Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 11

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(We are discussing Vedanta ParibhASha (VP) of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra,

based on my understanding.)

 

11. Determinate and indeterminate perceptions

 

Components of the mind:

 

The mind itself, if considered as mental state with its attributes, has

four components. They can be considered as four states of the mind; (a)

a doubting mind, (b) a determinate mind, © egoism, and (d) memory.

Because of the diversity of their functions, mind, although is one, is

considered as having four components, collectively referred also as

just the mind. These are designated as 1) manas, or (emotional) mind,

2) the intellect or buddhi, 3) the ego or ahankaara, and 4) memory or

chitta. Since we can think of them as mental states or vRittis, the

corresponding objects of the vRittis respectively are (a) doubts and

emotions (b) concepts, knowledge or certitude © egoism and (d) memory

or smRiti.

 

Determinate and indeterminate perceptions:

 

The direct perception is of two types: (a) determinate or savikalpaka

and (b) indeterminate or nirvikalpaka. In the case of determinate

perception, the knowledge gained is directly relatable in terms of the

substantive and its attributes. The knowledge of the object perceived

has determinism associated with it. Consider perception of ‘This jar’.

When the knowledge occurs through perception, we have a determinate

knowledge as ‘I know the jar’ – a relation between the subject and the

object is immediately established. That is a determinate knowledge,

according to Advaita.

 

In the indeterminate perception, knowledge gained is not directly

relatable to the subject. That is a determinism that ‘I know this’ is

not discretely present. Let us take a classic example – ‘This is that

Devadatta (sOyam dEvadattaH)’. In this case – we have two components –

‘this is Devadatta’ and ‘that was Devadatta’ – but combined into a

unitary statement ‘this is that Devadatta’. Here ‘this’ refers to the

present and here, and ‘that’ refers to the past and there. Therefore

the knowledge of ‘that Devadatta’ has to come from memory. ‘This

Devadatta’ is directly perceived since object is right in front

available for pratyaksha pramANa, where the criteria for perceptuality

are directly fulfilled. There is no problem in just perceiving this

Devadatta in front since that is determinate perception. But the

statement ‘this is that Devadatta’ involves an equation of this mental

state corresponding to the present with the recollection of that

Devadatta from the memory. The attributes of this Devadatta and that

Devadatta are different since they belong to different times and space.

Hence the equation gives only indeterminate knowledge. (Technically it

is called bhAgatyAga lakshaNa – wherein the contradictory attributes of

this Devadatta and that Devadatta are to be discarded equating only the

essentials that are common to both). Similarly the Upanishadic

statement ‘That Thou art’ or ‘tat tvam asi’ – The ‘Thou (tvam)’ part of

the statement is directly perceivable but ‘That (tat)’ part that

designates the absolute reality is not deterministic, since it is not

finite. One has to discard the dissimilar attributes of both ‘That,

tat’ and ‘Thou, tvam’ to arrive at the knowledge. Hence in these cases

the knowledge is called indeterminate. Further clarification of this

aspect is done through questions and answers.

 

Q. In the statement ‘This is that Devadatta’- the knowledge is based on

verbal comprehension and should not be considered as perception, since

it is not through sense organs.

 

A. It is not so. We have already established that for a thing to be

perceived, its sense data are not the criterion. The criteria stated

are consciousness associated with the subject is not different from the

object when the object is present and perceivable. The object should

have attributes, but not necessarily gathered by senses. In the case

of internal perceptions there are no tangible objects ‘out there’, and

therefore no sense-data. Yet, for internal perceptions like anger etc

the attributes of the vRitti are internal and not by sense-input. In

the case of ‘this Devadatta’ who is right in front and is perceivable

through senses, the knowledge due to the sentence ‘this is that

Devadatta’ has for its object something connected with the sense organs

and the associated mental state formed has a limiting consciousness of

the object, Devadatta. In addition to the perceptual knowledge of this

Devadatta, the prior knowledge of ‘that Devadatta’ is also brought in

for the purpose of recognition of ‘this Devadatta’. Cognition process

involving ‘this Devadatta’, and recognition process involving ‘that

Devadatta’ are both involved in the recognition of ‘this is that

Devadatta’. The perceptual limiting consciousness of this Devadatta

where all the conditions of perceptuality are met is identified with

the information from memory for the purpose of recognition. It is the

recognition part that makes the perception indeterminate.

 

Here we need to recognize that the cognition and recognition play in

sequence together. When I say this is a jar, looking at the jar in

front, two aspects are playing a role. One is the cognition where

perceptuality condition is being met and I perceive the object jar with

its attributes as immediate and direct. That this is a jar and not a

vase comes by the association with the knowledge in the memory. The

memory involves the names and forms of a jar as well as a vase.

