Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge

[Guest guest]

Namaste to all

The following is by way of supplement to the posts that have appeared recently on this subject.

The word 'jnAnam', which means 'knowledge' is used in two different senses in vedAntic works. In taittirIya upanishad 2.1.1 brahman is defined as 'satyam jnAnam anantam'. Here the word 'jnAnam' means consciousness which is the very nature of brahman and is therefore eternal, having no beginning or end. The word 'jnAnam' is also used in the sense of 'a particular cognition', in which case it is an action which has a beginning and an end. Taking this second meaning of the word 'jnAnam' an objection could be raised that if jnAnam is the nature of brahman it would also be transient. Such an objection has been considered in the bhAshya on this upanishadic statement and it has been pointed out that, while the nature of brahman is eternal consciousness, particular cognitions arise because of this consciousness illumining the mental modification (vritti) in the form of the object. Shri Shankara refers to these particular cognitions as 'semblances of consciousness' and says that they can also be referred to as jnAnam'.

 

In bRihadAraNyaka upanishad, 3.4.2, the word 'dRishTi' which means 'sight' is used as a synonym of 'jnAnam'. Shri Shankara points out in his bhAshya that this sight is of two kinds. He says:--

This sight is of two kinds, empirical and real. The empirical sight is a function of the mind as connected with the eye; it is an act, and as such it has a beginning and end. But the vision of the Self is like the heat and light of fire; being the very nature of the witnessing Consciousness it has neither beginning nor end. This eternal consciousness is the very nature of the jIva also, as stated in brahma sutra 2.3.18, since the jIva is none other than brahman.

 

The particular cognitions, which are transient, are brought about by the pramANas such as pratyaksha. The eternal Consciousness is realized as the jIva's own nature through the mahAvAkyas such as 'Tat tvam asi'. This realization is known as 'aparoksha anubhUti'. It is called aparoksha because it is not paroksha or mediate. Though it is also direct knowledge, it is not called 'pratyaksha' in order to distinguish it from all worldly knowledge attained through pratyaksha pramANa. To point out that it does not fall under the categories generally understood by the terms pratyaksha and paroksha it is called aparoksha.

Best wishes,

S.N.Sastri

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " S.N. Sastri " <sn.sastri wrote:

 

> and it has been pointed out that, while the nature of brahman is eternal

> consciousness, particular cognitions arise because of this consciousness

> illumining the mental modification (vritti) in the form of the

object. Shri

> Shankara refers to these particular cognitions as 'semblances of

> consciousness' and says that they can also be referred to as jnAnam'.

>

 

Sri Shastriji,

 

I got access to Panchadasi of Sri Vidyaranya where in Chp 4 this topic

is discussed. See also

http://www.sankaracharya.org/panchadasi_trans_3.php#1

 

Slokas 26-40 affirm that the Vyavahaarika position of the jiva should

be that external objects exist. And it is the external objects that

cause the mental vritti when the mind comes in contact with them.

 

But that " existence " is not affirmed from perception alone, though

logic is used to aid in the understanding; there is a simultaneous

(actually prior) contention that Ishvara created the objects (see also

slokas 8-20) through the power of maya. So the objects' 'existence' is

affirmed in the eternal consciousness of Ishvara, and Ishvara/Brahman

is the substratum for the cognition offered through pratyaksha. As I

see it, Shankara/Vidyaranya affirms the ontological position of the

sruthi wherever he affirms existence in the perceived duality. It is

not from perception alone, that we can know or even define existence

as we (advaitins) would think of it.

 

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

 

 

> The particular cognitions, which are transient, are brought about by the

> pramANas such as pratyaksha. The eternal Consciousness is realized

as the

> jIva's own nature through the mahAvAkyas such as 'Tat tvam asi'. This

> realization is known as 'aparoksha anubhUti'. It is called aparoksha

because

> it is not paroksha or mediate. Though it is also direct knowledge,

it is not

> called 'pratyaksha' in order to distinguish it from all worldly

knowledge

> attained through pratyaksha pramANa. To point out that it does not fall

> under the categories generally understood by the terms pratyaksha and

> paroksha it is called aparoksha.

