some points on VP 10

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sada-ji and advaitins all,

 

I must say it's hard to keep up with you. This article is 3,848 words

long, the previous one was around 3,000 and the one before that was around

5,000. And there were others. So to keep it simple I'll just focus on a

couple of points:

You write:

" Perceptuality of the object in the mind then is when the consciousness

underlying the subject becomes one with the consciousness that is

substantive of the object, the attributes of the object being only

superimpositions on the substantive. "

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The mind in VP goes out to the object, the mind is not a place in which

things happen. The mind becomes modified by the object i.e. it takes that

form. There is no 'in' to be in. On page 32 is a summary of what the

mind is. Acting in different way it is designated by different titles "

The manas, the intellect, the ego and the citta constitue the internal

instrument (mind). Doubt, certitude, egoism and recollectio - these are

respectively their objects " . (32)

 

You write:

" Because of the imperceptibility of their attributes the knowledge of

dharma and adharma is

difficult and has to be known only through shaastras. "

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Surely a problematic observation because many people without the benefit

of Sastras of any kind come to decisions which are similar. Theft is bad,

murder is to be discouraged, envy is corrosive etc. Have a look at the

writings of the Stoics.

 

You write:

" What is implied in the perceptuality criteria is the perception is

limited to

the vRitti of the object formed. If the sense data is incomplete, the

object

perception is also incomplete to that extent. We defined object as limiting

consciousness-existence (Brahman) + A + B + C + D + ?. attributes. For

perceptuality, the limiting consciousness-existence of the subject extends

to

the limiting consciousness-existence of the object + whatever attributes

the

senses have gathered up to the point, say A and B but not C and D. "

|||||||||||||||||

The object is a limiting adjunct of pure consciousness. One can speak of

an object and the attributes of that object. Attributes are only 'in' the

object or can be said of the object, they do not exist in a free floating

manner to be plucked out of their realm, wherever that is, and added to

anything particularly to Brahman.

 

The qualifying attributes are not added on to the object but rather serve

to identify the object that is before us. VP gives an example: The

coloured jar is transitory - the colour is a qualifying attribute. We

can so to speak point to an object i.e. indicate it. Thereafter we can

note its attributes so that we will know it the next time.

 

I see a note on pg.39 on the substantive (viseya) and it is defined as

that which is qualified. Brahman cannot be a substantive according to

this line of thinking. Neti, neti.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

Michael- PraNAms.

 

Actually Michael - it is hard to keep up myself too. First I write, then I

revise and every time I revise the thing gets bigger, since I feel that I have

to add this or that for clarification. I am taking each section heading at a

time from the text and using it as a basis to explain what I understand. I know

many do not read and just copy the file and keep it for future reading and

future never comes as the analysis of time shows! I am writing to my

satisfaction to make sure what I write is clear to me at least. God has given

me patience to write but not read what I write! Dennis is ending up rewriting

what I wrote.

 

 

--- ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

So to keep it simple I'll just focus on a

> couple of points:

> You write:

> " Perceptuality of the object in the mind then is when the consciousness

> underlying the subject becomes one with the consciousness that is

> substantive of the object, the attributes of the object being only

> superimpositions on the substantive. "

> |||||||||||||

> The mind in VP goes out to the object, the mind is not a place in which

> things happen. The mind becomes modified by the object i.e. it takes that

> form. There is no 'in' to be in. On page 32 is a summary of what the

> mind is. Acting in different way it is designated by different titles "

> The manas, the intellect, the ego and the citta constitue the internal

> instrument (mind). Doubt, certitude, egoism and recollectio - these are

> respectively their objects " . (32)

 

Yes - the divisions in the mind is in the next part that I have to post. I am

keeping one post a week since they are too long.

 

The first part of your comment - As I discussed before that mind goes out along

with the senses only with respect to two senses (visual and audio) the rest of

these stay where they are. But the statement that attributes are only

superposition on the substantive is independent of whether mind goes out or

stays there. It follows from:

Sarvam khalu idam brahma - all this is Brahman and Brahman is the upaadaana

kaaraNa for the world of objects. Hence Brahman is the adhiShTanam and

superimpositions are attributes - just as ring on gold. Conscious-existence

Brahman is the substantive and attributes of the objects that the sense and the

mind along with senses (whether going out or staying there) gather. Then only

the statement of VP that the subject consciousness unites the object for

perceptualaty makes sense to me. All object knowledge is only attributive

knowledge since Brahman is all pervading as substantive of pramAta, Prameya and

pramAna.

 

Michael - Do you feel this interpretation is incorrect? Can you account the

statement that subject consciousness is the same as the object in the

perceptuality requirement?

 

> You write:

> " Because of the imperceptibility of their attributes the knowledge of

> dharma and adharma is

> difficult and has to be known only through shaastras. "

> ||||||||||||||

> Surely a problematic observation because many people without the benefit

> of Sastras of any kind come to decisions which are similar. Theft is bad,

> murder is to be discouraged, envy is corrosive etc. Have a look at the

> writings of the Stoics.

>

True - that is simplified dharma - I should do to others what I want other to

do to me and I should not do to others what I do not want others not to do me

- simplified ethical living. But dharma is much more deeper - hence we have

dharma shastras. VP addreses these in response to question earlier where dharma

is known through others statements or through their results in terms of good or

bad but not directly.

 

Purvamiimaamsa starts - athAthO dharma gijnaasa - Hence enquiry into nature of

dharma which of course dictates one's karma too. Arjuna's problem was based on

dharma -kArpanya dhoshopa hataswabhaavaH, prucchaamitvaam dharma smmuuDha

cEtaaH - I am not able to know what is my dharma - to fight or not to fight.

Hence we have shaatras determining dharma. swadharmE nidhanam shreyaH - says

Krishna.

 

> You write:

> " What is implied in the perceptuality criteria is the perception is

> limited to

> the vRitti of the object formed. If the sense data is incomplete, the

> object

> perception is also incomplete to that extent. We defined object as limiting

> consciousness-existence (Brahman) + A + B + C + D + ?. attributes. For

> perceptuality, the limiting consciousness-existence of the subject extends

> to

> the limiting consciousness-existence of the object + whatever attributes

> the

> senses have gathered up to the point, say A and B but not C and D. "

> |||||||||||||||||

> The object is a limiting adjunct of pure consciousness. One can speak of

> an object and the attributes of that object. Attributes are only 'in' the

> object or can be said of the object, they do not exist in a free floating

> manner to be plucked out of their realm, wherever that is, and added to

> anything particularly to Brahman.

>

> The qualifying attributes are not added on to the object but rather serve

> to identify the object that is before us. VP gives an example: The

> coloured jar is transitory - the colour is a qualifying attribute. We

> can so to speak point to an object i.e. indicate it. Thereafter we can

> note its attributes so that we will know it the next time.

>

> I see a note on pg.39 on the substantive (viseya) and it is defined as

> that which is qualified. Brahman cannot be a substantive according to

> this line of thinking. Neti, neti.

 

Michael - true - attributes are not free floating. But the substantive is Sat

only; hence they are locussed on sat. The sense can only measure the

attributes, the sat is ever present and infinite. When the senses gather the

attributes they get locussed in the vRitti - vRitti is a thought the contents

are the attributes - the substantive is caitanyam in terms of

conscious-existent. The theory of knowledge rests on senses gathering

attributes for external perceptions. For internal perceptions the attributes

are there inherent in the vRitti that is formed. All perceptual knowlede is

attributive knowledge only - hence it is direct and immediate.

 

The relation between visheshaNa and visheshya in advaita is only adhyaasa since

the vishshya to the core is Brahman only - upAdAna kaaraNa - There is no other

material in the universe. Hence object is attributes + Brahman - otherwise we

will end up with duality as reality. That is the only way I understand the

janmaadhyasya yathaH - suutra - and all sRiShTi prakaraNas in the Upanishads.

 

I am glad you brought these issues. We agree or not, it will help others to

think deeply the truths that are being discussed - That is important for the

discussion - especially when the posts are too long even to read!

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda