The Text 2

[Guest guest]

Namaste Advaitins,

"This behaviour has for its material cause an unreal nescience and man resorts to it by mixing up reality with unreality as a result of superimposing the things themselves or their attributes on each other."

Here we have large blocks of ideas being introduced such as ‘material cause’ and ‘unreal nescience’. First we must get the general purport of the sentence and then how the blocks of meaning move within it. Essentially what Sankara is saying is that we have a limited understanding of reality and suppose that it is complete. We accept perception as a fact and go no further to enquire as to how it is possible. Perception has already been presented as superimposition of the inert on the conscious and the conscious on the inert. Simply sticking at that we are left at the stage where we take the gulf between subject and object to be fixed and final. It is our ignorance of the reality of the unity of being and consciousness, an ignorance exacerbated by the material conditions of perception such as location, ambient conditions, presence etc that make us accept a narrow view of the self. I take material conditions to be what Sankara means by ‘material cause’. It is an extension of the base concept of being made out of something or arising out of something.

The text:

"If it be asked; "what is it that is called superimposition?" - the answer is: It is an awareness, similar in nature to memory, that arises on a different (foreign) basis as a result of some past experience."

He now finds it necessary to give his account of the place superimposition has to play in Advaita. Here I must say that I have found the extensive discussion of the various sorts of confusion, illusion and delusion to be excessive and contrary to the purport of Sankara’s basic use of it. He uses superimposition as an analogy for the way in which the object comes to be in the consciousness of the subject and also the way that the consciousness of the subject ‘covers’ the inert object. He later makes it clear that confusion is not a parallel for superimposition i.e. that all sorts of superimposition must conform to the example of confusion. In fact it is taking an analogy as an example that is the problem. An analogy is like that which it seeks to clarify in one fixed facet only and not in a global way. The facet that is focused on is the coming to be in the mind of an object. That the object in the case of confusion is not really there is not a relevant consideration. It is not the purport of the analogy. Many generations of overinterpretation have befogged this.

Sankara goes on to make it clear, to me at least, that this is his intent.

The text:

"But others assert that wherever a superimposition on anything occurs, there is in evidence only a confusion arising from the absence of discrimination between them. Others say that the superimposition of anything on any other substratum consists in fancying some opposite attributes on that very basis. From every point of view, however, there is no difference as regards the appearance of one thing as something else. And in accord with this, we find in common experience that the nacre appears as silver and a single moon appears as two."

What we have there is a swift review of all the theories of confusion which were an important topic for the philosophers of the day in their discussion of error. The paradigm or central case of error is taking something to be that which it is not. That is a very interesting discussion in its own right, but what Sankara is using the phenomenon of error for, is to bring out is the notion of the mutual transference of attributes i.e. superimposition. He is not interested in the minutiae of the mechanics of confusion.

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

Michael - PraNAms

 

I missed something.

 

--- On Thu, 10/16/08, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

 

 

Perception has already been presented as superimposition of the inert on the

conscious and the conscious on the inert.

 

-----------

 

I can see the superimposition of the inert on the consciousness. Now the second

part - superimposition of the consciousness on the inert? Since inert is mithyaa

I can superimpose on the substantive consciousness - where is it said the

consciousness is superimposed on inert?

Please explain.

 

I must request - please explain little more in detail if you want us to follow

the logic. I am not sure if any one else is following the language. Concepts are

difficult and if the language is also difficult, it becomes a problem for people

like me. Thanks

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri Sadananda,

 

You write to Michael, " I can see the superimposition of the inert on the

consciousness. Now the second part - superimposition of the consciousness on

the inert? Since inert is mithyaa I can superimpose on the substantive

consciousness - where is it said the consciousness is superimposed on inert?

 

Please explain. "

 

I'm just sharing to see if I am following what Michael is saying, at least

in part. Isn't Michael simply reflecting upon Shankara's opening paragraph

in the preamble to Brahmasutrabhashya? Namely:

 

" It being an established fact that the object and the subject that are the

fit contents of the concepts 'you' and 'we' (respectively), and are by

nature as contradictory as light and darkness, cannot logically have any

identity, it follows that their attributes can have still less.

Accordingly, the superimposition of the object, referable through the

concept 'you', and its attributes on the subject that is conscious by nature

and is referable through the concept 'we' (should be impossible), and

contrariwise the superimposition of the subject on the object should be

impossible. Nevertheless, owing to an absence of discrimination between

these attributes, as also between substances, which are absolutely

disparate, there continues a natural human behaviour based on

self-identification in the form 'I am this' or 'This is mine'. This

behaviour has for its material cause and unreal nescience and man resorts to

it by mixing up reality with unreality as a result of superimposing the

things themselves or their attributes on each other. "

 

So my understanding would be that Shankara is saying when 'I', 'we',

identify with the body as in " I am this " then I/we do two things (at least).

We superimpose the body (the inert) on the self and also superimpose the

self (consciousness) on the body. Shankara says this process, which is an

unreal nescience, involves " mixing up reality with unreality " which to me

looks like attributing form to consciousness and consciousness to form.

 

Would this be a valid understanding or does this need amending in some way?

 

Kind regards,

 

Peter

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf

Of kuntimaddi sadananda

16 October 2008 16:45

advaitin

Re: The Text 2

 

Michael - PraNAms

 

I missed something.

 

--- On Thu, 10/16/08, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

 

 

Perception has already been presented as superimposition of the inert on the

conscious and the conscious on the inert.

 

-----------

 

I can see the superimposition of the inert on the consciousness. Now the

second part - superimposition of the consciousness on the inert? Since inert

is mithyaa I can superimpose on the substantive consciousness - where is it

said the consciousness is superimposed on inert?

Please explain.

 

I must request - please explain little more in detail if you want us to

follow the logic. I am not sure if any one else is following the language.

Concepts are difficult and if the language is also difficult, it becomes a

problem for people like me. Thanks Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Hi Peter,

 

I agree with this. In the rope-snake metaphor, we can say that

we are ‘superimposing’ the ‘is-ness’ of the rope onto

the unreal, mentally projected snake or we can say that we are superimposing

the illusory existence of the snake onto the real rope. This is why Shankara

says that we are ‘mixing up’ real and unreal.

 

But I would go along with Shri Sadananda’s request that

Michael elaborate a little more in his vArtika (!). It is not so much that I

was having difficulty following it but I was intending to request that I put it

on my website for everyone else to read when it is complete. And it is a

difficult as well as a fundamental topic. Alternative explications can only

help.

 

Best wishes,

Dennis

 

 

 

 

advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf Of Peter

Thursday, October 16, 2008 6:18 PM

advaitin

RE: Re: The Text 2

 

 

 

 

 

 

<>

 

So my understanding would be that Shankara is saying when 'I', 'we',

identify with the body as in " I am this " then I/we do two things (at

least).

We superimpose the body (the inert) on the self and also superimpose the

self (consciousness) on the body. Shankara says this process, which is an

unreal nescience, involves " mixing up reality with unreality " which

to me

looks like attributing form to consciousness and consciousness to form.

 

Would this be a valid understanding or does this need amending in some way?

 

Kind regards,

 

Peter

[Guest guest]

" Dennis Waite " <dwaite wrote:

>

> I agree with this. In the rope-snake metaphor, we can say that we are

> 'superimposing' the 'is-ness' of the rope onto the unreal, mentally

> projected snake or we can say that we are superimposing the illusory

> existence of the snake onto the real rope. This is why Shankara says

that we are 'mixing up' real and unreal.

>

 

Dear Dennis,

Help me clearing this doubt.

Following your logic, how could we surimpose the 'is-ness' of the rope

onto the unreal?, since the unreal never existed in the first place?.

Also, the 'is-ness' of objects is not an attribute, it's the very

essence, ergo non surimposable.

Am I wrong?

 

Yours in Bhagavan,

Mouna