>

> Best wishes,

>

> S.N.Sastri

>

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " putranm " <putranm wrote:

 

> sruthi wherever he affirms existence in the perceived duality. It is

> not from perception alone, that we can know or even define existence

> as we (advaitins) would think of it.

>

>

> thollmelukaalkizhu

 

 

 

That is, from a strictly logical standpoint. In actuality (as per

advaita), existence is affirmed since existence (... Brahman) is

fundamental reality; so it is automatically sensed but

attributed/superimposed independently to specific perceptions (i.e. to

" objects " ). Why the specific perceptions, appearance of

manifoldness... due to maya, Ishvara, or ... anirvachaniya etc. The

answer to " What exists? " is Brahman, not " objects " , although in

vyavahaarika we affirm the existence of Brahman in the perception of

names and forms, as objects.

 

If I am a Buddhist, I would say existence is imagined due to

delusion/maya and superimposed onto specific perceptions.

 

Our final affirmation (as I understand) is from sruthi or real jnana,

not logic or perception.

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " putranm " <putranm wrote:

>

> Sri Shastriji,

>

> I got access to Panchadasi of Sri Vidyaranya where in Chp 4 this

topic

> is discussed. See also

> http://www.sankaracharya.org/panchadasi_trans_3.php#1

>

> Slokas 26-40 affirm that the Vyavahaarika position of the jiva

should

> be that external objects exist. And it is the external objects that

> cause the mental vritti when the mind comes in contact with them.

>

> But that " existence " is not affirmed from perception alone, though

> logic is used to aid in the understanding; there is a simultaneous

> (actually prior) contention that Ishvara created the objects (see

also

> slokas 8-20) through the power of maya. So the

objects' 'existence' is

> affirmed in the eternal consciousness of Ishvara, and

Ishvara/Brahman

> is the substratum for the cognition offered through pratyaksha. As

I

> see it, Shankara/Vidyaranya affirms the ontological position of the

> sruthi wherever he affirms existence in the perceived duality. It

is

> not from perception alone, that we can know or even define

existence

> as we (advaitins) would think of it.

>

>

> thollmelukaalkizhu

 

Dear Putran-ji,

It is not clear to me what exactly is the point you are trying to

make out. I have given a summary of all the 15 chapters of

Panchadasi on my website

http://www.geocities.com/snsastri

 

Please let me know precisely what is the point you are raising.

Best wishes,

S.N.Sastri

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " snsastri " <sn.sastri wrote:

> Dear Putran-ji,

> It is not clear to me what exactly is the point you are trying to

> make out. I have given a summary of all the 15 chapters of

> Panchadasi on my website

> http://www.geocities.com/snsastri

>

> Please let me know precisely what is the point you are raising.

> Best wishes,

> S.N.Sastri

>

 

 

Sri Shastriji, my post was intended to the general audience though I

had specifically addressed you.

 

To my understanding, the topic in discussion is whether we can affirm

existence of objects through perception alone.

 

In your writeup, you mentioned " Unlike the Buddhist Vijnanavadins,

Advaita accepts the existence of external objects and holds that, in

perception, the mind takes the form of the external object. "

 

Here Advaita's acceptance is a particular logical preference (not

universally accepted) whose basis is the Sruthi and not just

perception/logic. To say an object exists, we must know what we mean

by existence and how to associate the term to an entity identified

with attributes. Can a reality which exists become non-existent? Can

the real become unreal? We say NO.

 

But then an object becomes a different object or non-object if its

attributes undergo change, or if under a different lens of perception,

it appears different. That stable distinguishing name-form of a chair

that told us to classify it as 'object' is lost if we look at the same

with an electron-microscope. Then that very thing becomes a group of

things. The appearance of an object implies existence, not of the

object but of the constant Brahman that appears objective. In common

parlance (vyavahaarika), we say that the object exists.

 

Do correct me if wrong.

 

thollmelukaalkizhu