crock of gold

[Guest guest]

Sada-ji wrote,

Actually I did not have to stretch the statement. VP makes the following

statement in the perceptuality criterion.

– ‘perceptual object has no independent existence apart from the existence

of

the subject’, ‘pramAtRi satta Eva ghaTAdhi satta, na anyaH’ -VP here is

very

emphatic that existence of the knower alone is expressed as the existence

of the pots,

etc.

 

Unless one perceives it, the existence of the object is not established.

That

does not mean it does not exist nor does it means it exists either. Who

knows? Unless

one perceives there is ignorance about its existence. Ignorance is as per

advaita -

sat asat vilakshanam - it is mithyaa only. Hence it is indeterminate.

 

 

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Namaste Sada-ji, Shyam-ji and the followers of this thread,

 

You are patient with this fine combing but I

think that the issue is being clarified. It comes down to this.

 

Referring to my previous A, B, C schema. There is a confusion between the

personal knowledge which establishes a thing as existing at the A level

and the knowledge which is *constituitive* of the thing at the C level.

This metaphysical level of pure consciousness constitutes the upadhi of

the thing whether or not the thing is known at the A level of empirical

reality. Consider the topic of eternal words B.S.B. I.iii.28 in this

regard.

 

I of course am using this schema as a place holder to show the tension

between the different levels. We know that in reality there is unity of

being. However in empirical knowledge the specific awareness that

establishes for us the existence of something is made possible because the

mind *goes out* to something and takes *that form*. Unless it was

something already the mind could not go out to it. It could not go out to

nothing. The alternative is that it makes that object something and then

goes out to it which is absurd.

 

You have made a point of quoting the definition of perceptuality. Let us

look at the section in full.

Quote:

" The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their

not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.

Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the

mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say,

" I see this " ?

Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject

does not indeed mean identity; it mean having no existence apart from

that of the subject. "

 

That is a tricky passage but it can be teased apart. If the object were

one with the subject you would have the identity of idealism. But the

object can be known as it is out there because the same consciousness that

is constituitive of the subject is constituitive of the object. In this

way they, subject and object, have the same existence or are the one

being. It is this that allows the superimposition to take place.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

 

>

> You have made a point of quoting the definition of perceptuality. Let us

> look at the section in full.

> Quote:

> " The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their

> not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.

> Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the

> mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say,

> " I see this " ?

> Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject

> does not indeed mean identity; it mean having no existence apart from

> that of the subject. "

>

> That is a tricky passage but it can be teased apart. If the object were

> one with the subject you would have the identity of idealism. But the

> object can be known as it is out there because the same consciousness that

> is constituitive of the subject is constituitive of the object. In this

> way they, subject and object, have the same existence or are the one

> being. It is this that allows the superimposition to take place.

 

Michael - PraNAms

 

Your point is well take. I do not to Idealism either. I think Shyam

ji

brought the anirvachanIya khyati - that is exactly correct position - that is

precisely the statement boils down to - indeterminate problem.

 

About perceptuality - I think I have brought this out in the -Knowledge and the

Means of Knowledge - 9.

 

The identity at the substantive level and at superficial the attributes content

of

the vRitti involved which differentiates object A from object B. The attributes

are

not individual subject generated - it comes from the world and the world is not

creation of jiiva. It is Iswara sRiShTi - and it is part of the global mind -

which

as you know VP will address that too. From Iswara point it is maayaa and from

jiiva's point it is avidya or ignorance. Both are mithyaa only. We are

addressing

the perception from jiiva's point who has the ignorance.

 

Please go over the post 9 and see if I have not brought the perceptuality

condition

as stated in VP correctly - the next post also will have these conditions

restated

in terms of questions and answers starting from reference to Dharma and adharma,

etc.

 

Thanks for you input.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Dear Shyam-ji,

You have referred to Atmakhyati and Anirvachaniyakhyati. I wish to

invite the attention of the members to my detailed notes about all

the five types of khyati on my website

http://www.geocities.com/snsastri/khyati.pdf

 

S.N.Sastri

 

 

 

In advaitin , Shyam <shyam_md wrote:

>

> Atmakhyati (perhaps what we today would refer to as subjectivism

or idealism) - where there are no external objects at all - anything

is perceived is but projection of consciousness alone. You are very

correctly objecting to any notion that one cannot deny that there

are objects " out there " which do have existence - that the flower

you are seeing does not derive its existence from the perceiver you.

>

> This however is neither the advaitic position, and again, from

what I can understand, this is not what Sada-ji is talking about.

> What he is referring to is Anirvachaniyakhyati - the existence or

satta to external objects that we cognize is certainly not denied.

After all the satta for every manifest entity is Brahman alone. But

as long as an object is not perceived by a subject i.e. a conscious

entity, nothing can be said about its nama-roopa aspect - in other

words, one refrains from any categorization about either its

existence or non-existence - it is sat-asat vilakshana or mithya.

>

>Hari OM

> Shri Gurubhyoh namah

> Shyam

>

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>

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>

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