Recognition that the cognized object is jar and not a vase comes by

process of matching the attributive content of the present vRitti with

the past knowledge of a jar and a vase to conclude that this is a jar

and not a vase. Mind has the capacity for codifying the attributes as

it sees and uses it for recognition. Suppose if I do not have the

knowledge of what a jar or a vase is, and when I see a jar for the

first time, there is only cognition but not recognition. Since the

memory is blank, as there no knowledge of jar or vase, I have knowledge

of only the cognized object. If I now learn that it is a jar, that

information with its attributes is stored in the memory. Hence the next

time I see the same or similar object, not only cognition but

recognition also occurs immediately. Here the cognition part is direct

and immediate and recognition part has to come from memory. It is a

common experience that we see some people and even recognize them, but

we do not remember the name of the person. That is because it is said

that the brain stores the information of names, words and language in

one side and figures and pictures on the other. Hence recognition of

the form is immediate but name has to come from different location. It

is also said that language that is pictorial (Chinese and Japanese) the

names and forms are stored in the same side of the brain, and for them

recognition is faster. This aspect is exploited in the early childhood

education, where language is taught with pictures; and pictures speak

thousand words.

 

In the statement ‘this is that Devadatta’, the cognition part is direct

and immediate since the object perceived is right in front. But the

recognition part becomes a problem particularly if the attributive

content of this Devadatta and that Devadatta are unrecognizably

different. The indeterminacy comes from recognition process than from

the cognitive process. Hence VP says cognition is perceptual. The same

applies to ‘Thou art That’. The perception of ‘Thou’ is direct and

immediate since the subject itself is the object for cognition. But

the indeterminacy comes from the recognition process where the

attributive content of ‘Thou’ is much different from the attributive

content of ‘That’, where ‘That’ stands for Brahman.

 

If one is closely familiar with ‘that Devadatta’ and showing this

Devadatta in front, if the teacher says ‘this is that Devadatta’,

because of the full faith in the teacher’s words, even though the

attributive knowledge of this and that Devadattas are different, the

student gains immediate and direct knowledge. He may wonder and say ‘

Oh! My God! What a change in Devadatta!’. In the recognition, the

student is able to discard the contradictory qualifications of the

present and the past Devadatta, and still equate the essence to arrive

at the knowledge. With the full faith in the teacher’s words, the

contradictory qualifications in this and that Devadattas are stripped

out to arrive at the unique knowledge. The knowledge occurs directly

and immediately as one sees this Devadatta while hearing the statement

by the teacher. The same is the case with ‘tat tvam asi or That thou

art’ statement. Faith in the teacher’s words (words of the scriptures

expressed by a teacher who is trustworthy) as the student listens

(shravaNam) forms the basis for the direct and immediate knowledge as

Shankara says, ‘like the perception of fruit in the hand’ – indicating

the knowledge is perceptual and immediate.

 

In contrast to ‘this is that Devadatta’, the difficulties here,

however, are compounded and more so when there is lack of complete

faith in the words of the teacher. The difficulties arise, since

‘That’ has no attributes and whatever they are come from scriptures.

The attributes are of indicative (lakshaNas) than cognitive. The

knowledge is still considered as direct perception for two reasons.

From the point of ‘Thou’ it is immediate and ever present subject; and

the perceptuality criteria that consciousness of the subject is the

same as the object is immediately satisfied, since here subject is the

object and the identity is established. From the point of ‘That’ is

also direct in the sense that the same consciousness is the content of

‘That’, since ‘that’ stands for Brahman, which is pure consciousness,

which is indivisible. Hence ‘tat tvam asi’ or ‘Thou art That’ has to

be direct and immediate. The reason the knowledge does not take place

directly and immediately is erroneous and misconceived attributes are

placed on both ‘Thou’ and ‘That’, making the knowledge of the identity

seems impossible. The spiritual study and practices involve the mind in

trying to get rid of these preconceived attributes assigned to both

terms ‘Thou’ and ‘That’. This getting rid of preconceived notions is

called ‘chitta suddhi’ or purification of the mind, where wrong notions

placed on both ‘Thou’ and That’ are dropped. If one thinks that

learning is difficult, the unlearning is even more difficult. All the

spiritual practices are centered on unlearning process so that the

equation ‘Thou art That’ is understood or realized.

 

Although ‘That art Thou’ involves immediate and direct knowledge,

realization that I am brahman does not occur for many. There are two

obstacles that prevent from the seeing the truth as the truth. They

are called samshaya and viparya. Samshaye means doubt that can arise

if there is no faith in the word of the scriptural statement – That art

Thou. To remove this, mananam or reflection on the Vedantic truth is

recommended. The second obstacle is the viparya that is habitual

thinking of deep rooted notions that I am this body, mind and

intellect. The day to day transactions essentially endorse this notion.

For that contemplation on the truth – That art Thou – is recommended.

Both mananam and nidhidhyaasanam do not produce new knowledge but

eliminate the obstacles that prevent the assimilation of the truth that

I am. Hence fundamentally the statement ‘That art Thou’ inderminate

but comes under direct perception since subject is the object of

knowledge.

 

The other philosophers view the determinate and inderminate perceptions

differently and we will examine them to see clearly why advaitic

position is correct. This will be done as we address additional

questions raised related to the topic.

Q. ‘Thou art That’ is verbal instructional statement. In any verbal

communication, for knowledge to take place, one has to understand the

relationship implied between the words based on the sentence structure.

In Sanskrit the declensions of the words provide immediate

relationships – the subject and its qualifications and the object and

its qualifications and the action verb relating the two. When the

relationships between the words are obvious how can the verbal

communication be indeterminate?

 

A. VP says to understand the intended meaning of the sentence, the

relationships between words alone is not sufficient. There are simple

sentences where direct meaning is obvious and makes sense. In that case

the verbal communication with the word relationships provide the direct

meaning. Take for example, ‘Rama is Dhasaratha’s son’ – The meaning is

straight forward that can be obtained from word relationship. In the

statements – ‘This is that Devadatta’ or ‘That Thou art’ – the direct

meaning using the relationship between the words would not make sense.

One has to look for the intended meaning. In some cases, if one

considers just relationships between the words without understanding

the proper context in which the verbal statement is made, there is

every possibility to reach unintended meaning. Take for example a

cricketer saying to his friend, ‘please bring me a bat’. Looking at

the sentence and observing the word meaning and the relationship

between the words, if his friend brings him a flying quadruped bat, he

missed the intended meaning. Contextual understanding is also very

important in verbal communication. In the statements ‘this is that

Devadatta’ – to understand the sentence one has to have prior knowledge

of that Devadatta, otherwise the intended identity of this Devadatta

and that Devadatta is not understood. If one has no knowledge of that

Devadatta, ‘this is that Devadatta’ would not make any sense.

 

In relation to the sentence ‘Thou art That’ – the verbal instructional

statement by a teacher to his student comes after many passages

starting with preposition that ‘by knowing one thing everything else is

as though known- Eka vijnAnEna sarva vijnAnam bhavati’ – particularly

knowing the material cause, all the effects produced by that cause are

known. This is similar to saying that by knowing gold all the

ornaments of gold are ‘as though’ known, since all the ornaments are

nothing but gold alone with different names and forms. In extending

this application, the teacher first establishes that the material cause

for the entire universe is Existence, Brahman, alone. Hence the teacher

says – ‘this universe, my dear, was but existence alone in the

beginning’. Thus existence is the material cause for the universe like

gold for ornaments. The whole world is nothing but existence alone but

with different names and forms perceived as objects. Hence if we know

‘Existence’ everything in the universe is as good as known. Hence the

question arises, where is that existence for us to know. The teaching

terminates with the instructional statement – that is the truth, that

is real, and that is the self, and ‘Thou art That’ O’ Swetaketu. Hence

the intended purport of ‘That’ in the sentence is the Brahman, the

material cause for the universe which is of the nature of pure

consciousness-existence. And ‘That’ Brahman you are. The intended

meaning relays on the correct understanding of what ‘That’ stands for.

In addition, the context of what ‘Thou’ stands for also has to be

understood. If contextually ‘That’ includes the substantive of all this

universe of names and forms which includes the subtle as well as gross

bodies as the teacher explains, then ‘Thou’ that stands for self or

Atma which appears to be different from the universe of names and

forms. The sentence ‘Thou art That’ equates these two apparently

dissimilar entities. Hence to make sense of this equation, one has to

drop all dissimilarities or contradictory qualifications of ‘That’ and

‘Thou’ and equate the essence of both, the process known as bhAga TyAga

lakshaNa – that is renouncing the unnecessary or superficial parts of

both and equating only the substantial parts. Since the intended

meaning of the sentence has to be understood than the direct meaning,

it is called indeterminate knowledge.

