In this case gold

remains

changeless as the ring changes to bangle and bangle to necklace, etc. Hence if

the

world is continuously changing as we can see, then there has to be a changeless

entity in the changing things. Hence Brahman alone can be changeless substantive

for

the transient universe. Given the transitory nature of the universe, to talk

about

jaati and samavAya as eternal and inherent entities is meaningless. To talk

about

the generic attributes like jarhood or cowness or horseness, etc., as eternal

entities, when the whole universe itself is transient, also has little meaning.

Similarly all attributes and their knowledge are valid only at vyaavahaarika

level

and other than Brahman nothing else is fundamental and eternal. Hence objection

that

jaati is being compromised by admitting simultaneously both mediate and

immediate

knowledge has no relevance. In fact, if we examine closely it is not the same

knowledge that is simultaneously categorized as mediate and immediate knowledge.

In

the statement – ‘that is fragrant piece of sandal wood’ – immediate part of

knowledge and mediate part of knowledge are different. Hence both mediate and

immediate knowledge do not corresponds to the same attributive knowledge, to

cause

any contradiction. They correspond to two different sense inputs which do not

overlap.

 

In a statement ‘the hill is on fire’, the mental states or vRittis are different

for

the hill and for the fire. Hill is directly and immediately perceived. Fire is

not

directly and immediately cognized. Fire is inferred since we can see smoke on

the

hill, since there cannot be smoke without a fire. We conclude that hill is on

fire.

Knowledge of fire is deduced based on the perceptual knowledge of both the hill

and

the smoke. The Vritties associated with hill and smoke have their attributes

grasped by the senses. Hence cognition of hill and smoke is direct and

immediate.

The mind has to go through the deductive reasoning to arrive that the hill is on

fire. This vRitti is different from that of hill or smoke. For the fire vRitti,

there are no corresponding attributes of the fire, since there is no sense data

of

fire on the hill. The knowledge that the hill is on fire therefore is only

mediate

and indirect. Hence there is no contradiction involved with respect mediate and

immediate knowledge occurring simultaneously regarding the same limiting

consciousness. In fact knowledge of the fire could be debatable, since it is a

deductive knowledge, which can be faulty if the vyaapti (relation between cause

and

effect) is defective. That is if the logic is not fool proof, the deduction

(that

hill is on fire) based on the observed perceived fact (hill and smoke) could be

erroneous. There are many theories in science which were proved wrong by

subsequent

data. Hence not only we have valid knowledge about the presence of hill and

smoke

but also possibility of invalid knowledge of fire if vyaapti (related to smoke

and

fire) is not fully established. With this example, VP summarizes the criterion

for

perceptual knowledge.

 

Perceptual knowledge which is direct and immediate occurs when the vRitti or

mental

mood arises in the form of an object. i.e. in the form containing all the

attributes

of the object, thus establishing one to one correspondence between the object

and

the vRitti formed. That insures the limiting consciousness (existence) in the

form

of an object coincides with the limiting consciousness in the form of vRitti in

the

mind. In both the object and the vRitti – two things are same. One is the

substantive that is the existence is the same in both the VRitti and the object

(it

could manifest also as reflected consciousness in the Vritti since vRitti is

part of

the mind which as a subtle matter can reflect consciousness much more than the

inert

object outside). Second, the attributes are also same in both the object and the

vRitti to the degree that the senses could measure. Hence as long as the

attributes

are measurable by the appropriate senses and to the degree they are measured,

the

vRitti of the object is formed. The vRitti thus formed is immediately illumined

as

it forms and the reflected consciousness reveals the object to the subject,

insuring

the direct and immediate perceptual knowledge of the object.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda