Names and Objects

[Guest guest]

The mANDUkya upaniShad begins with the

statement that everything is OM. This can readily be understood in a

metaphorical sense, in that it is by naming things that we effectively

introduce separation where there is none. However, Shankara, in his bhAShya on

the first two verses appears to be saying that the name of an object is quite

literally the same as the object:

 

“As all diversified objects that we

see around us, indicated by names, are not different from their (corresponding)

names...”

“Though the name and the object

signified by the name are one and the same...”

“The object is to realise the

knowledge of the oneness of the name and the thing signified by it. Otherwise,

(the explanation) that the knowledge of the thing is dependent on the name,

might suggest that the oneness of the name and the thing is to be taken only in

a figurative sense.”

 

This does not seem to fit in with the

mechanism of perception and knowledge propagated by vedAnta paribhAshA either (at

least as far through as I have currently progressed). Even ignoring the obvious

problem of different languages having different names for things, still the

name does not seem to be immediately associated with an object. The VP

description has the attributes forming a vRRitti in the mind, reflecting

consciousness and becoming one with the witnessing consciousness. It is only in

the subsequent process of re-cognition that a name is retrieved from memory and

associated with the perception.

 

Surely a completely novel object, which has

never been assigned a name, would nevertheless still be perceived. We might

even intuit its function despite the lack of prior acquaintance. Only later, might

we say: “let’s call it x.” Indeed, this must happen when some

new commercial product is invented. Initially, although its intended function

is already known, no name has yet been decided. How is the name of a thing

transmitted other than by someone telling us: “this object is called a ‘y’”

(*after* we have already perceived its attributes and thereby come to know it)?

 

Is anyone able to cast some light on this

strange assertion and perhaps point to scriptures where it is stated to be the

case and commentaries where it is explained/discussed?

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

[Guest guest]

Namaste Dennisji.

 

Although I haven't understood your doubt well, something inside me

tells that the following link, provided by Shri Shailendra Bhatnagar

off-List, might have an answer:

 

http://www.arshakulam.org/pdf/sanskrit/swamijisatsangtranscription070

101.pdf

 

To be honest with you, I haven't understood the link also well.

 

Best regards.

 

Madathil Nair

_________________________

 

advaitin , " Dennis Waite " <dwaite wrote:

>

> The mANDUkya upaniShad begins with the statement that everything

is OM. This

> can readily be understood in a metaphorical sense, in that it is

by naming

> things that we effectively introduce separation where there is

none.

> However, Shankara, in his bhAShya on the first two verses appears

to be

> saying that the name of an object is quite literally the same as

the object:

>

>

>

> " As all diversified objects that we see around us, indicated by

names, are

> not different from their (corresponding) names... "

>

> " Though the name and the object signified by the name are one and

the

> same... "

>

> " The object is to realise the knowledge of the oneness of the name

and the

> thing signified by it. Otherwise, (the explanation) that the

knowledge of

> the thing is dependent on the name, might suggest that the oneness

of the

> name and the thing is to be taken only in a figurative sense. "

>

>

>

> This does not seem to fit in with the mechanism of perception and

knowledge

> propagated by vedAnta paribhAshA either (at least as far through

as I have

> currently progressed). Even ignoring the obvious problem of

different

> languages having different names for things, still the name does

not seem to

> be immediately associated with an object. The VP description has

the

> attributes forming a vRRitti in the mind, reflecting consciousness

and

> becoming one with the witnessing consciousness. It is only in the

subsequent

> process of re-cognition that a name is retrieved from memory and

associated

> with the perception.

>

>

>

> Surely a completely novel object, which has never been assigned a

name,

> would nevertheless still be perceived. We might even intuit its

function

> despite the lack of prior acquaintance. Only later, might we

say: " let's

> call it x. " Indeed, this must happen when some new commercial

product is

> invented. Initially, although its intended function is already

known, no

> name has yet been decided. How is the name of a thing transmitted

other than

> by someone telling us: " this object is called a 'y' " (*after* we

have

> already perceived its attributes and thereby come to know it)?

>

>

>

> Is anyone able to cast some light on this strange assertion and

perhaps

> point to scriptures where it is stated to be the case and

commentaries where

> it is explained/discussed?

>

>

>

> Best wishes,

>

> Dennis

>

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " Dennis Waite " <dwaite wrote:

>

> The mANDUkya upaniShad begins with the statement that everything

is OM. This

> can readily be understood in a metaphorical sense, in that it is

by naming

> things that we effectively introduce separation where there is

none.

> However, Shankara, in his bhAShya on the first two verses appears

to be

> saying that the name of an object is quite literally the same as

the object:

> Surely a completely novel object, which has never been assigned a

name,

> would nevertheless still be perceived. We might even intuit its

function

> despite the lack of prior acquaintance. Only later, might we

say: " let's

> call it x. " Indeed, this must happen when some new commercial

product is

> invented. Initially, although its intended function is already

known, no

> name has yet been decided. How is the name of a thing transmitted

other than

> by someone telling us: " this object is called a 'y' " (*after* we

have

> already perceived its attributes and thereby come to know it)?

>

>

>

> Is anyone able to cast some light on this strange assertion and

perhaps

> point to scriptures where it is stated to be the case and

commentaries where

> it is explained/discussed?

>

>

>

> Best wishes,

>

> Dennis

 

Dear Dennis-ji,

The bhAshya in mANDUkya up. you have referred to says that the

object is non-different from its name. This idea is something found

in Sanskrit literature. In Raghuvamsa, one of the works of the poet

Kalidasa, the first verse says that a word and its meaning are

identical, like Lord Shiva and His consort pArvati. pArvati is

considered to be the shakti or power of Shiva and, since a power and

its wielder are not different, Shiva and pArvati are not different

from each other. To bring out this idea the poet uses the simile of

the identity of a word and its meaning, i.e., the object represented

by the word.

The idea brought out in the mANDUkya bhAshya is that name and form

are not different from each other. We can refer to any object only

by its name. Each form has a name and when the name is mentioned the

form is also as good as mentioned. When some object is discovered or

invented it is given a name. All names are composed of letters and

all the letters are included in the letter Om. Thus any name coined

in the future will also be covered by the letter Om.

I have not been able to see anything in V P which contradicts the

above bhAshya statement.

It has been stated in the upanishads that Om is the symbol as well

as the name of brahman. So when it is said that everything is Om,

what is conveyed is that everything is brahman. This is my

understanding.

Best wishes,

S.N.Sastri

[Guest guest]

Dear Dennisji and Sadaji,

Pranams

 

thank you for bringing up this question, Dennisji, which in my ongoing

studies of Mandukya Up has come up for me too (though Shankara bhashya

is not yet part of it).

 

" The object is to realise the knowledge of the oneness of the name and

the thing signified by it. Otherwise, (the explanation) that the

knowledge of the thing is dependent on the name, might suggest that

the oneness of the name and the thing is to be taken only in a

figurative sense. "

 

To me what you, respected Sadaji, have said, comes exactly to that:

figurative understanding.

Is not talking of representation as quoted below the same as

understanding it figuratively, metaphorically or symbolically?

 

> The root cause for all objects in the universe is Brahman which is

turiiyam of ManDukya - waking, dream and deep sleep states

(represented by Om) - they raise, sustained and go back into that

fourth state or turiiyam (represented by the silence in Om), as

described by mantra 7, is the root cause for the world.

 

Thank you for clarifying this.

 

Om Shanti

Sitara

 

 

 

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

>

>

> --- On Sun, 9/7/08, snsastri <sn.sastri wrote:

>

> The idea brought out in the mANDUkya bhAshya is that name and form

> are not different from each other. We can refer to any object only

> by its name. Each form has a name and when the name is mentioned

>

[Guest guest]

Dennisji - praNAms

 

Here is my understanding of how knowledge GROWS.

 

When I see an object out there with certain attributes - as a child my mother

shows me a cow out there - I perceived the object with the attributes - Mom

tells me that is a cow. Let us say it is a white cow. Now I have registered

the name and the object (with its attributes in a memory) - Next time when a

brown cow is there and mom shows me that is a cow - now the cow is not white as

before. I learn that there are generic qualities of a cow that makes cow a cow

and there are individual properties that differ one cow from the other cow. Next

time a black cow I see, I say mom that is a cow. Now we have an object cow with

generic (jaati) attributes and name tag for that object that differentiates the

cow from horse. Hence children books are with figures with A for apple, b for

boy etc where the picture (form) and the name are together associated with the

object are stored.

(It is said that mind stores the pictures on one side of the brain and language

on the other. Hence some times both halves do not get synchronized. We see a

person and remember his form but cannot recollect his name- this happens quite

often, particularly with age) Apparently Japanese and Chinese do not have this

problem since their language is pictorial. Hence both name and form are stored

in the same side!)

 

Now any time once the form and name are registered together, form goes with the

name and name goes with the form. If I say the word - cow - hearing the name -

the form comes to my mind immediately - that is how the thinking process goes -

you cannot have form without naming since communication cannot be done.

 

If I see a new object, whose name I do not know or it has not been named - I see

attributes and say I see an object there with these attributes and I do not know

what it is - it looks like a snake but it is not a snake. When I tried to

enquire about it - if that object has no name before or not discovered before, I

will name it and declare this is gaagaabuubu and has these attributes so that

naming ceremony is over for the record. From that on gaagaabuubu name is fixed

for an object that has those particular attributes.

 

This is how the knowledge takes place. The ring and bangle, and bracelet etc are

named like that only and now they are all standardized. In chemistry the names

of elements are fixed like that - some times by convention. This is all for

vyavahaara. What is there is an object with specific attributes that define the

object separating from the rest of the objects in the universe.

 

Hence the whole world is nothing but objects with names and forms. I have

discussed before there is no swaruupa lakshaNa for the object - since every

object is made up of parts - Ultimately you get into quantum level to define an

object with all its uncertainties.

 

That in essence is the objective knowledge. Interestingly I was and am still

getting paid for understanding the materials which have no substantive. In fact

I get paid for breaking things since they are breakable into parts.

 

 

Hari Om!

sadananda

 

 

 

--- On Sun, 9/7/08, Dennis Waite <dwaite wrote:

 

Dennis Waite <dwaite

RE: Re: Names and Objects

advaitin

Sunday, September 7, 2008, 2:25 PM

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dear  Sastri-ji and Sada-ji,

Thank you for the prompt clarification.

Yes, I was reading it as though Shankara was saying that, by perceiving an

object, one was also automatically acquiring its name. Also, it seemed slightly

contradictory in that any given object will have lots of names (in different

languages). But what you are saying is that, when we perceive a new object, we

give it a new name (or someone tells us that it has already been given one by

someone else). From that time forth, we understand the same thing by the name as

we do by the object itself. As you say, Sadaji, if you ask me to bring the

bangle from the other room, I know not to bring the ring.

This works well, too, from the vantage point of new attributes. If we look more

carefully at an object that we had previously only glanced at, the corresponding

vRRitti acquires new attributes and the associated name also acquires

corresponding new connotations.

What it does seem to mean, though (I am thinking out loud, here Sastriji!), is

that a given name for me will almost certainly mean something a little different

than that same name for you, because I have noticed some attributes which you

have not (and vice versa). But does that this mean that the name is NOT the same

as the object but the same as the particular vRRitti in the mind that is

perceiving or thinking about the object?

For example, suppose that you and I are both taken into a room and see an object

there which neither of us has seen before and whose purpose is unknown. Suppose

that, after allowing you only a second or two to look at this strange object,

you are then taken out of the room. I, on the other hand, am allowed as much

time as I like to pick up and examine the object in detail. If, later, we are

told that the object was a convolvulator, our respective understanding of what

is meant by that name will be quite different.

Can this be explained so that the argument still holds?

(Incidentally, thanks for the link Nair-ji. I did read it this time (!) but

I’m afraid I didn’t really understand it either. In fact, I think I may have

read or heard it last year and I didn’t understand it then either.)

Best wishes,

Dennis  

[Guest guest]

Dear Sada-ji and Sastri-ji,

 

Thanks again for the responses – both very clear, though I

believe this is already how I understood it to be. The very specific point that

I was picking up on was Shankara’s apparent assertion that the object and its

name are literally identical. From what you say, this should actually be

qualified. You seem to be saying that what Shankara meant was: an object and

its name are identical *for any given perceiver*. (i.e. an object called

X by one person would not necessarily have the same attributes as an object

called X by another person.) Would you agree that this is so? Does it not also

follow, then, that if a third person is told that there is an X in the next

room, he does not precisely what to expect? Does this, then, not amount to

saying that an object and its name are *not* identical (from a general

standpoint)?

Sorry to be nit-picking about this – but then much of the

subtler aspects of advaita do seem to be nit-picking and it is necessary to

pick at the nits until the substantive stand clearly revealed!

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

 

..

[Guest guest]

Hari OM~

Pranams Shri Sastri ji, Shri Sada ji, Dennis ji,

 

I first all would like to appreciate Dennis ji for raising this

interesting topic for discussion. As always I closely observed the

points discussed by Shri Sastri ji and Shri Sada ji in this regard.

I would like to humbly submit few more points on this issue.

 

The object's form and name according to Vedanta are treated in the

capacity of justifying the contextual verbal judgments in the

process of empirical transactions (Vyavahara), which inherently

involves the functional relation between different modes of internal

modifications with reference to the psycho-physical cognitive

structures of Human existence. According to Advaita, the cognitive

structures are widely categorized into three types namely, a) Manas

b) Vak and c) Prana, as discussed in detail in the Saptanna Brahmana

1.5 of Br.Up. Out of these cognitive structures, Manas and Vak

as `apriori' factors assumes different functional activities on

different domains of existence, anticipates multifarious modules of

relations such as the denoter-denoted (abhidana-abhideya sambanda),

(Vyanjya-vyanjika sambanda) etc, driving to activity of

(communicative) transactions known as the Visaya-samsarga-maryada.

 

Manas and Vak are two different functional aspects where the former

represents the totality of forms while the latter represents the

totality of Names. Suresvaracarya emphasizes this point to

say `Manas which is nothing but forms is the illuminated while the

Vak which is totally the names is the illumined'. It is apparently

known fact that illuminated is quite different from illumined for

the latter is self-luminous. Suresvara contends hence that `Vak –

the illumined is like a lamp that is self-luminating unlike the

manas – Prakasyameva rupam syatprakaso vAktaiva ca'

 

`Dhi' is the mental modification that mind assumes to capture

the `form' of an object, acquires its characters like `whiteness'

etc and encapstulates in Buddhi. Anandagiri in Sastraprakasika

advocates this point to say `rupadheyam sarvam dhimAtram' `dhir eva

sarvam rupam' iti. This rupadheyam is distinguished from Namadheyam

which is concerned with the Vak and not the manas. Forms are

Rupadheyams that are apprehended by the antahkarana to apprehend the

objectivity. On the otherhand, Vak being Self-luminous is purely

subjective by itself, which operates on three modes Vaikhari,

Mahyama, and Pasyanti – all of them are subjective by nature. Even

though Manas and Vak are modifications of Prana, the operative

functional aspects are entirely different.

 

To consolidate the above points, in my view, the name-form relation

is neither causally identical nor is ontologically consubstantial.

However, such a relation is postulated to be configured (Akrti) on

common plane of existence ie, Prana to grasp the `class of names'

with certain magnitude of reality that overlaps with that of forms

rather than the total idenity.

 

Further, in the Raghuvamsa verse quoted by Shri Sastri ji , Vak-

artha (word-meaning) denotes Shiva-Parvati, where Shiva is sarva

abhideya `Tatparya' while Parvati is known to be the

Tatparya `Sakti' which is identical with that of Shiva himself. It

does not imply any direct reference to identity of names and forms

here. I humbly request Shri Sastri ji to elaborate this point

further.

 

With Narayana Smrti,

Devanathan.J

[Guest guest]

advaitin , " antharyami_in " <sathvatha

wrote:

>

> To consolidate the above points, in my view, the name-form

relation

> is neither causally identical nor is ontologically consubstantial.