 

VP quotes a sloka from Tatva pradIpikA of Citsukhi Acharya, which

states that in the sentences that convey identity relations, one has to

take the substantive meanings for the words than the superficial

meanings to recognize or realize the identity that is conveyed by the

sentences. In the sentence ‘this is that Devadatta’ the identity of

this Devadatta and that Devadatta is implied in the sentence. Based on

Citsukhi’s statement, we recognize that we need to equate the

substantiality of this Devadatta and that Devadatta and not the

superficial attributive qualities. The identity is therefore only with

respect to the essence of this and that Devadatta and not the external

changing non-substantive qualities. Within the vyavahaara, the essence

of both this Devadatta and that Devadatta is individual, who is jiiva

and is changeless in spite of changing BMI with age. Similar identity

is implied in the relation ‘Thou art That’. The substantiality of both

‘Thou’ as well as ‘That’ is ‘existence-consciousness’ and therefore the

identity is only with respect to the substantives and not in terms of

adjectives. The contradictory attributes prevent the recognition of the

identity unless one can strip out the contradictory qualifications of

‘Thou’ and ‘That’. In the case of ‘this is that Devadatta’ the

stripping process is easier since Devadatta is object detached from the

subject. However in the case of ‘Thou art That’, the stripping of the

qualifications are difficult due to deep-rooted habitual association of

the attributes with the locus. Hence, the indeterminacy in all verbal

statements involving identity comes due to difficulties in overlooking

the obvious adjectives of both relata to identify the identity only in

the substantives.

 

The VishiShTAdvaitic Position:

 

We present here some aspects of other philosophical positions related

to determinate and indeterminate perceptions, for purpose of

comparison. It is also interesting to view how advaitic position is

viewed by vishiShTadvaitin. In tatva muktA kalApa, Vedanta Desika

(13th Century) states Advaitic position as puurvapaksha, as reported by

S.M. Sreenivasa Chari, in Fundamentals of VishiShTAdviata Vedanta.

According to Vedanta Deshika, Advaitin’s position is that the first

contact of the sense organs with the object reveals the mere existence

(SAT) devoid of all attributes, while subsequent contact reveals

objects with attributes. Former is indeterminate and the later is

determinate perceptions. Hence according their understanding, Advaita

has two stage perception the first involves the perception which is

indeterminate, implying non-attributive involving the perception of

mere existence and the second stage of perception involves attributive.

Stating their understanding, they criticize that understanding. Vedanta

Deshika says that perception of an object devoid of attributes is a

psychological myth. Ramanuja also points out that apprehension of mere

‘being’ or existence without any attributes does not takes place any

time and such an experience is impossible since all cognitions are in

terms of ‘this is such and such’. Nothing can be perceived without

attributes. Hence even indeterminate perception has to be attributive.

If both determinate and indeterminate perceptions are attributive then

where is the distinction between the two, asks VishiShTadvaitin? If we

pose the question the other way that if both determinate and

indeterminate perceptions are attributive then what is the difference

between the two? Ramanuja accounts that indeterminate perception is the

first time perception of an object – For example, when the child sees a

cow and mother says ‘that is a cow’. He grasps the object and the

attributes and store in his memory – since this is the first time a cow

has been seen, he stores that attributive knowledge in his mind. When

he sees another cow and third cow, he slowly recognizes the generic

features of the cow that makes a cow a cow and not a horse. Hence

according to vishiShTaadvaitic position, the first time perception that

involves no recognition process is an indeterminate perception, while

the subsequent perceptions that involves not only cognition but

recognition based on memory is determinate perception. Although both

cognitions are attributive in the first one there is no recognition

while in the subsequent perceptions there is one. The cognition,

recognition and generic attributes (jAti) of Cow in contrast to that of

a horse, etc are involved in the inderminate vs determinate perception.

This is the vishiShTaadvaitic position.

 

There is nothing wrong with the vishiShTaadvaitic position in

classifying the first time vs the subsequent perceptions respectively

as indeterminate vs determinate, but clearly their criticism of

Advaitic position is unfounded. According to the foot note provided by

S.M.S Chari – ‘This is the view criticized by Ramanuja’. S.M.S. Chari

says, according to later advaitin, as stated in Vedanta ParibhASha,

indeterminate perception is non-relational knowledge of the perceived

object and determinate perception is relational knowledge. As an

example of the former, the verbal statement – ‘this is that Devadatta’

where indicated identity of substantive is to be understood discarding

the differences in attributive knowledge of this and that Devadatta.

S.M.S. Chari says this view is also rejected by Vedanta Deshika on the

ground that memory involving prior perception (pratyabhijna) of that

Devadatta is also determinate in character and therefore does not refer

to identify of the essentials. Reference is given to Vedanata Deshika’s

‘Sarvartha Siddhi’. We note that Vedanta Deshika also has written

SatadhUShani, hundred defects in Advaita Vedanta, and one of them is

related to the inderminate perceptions.

 

The criticism of Vedanta Deshika related to indicative meaning implied

in the statement ‘this is that Devadatta’ is also not justified. The

indeterminacy is not from the pratyabhijna or deterministic aspect of

prior cognition of ‘that Devadatta’. The problem in the identity

statement is ‘this is that Devadatta’, the identity is not exact. Each

cognition by itself, i.e. ‘that Devadatta’ and ‘this Devadataa’

independently are deterministic. The problem arises in the identity of

these two, implied in the statement, ‘this is that Devadatta’. The

reason is that Devadatta that was cognized long time ago who was so

cute and handsome looking boy is this Devadatta who is ugly looking fat

individual. Hence attributes of the two do not match and therefore

there is no identity in the attributive knowledge of the two

Devadattas, even though the perception is determinate by itself. Hence

the identity of the two is not obvious to have deterministic cognition

of the identity. When the teacher says ‘this is that Devadatta’ – what

is involved is a faith in the knowledge of the teacher who made that

statement that it is true and to cognize the identity using bhAga

tyAgam or discarding the contradictory qualifications of this and that

Devadattas and unifying only the essentials. Those who knew that

Devadatta and now seeing this Devadatta, and with the verbal statement

that this is that Devadatta, the identity is immediate and direct. The

recognition process requires rejection of contradictions in the

attributive knowledge. This is normal experience and therefore

criticism of advaitic position is baseless.

 

The above criticism has lot more bearing in the analysis of the Vedic

statement ‘That art Thou’ , wherein the identity involves discarding

the contradictory qualifications of ‘Thou’ and ‘That’ and unifying only

the essentials. Before the statement was made, Upanishad itself

provides the justification for the rejection of the superimposed names

and forms to see the identity by saying all objects are their cause

itself in different forms- vAchArambhanam vikArO nAmadhEyam – The

differences are only at the level of words or speech involving

attributes and not in substantives. It is similar to the statement ‘All

ornaments in essence are the same and therefore ring is necklace’

referring to gold ring and gold necklace. The attributes of the ring

and the necklace are different and therefore implied identity is not at

that level. Deterministically ring is different from necklace.

Therefore the identity is only at the substantive level since both are

nothing but gold. As Citsukhi stated that in the verbal statements

involving identity relations the identity is implied only at

substantial level and not at attributive level. The indeterminacy is

inherent due to differences in the attributive knowledge. Therefore the

criticism of Advaitic position by Vedanta Deshika is also baseless.

 

If one closely examines the VishiShTAdvaitic doctrine involved in the

analysis of ‘That art Thou’ statement, it also uses some kind of bhAga

tyAga to arrive at the identity relation (although they do not say so),

and there is indeterminacy involved in the understanding. They use the

samAnAdhikarana between the attribute and the substantive as indicative

of the implied identity. The attributes of Thou, jiiva, and those of

‘That’, parabrahma, are entirely different and distinct. Since,

according to them, ‘parabrahman pervades the whole universe of movable

and immovable as indweller or antaryAmin, in the implied identity

statement, one has to discard all the attributes of the ‘thou’ and only

equate the essence in all ‘thou’ as an indweller that pervades all

‘Thou-s’, since ‘Thou’ is part of ‘That’. According to VishiShTAdviata

the indwelling part is only to be involved in the identity relation and

‘Thou’ itself constitutes an attribute of Parabrahman. Since attribute

is inseparable from substantive, identity is to establish the oneness

in terms of substantive. Taking the blue lotus as an example and

addressing the blue – ‘Thou art Lotus’, since blue is an inseparable

attribute of Lotus and depends on Lotus for its existence, referring to

an attribute is then to refer to its substantive; that is what they

imply as samAnAdhikaraNa. Without going into the validity of their

analysis and conclusion, we note that they are adopting a procedure

somewhat similar to bhAga tyAga that is discarding some parts to arrive

at the implied identity relation. They are discarding the individual

attributes of the jiiva in identifying with Parabrahman, since jiiva is

the part of the later and depends on him, while being pervaded by it as

indweller. They are in essence following Citsukhi’s guidelines while

criticizing Advaitic stand. Hence their criticism of Advaitic position

is unwarranted.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

PS - I will be on travel from tomorrow returning to States and may take

few days to get access to internet. There will be some delay in my

responses, if they are needed.