Guest guest Posted July 6, 2008 Report Share Posted July 6, 2008 Sri Sadananda wrote: " The perception through the senses involves perception of only the attributes of the object since Brahman, the substantive cannot be perceived as separate from the perceiver. " Namaste Sri Sadananda, Good to see you keeping up your course on V.P. Small point: throughout the text we read that mental states/mental modifications/vritti are in the form of the object. pg.15: " so also the luminous mind, issuing through the eye etc., goes to the space occupied by objects such as a jar, and is modified into the form of a jar or any other object " . What we perceive are objects in the first instance. The object may be red, oblong, coloured, fragrent etc but that becomes evident later. In fact there may be much about the object that we miss but that does not mean that we have failed to perceive the object. If what we perceive are merely attributes then we are left with the problem of how an object is conjured up. What tells us that all this information is an object? It is a much simpler explanation to hold that the mental modification is that of an object. Now one might object that the object cannot be in the mind, how can that physical presence be in my brain/mind. Advaita would rebut this by holding that the physical object is not the ultimate reality, rather Consciousness is. The idea of attributes being in the mind of the subject must be the result of an assumption that the neural state gives rise to the mental state or that it is equivalent to it. " Consciousness limited by a jar etc, is the Consciousness associated with the object; that limited by the mental state is the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge; and that limited by the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. " pg.14. Note that neural states are not denied - " Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge " - but that they are just an element in the threefold complex which never loses sight of the fact that it is an object that is in question and not a bundle of attributes that are inferred to belong to an object. Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 8, 2008 Report Share Posted July 8, 2008 Namaste Sri. Michael, advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote: > > > Sri Sadananda wrote: > " The perception through the senses involves perception of only the > attributes of the object since Brahman, the substantive cannot be > perceived as > separate from the perceiver. " > Michael wrote: > > What we perceive are objects in the first instance. The object may be > red, oblong, coloured, fragrent etc but that becomes evident later. In > fact there may be much about the object that we miss but that does not > mean that we have failed to perceive the object. If what we perceive are > merely attributes then we are left with the problem of how an object is > conjured up. What tells us that all this information is an object? > I too having difficulty in admitting we perceive only attributes. My skepticism is from epistemological point of view. What we know is what we perceive (either in current perception or in past ones). If so called `substance' is not at all perceived, how did we know in the first place that there is such thing as `substance'? Taking one step back, we can question ourselves, in the first place, how do we know there are two such things as `attribute' and `substance' in reality? Let me discuss this epistemological point a bit more; In general, when one claims that only A is perceived but not B, two things is sure ; 1.Either B is known to exist apriori (from other means/instances of perceptions), but not perceived in this specific instance . Or 2. B is totally unknown apriori and not perceived to exist in this specific instance too . So, which case of the above is true when perception of substance is denied? If it is former, it begs the question what is that source of our knowledge about `substance'? Whatever that may be, but given the position taken by VP (that memory is not pramANa), such apriori knowledge about substance can not be summoned in the current denial of perception of substance. This I say because, for both, either attestation or denial, one needs a pramANa. If a specific piece of knowledge is in the memory (which is gained from prior means) is not pramANa , such knowledge can not be used in denial of any thing, let alone perception of substance of things. On the other hand, if the position is that of the later, there too exist a problem. If the very notion called `substance' is ever unknown apriori, how can one say substance of all things is Brahman, for Brahman is not at all perceived to be the substance of the things in any acts of perception? In my understanding, dividing reality of things into `attribute' and `substance' is illogical. `Substance' and `Attributes' do not exist as distinct entities in the reality. The correct position is that we perceive what we perceive, and our language of our communication allows for such a usage as that of `of things' kind. For example, we perceive a unitary thing and our language allows us to call it `Apple, the substance'. The same language allows to use the terms such as " color of the apple " , " shape of the apple " etc. These terms `color of' , `shape of' , `taste of' we label as " Attribute " . The reality of things has different aspects of existence. These different aspects of the reality, in this case aspects of apple, allows us to perceive those aspects through different instruments-of-perceptions we equipped with. These aspects of reality are expressed in our language as `attribute of things' only. Nothing more and nothing less. Regards, Srinivas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 9, 2008 Report Share Posted July 9, 2008 advaitin , " Srinivas Kotekal " <kots_p wrote: > > > Michael wrote: > > > > What we perceive are objects in the first instance. The object > may be > > red, oblong, coloured, fragrent etc but that becomes evident > later. In > > fact there may be much about the object that we miss but that does > not > > mean that we have failed to perceive the object. If what we > perceive are > > merely attributes then we are left with the problem of how an > object is > > conjured up. What tells us that all this information is an object? > > > > I too having difficulty in admitting we perceive only attributes. My > skepticism is from epistemological point of view. > > What we know is what we perceive (either in current perception or in > past ones). If so called `substance' is not at all perceived, how > did we know in the first place that there is such thing > as `substance'? Taking one step back, we can question ourselves, in > the first place, how do we know there are two such things > as `attribute' and `substance' in reality? Don't we say that it is Shruthi that first teaches us of the Substance Brahman? That Brahman ('pure Intelligence') is perceived as having attributes, specifically distinguished as objects etc. The attributes are superimposition, mithya: they are not real as they come and go whereas the existing reality that appears thus is always the same. The question " Why does it appear thus to me? " is not answerable for the " me " is part of appearance. Logically, we perceive non-eternality about any attribute-specific existence; however existence is constant reality and whatever is existing is that Reality of Brahman. We cannot speak of it without specifying it through limitations/attributes; however the latter are not its essential features: they constitute its appearance. When the focus is on the appearance, we imagine reality of time, space, causation, and want to determine Brahman through its appearance. When the focus is the Reality that appears, all these notions are lost in value. thollmelukaalkizhu > > Let me discuss this epistemological point a bit more; > > In general, when one claims that only A is perceived but not B, two > things is sure ; > > 1.Either B is known to exist apriori (from other means/instances of > perceptions), but not perceived in this specific instance . > > Or > > 2. B is totally unknown apriori and not perceived to exist in this > specific instance too . > > > So, which case of the above is true when perception of substance is > denied? > > If it is former, it begs the question what is that source of our > knowledge about `substance'? Whatever that may be, but given the > position taken by VP (that memory is not pramANa), such apriori > knowledge about substance can not be summoned in the current denial > of perception of substance. This I say because, for both, either > attestation or denial, one needs a pramANa. If a specific piece of > knowledge is in the memory (which is gained from prior means) is not > pramANa , such knowledge can not be used in denial of any thing, let > alone perception of substance of things. > > On the other hand, if the position is that of the later, there too > exist a problem. If the very notion called `substance' is ever > unknown apriori, how can one say substance of all things is Brahman, > for Brahman is not at all perceived to be the substance of the > things in any acts of perception? > > In my understanding, dividing reality of things into `attribute' > and `substance' is illogical. `Substance' and `Attributes' do not > exist as distinct entities in the reality. The correct position is > that we perceive what we perceive, and our language of our > communication allows for such a usage as that of `of things' kind. > For example, we perceive a unitary thing and our language allows us > to call it `Apple, the substance'. The same language allows to use > the terms such as " color of the apple " , " shape of the apple " etc. > These terms `color of' , `shape of' , `taste of' we label > as " Attribute " . The reality of things has different aspects of > existence. These different aspects of the reality, in this case > aspects of apple, allows us to perceive those aspects through > different instruments-of-perceptions we equipped with. These aspects > of reality are expressed in our language as `attribute of things' > only. Nothing more and nothing less. > > Regards, > Srinivas. > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 9, 2008 Report Share Posted July 9, 2008 Michael - PraNAms Thanks for your comments. I thought we went over this in the past. Since our dvaitin friend Shree Srinivas joined in the discussion, let me go over briefly the advaitic position as I understand. I just finished Memorial Day camp on Sad vidya of Chandogya where some of these issues I addressed based on Shankara bhaashya and Shree Vidyaaranya's AnubhutiprakaaSha. I will present again my understanding - I do not want to sound like a broken record but since the question keeps coming I have to answer to the best I can based on my knowledge. I am going to do systematically why only attributes form the input and not substantive for object knowledge although Michael I am fully aware that you are aware of these. 1. Brahman is the material cause for the universe. yetova imaani bhuutani jaayante etc and janmaandhyasya yataH. 2. kaarya kaaraNa samaanaadhikara is employed to understand the effect is nothing but cause itself in different form. 3. Upanishad gives three loukika or worldly examples - just as pots are nothing but clay itself in different forms - just as ornaments are nothing but gold itself in different forms and iron tools are nothing but iron itself in different forms. Lohamiti eva sataym - eva implies gold alone is real not the names and forms or kaaryams or products. Ring is nothing but gold itself in different form - ring, bangle, bracelet, etc are vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam -just names and forms for the same substantive gold. By saying gold alone is real, it dismisses the reality to the products - only material cause or substantive cause alone is real - not the superficial names and forms. Hence the famous statement vaachaarambhano vikaaro naamadheyam is repeated many times in the chapter to drive that there is no substantive of any object other than Brahman – hence neha naanaasti kinchana and sarvam khalu idam brahma – there is nothing other than brahman and if one sees something other than Brahman then it is just name and form not substantive of its own. Hence Brahaarpanam braham haviH etc follows. 4. Going back to our worldly example - When I say it is ring, I am seeing ring attributes which are different from gold attributes. Based on ring attributes I say it is ring and based on bracelet attributes I say it is bracelet. There is no ring substance no Bracelet substance to differentiate the two. The substantive for both are gold alone which alone is real – gold between the two (ring and bracelet) is not differentiable – loham iti eva satyam implies the real is not the ring and bangle or bracelet - they are vaachaarambanam vikaaraH namaadheyam - the product, vikaara is just vaak aarambhanamam with name - naamadheyam - we need to name ring based on its attributes to separate it from bangle with its attributes - they are just words - vaak aarambhanam - just speech for transactional purposes - naama for ruupa - ruupa in general includes - shabda, sparsha ruupa, rasa, gandha - the five sense inputs- with ruupa and naama - The same gold - transacted differently with names and forms and therefore with verities of utilities. Ring, bangle etc are just 'padams' or names with no padaartham of ringly substance or no substantive of their own to separate ring from bangle. Gold attributes are different from ring - its luster, its malleability, resistance to corrosion etc. Gold is recognized based its attributes. The loukika or worldly example is shown to indicate that material cause pervades through the products. Products of the same material cause are nothing but names and forms (attributes) of the same material. That is what is called vyavahaara satyam. By saying gold ALONE, eva, real, it dismisses the names and form as not real, but not unreal either since they have transactional reality -Hence vyavahaara satyam is provided by vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naaamadheyam statement. Paaramaarthika satyam and vyaavahaarika satym - follow - one at kaaraNa (cause) level and other at kaaryam (product) level. 4. After establishing that material cause alone manifest in verities of names and forms - chandogya goes into elaborate description of the cause for the whole universe with Sat eve soumya idam agra asiit - relating to Brahman has the material cause. Sat is used as the Ch. Up and Atma is used another Upanishad. The whole of chadogya 6th chapter upto 7 sections center on establishing-Brahma satyam and jagat mithyaa- and Brahman is the material cause for the whole bhuuta and bhoutica - both subtler and grosser entities in the universe. From section 8 to 16 it completes the teaching with jiivo brahma eva na aparah – with tat tvam asi statement. Thus whole advaitic teaching is packed in that Chapter. mithyaa is neither real nor unreal - it is maaya - or adhyaasa a superimpostion on the real - like ring on the gold. Hence according to Advaita - Brahman alone is the material cause and everything is nothing but form and name (attributes with naamadheyam - like ring and bangle etc.) 5. Only attributes can be gathered by senses not the substantive - In the case of ring and bangle example - worldly example- I gather the attributes of the ring and attributes of the gold. If ring is made up of iron then attributes of the ring and attributes of the iron. There are no ringly substantive to separate it from bangly substantive. 6. According to Vedanta, sat is the material cause - sat has no attributes since attributes belong to finite not infinite - therefore senses can gather only all the attributes of the worldly objects and not that of Brahman since Brahman is all pervading. 7. If one understand Vedanta Paribhaasha correctly, it clearly says perceptuality condition involves unity of the subject consciousness with the object consciousness (Brahman expresses only as existence, sat in the inert objects) formed as the VRitti of the object in the mind - Mind is subtle matter not gross matter - the contents of the vRitti are the attributes for the object perceived by the senses. Since Brahman expresses vividly in inert objects as pure existence - the unity is the unity of the subject consciousness with the objects existence now as VRitti which has attributes of the objects as its contents. When the VRitti is formed in the mind, it reflects the illumination of the witnessing consciousness and the reflected limiting consciousness of the object is the knowledge of the object. This aspect I have discussed elaborately in the previous posts (this is for the benefit of Shree Srinivas). Whole of Vedanta and Vedanta Paribhaasha is correctly understood without compromising Advaitic position. I can go and bring the discussion of perception of the dream world and dream objects but wait when VP discusses that topic. But in the discussion of creation - Chadogya say - bahusyaam - let me become many - sat becoming many is the varities of objects and the world. Objects are nothing but vaachaarambhanam vikaaraH naamadheyam - just words with names and forms - forms are attribtues - no substantive of their alone. I have discussed before from Science point there is swaruupa lakshNa for any object since they are just assemblage of finer particles - At each level of transactions, we have only transactional reality. I request Shree Sastriji who also has written on VP to step in if there is any discrepancy or if these can be stated better for clarification. I also would like to request Shree Srinivas not to bring in dvaita position here since VP is clearly advaitic epistemological analysis based on Vivarana school. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 9, 2008 Report Share Posted July 9, 2008 --- On Tue, 7/8/08, kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote: I have discussed before from Science point there is swaruupa lakshNa for any object since they are just assemblage of finer particles - At each level of transactions, we have only transactional reality. ------- - 'no' is missing in the first line - it shoul dbe - there are no swaruupa lakshaNa for objects since they are made up of parts - Brahman alone has swaruupa lakshaNa since He is part less. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2008 Report Share Posted July 10, 2008 advaitin , " putranm " <putranm wrote: > the same. The question " Why does it appear thus to me? " is not > answerable for the " me " is part of appearance. > > I plugged-in the above sentence in a time crunch. Perhaps Sri Sadaji or others can address it. If I ask " Why do i see this object? " , the answer can be related to my present existence and given some cause-effect answer. If the question is " Why is this seer-seeing-seen multiplicity ever arise in Brahman? " , then how does Advaita respond? I understand the Chandogya Up. mentions of Sat becoming many " Let me be many " etc. Here, my understanding is that Brahman projected a semblance of many. Still, where do the notions of anirvachaniya and anaadi fit into this picture? thollmelukaalkizhu Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2008 Report Share Posted July 10, 2008 Shree Putram ji - PraNAms Here is my understanding. In Gita Ch. 8 Krishna define karma as that which is the cause for creation. We need to first recognize that the cycle of creation, sustenance and dissolution is beginning less. At the time of pralaya, all the beings - sentient and insentient - resolve back to the source - Brahman - and remain there in the dormant form or in potential form. This is similar to the individual sleep where all the things and beings going back into myself as the mind gets resolved in potential form - When I get up in the morning all that went in will come out exactly as was left before. Individual sleep is called laya and Iswara's sleep is called pralaya. When Iswara projects - saying that let me become many, it is not a random creation - the seeds for the creation come from karma of the jiivas from the previous cycle. Hence when it says 'tat aikshata' - That sat swaruupam - visualized what should be creation, given the all the blue prints that was available. Hence Krishna says even though he is the creator, he is not responsible what comes out the prakRiti since what comes out depends on what went in. Hence for all the objects that are created in the universe the seeds are there already - the jiiva does not create the objects - Jiiva's creation is only in his dream world. In the waking world the objects and their attributes arises from the prakRiti - which is same as maaya - and seed for that come from the previous life cycle. There is no beginning for the cycle and nothing gets wasted nor nothing gets created randomly. Model of creation of the waking world in the dream is somewhat similar to that in dream. The cause for the dream is the jiiva vaasanaas due to suppressions and oppressions in the waking world -Similarly the total vaasanaas of all beings in the universe form the basis for Iswara's creation. Just as I consider myself a tiny subject in my own dream while the rest of the beings and things are different each with their own BMI (body, mind and intellect) even though the whole dream world of beings and objects are projected by one waking mind that pervades the whole dream world - in the same way the Iswara creates saying let me become many each with individual vaasanaas based on previous samskaara. Hence Krishna says: bhuutabhaavodbhavakaro visargaH karma sanjnitaH - The cause for the creation of all the beings is nothing but Karma - Obviously the karma has to come from the previous life or lives or previous cycle. From the jiiva's point his cycle is broken when he realizes. From Iswara's point the total cycle is broken when all beings in the whole universe or universes realize! Hari Om! Sadananda --- On Wed, 7/9/08, putranm <putranm wrote: If the question is " Why is this seer-seeing- seen multiplicity ever arise in Brahman? " , then how does Advaita respond? I understand the Chandogya Up. mentions of Sat becoming many " Let me be many " etc. Here, my understanding is that Brahman projected a semblance of many. Still, where do the notions of anirvachaniya and anaadi fit into this picture? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2008 Report Share Posted July 10, 2008 advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote: > > Michael - PraNAms > > Thanks for your comments. I thought we went over this in the past. Since our dvaitin friend Shree Srinivas joined in the discussion, let me go over briefly the advaitic position as I understand. I just finished Memorial Day camp on Sad vidya of Chandogya where some of these issues I addressed based on Shankara bhaashya and Shree Vidyaaranya's AnubhutiprakaaSha. > > > I will present again my understanding - I do not want to sound like a broken record but since the question keeps coming I have to answer to the best I can based on my knowledge. I am going to do systematically why only attributes form the input and not substantive for object knowledge although Michael I am fully aware that you are aware of these. > I request Shree Sastriji who also has written on VP to step in if there is any discrepancy or if these can be stated better for clarification. > > Hari Om! > Sadananda Sadananda-ji, According to all schools of Vedanta, attribute and substance are non- different. The relation between the two is the relation of identity (tAdAtmya sambandha). (Please see Methods of knowledge, Note no. 45 on page 48). From your latest posting it appears that in the case of a gold ring what you mean by substance is gold and what you call attribute is `ring'. But what is generally understood by the word 'substance' is an object and what is understood by the word attribute' is its colour, shape etc. When we talk about perception from the vyAvahArika point of view what we perceive is the object along with its attributes, namely a black pot, round in shape, etc. When I look at a ring I see only a ring, though I know that is nothing but gold. No doubt we must always remember that the ring is nothing but gold and has no separate existence of its own, but this aspect, I feel, does not come in when we are dealing with the nature of perception. From the absolute point of view even attributes such as colour have no existence of their own and they are also only Brahman. So we will have to say that nothing is perceived except Brahman. But that is the ultimate advaitic realization and not the perception from the vyAvahArika point of view that you are now dealing with. This, to my mind, is the reason for the objections raised by Michael-ji and Srinivas-ji to your statement that only the attributes are perceived. In this particular instance Srinivas-ji's objection is not based on dvaita. Regards, S.N.Sastri Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2008 Report Share Posted July 10, 2008 According to all schools of Vedanta, attribute and substance are non- different. The relation between the two is the relation of identity (tAdAtmya sambandha). praNAms Hare Krishna I have a doubt here..how can attribute (guNa/vishesha) and substance (sAmAnya) be non-different from each other?? especially when attributes are subject to modification/change as per the demands of space and time?? If we take the ring-gold example, ofcourse ring is gold but gold cannot be always ring to say the nAma & rUpa of gold in ring shape is non-different from gold...ring may lose its identity today & become nose drop tomorrow, nAma & rUpa have been changed here but the substance remains the same as *gold*...IMHO, when we talk about sAmAnya-vishEsha of the objects or the perceived world, we should always keep in mind the substance of the Atman being said here just to drive home the point that *there is nothing exists apart from THAT*..it is not intended to argue that without species (attributes) there is no genus (substance)...In that case very assertion of the shruti such as : Atman is nirguNa, nirAmaya, nirvikAra, niravayava will be defeated by the excessive dependency on the attributes & its identification with *substance*...Shankara explains this in gIta bhAshya : when we say 'there exists a pot', 'there exist an elephant', 'there exists a cloth' etc., two notions have been involved...i.e. *existence* & the object (being or non-being)..Of these two notions, the notion of Pot, cloth, elephant etc. are variable, but not the notion of existence. Hence, the final conclusion as to the essential nature of both being and non-being or the self (Atma) and the not-self (anAtma) has been arrived at by the knowers of truth that *the existent* always is and the non-existent (or unreal) never is...Here if my understanding is right, Sri Sadananda prabhuji arguing that unreal attributes (ring) of the substance (gold) and holding the ultimate reality of the *gold* (substance i.e. *the existent*) as against *ring*. In short attributes are unreal (since it is subject to *change*) and the substance is Real, since it cannot be influenced by time & causation... Hari Hari Hari Bol!!! bhaskar Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2008 Report Share Posted July 10, 2008 --- On Thu, 7/10/08, snsastri <sn.sastri wrote: When I look at a ring I see only a ring, though I know that is nothing but gold. No doubt we must always remember that the ring is nothing but gold and has no separate existence of its own, but this aspect, I feel, does not come in when we are dealing with the nature of perception. From the absolute point of view even attributes such as colour have no existence of their own and they are also only Brahman. So we will have to say that nothing is perceived except Brahman. But that is the ultimate advaitic realization and not the perception from the vyAvahArika point of view that you are now dealing with. This, to my mind, is the reason for the objections raised by Michael-ji and Srinivas-ji to your statement that only the attributes are perceived. In this particular instance Srinivas-ji' s objection is not based on dvaita. Regards, S.N.Sastri Sastriji - My sahstanga praNAms. Thanks for your lucid comments and responding immediately. Not for an argument sake, but I would like to present to illustrate with an example. I recognize that within the transactional reality the substance is recognized as locus for the attributive knowledge. Here I have problem accepting that senses gather substance along with attributes. I feel that there is inherent assumption involved that attributes cannot exist without locus and Mind makes that assumption as part of its structure. I know Shree Srinivas once asked me where is vyaapti for that inference. As worldly example - let us take an image formation from the light emitted by an object. When I see the image on the screen, I am seeing the image, should I say that light that is emitted by the source grasped the substance too in forming the image. Looking at the image (as in the mind) I do infer that there is an object out there with the particular form as reflected in the image. Disneyland uses this to projects virtual images on the floor dancing and disappearing - they call this haunted house or something like that. I cannot have an image without an object out there, but the image is formed by the reflected light from the object - the object substantive remaining where it is. The same is true in the mirror image - pratibimba. In the image should there be substantive of the object? The second problem that arises is when the senses grasp the substance the errors in perception cannot occur - such as snake where there is a rope. Since what senses have gathered through sense input is not only the attributes of the object but substantive too (within vyavahaara) and there is no reason to grasp snake substance when there is a rope. I have a feeling that senses perception and the image (vRitti) formed mimicking the object involves an inherent presumption that there is an object out there with these attributes. I do appreciate your input and I am sure Michael and Srinivas are happy too. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2008 Report Share Posted July 10, 2008 Namaste Sri.Sadananda-ji, Thanks for your analysis. This not for argument sake, but as an attempt to understand your perspective, here is some difficulty I am facing (pardon me if it sounds like Dvaita arguments, but rest assured it is not. It is my own doubts); advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote: > > I recognize that within the transactional reality the substance is recognized as locus for the attributive knowledge. Here I have problem >accepting that senses gather substance along with attributes. I feel that there is inherent assumption involved that attributes cannot exist >without locus and Mind makes that assumption as part of its structure. I know Shree Srinivas once asked me where is vyaapti for that inference. > Yes, I still have that question. My contention is that our mind do not make such assumptions between attribute and substance. There is no ground to say so. Because, for any such assumptions to make, we should have actually witnessed such association or concomitance (between attribute and substance) elsewhere in the past perceptions. Only if we did that, we could say our mind is somehow making that assumption in the current instance of perception. But, if we were to say so, that itself proves the truth that at least we perceived (in that past) the actual association of attributes with substance. Either way we have established the actual association and thus the claim of assumed association has no basis. This is the question of vyApti I was raising elsewhere. You have already know all this, but for the sake of context let me put it. If we know how anumAna works, we could appreciate the above raised issue. All schools of vEdAnta agree that for any anumAna or inference to happen, one has to observe (in pratyksha) the actual concomitance (sambandha) between the terms involved. Without seeing/aware of the actual relation between fire and smoke apriori, one can not make anumAna of the kind `There must be a fire on the hilltop, for I see smoke there'. This is the reason anumAna is defined as the one which is `anusAri' (to follow) either pratyksha or aagama. It will never can happen independently on its own. > As worldly example - let us take an image formation from the light emitted by an object. When I see the image on the screen, I am seeing the >image, should I say that light that is emitted by the source grasped the substance too in forming the image. Looking at the image (as in the >mind) I do infer that there is an object out there with the particular form as reflected in the image. Disneyland uses this to projects virtual >images on the floor dancing and disappearing - they call this haunted house or something like that. I cannot have an image without an object >out there, but the image is formed by the reflected light from the object - the object substantive remaining where it is. The same is true in the >mirror image - pratibimba. In the image should there be substantive of the object? We don't look at the object in the mind same way as we look at the image on screen. When we aware of a pot, we aware of pot as existing, it is never in our experience that we are aware of pot's image in the mind. Also, this confusion is due to assuming the `perception' is just `seeing' alone. Let's not forget `perception' or `pratyaksha' is not just seeing but more than that of sparsha, rasa, gandha, shabda etc. Projection of object's image on the screen is devoid of substance, I agree, but we know it involves visual aspect of perception only. All other aspects of perception, such as sparsha, rasa, gandha, shabda, are missing there. For that matter, one can argue that the very fact that we know it is an `image' (distinct from object itself) proves that image is different from object and that image's substance (screen material in this case) is not the same as object's substance. > The second problem that arises is when the senses grasp the substance the errors in perception cannot occur - such as snake where there is >a rope. Since what senses have gathered through sense input is not only the attributes of the object but substantive too (within vyavahaara) >and there is no reason to grasp snake substance when there is a rope. > Here too, the problem is due to thinking seeing alone is perception. I may be `seeing' snake in place of a rope, but that alone doesn't establishes there is a snake substance out there. It is established or negated only if I allow other components of pratyaksha to act, such as, if I were to touch it, hear it etc. The errors in pratyaksha happens only if few of the panchEndriaya-s were in action. For that matter, one can turn the table and argue that; the very process of error correction will not happen if we never perceive the actual substance. That's to say, if we never perceive underlying substance, how can we say we were confused rope as a snake? We could as well say we were confused `rope attributes' for `snake attributes', but do we? Regards, Srinivas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 10, 2008 Report Share Posted July 10, 2008 Hi Srinivas-ji, I really ought to re-read the complete thread on this topic but, if you will allow and if it is pertinent, I would like to pick up the last point you made: “For that matter, one can turn the table and argue that; the very process of error correction will not happen if we never perceive the actual substance. That's to say, if we never perceive underlying substance, how can we say we were confused rope as a snake? We could as well say we were confused `rope attributes' for `snake attributes', but do we?” Surely, all that we ever do is ‘collect’ more attributes by further examination. We never perceive the ‘actual substance’ which is always only brahman. If we could perceive this, we would never mistake anything to be other than brahman. In the case of the apparent snake, we could (in theory) touch it and establish that the texture is not that of snake skin. But we haven’t perceived any underlying substance, merely established that an attribute contradicts our previous assumption that the rope was a snake. Imagine that we have a rod of metal on the ground. We can apply all of our senses to the matter but, on their own, it is unlikely that we would be able definitely to conclude anything more than this. We might note that it is heavy but not malleable so that it cannot be lead, for example. But, in order to refine our conclusions, we need to acquire other attributes that are not accessible to our immediate senses. We might carry out chemical tests, for example, or place it next to a Geiger counter and so on. Eventually, if our tests are sufficiently rigorous, we may conclude that the rod is, say, uranium. But even this is only a description of attributes. Whatever the ‘substance’, it is mithyA only. At a more detailed level, it is a metal lattice of atoms, consisting of nuclei of protons and neutrons surrounded by electrons in a particular configuration. And, of course, ultimately this is only an attribute of the real adhiShThAna - brahman. Apologies if I am diverting the discussion into an unintentional area! Best wishes, Dennis Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2008 Report Share Posted July 11, 2008 --- On Thu, 7/10/08, Srinivas Kotekal <kots_p wrote: Yes, I still have that question. My contention is that our mind do not make such assumptions between attribute and substance. There is no ground to say so. Because, for any such assumptions to make, we should have actually witnessed such association or concomitance (between attribute and substance) elsewhere in the past perceptions. Only if we did that, we could say our mind is somehow making that assumption in the current instance of perception. But, if we were to say so, that itself proves the truth that at least we perceived (in that past) the actual association of attributes with substance. Either way we have established the actual association and thus the claim of assumed association has no basis. This is the question of vyApti I was raising elsewhere. --------------- Srinivas - PraNAms The reason I did not address the issue you raised before is that I am not sure I understand it clearly myself to explain it. I still do not know how to explain the process but I know that I cannot accept that senses bringing in the substantive with it. That is impossible. That it brings in is also an assumption. - It comes originally from Tarkikas - not actually from Vedanta. Although I used the word inference, it is not exactly the inference that we are familiar in nyaaya, as the means of knowledge, where five (hetu- saadhya - paksha - dRiShTanta - and vyaapti) are involved in the anumaana. The reason I did not address the issue you raised is if anumaana is really involved then perceptual knowledge is not direct and immediate. It would rest on the inferential process which is indirect. Pratyaksha is direct and immediate and is different from anumaana - this we all accept. Hence I do not venture it to call really as anumaana. I would like to consider it as part of inherent Mental structure itself - if I can say so - see for example Kantian analysis of the working of the mind where inherent structure is capable of direct association of the image in the mind with the object out there. The inherent mental structure involves a structural format - in computer language we can say programming language - that translates the mental image into the 'notion' of the presence of an object out there that matches the image (which is based on the attributes that sense gathered). Remember the mind is a subtle matter and the object is gross substance - now how do the senses bringing the substantive of the object which is gross in the form of an image or vRitti in the mind - That becomes even a bigger problem to explain. The structural format of the mind is capable of logical analysis by programming to deductive or inductive reasoning to deduce the vyaapti out of hetu and saadhya. How does that occur, I do not know. But that does not mean senses gather substantive. If I see a distant star out there billions of light years away, if my senses have to go there and grasp the object and bring in to my mind I may have to wait twice no. of billions of years. The only correct understanding is the light emitted billions of years ago reaching my vision and forming an image in the mind. That there is a star out there is based on the knowledge that of vRitti that formed in the subtle mental screen. As soon as I turn my mind to some other object, the mental screen is wiped out clean and I have a next image – like at TV screen. If substantives were also gathered I will have big problem of getting packed with substantives of all the objects I perceived! – There senses cannot bringing gross matter and we have do now to account how subtle matter of the gross object is brought – that brings in a different assumption requiring justification. The point is it is not necessary to bring in order to account for the knowledge of the vRitti which is based on the attributive input. If the attributes inadequate - fuzzy logic can come and if the attributes as defective errors in the perception can occur. All that is possible only because there is substantive that came with the attributes. Even though I do not fully understand the working of the mind - I do know that senses can only bring attributes and not substantive. Thanks for the discussion - you are forcing me to think! Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2008 Report Share Posted July 11, 2008 advaitin , " Srinivas Kotekal " <kots_p wrote: > My contention is that our mind do not make such assumptions between > attribute and substance. There is no ground to say so. Because, for > any such assumptions to make, we should have actually witnessed such > association or concomitance (between attribute and substance) > elsewhere in the past perceptions. Only if we did that, we could say > our mind is somehow making that assumption in the current instance > of perception. But, if we were to say so, that itself proves the > truth that at least we perceived (in that past) the actual > association of attributes with substance. Either way we have > established the actual association and thus the claim of assumed > association has no basis. This is the question of vyApti I was > raising elsewhere. Sri Kotekalji, I ask again " where does Sruthi's affirmation of Brahman (substance) come in? " . Are you sure your arguments are different from the Buddhists? As I said before, if I was to make just a logical attempt, I would say that existence is constant reality: we (astikas) cannot deny that there is a Reality that exists. The question then becomes whether it is possessed of real attributes. Then we argue that there is no reality (eternality) to attribute-specifications on Brahman, hence the essential reality is attribute-less but appears/manifests as if having attributes. [i know a dvaitin may challenge the 'eternality' point; but here my argument is to give the general structure and not details.] Even scientists these days will say that matter is only nama-rupa of a substratum called energy. It is not that they perceive energy directly apart from attributes; rather they perceive matter (existing reality as it appears) with attributes (name-form), however the attributes are not the essential features. Therefore they conclude that the substance ('energy') is attributeless but appears as with attributes ('matter'). thollmelukaalkizhu Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2008 Report Share Posted July 11, 2008 advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote: > Sastriji - My sahstanga praNAms. > > Thanks for your lucid comments and responding immediately. Not for an argument sake, but I would like to present to illustrate with an example. > > I recognize that within the transactional reality the substance is recognized as locus for the attributive knowledge. Here I have problem accepting that senses gather substance along with attributes. I feel that there is inherent assumption involved that attributes cannot exist without locus and Mind makes that assumption as part of its structure. I know Shree Srinivas once asked me where is vyaapti for that inference. > > As worldly example - let us take an image formation from the light emitted by an object. When I see the image on the screen, I am seeing the image, should I say that light that is emitted by the source grasped the substance too in forming the image. Looking at the image (as in the mind) I do infer that there is an object out there with the particular form as reflected in the image. Disneyland uses this to projects virtual images on the floor dancing and disappearing - they call this haunted house or something like that. I cannot have an image without an object out there, but the image is formed by the reflected light from the object - the object substantive remaining where it is. The same is true in the mirror image - pratibimba. In the image should there be substantive of the object? > > The second problem that arises is when the senses grasp the substance the errors in perception cannot occur - such as snake where there is a rope. Since what senses have gathered through sense input is not only the attributes of the object but substantive too (within vyavahaara) and there is no reason to grasp snake substance when there is a rope. > > I have a feeling that senses perception and the image (vRitti) formed mimicking the object involves an inherent presumption that there is an object out there with these attributes. > > I do appreciate your input and I am sure Michael and Srinivas are happy too. > > Hari Om! > Sadananda Dear Sadananda-ji, Thank you for your post. I wish to add the following in further clarification of what I had stated in my previous post. In the case of the rope appearing as a snake, what the person sees is only the rope, but he sees it only as some object in front and does not realize that it is a rope because of the dim light. That is to say, he fails to see its attribute `rope-ness' and sees it only as `this'. Then the memory of a snake which he had seen some where else earlier arises in his mind because of some similarity between the rope and a snake and he thinks that the object before him is a snake. Here he does not actually see either a snake or the attributes of a snake. The eye can come into contact only with an object that actually exists. Since the snake does not exist in front of the person, the eye cannot come into contact with it. The seeing of the snake is therefore not considered as a normal pratyaksha which arises through a vritti of the mind caused by the mind coming into contact with the object through the eyes. It is called sAkshi pratyaksha, which is described as below in my posting on VP on my website (based on VP itself):-- " Being cognised by the witness alone (kevalasakshi-vedyatvam) does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of the mental modifications corresponding to them, but that they are objects of the witness without the activity of pramanas such as the sense-organs and inference. Hence Prakasatmayati has, in Vivarana, admitted a mental modification in the form of the ego-- ahamakara- vritti. So also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a vritti of nescience in the form of silver (rajata-akara-avidya- vritti) has been admitted in works such as Samkshepa-sariraka. The illusory silver is 'sakshi-bhasyam', cognised by the witness-self, since the mental modification is not of the vyavaharika mind, but is a vritti of avidya " . It is clear from the above that neither the illusory snake nor its attributes are seen by the eye. In VP the perception of objects is what is spoken of and not the perception of attributes. Nowhere in VP or elsewhere it is said that pratyaksha pramana reveals only attributes and not the object. No attribute such as colour, shape, etc., can appear apart from its locus, which has to be an object. Pratyaksha or perception is a pramana which reveals the world as real. The knowledge that the world is unreal and is a mere superimposition on brahman is not conveyed by pratyaksha pramana. This knowledge is revealed by the sabda pramana in the form of sruti statements such as " All this is indeed brahman " , " There is no diversity here whatsoever " , " All transformation is mere name " . These two pramanas have to be kept separate. Sri Sankara has pointed out in his bhAshya that each pramana is supreme in its own field. When we are dealing with pratyaksha pramana we cannot bring in the falsity of the world, which is based on another pramana, and say that everything is brahman. Moreover, according to advaita the world is not an attribute of brahman. So it would not be correct to say that when we see the world we are seeing only attributes. What we see are objects which are real as far as pratyaksha pramana is concerned. The present discussion is about pratyaksha pramana and so it would not be correct to bring in what is stated by sruti which is a different pramana. As regards an image on a screen, the mind comes into contact with it through the eye in the same manner as any picture or any other object. This image may have attributes such as colour, shape, etc., and these are also perceived along with the image. The attributes may or may not be perceived fully, depending on the circumstances such as the sufficiency of the light, distance of the object from the eye, etc. The object itself may not be correctly recognized. But these defects cannot affect the truth of the general statement that pratyaksha reveals objects. A mirror image is illusory like the rope-snake and so what I have said above regarding rope-snake applies to this also. In this case also the eye does not come into contact with the object and so it is also seen only by the witness-consciousness. Thus what I want to bring out is that in all perceptions what is seen is an object. Its attributes may not be clearly recognized in the beginning, but they may become clearer subsequently. Naiyayikas distinguish the first perception which gives only a general idea of the object as indeterminate perception and the subsequent perception as determinate perception. But advaita Vedanta does not make this distinction. According to advaita only the realization of Brahman is indeterminate perception and all perceptions in the vyAvahArika realm are considered as savikalpaka perceptions. Regards, S.N.Sastri Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2008 Report Share Posted July 11, 2008 Namaste Shri thollmelukaalkizhu, In your message #40945 (Fri Jul 11), you say: Even scientists these days will say that matter is only nama-rupa of a substratum called energy. It is not that they perceive energy directly apart from attributes; rather they perceive matter (existing reality as it appears) with attributes (name-form), however the attributes are not the essential features. Therefore they conclude that the substance ('energy') is attributeless but appears as with attributes ('matter'). Yes, matter can be conceived as a gross appearance of more subtle energy, both in modern mechanical physics and in the older organic sciences. Moreover, in both new and old sciences, that subtle energy can be conceived in a de-materialized way -- as made up of unlimitedly violent and subtle fluctuations in a field conditioning that pervades throughout the background continuity of space and time. In Sanskrit, the 'energy' is of course called 'prana', the 'field' is called 'kshetra' and the 'background continuity' (the space-time continuum) is called 'akasha'. However, if we look at the terms more closely, one by one, we can see a crucial difference between modern mechanics and the old sciences. 'Energy' or 'prana' In modern mechanics, the concept of 'energy' is necessarily restricted to actions that take place between objects. But in the old sciences, the action of energy between objects is traced back to an ultimately subjective origin, in a pure consciousness that is not the object of any action. That consciousness is knowing in itself. It knows itself, as its own light, by which all objective appearances get lit. That consciousness stays present changelessly, throughout all experience. It is thus completely different from each objective appearance, which comes and goes in the limited focus of the mind's attention. It's only objects that appear and disappear, as attention turns towards them and away from them. Throughout this turning of attention, consciousness remains the same, neither appearing nor disappearing. That consciousness is found expressed -- in all the ordered forms, the intelligible meanings and the valued qualities which we perceive and conceive in the changing objects of our sensual and mental attention. As these objects act upon each other, we may naturally reflect back to the consciousness which they express in their actions on each other. The energy of that expression is inherently alive. It inherently expresses consciousness, to which each one of us may reflect, within our own experience. That living energy is 'prana'. We naturally associate it with the outward breathing which enables our bodies to speak living words whose purposes and meanings and motivations may be understood, by reflecting back into the consciousness that we each find in our individual experience. That living energy called 'prana' cannot be considered mechanically -- by outward observation through our bodies and their mechanical instruments. It has to be considered organically -- through an inward reflection that turns back into the underlying depth of mind, beneath all changes at the surface of attention. 'Field' or 'kshetra' In modern mechanics, a field is described quantitatively, by associating a mathematical quantity with each point-event of space-time. But in the old sciences, the description is more basically qualitative, by associating purposeful and meaningful and valued qualities with each space-time neighbourhood. Such qualities are not necessarily measured quantitatively, by mechanical instruments. They have to be observed more subtly -- by a 'kshetra-jnya' or a 'field-knower', who stays present as a disinterested witness. Each of us thus experiences a living field, which is always found inhabited by an ever-present witness. That witness must stay utterly unchanged and unaffected within -- while body, sense and mind keep on journeying through space and time, by our bodily travelling through outside space and by the turning of our sensual and mental attention from one neighbourhood or happening to another. By reflecting back down into that changeless witness, common principles are recognized in differing particulars, so that experience from the past can be applied to new happenings which are observed in the present and which may be expected in the future. In a mechanical science, the common principles are used to formulate quantitative laws that may calculate predictions for the future. Such a science is accordingly applied through its predictions -- as for example when an engineer builds a bridge by calculating the breaking stress of its various structural components. In an organic science or in the humanities or in psychology, the recognition of common principles is used in three ways: (1) to harmonize our personal and cultural microcosms with their containing macrocosm, (2) to educate our living faculties of expression and interpretation, or (3) to expand and steady our minds. The application of science thus turns inward, from prediction to education. 'Space-time continuum' or 'akasha' In modern mechanics, the space-time continuum is geometrically described as a four-dimensional geometry that interconnects all point-events of happening. A material mechanics (of objects placed in relative and changing space) is thus replaced by an immaterial geometry (of point-events in all-inclusive space and time). Physics is thus dematerialized -- but at the cost of making it harder and harder to understand intuitively or to apply effectively, in our seemingly material and changing world of three-dimensional objects. In the older sciences, the continuity of space and time is subjectively identified as that background of knowing which continues through everyone's experience -- no matter where or when any bodily observer may be located, nor which observing instruments or senses may be used, nor where attention is turned, nor what conditioning affects an imagining or believing or conceiving or questioning or judging or suffering or enjoying mind. The word 'akasha' refers to an 'inner shining' (from 'a-' implying an inner origin and 'kasha' meaning shining). What's thus described is a 'self-shining' which we all experience in common, beneath our differences of location and orientation and attitude. That self-shining is pure consciousness, unmixed with any differences of personality. It's thus the same for everyone, just like the totality of space-time in which all our personalities are contained. In the end, that totality is indistinguishable from the pure consciousness at the unchanging background of each person's experience. So it may be accessed immediately, by asking back within. Such asking is purely educational. It is not rightly concerned with the achievement of any object in the world. It's only concern is with true knowing -- which comes at last to the reality that's shown, no matter what may appear. Where asking for truth is thus purely educational, it goes by the name of 'philosophy'. It therefore puzzles me when people speak of 'science' and 'philosophy' as two different kinds of discipline. I cannot see how there can be any proper science, without a basic grounding in philosophy that asks for truth alone. As I see it, the older sciences acknowledged that philosophical grounding, in a way that modern mechanics has not properly been able to. The older sciences conceive of the 'kshetra' or the 'field' as essentially alive, in its expression of the 'kshetra-jnya' or the 'field-knower'. When that conception of a 'living field' is rightly understood, the field turns out to be nothing other than the knower, and advaita is there realized, in the identity of knower and known.Ananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2008 Report Share Posted July 11, 2008 advaitin , " snsastri " <sn.sastri wrote: > Pratyaksha or perception is a pramana which reveals the world as > real. The knowledge that the world is unreal and is a mere > superimposition on brahman is not conveyed by pratyaksha pramana. > This knowledge is revealed by the sabda pramana in the form of sruti > statements such as " All this is indeed brahman " , " There is no > diversity here whatsoever " , " All transformation is mere name " . These > two pramanas have to be kept separate. Sri Sankara has pointed out > in his bhAshya that each pramana is supreme in its own field. When > we are dealing with pratyaksha pramana we cannot bring in the > falsity of the world, which is based on another pramana, and say > that everything is brahman. Moreover, according to advaita the world > is not an attribute of brahman. So it would not be correct to say > that when we see the world we are seeing only attributes. What we > see are objects which are real as far as pratyaksha pramana is > concerned. The present discussion is about pratyaksha pramana and so > it would not be correct to bring in what is stated by sruti which is > a different pramana. (First, thanks to Sri Anandaji for the useful explanation on science and religion in post # 40947) Sri Shastriji and others, with regard to my post to Sri Kotekalji (# 40945) where I say QUOTE I ask again " where does Sruthi's affirmation of Brahman (substance) come in? " . Are you sure your arguments are different from the Buddhists? QUOTE and the above quote of Shastriji, I think one of the thrusts of the dvaitic viewpoint is that pratyaksha offers us a " changing reality " that is true unto itself. Since Sruthi explains a Brahman that is unchanging, etc., we must accept Brahman as distinct from the reality verified by pratyaksha. Similarly since Sruthi talks of eternal jiva, we must admit that prakrithi and jiva are distinct realities, for again the pramana of pratyaksha affirms Prakrithi and to know of a separate jiva we appeal to Shabda... The Advaitin uses Shabda to obtain the paramaarthika understanding of Brahman whereas Pratyaksha (mixed with Shabda?) gives the vyavahaarika understanding. The former is considered as absolute whereas the latter becomes mithya once Shabdha is taken into account; but both describe the same Reality. The Dvaitin keeps the realities described by distinct pramanas as ultimately distinct. The Buddhist also follows the dvaitin's method of analysis (starts with pratyaksha alone) but does not resort to Shabda in the end, so comes with a different conclusion. (This is just a free-flow perspective of the groups.) thollmelukaalkizhu Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2008 Report Share Posted July 11, 2008 Thank you for the wonderful deliberation on the means of knowledge. I recall Sage Charaka's comments and are worth mentioning. dvividhaa khalu parixaa j~naanavataaM pratyaxamanumaana~ncaitattu | dvayamupadeshashca pariixaatrayamevameShaa dvividhaa pariixaa trividhaa vaa sahopadeshena || caraka vimaanasthaana 8.91 || Meaning - Wise take recourse through two types of examinations - perceptual (as observed - pratyaxa) and inferential (derived from - anumaana). These two when combined with instructions from colleagues ( or shaastra) constitutes the method for examination. Ultimately the observations needs to become " ONE " (advaya) with the observer, then only there is some use for any observations. yaH saaxaata kurute prabodhasamaye svaamtaana mevaadvayaM Regards, Dr. Yadu So it would not be correct to say > that when we see the world we are seeing only attributes. What we > see are objects which are real as far as pratyaksha pramana is > concerned. The present discussion is about pratyaksha pramana and so > it would not be correct to bring in what is stated by sruti which is > a different pramana. > S.N.Sastri > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 11, 2008 Report Share Posted July 11, 2008 Dear Dennis-ji, Sadananda-ji and Putranm-ji ; Pardon me for writing a common reply to all of you. The reason is simply to avoid three separate mails and clog the list. Sadananda-ji wrote: --------------------------- Remember the mind is a subtle matter and the object is gross substance - now how do the senses bringing the substantive of the object which is gross in the form of an image or vRitti in the mind - That becomes even a bigger problem to explain. The structural format of the mind is capable of logical analysis by programming to deductive or inductive reasoning to deduce the vyaapti out of hetu and saadhya. How does that occur, I do not know. But that does not mean senses gather substantive. If I see a distant star out there billions of light years away, if my senses have to go there and grasp the object and bring in to my mind I may have to wait twice no. of billions of years. The only correct understanding is the light emitted billions of years ago reaching my vision and forming an image in the mind. That there is a star out there is based on the knowledge that of vRitti that formed in the subtle mental screen. As soon as I turn my mind to some other object, the mental screen is wiped out clean and I have a next image †" like at TV screen. If substantives were also gathered I will have big problem of getting packed with substantives of all the objects I perceived! †" There senses cannot bringing gross matter and we have do now to account how subtle matter of the gross object is brought †" that brings in a different assumption requiring justification. My reply: ----------- Mind is subtle, agreed, but not two dimensional. Senses do not bring the sense data (either attributes or substance) and project it on the mind screen so to speak. This `bringing-of-data' idea of yours escapes my understanding when you write " I do know that senses can only bring attributes and not substantive " . How do we know senses `bring' attributive data in? We have no experience of witnessing anything bringing-in or taking out. In pratyaksha, sense organs directly interacts with reality. Mind's apprehension of reality is direct and immediate. There is no bringing and projecting of anything. Our ability to interact with reality is direct and immediate. As far as seeing distant stars are concerned, again the confusion is thinking `seeing' is only the perception. How do we know star's have substance in order for your argument to stand? Since we know from other source (like astronomy etc) that those stars are indeed Sun like objects in far off solar systems. From this we conclude that they are huge spheres emitting light. Without this external knowledge from astronomy etc, whenever we see stars in the sky, we can not conclude those are objects, but we may conclude they are two dimensional light points without any underlying substance. Sadananda-ji wrote: --------------------- Even though I do not fully understand the working of the mind - I do know that senses can only bring attributes and not substantive. My reply: ----------- If we do not know how mind works, then there is no basis in saying senses `bring' only attributes to the mind. All our experience in this regard is different. When I see a marble (glass balls kids play with), my eye senses it as three dimensional spherical object. This sensing is immediate and direct. So also when my fingers gloss over it, it also senses directly that it is spherical in form. I can interact with it, I can sense the mass and weight of it, I can also sense another marble can not occupy the same space (occupied by the first one) at the same time. These experiences are direct and immediate. Dennis-ji wrote: --------------------- Surely, all that we ever do is 'collect' more attributes by further examination. We never perceive the 'actual substance' which is always only brahman. If we could perceive this, we would never mistake anything to be other than brahman. In the case of the apparent snake, we could (in theory) touch it and establish that the texture is not that of snake skin. But we haven't perceived any underlying substance, merely established that an attribute contradicts our previous assumption that the rope was a snake. My reply: ----------- That depends on how you define `substance'. All schools accepts `substance' is concrete objects as exists in time-space locus of this (vyavaharic) reality. Substance was never defined as Brahman. While we are talking epistemology, it is obvious that we are still in vyavahAric stage and at this stage niruNa-brahman can not be conceived of existing. Else, we'll end up having positing Brahman and also these attributes at the same time, which obviously will compromise non-dual nature of Brahman. So either let's talk of about vyavaharic attributes and vyavaharic substances (if any) or we'll talk about Brahman and nothing but Brahman only. Let's not mix up two, otherwise it will loose the perspective and muddle up the issue. Also from VP's perspective, bringing Brahman as substance does not help here. I have asked this question in my previous mail. My difficulty is like this; VP advocates smaraNa (memory) is not pramANa. If so, saying Brahman as substance will not be pramANa. Why? Because, the position `Brahman is substance' is something coming from shruti. But shruti is something we remembered in our mind (or have been remembered in minds of people in unbroken tradition). We (at least me) never perceived shruti afresh. Thus, since shruti is originating from the memory, one can not forward any shruti based theory as pramANa. Then, that means shruti is not pramAna at all? Shruti may be pramANa only if there is no temporal gap between shruti's assertion (that B is substance etc) and perception of objects in epistemic analysis. That means, bringing Brahman as substance is allowed to a person who is himself is a mantra draShTa (vedic seer) and actually seeing shruti mantra-s (that B is substance etc) and at the same time also perceiving the mundane objects of this world. In such cases only it is justified, as per VP, that shruti is pramANa. Dennis-ji wrote: --------------------- Imagine that we have a rod of metal on the ground. We can apply all of our senses to the matter but, on their own, it is unlikely that we would be able definitely to conclude anything more than this. We might note that it is heavy but not malleable so that it cannot be lead, for example. But, in order to refine our conclusions, we need to acquire other attributes that are not accessible to our immediate senses. We might carry out chemical tests, for example, or place it next to a Geiger counter and so on. Eventually, if our tests are sufficiently rigorous, we may conclude that the rod is, say, uranium. But even this is only a description of attributes. Whatever the 'substance', it is mithyA only. At a more detailed level, it is a metal lattice of atoms, consisting of nuclei of protons and neutrons surrounded by electrons in a particular configuration. My reply: ----------- How do you account for existence of object with that particular configuration in a given space-time locus? If all is just electron- proton-neutron, we would have found infinite combinations of electron-proton-neutron structure everywhere. Why do we have only handful of finite elements on periodic table? The important thing needs to be considered here is, our very knowledge about molecular structures was possible because reality gave us those structures to study in concrete objects located at specific time-space locus. Dennis-ji wrote: --------------------- And, of course, ultimately this is only an attribute of the real adhiShThAna - brahman. My reply: ----------- But Dennis-ji, that makes nirguNa Brahman into saguNa Brahman. Putranm-ji wrote: ----------------------- I ask again " where does Sruthi's affirmation of Brahman (substance) come in? " . Are you sure your arguments are different from the Buddhists? My reply: ----------- I'm sorry, I do not think shruti is saying Brahman is substance for this jagat. But that is my own doctrinal persuasion and do not wish to have any bearing on our dialog. But as for as this discussion, as I said to Dennis-ji, bringing Brahman (whether as a substance or not as a substance) to this epistemic dialog is irrelevant. On the side note (just for the info), my school's methodology is little different from Advaitic methodology. We to the idea that any metaphysical (ontological) concepts has to be established from epistemology. Never other way. Because, epistemology is all about immediate and given data we have now to work with. Brahman is not available yet at this stage. Only if I make my pramANa vichAra defect free, I can guarantee myself that one of such pramANa i.e shabda-pramAna is revealing the truth. Such shabda-pramAna may tell us Brahman is substance or may tell us Brahman is not substance, wither way we'll go with it. But that truth should not colour our understanding at this epistemic level. Just to address your question that my arguments are different from the Buddhists; yes, we bring Brahman into picture in a way which will not effect our epistemological analysis. We say these concrete objects of reality exist because of Brahman's ichha. We never say they exist on their own. But this fact has no bearing on the issue of substance-attribute we are discussing now. The issue being discussed now is whether attributes and substance are two distinct or one & the same. If different, do our sense gather only attributes or do they gather both. You see, for this epistemic dispute, Brahman's ichha has no bearing. But when it comes to the question why objects appear as they do or exist as they do etc, we need to invoke Brahman's iccha. But they already appear as they do is already given and we say we must start inquiry from that point of reference. `How-s' are first and `Why-s' are later. Thanks to all for the opportunity to discuss. Regards, Srinivas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 14, 2008 Report Share Posted July 14, 2008 Namaste Anandaji, What we are discussing here is perceptual knowledge. Properly understood the realization of what that is and how it is possible is jnana. There are many texts to that effect. Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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