> However, such a relation is postulated to be configured (Akrti) on

> common plane of existence ie, Prana to grasp the `class of names'

> with certain magnitude of reality that overlaps with that of forms

> rather than the total idenity.

>

> Further, in the Raghuvamsa verse quoted by Shri Sastri ji , Vak-

> artha (word-meaning) denotes Shiva-Parvati, where Shiva is sarva

> abhideya `Tatparya' while Parvati is known to be the

> Tatparya `Sakti' which is identical with that of Shiva himself. It

> does not imply any direct reference to identity of names and forms

> here. I humbly request Shri Sastri ji to elaborate this point

> further.

>

> With Narayana Smrti,

> Devanathan.J

 

Dear Devanathan-ji,

You have used many technical terms which I do not understand. But in

the first para above, are you not contradicting Shri Shankara's

statement that name and form are " avyatireka " , non-different?

I gave the Raghuvamsa shloka as an example to show that a word and

its meaning are inseparable, which would amount, in effect, to

saying that they are the same.What exactly is the meaning

of 'sampRiktau'?

 

Dear Dennis-ji,

As I said in my prev note, even if two persons form different

impressions about the same object, the fact remains that the object

is the same and is represented by the same name. So the relationship

of the name and its object is a general one. Ultimately Shankara

says in the same bhAshya, " The necessity of understanding their

identity arises from the fact that once this identity is

established, one can by a single effort elominate both the name and

the nameable ro realize brahman that is different from both " . So

this is only a means to realize that all names and forms are

brahman. For that matter we can ask how Shankara says that all names

are non-different from Om. Om is made up of only the three Sanskrit

letters a,u,m. But Om is said to be the essence of all the vedas.

This can be only in a figurative sense.

When Shankara says that the identity of names and forms should not

be taken as only 'gauNa' or secondary, he is only saying that we

muat take them as identical in order to understand the upanishadic

statement that all this is Om.

In a way Devanathan-ji is right in saying that name and form are not

identical (if that is what he says). But Shankara wants us to

consider them as identical so that the upanishadic statement becomes

meaningful.

 

Regards,

S.N.Sastri

[Guest guest]

Dennis-ji wrote:You seem to be saying that what Shankara meant was: an object and

its name are identical *for any given perceiver*. (i.e. an object called

X by one person would not necessarily have the same attributes as an object

called X by another person.) Would you agree that this is so? Does it not also

follow, then, that if a third person is told that there is an X in the next

room, he does not precisely what to expect? Does this, then, not amount to

saying that an object and its name are *not* identical (from a general

standpoint)?What is the logic of talking about a " given perceiver " ? I can only perceive through my own perceptive instruments, the j~nAnendriya-s, and have no way of perceiving how other " perceivers " perceive.

What is a " general standpoint " then?On the issue of different languages having different names for the same object, I think we are making the mistake of using " name " in a restricted sense as if it were an element of human languages only. A two month old baby seems to be able to be distinguish its mother from other " objects " . What language does it use?

By " name " , we simply mean the ability to distinguish, which effectively is the same as form. That is my understanding of the mANDukya verses you quoted. I must admit though that I have not really studied the bhAShya and could be mistaken.

-- santoShaH paramo lAbhaH satsa~NgaH paramA gatiH I vicAraH paramaM j~nAnaM shamo hi paramaM sukham II- yoga vAsiShTha

[Guest guest]

Dear Ramakrishna-ji,

Thanks for the pointer. It did occur to me that there must be

something on the subject in that area and I was surprised that Ananda-ji had

not responded. I will look it up!

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf Of Ramakrishna

Upadrasta

Thursday, September 11, 2008 9:48 AM

advaitin

Re: Names and Objects

 

 

 

 

 

 

praNAms Dennis-ji,

 

Though I think others have already answered your question,

you could also refer to Shri Ananda Wood's Vakyapadia

for scriptual support of equivalence of names and

objects.

 

The web-source is the following:

http://www.advaitin.net/Ananda/VakyapadiyaExcerpts.pdf

 

praNAms to all Advaitins,

Ramakrishna

 

 

 

..