Guest guest Posted July 24, 2008 Report Share Posted July 24, 2008 PraNAms to all This is being posted in two parts due to length. I request the discussers to study both before they comment on the issues discussed. Hari Om! Sadananda -------------------- Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -14 Part-1 In view of the recent stimulating discussions on the post 13, I am going to re-examine in detail the essence of the perceptual process, as I understand, taking some of the comments and objections that were raised during the discussion. Beforehand, I want to thank particularly reverend Shree Sastriji and others who participated in the discussion starting from Shree -Michael, Srinivas, Putram, and Ananda Wood. The comments span from paaramaarthika to vyaavahaarika and several epistemological issues that are related to substance, object and attributes, and perceptual process in the mind or by the mind. Here I recognize the philosophical position on one side and understanding of the perceptual process from science on the other, as they get fused in, to arrive a self-consistent understanding. As shree Ananda Wood put it gently, scientific thought only goes only up to some point, and beyond that philosophical position has to take over in understanding the knower, known and knowing process – kshetra and kshetrajna – involving consciousness on one side and inert object on the other – resulting in subject-object relationships. I request forgiveness beforehand if I differ from others, but I have to present what I clearly understand. I am going to present in very detailed account since there seems to be lot of confusion of what exactly VP says, what exactly is understood as VP says, and what exactly the correct epistemological position of advaita Vedanta is. Coming from a science background, I strongly to the understanding that philosophical position cannot violate the objective science, but can go beyond it where objective science fails to provide a clear understanding of the mechanics of the process involving consciousness because of which one is conscious of the objects. Consciousness and mechanics of the cognitive process cannot be separated. Yet, we do have now clearer understanding of the mechanics of wave propagation and image formation as well as communication of the sense input via sense organs to the brain. Jumping from the physical process of perception to metal cognition involves (using computer terminology) jumping from hardware to software where we know we need a programming language to interpret neural input into cognitive process. This is currently a black box. Therefore, in understanding the perceptual process we take whatever physics or biophysics provides us and without violating these physical principles jump to philosophical principles. Shastra becomes pramaaNa only for the later part. As Shankara states clearly, Shaastra is valid only where pratyaksha and anumaana fail to reveal the facts. With this as the basis we proceed addressing some of the comments and objections that were raised. The purpose of this post is not meant for continuing the same discussion further, but for clarification the extent of our understanding, or lack of it, of the perceptual process based on the current state of science on one side and philosophical position on the other, without, of course, compromising fundamental advaitic stand: brahma satyam, jagat mithyaa, jiivobrahmaiva naaparaH – the Brahman alone is the real or the truth and the world is mithyaa or apparent, and jiiva is none other than Brahman itself. 1. Comments on the substance object and attributes: Objection: In the example of a ring, which is an object that is made of gold, ring has its attributes; ‘object-ring’ is different from the substance gold that the ring is made up of. Thus we have three things – object-ring, attributes of ring (ID, OD, width, ellipticity, etc), and material substance, that it is made of Gold. When Vedanta ParibhaaSha says – object is perceived – it is the ring that is perceived, along with its attributes and not the attributes alone by the senses, since according to advaita the object and attributes have taadaatmya sambhandha. VP does not say that attributes alone are gathered by the senses. It says object is perceived. Response: The response comes from two sides – from objective scientific analysis and the other from philosophical side, since perception involves the role of consciousness which is beyond objectification. First, I recall the introductory statement I made in the first post - The purpose of the inquiry into the epistemological issues, as DA (Dharmaraja Adhvarindra), emphasizes in this introduction to VP, is to gain the knowledge of Brahman, knowing which there is no return back to the transitory world. Hence understanding of the process of how knowledge takes place in the mind is essential to separate what is transitory and what is permanent – essentially nithya-anitya vastu viveka essential for Vedantins. Hence the text does not loose sight of paaramaarthika while discussing the knowledge and the means of