Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 13+

July 12, 2008

advaitin , " Srinivas Kotekal " <kots_p wrote:

>

> My reply:

> -----------

>

> That depends on how you define `substance'. All schools

> accepts `substance' is concrete objects as exists in time-space

> locus of this (vyavaharic) reality. Substance was never defined as

> Brahman. While we are talking epistemology, it is obvious that we

> are still in vyavahAric stage and at this stage niruNa-brahman can

> not be conceived of existing. Else, we'll end up having positing

> Brahman and also these attributes at the same time, which obviously

> will compromise non-dual nature of Brahman. So either let's talk of

> about vyavaharic attributes and vyavaharic substances (if any) or

> we'll talk about Brahman and nothing but Brahman only. Let's not mix

> up two, otherwise it will loose the perspective and muddle up the

> issue.

>

Sri Kotekalji,

I think I may be confusing the issues since I have not studied VP.

Perhaps VP as you suggest is only dealing with epistemic analysis at

this point; i.e. given the data from pratyaksha ( & anumana?), what are

the conclusions we can derive? Something along the lines of modern

science.

My personal opinion (driven by modern 'education') tallies (on this

particular discussion) with modern science as dependable

epistemic/vyavahaarika analysis, and I had mentioned in post 40945 how

the distinction of substance (energy) from its attribute-specific

appearance (matter) can be psychologically accepted in vyavahaarika as

well. Of course, science may correct itself; but any vyavahaarika

analysis is susceptible to correction with newer data.

Epistemic question : Is fire cold to you?

Requires epistemic answer: NO. Why? Since the question is regarding

the attribute that is perceived, and the object is pre-defined through

epistemic considerations.

Not exactly epistemic question: What is that " object " that you are

perceiving to be fire?

a. Can have an epistemic/vyavahaarika answer: Gaseous molecules in a

state of chaos. Then " What is that which you analyze to be molecules? " ...

b. Can have ontological answer: in truth, that which is perceived to

be fire/molecules, is only Brahman, that you also are. THE END.

Advaita says that the latter type of question must be asked to obtain

real knowledge. It is the type of questions that lead to understanding

of the sruthi. Sruthi's information clarifies/corrects our

vyavahaarika understanding: the ontological questions arise in the

vyavaharika plane, due to a realization that vyavaharika (or

epistemology) cannot give (or misdirects) the answers. A vyavahaarika

answer " Energy/Prana " may have an ontological correction in

" Brahman/Consciousness " . As per advaita, this is indeed the case: the

substantive consciousness of the body-mind complex is only Brahman, as

also that of jagat -- the remaining things that seem to limit and

define in vyavahaarika are upadhi-superimpositions.

[This also shows why we cannot escape ontological-correction to our

epistemic analysis, since " consciousness/awareness " is experienced in

vyavahaarika, and vyavahaarika answer is that it is a product of

molecular interaction -- an answer that may well seem incoherently

surmised to a religious person.]

thollmelukaalkizhu

>

> Putranm-ji wrote:

> -----------------------

>

> I ask again " where does Sruthi's affirmation of Brahman (substance)

> come in? " . Are you sure your arguments are different from the

> Buddhists?

>

> My reply:

> -----------

>

> I'm sorry, I do not think shruti is saying Brahman is substance for

> this jagat. But that is my own doctrinal persuasion and do not wish

> to have any bearing on our dialog. But as for as this discussion, as

> I said to Dennis-ji, bringing Brahman (whether as a substance or not

> as a substance) to this epistemic dialog is irrelevant.

>

> On the side note (just for the info), my school's methodology is

> little different from Advaitic methodology. We to the idea

> that any metaphysical (ontological) concepts has to be established

> from epistemology. Never other way. Because, epistemology is all

> about immediate and given data we have now to work with. Brahman is

> not available yet at this stage. Only if I make my pramANa vichAra

> defect free, I can guarantee myself that one of such pramANa i.e

> shabda-pramAna is revealing the truth. Such shabda-pramAna may tell

> us Brahman is substance or may tell us Brahman is not substance,

> wither way we'll go with it. But that truth should not colour our

> understanding at this epistemic level.

>

> Just to address your question that my arguments are different from

> the Buddhists; yes, we bring Brahman into picture in a way which

> will not effect our epistemological analysis. We say these concrete

> objects of reality exist because of Brahman's ichha. We never say

> they exist on their own. But this fact has no bearing on the issue

> of substance-attribute we are discussing now. The issue being

> discussed now is whether attributes and substance are two distinct

> or one & the same. If different, do our sense gather only attributes

> or do they gather both. You see, for this epistemic dispute,

> Brahman's ichha has no bearing. But when it comes to the question

> why objects appear as they do or exist as they do etc, we need to

> invoke Brahman's iccha. But they already appear as they do is

> already given and we say we must start inquiry from that point of

> reference. `How-s' are first and `Why-s' are later.

>

> Thanks to all for the opportunity to discuss.

>

> Regards,

> Srinivas.

>

July 12, 2008

Namaste All Followers of this Thread,

On the advaitin list it seems to me vital that we focus our attention on

the writing of Shankara and not get distracted by other theories no matter

how logical and fascinating they may be. How is it that he takes the

view that he does in his explication of the subject-object problem? It is

of course because he comes to that teazing out of all the strands with a

mind informed by his realization of the unity of being and consciousness.

Thus it is that in his preamble to the B.S.B. that when he asks himself

rhetorically how it is that the object which is inert comes to be somehow

in him as knowledge he does _not_ offer as a theory the idea that really

only the attributes of the object are in him. Let us be very clear on

this - for Sankara our knowledge is of objects and we do not arrive at

this knowledge by means of an inference.

His understanding is guided by his realization of what an object is or the

being of the object. This is where the discussion of the topic of

'upadhi' and 'vritti' in V.P. can help. A good place to pause.

Best Wishes,

Michael.

July 12, 2008

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

>

> Namaste All Followers of this Thread,

>

> On the advaitin list it seems to me vital that we focus our

attention on

> the writing of Shankara and not get distracted by other theories no

matter

> how logical and fascinating they may be. How is it that he takes the

> view that he does in his explication of the subject-object problem?

It is

> of course because he comes to that teazing out of all the strands

with a

> mind informed by his realization of the unity of being and

consciousness.

> Thus it is that in his preamble to the B.S.B. that when he asks

himself

> rhetorically how it is that the object which is inert comes to be

somehow

> in him as knowledge he does _not_ offer as a theory the idea that

really

> only the attributes of the object are in him. Let us be very clear on

> this - for Sankara our knowledge is of objects and we do not arrive at

> this knowledge by means of an inference.

>

> His understanding is guided by his realization of what an object is

or the

> being of the object. This is where the discussion of the topic of

> 'upadhi' and 'vritti' in V.P. can help. A good place to pause.

>

> Best Wishes,

> Michael.

>

Sri Michaelji and others,

From what I understand, one of the fundamental assertions of

Shankara's school against the Buddhists is that " Illusion cannot occur

without a substratum. " Regarding the present discussion, Shankara

would think it obvious that perception of attributes implies an object

of perception.

Now what is that object that is perceived thus?

A purely epistemological understanding of " object " should amount to a

combination of name and form (attributes), to which identity/existence

is superimposed by the mind.

But (I understand) Shankara's main goal in affirming object (as an

existing reality) is to affirm the substratum Brahman, that in the

context of upadhis appears as the perceived " object " .

Now upadhis. Do they exist as objective realities, that make the

name-form appear? I see two positions here:

1. The " reality " associated to the upadhi is also only Brahman, and

the upadhi itself reduces to name-form. For Brahman cannot be subject

to constraints, modifications, that cause it to appear manifold. We

can only place the entire blame on our own minds, on Ignorance. The

manifoldness is more like a dream occurence in 'Ishvara's

Consciousness', and the jiva who is part of that dream finds it real.

The actual reason of Ishvara's dream is anirvachaniya.

2. Though inherently Brahman is nondual, the upadhis are 'real'

constraints on Brahman causing it to appear manifold. If so, we can

formally anoint " objects " a real existence as a combination of the

real Substratum with 'sub-real' upadhis, giving rise to attributes.

That is, it is like water taking various real shapes according to

internal turbulence, but ever remaining only water in substance.

Perhaps as suggested, people can clarify on these two points with VP.

thollmelukaalkizhu

July 13, 2008

Namaste Shri Michael,

In message #40954 (Sat Jul 12), you say:

Let us be very clear on this - for Sankara our knowledge is of objects and we do not arrive at this knowledge by means of an inference.

I must confess that I am not clear on this at all. Are you suggesting that Shri Shankara rules out the prakriya (approach) which questions our so-called 'knowledge of objects'?

This prakriya points out that whenever we speak of 'knowing' an object in the world, this so-called 'knowledge' is a personal and changing action through which our bodies, our senses and our minds produce appearances. But there is then something wrong with using the word 'knowledge' for such a personal and changing action.

No act that produces appearance can be rightly called 'knowledge'. It's more correct to say that 'knowledge' is what lights each appearance that anyone perceives or thinks about or feels. Perceptions, thoughts and feelings are just personal and changing acts, whose passing show is illuminated by an impersonal and changeless consciousness which is the same for everyone.

This is, of course, only one among many different prakriyas (approaches). And I would suggest that Shri Shankara allows for such differing approaches, in which the word 'knowledge' may be differently used.

So, in the course of describing different prakriyas, he may sometimes speak of 'knowledge' in a compromised way -- as a 'knowledge of objects'. But at other times, he may also speak of 'knowledge' in a less compromised way -- as the self-knowing of consciousness, whose very being is to shine with knowing light.

In either case, the enquiry is aimed at a truth that is completely uncompromised, beyond all the differing confusions of our many ways to truth.

Ananda