Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 14: Part II

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Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge -14

Part-II

 

Objections

 

1. Objection: The mind through vRitti has only attributive knowledge and not

substantial knowledge is similar to Vijnaana vaadins of Buddhism and Western

Idealism. For them also there are no objects out there. Object knowledge is

only attributive knowledge is against Vedanta.

Response: Absolutely not. There is difference between attributive-object

knowledge vs. Vijnaana vaada or Idealism of the West. When senses gather

attributes when an object is perceived, the attributes are not created by the

seer or seer’s mind. There is an objective reality or empirical reality or

vyaavahaarika satyam. The objects with their attributes are the creation of the

Iswara. Jiiva’s creation manifests only in dream states. Iswara creation is in

the waking state. According to Advaita Vedanta, the Iswara himself became many

– bahusyam, let me become many. The different objects with divergent

attributes that distinguishes them are based on creation that occurs based on

previous karma. Every object is an assemblage of the basic elements, the pancha

bhuutas, the five primordial elements that come from Iswara. Iswara creation

includes the minds of beings that perceive the objects through their senses.

The minds and the objects they perceive

and the attributive knowledge of the objects through senses and the mind are

ontologically in par. Only difference is mind is made up subtle elements while

the objects are made with gross elements (i.e. after pancheekaraNam). That is

one of the reasons why physical objects do not enter into the mind.

2. Objection: How do we know that senses bring in only attributes and not

substance, since substance and attributes are inseparable?

Response: It is well known that when I see an object, the image of the object is

formed on retina which gets transmitted in terms of electrical signal to the

brain. The projection of three-D form occurs due to the presence of two eyes.

Object remains outside while the image is formed inside the retina first, which

is transmitted to the brain. This is where physics ends – the electrical input

is transformed (through, how is not yet understood by anybody), into what

Vedanta calls as vRitti in the mind. Hence, only those attributes that can be

measured by the senses are fed into the brain and through brain to the mind.

The mind being subtle and object being gross, it is good that substance does not

enter into the brain and therefore into the mind. These are facts that we

understood so far.

 

3. Objection: Form and color are not the only attributes, there are other sense

input –shabda, sparsha, rasa, gandha, etc. Image formation is only at optical

level. Hence the above explanation is not valid.

Response: The optical signal processing is very clear and faster compared to the

processing of other signals. All sense-inputs follow through electrical inputs

to the brain. If the nerves system fails and electrical signal input fails, the

input from that senses fails. If all senses fail no knowledge of the external

world occurs. These are facts that we know. There are no assumptions involved

here. Having more than one type of attributes does not make the process

different. All signal processing are the same. There may be parallel processing

in stead of series processing, that is, simultaneous information feed rather

than sequential feed. However at VRitti level, the thought in the mind appears

to be sequential not parallel. One does not have two simultaneous thoughts.

 

4. Objection: The mind is not two dimensional screen for projection, as the

analysis implies.

 

Response: The analysis does not assume that mind is two-dimensional screen.

Virtual images of 3-D can be made easily and can be seen. Conceptually, the

process is the same. The above analysis is valid even if one considers mind is

3-D or even multi-D. Mind remains subtle even if it is multi-dimensional. Matter

outside is gross. According to Vedanta, mind as a part of subtle body is formed

by the subtle elements before panciikaraNam. The matter (bhoutika) outside is

gross and formed after panciikaraNam. The objects are made up of gross matter

and attributes are subtle for senses to communicate, since sense input is

transmitted as signal with codes imbedded in them. Senses form part of the

subtle body only.

 

5. Objection: Object is not a substance, but it is an object with attributes

whose attributes may differ from attributes of the substance. Ring is different

from gold, the material substance. When VP says object ring is perceived, ring

object is perceived by the mind not necessarily the attributes of the ring only.

Response: No. There are only two things – it is the substance in the form of

an object, where form constitutes an attributes of an object along with other

attributes. Object is notional, since it is the material or substantive itself

in that form. When attributes are perceived, for perceived attributes a locus is

formed and that is the vRitti in the mind. That vRitti is the object ring that

is perceived. Object ring perceived is as real as the mind that perceives.

Within vyavahaara ontologically both are equally real or equally unreal,

depending on one’s vision or understanding.

 

6. Objection: According advaita there is a taadatmya sambandha between object

and the attributes. Hence advaita does not say one can only perceive the

attributes and not the object. VP says clearly object is perceived, and never

says only attributes are perceived and the object is real within vyavahaara.

 

Response: taadaatma sambandha has to be understood correctly. Attributive locus

is an object that is perceived – matter say gold, remaining out there, when I

perceive the object ring, ring being a notional (a padam with no padaartham of

its own – even at vyavahaara level) the attributes of the ring that senses

perceive are ‘as though’ now locussed into the vRitti to form an object ring

that is perceived. It could be semantics here. The taadaatma sambandha between

the locus and its attributes remain during the perceptual process since notional

ring outside is now notional ring inside – only the difference is the ring

outside has its attributes while the ring inside the mind has to be based on the

attributive knowledge gathered by the senses. Defects in the sense – and in

the associated signal processing can reflect in the ring object seen in the

mind, even though the outside ring is perfect. Neither ring outside nor the ring

inside has matter

of its own, since objects are notional. Ring matter outside is gold and ring

matter inside is the existence itself as part of vRitti, a subtle matter.

taadaatmaya Sambhadha remains for both ring outside and ring inside since

attributes perceived and object seen have avinaabhaava sambandha or

non-separatability relationship of the object outside and object inside. This is

accomplished without the matter or substance transfer – only because the

objects are notional. This is not paaramaarthika; it is vyaavahaarika only.

 

7. Objection: This is an important objection that was not clearly addressed

before. If we do not perceive the substance how do we ever know that there is

such a thing as substance. In fact, how do we ever know that there are two

things – substance and attributes if all objective knowledge is attributive?

 

Response: Here we need to differentiate between knowledge and experience to

understand clearly. Knowledge involves mental process which is subtle. This

includes perception. If there is a ring on the table, I perceive the ring

through the process described above. Now when I pick up the ring and ware it,

there is transaction that is involved that is not just a perceptual transaction.

For others who are witnessing it may be, but for not the one who is transacting.

There is an experience of wearing the ring that goes with the transaction.

Sambhadha is now established between what is perceived and what is transacted.

If the object cannot be transacted but only perceived, it will remain only as

the perceived object. VP defines pramaaNa clearly as ‘anadhigata, abhaadita,

arthavishayaka jnaanatvam’ – That which is not known before, that which is

not contradicted and that which has a meaning in the sense that it has

transactional reality. The

transactional reality is established by transaction. Bhagavan Ramanuja puts it

as utility or usage. Transactablity establishes the reality of what is perceived

and what is transacted. Hence the error or bhrama in advaita Vedanta is clearly

related to negatability by contradictory experience. If I see a snake and later

discover that it is a rope via transaction (say by beating the snake/rope by a

stick), what was perceived before is recognized as error. If there is no

contradictory transaction (that is transaction that contradicts the perception

of a snake) involved the perception of the snake of a rope remain as a snake in

the mind of the perceiver.

Whoever comes to our house feels like touching the flowers displayed on our

coffee-table to find out if they are real or those made in Japan. By the feeling

the texture, they discriminate real vs. Japanese flowers, because by perceptual

process or just by looking at the flowers the attributes are not discriminative

enough to differentiate. If one can make the texture also identical, then they

may venture to do further tests to differentiate them. The example further

proves that attributive knowledge is not substantial knowledge. Advaita Vedanta

is self-consistent, logical in its analysis and also is in tune with the current

state of understanding of science.

 

As a child grows to gain knowledge of the world, perception and the associated

transaction establishes the validity of perceptions. Both are within vyavahaara

or transactional realities. We are not bringing paaramaarthika here, although in

the perceptuality requirement VP does address the paarmaarthika aspect too.

There is no other vyaapti required to establish the concomitant relation between

the vRitti in the mind and the object out there – since perception is

immediate and direct. We are also not violating any epistemological issues

either. That one perceives through the subtle mind, the substantive that is

gross, along with attributes that are subtle is indeed an assumption that is

unscientific and illogical. We do not want our minds clogged by all the

substantives that we perceive.

 

8. Objection: If there are two things A and B, and if A is perceived and not B,

two things are sure: 1. either B is known to exist apriori, and not perceived in

this specific instance. 2. Or B is totally unknown apiori and not perceived in

this specific instance too. So which case of the above is true when perception

of substance is denied? If it is former then what is the source of our knowledge

about ‘substance’? If memory is not pramaaNa, such apriori knowledge of

about the substance can not be summed in the current denial of perception of the

substance.