knowledge. VP follows closely vivarana school of advaita Vedanta. Now - Let us ask first the question - What is an object? There are two aspects that are involved in defining an object. Just from epistemological point, object can only be defined in terms of attributes. In chemistry, we learn to identify a chemical substance by stating its physical and chemical properties – which are all attributes. The more precise the definitions are the more discriminative the object becomes from the rest of the objects in the world. Only through properties we identify the chemical compound. Hence objective science relays heavily on the precise definition of any objectifiable entity only through its attributes. That is the only way to communicate knowledge for transactional purposes or vyavahaara. This is the first fundamental aspect of the object that cannot be violated. For example, if I want to meet Mr. Gaagaabuubu in the station, whom I have never met, I need to have his precise definition or description in terms of his attributes; the attributes that differentiate him from rest of the masses in the station. The object, Mr. Gaagaabuubu, therefore, is the one who is the locus of all the attributes, collectively. Each one of the attribute may not be precise enough to locate him but all attributes collectively will define who Mr. Gaagaabuubu is. Is Mr. Gaagaabuubu just a bunch of attributes? No. Attributes cannot exist without a locus and the locus of the attributes we call it as an object. Do the senses perceive the locus or the attributes? Senses can only perceive the form, the color and other attributes that can be measurable by the senses – that includes – roopa, shabda, sparsha, rasa and gandha – form, sound, touch, taste and smell – all collectively referred to as roopa, since visual perception is most direct and immediate, since light travels fast. Hence from the point of our discussion, when we say roopa or form and color, in principle, it stands for all the five sense input, if the object has attributes that all the senses can gather. The second aspect that we need to understand clearly is there is no particular attribute that an object has that can uniquely characterize it. This was stated before in the discussions that no object has swaruupa lakshaNa that can define the object singly and uniquely (in mathematics we call the swaruupa lakshaNa as necessary and sufficient qualification). The fundamental reason for this is all objects in the universe are made up parts or assemblage of parts. This, in fact, forms a basis for an error, as we will discuss later. Since no single attribute can uniquely define the object, perception of incomplete set can result in errors in recognition of the object due to inherent ambiguity. Only Brahman has swaruupa lakshaNa, since he being infinite is part-less. Satyam, jnaanam, anantam Brahma, as Shankara clearly describes, are swaruupa lakshaNas of Brahman. There are not really three, are only one, but expressed from three different perspectives. Implication of this is that objects are distinguishable not by one attributes but sum total of all essential attributes (swaabhaavika lakshaNas) put together. That implies collective attributes together makes the object distinguishable from others in the universe, provided they are asaadhaaraNa, that is the combination of all attributes together make the object uniquely and precisely distinguishable. In summary, since 1) senses can only measure attributes and not substantive (substantive, say gold material, is too gross for the senses to carry), 2) there is no single attribute that can uniquely define an object, 3) all essential (asaadhaaraNa) attributes are needed for object knowledge to be complete, 4) errors in perception can occur since objective knowledge is only attributive knowledge and not substantive knowledge. If one argues that VP says (although VP does not say this) senses can also bring in the object, then question arises which sense input brings in the object, as there is no one unique attribute or single sense input that defines the object precisely. If so, then any sense input about the object should give us precise knowledge of the object and there is no possibility for any errors in perception. We will examine this aspect further. What VP says is the object is perceived by the mind riding on the senses. That does not mean senses bring in the object or mind grasps the object independent of the sense input. The rest is interpretation, and should be based on the laws of physics where they apply. Coming back to the object, let us find out that besides attributes what else is there that defines the object? Attributes should have a locus and what is that locus? Is locus an attribute? No, it is not. Is form a locus, no it is an attribute along with color that the sense of sight can see. Only the other thing that the object has besides the attributes is its contents or substance that provides the locus for the attributes. Matter, locussed as an object, has attributes. Gold locussed as an object is a ring with its attributes. Without mater, there cannot be attributes. If I say water is colorless, odorless and tasteless, there has to be some matter contents which are nothing but assemblage of water molecules that form the locus for the colorless, odorless and tasteless attributes – besides other physical and chemical properties like specific gravity, viscosity and ability to decompose into hydrogen and oxygen etc, which may not be directly perceived by senses. Vidyaaranya calls the knowledge of any object as adhaara and adheya jnaanam – substantive and superimposed attributive knowledge. Hence when I say it is a ring object – there is no ring object per sec, it is gold in the form of a ring, where form constitutes its attribute. Ring is a name or naama or ‘padam’ or word with no ‘padaartham’ or a noun or a substantive associated with it. That is why it is called mithyaa. There is no ringly material to substantiate it and differentiate it from bangly material. Is ring an object separate from bangle? Yes, they are separate because the attributes of the ring are not the same as that of bangle. Yet there are no substance ring and substance bangle to separate them apart at substantive level. Both are made of up the same substance – gold. Ring with its attributes cannot be thought of without having adhaara or a support just as we said attributes cannot be thought of without a locus. Ring is only a name for a form and so is bangle or bracelet; naama for a ruupa. Hence the statement ‘vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam’ – name for a product; and product is not different from the material (cause) in different form. Hence Gold forms the adheya or substantive support for the existence of ring’s attributes as well as bangle attributes. Gold with the attributes of a ring is a ring, and gold with the attributes of a bangle is a bangle. There is no other ring or bangle otherwise – they are only names for forms. Form is an attribute perceived by the senses. It is gold alone in the ring form or ring attributes since form, as we said before is representative of all associated attributes. Thus gold is the locus or substantive for the ring and gold is the locus or the substantive for the bangle too; and there are no ring and bangle separate from gold. Objection: Perceptual knowledge pertains to vyavahaara. The above discussion transgresses to paaramaarthika. In vyavahaara the objects are real. Hence ring, as an object, is real. When VP says when we perceive an object ring, we perceive both the object ring with its attributes. That it is made up of gold is not important here in the perception of the ring as an object. For paaramaarthika, shabda is pramaaNa and it is discussed separately in VP. Response: At the outset theses comments appear to be correct. But we need to go little deeper to unravel the truth- Even at empirical level or vyavahaara, there is no object ring other than form and color and other related attributes that can be perceived. This is precisely the reason why that Upanishad takes loukika or vyavahaara not aloukika examples to illustrate the fact that material cause itself is the products in verities of forms. Here scripture is not pramaaNa for the illustration that product is cause itself in different form. Scripture is using vyavahaara example to prove the point, which later it extends to paaramaarthika. It proves the point using three examples that there are no separate objects other than ruupa, form and naama, name – the first one constitute the attributive set and the later constituting the knowledge of its existence since name can be given only when there is knowledge – as we said before existence of an object is established by the knowledge of its existence. Hence objects are nothing but material cause itself in different forms. By knowing material cause, one knows all the objects formed out of that material. Hence ring, bangle, necklace, bracelet are ‘as well known’ since we have adhaara jnaanam. We will have adheya jnaanam, when we perceive through the sense the attributes of the object, ring which are different form the attributes of the bangle, etc. Only after establishing the fact at transactional level, Upanishad goes into the discussion of paaramaarthika to apply the same logic – knowing the material cause for the whole universe, one knows essentially all the objects in the world. Hence from the perception point also there is no object or objects other than the material cause and the attributive aspects of the products which differentiate one object from the other, ex: ring from bangle. Question: In the gold ring example, do we perceive the substance at any time? How do we know that it is gold ring and not iron ring – if we do not perceive the substantive? Answer: In these vyavahaara examples, the substantives of the two rings are different in the sense that they have their own attributes that distinguishes them as separate. Hence senses when gathering the attributes of the ring, also gather in the process the attributes of the substantive too, since the two substantives have their own attributes. Thus gold attributes are different from iron attributes and the locus of the attributes is the matter gold vs. matter iron – which are again assemblage of electron-proton-neutrons and as well as package of their atoms (gold is fcc and iron is bcc – for those who want to know). Senses again gather those attributes that they can measure. By using more sophisticated instruments such as electron microscope one can boost up the sensitivity of the senses. Suppose iron is gold plated and the iron ring is indistinguishable from the pure gold ring. Senses, if they measure external attributes such as luster, etc, may not be able to distinguish the gold from gold plated iron, and conclude that both rings are golden-rings – one may be small and other large due to difference in their ringly attributes. This further proves again the point that senses can only bring in the attributes but not substantives. After discussing the worldly examples, scripture then goes into paaramaarthika or at absolute level to point out that the substantive for the whole world is only Sat or Brahman, which has no attributes that the senses can gather. Hence we get only the attributes of the transactional realities not absolute reality making up the knowledge of the worldly objects – hence the scriptures says to learn about the substantive of the world ‘aachaaryavan purusho veda’ – learn from a teacher who teaches the scriptures. To complete the process, the sense input forms vRitti in the mind. VRitti can be thought of as image in the mental screen consisting of attributes of the object starting from ‘form’ which includes all the 3-D form since as we discussed before we have two eyes that are seven degrees apart to provide the stereographic projection. The image is the electrical or neural signal which gets transformed into the subtler image or VRitti. That it occurs is definite but how it occurs is anybody’s guess. The contents of the vRitti are the attributive knowledge about the object. Recognition follows after cognition, by comparing the object perception with the stored information from the memory bank to see if the attributive knowledge matches with any other object in the memory. If the memory is damaged, the recognition process can be affected even when cognitive process is complete. The witnessing consciousness illumines the vRitti as it forms in the mind and the reflected consciousness constitutes the attributive knowledge of the object ‘out there’. For perception to complete, VP has discussed the perceptuality requirements that need to be met. There are some epistemological issues that were raised which will be addressed now. I am paraphrasing some of the questions raised in relation to above description of attributive knowledge of an object. Some of the objections have already been addressed before, but they are being emphasized to focus on the issues involved. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 26, 2008 Report Share Posted July 26, 2008 advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote: > > PraNAms to all > This is being posted in two parts due to length. I request the discussers to study both before they comment on the issues discussed. > Hari Om! > Sadananda Dear Sadananda-ji, I read with interest your detailed postings 41032 and 41033. With due respect to your views, I wish to state my understanding as below. The basis of your entire analysis seems to be the premise that in the case of a gold ring, gold is the substance and ring is an attribute. I have not been able to find any support for this view in any work on advaita Vedanta. Substance (dravya) and attribute (guNa) are defined in the Vaiseshika work known as Tarka sangraha and these definitions have been accepted by Vedanta with some modification. According to these definitions, the substances are nine in number— the five elements, kAla, dik, AtmA and mind. Advaita accepts only the five elements and mind as substances and not the other three. This means that all things that are made up of the five elements, both before or after quintuplication (panchIkaraNam), are substances. The mind is made up of the sattva parts of all the five elements and it is therefore treated as a substance. Twenty-four attributes are postulated by Vaiseshika, out of which colour, taste, smell, touch, sound, number, size, fluidity, viscidity, and weight are accepted by Advaita as attributes. In the case of a clay pot, the clay as well as the pot are substances. Pot is not an attribute of clay. In Anubhutiprakasa of Swami Vidyaranya, in shloka 26 of the chapter on aitareya up., a pot is described as a mere `sannivesha' (a different form) of clay. Clay by itself does not have any form. It may be made into the form of a ball or a pot or plate or a doll. All these are substances and not attributes of clay. Sri Sankara says in his bhAshya on brahma sutra 2.1.18: " A thing does not become different just because of the appearance of some special feature (such as a new form). Devadatta does not become a different person when he is sitting or standing, though he appears different " . This, of course, is intended to show that the effect is not different from the cause, but I am quoting this to show that nowhere is it stated that an effect, such as a pot, is an attribute of its cause, clay. The effect is also a substance. Pot , plate, doll, etc., made of clay are substances and not attributes, just as much as a clay ball is. When a person sees some thing white at a distance and is not able to make out exactly what it is, he says, " I see some white object lying there " and not, " I see whiteness " . So what he sees is a white object and not just the quality `whiteness'. No attribute can remain without a locus. Of course when the nose feels a smell it knows only the smell, but that is because the object can be known only by the eye or the sense of touch. In Vedanta no distinction is made between the subtle element, earth and its specific quality, smell. So what the nose knows is the subtle element earth, which is a substance as stated earlier. The same with the other senses. This is clarified in the following paragraph. It would also not be correct to say that the senses can know only qualities. Each sense organ is, according to Vedanta, created out of the sattva aspect of the corresponding element. Sri Sankara says in his Bhashya on bRihadAraNyaka up, 2.4.11, " The sruti considers the objects to be of the same category as the objects, not of a different category. The organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them, as( the light of) a lamp, which is but a mode of colour, is an instrument for revealing all colours " . Here the light, which is fire, is described as a mode of colour, which we consider as a quality or attribute. This shows that Vedanta equates the subtle element and its quality. The subtle sense-organ, eye, is, according to Vedanta, made out of the sattva part of the subtle element fire. When it sees colour, it is seeing the subtle element fire. This may not be in accordance with science. According to Vedanta vision takes place by the mind stretching out through the eyes and reaching the external object and taking the form of the object. The explanation of science on how vision takes place is quite different, but when we are dealing with Vedanta we have to take the explanation given by Vedanta and not the one given by science. So the conclusion is, the senses reveal the objects and not their attributes alone. You seem to proceed on the basis that brahman is a substance and the things n this world are its attributes. I have already stated above that the effect is not an attribute of the cause, but both the effect and the cause are substances. Advaita does not consider brahman as a substance at all. All substances are negated for describing brahman by the words `neti', `neti'. gItA, 13.12 says that brahman is neither sat nor asat, meaning that it cannot be described as a thing with form or as a thing without form. Kenopanishad says that brahman is different from the known as well as the unknown. All these mean that brahman is not a substance. Moreover, it has been clearly stated in the bhAshya that there can be no relationship between brahman which is absolutely real and the world which has only empirical reality. So there cannot be the relationship of substance and attribute between brahman and the world. Six pramANas are recognized by advaita. Each of these operates in its own sphere. prayaksha shows everything as real. The karma kANDa is based on the acceptance of this world as well as the higher worlds as real, as Sri Sankara has pointed out while declaring that there is no conflict between karma and jnAna kANDas. Before one learns vedanta one looks upon the world as absolutely real. The Dvaitins contended that the testimony of pratyaksha cannot be set aside by sruti. Madhusudana Sarasvati, while dealing with this contention in Advaitasiddhi, does not dispute the fact that pratyaksha shows the world to be real. But he says that sruti, which is apaurusheya and therefore free from all defects, overrules pratyaksha which is sometimes found to give wrong knowledge. So when we are expounding pratyaksha we have to take the world as real. The AtmA for the purpose of karma kANDa is the subtle body with consciousness, because it is that which goes to heaven and not the pure AtmA as described in the upanishads. . Combining pratyaksha and sruti would be like saying that even in karma kANDa the AtmA should be taken as the pure AtmA which is described in the upanishads as free from all association with even the subtle body. That would make the karma kANDa devoid of any applicability. So we have to go step by step. pratyaksha explains how perception takes place and as far as this pramANa is concerned, the world is real. Then we go to the next higher step and go to to the sruti. Dharmaraja has mentioned liberation as the ultimate goal to be reached. But before that he has described the various pramANas which are applicable on the basis that the world is real. This is similar to the vedas prescribing various rituals to be performed as long as one considers the world to be real because of avidya. It is only when avidya has been eliminated that the world becomes unreal and the vedas, and even the upanishads, become inapplicable. So, the fact that he has spoken about liberation cannot be taken to mean that everything he says is on the basis that brahman alone is real and the world is mithya. That is a later and concluding stage. As far as pratyaksha is concerned, the world is real, because pratyaksha pramANa deals only with the vyAvahArika reality. Thus there are two steps. The first is pratyaksha by which we see the world. The second is the application of the sruti statements such as `neha nAnAsti kinchana' which say that the world which we see has no absolute reality and is only an appearance on brahman. Regards, S.N.Sastri Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 28, 2008 Report Share Posted July 28, 2008 Sastriji - My saaShTanga PraNAms  I am fully aware that there is a disagreement in our views. Just to clarify my position - I am just highlighting the issue that you have identified. --- On Sat, 7/26/08, snsastri <sn.sastri wrote: The basis of your entire analysis seems to be the premise that in the case of a gold ring, gold is the substance and ring is an attribute. ----------- Sadananda: If I can restate again - gold is substantive, ring is not an attribute - it is noun, but no substantive of its own and it has the attributes of the ring- Ring is an object - I have not denied the ring - but ring is name for attributive contents of the ring - naama for ruupa, rasa etc. All products are nothing but material cause itself in different forms. Locus of the attributes is a ring; but it actually is gold in that form with a name ring, given for an object ring. There is no other validity for the object other than its substantive gold and attributes of the ring. I am not denying the existence of gold at vyavahaara level – it is the material cause for the ring to exist. Objects are real in vyavahaara and I have never denied as the part II indicates. What is denied is that senses gather substantive along with attributes – in the perceptual process. That is an assumption and not a fact as I have shown, and that assumption has no scientific basis and no vedantic basis either as for as I know. There are jnaanedriays - through which knowledge takes place. There are karmedriyas - through which transactions take place. Transaction or vyavahaara constitute both - knowledge of an object at attributive level and transactions at substantive level. Hence in the description of turiiyam - it starts - yat adreshyam, agraahyam .. - That which can not be seen (denying at jnaanedriya level and then by agraahyam denying at karmedriya level) resulting in avyavahaaryam - non-transactability. Please note that I have never denied the object, ring. Ring is there for transactional purposes. I have detailed account how the attributive knowledge and substantive gold form basis for transaction or vyavahaara. Ring is there real at vyavahaara. There is no dravyam for ring of its own other than gold. Gold matter provides that substantive. The rest of the arguments you have presented, I am familiar but basis of the taarkikas for dravyas etc are their axiomatic statements and I would not like to go into the detailed analysis. Shree Vedanta Deshika has his own definition of what are dravyaas and adravyaas. I did look into the pancadasi sloka that you mentioned in your previous post - From my point that sloka does not negate what I have discussed. What I have referred to Vidyaranya swami statement regarding adhaara and adheya jnaana comes from Anubhutiprakaasha - Ch. 3 of his analysis of Ch. Up mantras. I do not have the text here to quote the specific mantra. Sastriji - if I look adamant, I request forgiveness. What I stated is the correct advaitic position that I understand, logical and scientific too. I have not found any convincing arguments that really contradict my statements either in Vedanta Paribhaasha or in other texts. ------------------------------ Sastriji: I have not been able to find any support for this view in any work on advaita Vedanta. Substance (dravya) and attribute (guNa) are defined in the Vaiseshika work known as Tarka sangraha and these definitions have been accepted by Vedanta with some modification. According to these definitions, the substances are nine in number— the five elements, kAla, dik, AtmA and mind. ........ Thus there are two steps. The first is pratyaksha by which we see the world. The second is the application of the sruti statements such as `neha nAnAsti kinchana' which say that the world which we see has no absolute reality and is only an appearance on brahman. ----------------------- Sadananda: Sastriji - All of your statements are accepted and none of the above statements are contradictory to what I stated either. The world is real at vyavahaara level and that I have not denied either - I request to study both parts I and II. What I am denying as a notion that senses or the mind gather substantive along with the attributes. As per advaita they are only real at transactional level. One can define all that you have stated at that level. None of that is contradictory to perceptual process described. Subtle mind cannot grasp the gross the object - At the mind level the locus of the object is only vRitti - that does not have any substantive other than subtle mind or thought - The object is out side the subtle image in the vRitti of an object is inside. Since there is object is notional as there is substantive of its own, the notional object outside becomes a notional object inside. Substantives come only in the transactional level when I use the karmendriyas. Only at paaramaarthika level even the substantive outside is denied with scriptural statement - sat eva idam agra asiit and the rest of the Vedanta. So no where the substantive is denied at vyavahaara level. What is denied is perception of substantive in the perceptual process. In couple of hours I am going to the Chinmaya International camp – and may not have access for the internet. I appreciate your efforts to educate me and my sincere thanks for that. I have been thinking of this epistemological problem for a long time, and now I find myself writing on Vedanta Paribhaasha, the way I understand the issues. I have so far not found any statements that contradict my statements and wherever I have deviated I have made a note for the reader to be aware. These discussions are helpful for clarying where separate the perceptual process leading to the knowledge and transactional experience involving inaddition to jnaanendriyas, karmendriyas as well at vyavahaara. Also underlying the paaramaarthika that transcends both jnaanedriayas and karmendriays. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted July 28, 2008 Report Share Posted July 28, 2008 Pranams Sadaji and Sastriji: Thanks for the posts with # 41032, 41033, 41048 and 41053 and they are all good informative and educational materials to academic advaitins. Here is my understanding of what Sastriji conveys: Brahman is neither a substance nor a non-substance. Essentially this means that Brahman is unknowable for all of us who are non-Brahmans. What we perceive as the Brahman is the world by which we seem to declare as an attributable object (substance) of Brahman. The question that arises is the following: Do we gain any knowledge with respect to the unknown Brahman through the attributes of the world of objects? To me, the answer could either yes or no. The answer could become `yes' after rejecting all the objectionable objects that we see (the principle of `neti, neti.' Such enquiries has to continue and the hope is eventually the Brahman will become that which we couldn't reject. There is a beginning to this enquiry and at the vyAvahArika level, there will no end! When the end comes, the vyAvahArika disappears and Paramarthika alone remains. This conclusion as well as all such other conclusions will depend on questionable (as always) assumptions! This is so because we all use a frame-work of thoughts which will be eventually unsupported by the Advaita Vedanta due to the fact that " Brahman alone knows the Brahman " is the Truth. There can never be any discussion when the Brahman knows the Truth! I will be surprised if everyone agrees with what I have said or have to say with respect the topic – Knowledge and the means of Knowledge (this is a loaded subject area and I have to admit that it is impossible for me to comprehend!!). What I have stated here shouldn't be considered a criticism and the purpose of my posting is indicate the real difficulty in our comprehension of this subject area. I want to thank both Sastriji and Sadaji for their since efforts in highlighting those difficulties. These posts once again emphasize the importance of having a Guru and most importantly that why we need both shraddha and Sadhana in all our endowers. With my warmest regards, Ram Chandran advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote: > > Sastriji - My saaShTanga PraNAms >  > I am fully aware that there is a disagreement in our views. Just to clarify my position - I am just highlighting the issue that you have identified. > > --- On Sat, 7/26/08, snsastri <sn.sastri wrote: > > The basis of your entire analysis seems to be the premise that in > the case of a gold ring, gold is the substance and ring is an > attribute. > ----------- > Sadananda: > If I can restate again - gold is substantive, ring is not an attribute - it is noun, but no substantive of its own and it has the attributes of the ring- Ring is an object - I have not denied the ring - but ring is name for attributive contents of the ring - naama for ruupa, rasa etc. All products are nothing but material cause itself in different forms. Locus of the attributes is a ring; but it actually is gold in that form with a name ring, given for an object ring. There is no other validity for the object other than its substantive gold and attributes of the ring. I am not denying the existence of gold at vyavahaara level †" it is the material cause for the ring to exist. > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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