 

Response: First the above statements are confusing. The objector starts with a

statement – ‘if there are two things A and B’ – and in that very

statement there is an inherent assumption of the conditional existence of two

things A and B and also the existence of difference between A and B, based,

obviously, on the differences in the attributive knowledge of A and B. The

subsequent discussion involving vikalpas (choices) only deny what has already

been assumed. ( I am just having some fun with dialectics, since the objector

enjoys the dialectics). Let us examine the objection more seriously. 1. If B is

known to exist apriori but not perceived now in this specific instance only

implies that object B, was perceived through the vRitti and is now stored in the

memory. Whatever objects B, C, D etc that were perceived before is stored in the

memory. The substantive knowledge is established for B only through transaction

with B. If perception of B is

brahma like a snake perception and was not negated as bhrama by contradictory

transaction, then it will remain as snake perception only in the memory. There

is no problem in that either, since perceptual process is only attributive. Let

us take the next choice – ‘2. Or B is totally unknown apiori and not

perceived in this specific instance too’. This statement denies the first

conditional statement that there are A and B. B is, means B exists and existence

of B cannot be established without the knowledge of its existence. That means

its existence is known but not perceived now (it can be known through by other

pramaaNa too). Since there is no object now with its attributes that mind

through the senses can perceive, one has no cognition of B now, even if it is

known to exist in the memory because of the assumption made.

 

The objector asks: So which case of the above is true when perception of

substance is denied? The current absence of the existence of object B is true

since it is not perceived now, even though existence of B and its attributive

knowledge is there in the memory. If I do not see cow in my office right now,

although I knows cows exists in the world with their characteristic attributes,

then non-existence of cow now in my office is true. Attributes do need a locus

and vRitti that formed locussed the attributes when the object is perceived and

is now stored as VRitti or its impression in the memory. I do not see cow now

because the attributes of the cow that are locussed in cow is not currently

perceived through senses in any object that I see in my office. In this case

there is no source for the substance or its attributes. Cow is only VRitti

stored in the memory.

Objector says, ‘if memory is not a pramaaNa, such apriori knowledge of about

the substance can not be summed in the current denial of perception of the

substance’. The statement of the objector is somewhat confusing. If I recall

that I saw a snake yesterday based on the attributive knowledge that the senses

gathered, and now say I do not see a snake here in my office, there is no reason

for substance snake to be there for me to deny its existence now. It is not

there now because I do not see any attributes of the snake in my office. I can

recall the snake that I saw yesterday sitting in my office now, since in my mind

what I saw as a snake based on the attributes that I could gather at that time.

There is no confusion in understanding of perception described above. The above

objection has no relevance.

 

Memory as pramaaNa is accounted by the VP as abhaadita arthavishayaka jnaanatvam

where anadhigata is removed since one knows based on past perception.

Non-negatability and transactability remain as means of knowledge. Recall the

example of trying to meet Mr. Gaagaabuubu in the station for the first time,

based on the attributive knowledge that I have gathered in the past. Since now

I know how he looks etc based on the hear-say knowledge (aapta vakyam), I can

look for Mr. Gaagaabuubu and find him there. I will find that the attributive

Gaagaabuubu in my mind matches with the attributes of the Mr. Gaagaabuubu out

there in the station. Suppose I do not find any one that matches the

description of Gaagaabuubu in the station, all it means is that attributes of

all the people that see in the station do not match with the attributes of

Gaagaabuubu that I have stored as a VRitti in my mind When I shake hands with

the Mr. real Gaagaabuubu – He becomes

transactable entity – vyaavahaarika satyam - if it is just attributive he may

remain as pratibhaasika like our good old snake.

None of the objections raised above contradicts the perceptual process

described.

 

9. Objection: If the very notion called `substance' is ever unknown apriori,

how can one say substance of all things is Brahman, for Brahman is not at all

perceived to be the substance of the

things in any acts of perception?

Response: Through transactions that one knows that ring that I see is real at

transactional level. Also the snake that I saw was not real when my subsequent

transaction proved that it is rope. Brahman is known as substantive not by

perceptual process but by Shruti statements – ‘sadeva souma idam agra

asiit’ – ‘aatma eva idam agra asiit’ and is further confirmed by ‘neha

naanaasti kincana’ and ‘sarvam khalu idam brahma’, etc.

In my commentary of VP, none of the basic principles of perception are violated.

Only disagreements are mind running to the object rather than senses bringing in

the attributive info to the mind and the concept to time. As for as I am know,

both have no bearing in terms of the perception of the objects, now.

 

With these statements I will continue with the analysis of VP. I want to thank

all the discussers for their stimulating discussions on the issues raised. My

special thanks to Shree Srinivas to force me to think deeply on the relation

between the substance and its attributes.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda