Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 Namaste Sada-ji, Mouna-ji, Peter-ji and Dennis-ji, Thanks for your interest and careful reading. I hope this background may make clearer the mutual superimposition idea which is so central to the preamble. The superimposition of the conscious on the inert has also been dealt with in V.P. in the Chapter on ‘Subject Matter of Vedanta’ page 188(trans.). It is objected that the self which is unlimited must have by that very fact a connection with everything and that there not being a mental state as in the case of the inert would be no bar to it. The reply to this is that Vedanta does not deny that the self is unlimited and that the individual self can be connected with that which is inert. Objection: "What, then"? i.e. how can this be? The answer to this is that the luminous mind because it is a transparent substance can manifest the Consciousness that is the individual self. However a jar or any inert object cannot manifest consciousness to itself because it is opaque. Nevertheless it is an upadhi or a limiting adjunct of pure consciousness in the form of the jar,etc. It is the mind or consciousness going out to it that ‘covers’ it and takes its form. "…and being possessed of a capacity to manifest Consciousness, imparted by the mental state, they manifest that Consciousness after the appearance of the mental state. So it has been stated in the Vivarana, "For the mind imparts to the jar etc. connected with it as well as to itself, the capacity to manifest Consciousness". On page 15 (Perception Chapter) there is the metaphor of the tank "so also the luminous mind, issuing through the eye etc., goes to the space occupied by objects such as a jar, and is modified into the form of a jar or any other object." As the Vivarana states the mind can give to the inert the power to manifest Consciousness. Because this manifestation is that of a limiting adjunct, it is the truth of the object. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 --- On Thu, 10/16/08, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote: Michael and Peter - thanks for the explanations. yushmad in the preamble arises from the ashmad - you, he, she and it for objective cognitions with attributive content requires ashmad to start - I or we have to be there - that is the first person has to be there before second and third person can arise. But asmad notion that I am this is part of the reflected consciousness in the mind. I am not sure one can call this as superimposition of consciousness on inert. May be reflected consciousness - yes, since that is also inert as the medium of reflection. Any qualified or attributive consciousness is inert only. Anyway I do follow now what you mean. But more explanation would help to go to the next statement. Hari Om Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 Namaste Sadaji, Michaelji, Peterji, Dennisji and Mounaji. It would be a good idea if we all refresh our memory by reading the following link where Sw. Dayanandaji has given us a simple and beautiful explanation of the nature of superimposition. http://www.avgsatsang.org/hhpsds/pdf/Pancadasi_Chap7_Verse5.pdf How sad that we always lose sight of this monumental light-house in the unyielding adhyAsa sea! Best regards. Madathil Nair _______________ advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 Dear Mouna-ji, I agree that it is a strange way of putting it and you could certainly argue that pedantically it cannot be so. However, the actual situation regarding the rope-snake is that the snake does not exist while the rope does exist. Yet we say with certainty ‘there is a snake’. What it seems that we have done is to take the ‘is-ness’ of the rope and superimpose it upon the illusory snake, thereby giving it seeming existence. A more rational way of speaking about this is to say that we have projected the mental image of a snake onto the rope but (pedantically speaking) this is superimposing the illusory snake onto the real rope and the ‘is-ness’ still belongs to the rope (which it does anyway of course). Certainly, since we believe that the snake exists, we must also believe that the snake has ‘is-ness’, even though it is ultimately discovered to have been illusory. To this extent, we must have ‘borrowed’ the is-ness from the rope. It’s really only playing with words in order to understand what is happening and it is probably best simply to say that we are mixing up real and unreal. Best wishes, Dennis advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf Of Mouna Thursday, October 16, 2008 9:57 PM advaitin Re: The Text 2 Dear Dennis, Help me clearing this doubt. Following your logic, how could we surimpose the 'is-ness' of the rope onto the unreal?, since the unreal never existed in the first place?. Also, the 'is-ness' of objects is not an attribute, it's the very essence, ergo non surimposable. Am I wrong? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 Dennis - I have a problem with the logic you presented. I do agree with the last statement. That is the definition of adhyaasa. Is-ness is not something that can be borrowed. The is-ness is everywhere. It is indivisible. what is there as a snake is snaky-existence that is existence expressed locally as a snake with its attributes that are different from its surrounding spacey-existence with its own attributes? What are differences between the snaky-existence vs. spacey-existence? - that is only the attributive content. What you are borrowing from the snaky-existence is existence of some of the attributes that you can see. Perception is only attributive and when you project the rope you are only projecting ropy-attributive with the sounding spacey-existence. It is not the existence that you are borrowing since existence is all pervading - you are only borrowing the partial attributive content of the object that you see. Shankara starts the preamble with statement of attributive content of yushmad and ashmad where they are different not the existence or consciousness that is different. Real part is not localized anywhere, the mithyaa part only is localized in the space which itself is mithyaa. Hence mixing of real and unreal is not mixing of two localized entities - borrowing real something and unreal something. It can only be all pervading reality of existence with localized attributive contents - attributive contents are mithyaa. Shankara starts with attributive defition of yushmad and ashmad. That is what my objection was in the statement that consciousness is superimposed on inert. The explanation Michael offered, as I understand, is limiting consciousness is getting (I should add - as though) superimposed on the inert. The conditional statement is OK as long as we do not talk of partitioning existence or consciousness with each inert content. Hari Om! Sadananda --- On Fri, 10/17/08, Dennis Waite <dwaite wrote:  I agree that it is a strange way of putting it and you could certainly argue that pedantically it cannot be so. However, the actual situation regarding the rope-snake is that the snake does not exist while the rope does exist. Yet we say with certainty ‘there is a snake’. What it seems that we have done is to take the ‘is-ness’ of the rope and superimpose it upon the illusory snake, thereby giving it seeming existence. A more rational way of speaking about this is to say that we have projected the mental image of a snake onto the rope but (pedantically speaking) this is superimposing the illusory snake onto the real rope and the ‘is-ness’ still belongs to the rope (which it does anyway of course). Certainly, since we believe that the snake exists, we must also believe that the snake has ‘is-ness’, even though it is ultimately discovered to have been illusory. To this extent, we must have ‘borrowed’ the is-ness from the rope.  It’s really only playing with words in order to understand what is happening and it is probably best simply to say that we are mixing up real and unreal.  Best wishes, Dennis  Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 That is what my objection was in the statement that consciousness is superimposed on inert. The explanation Michael offered, as I understand, is limiting consciousness is getting (I should add - as though) superimposed on the inert. The conditional statement is OK as long as we do not talk of partitioning existence or consciousness with each inert content. praNAms Hare Krishna I am not able to understand the superimposition of *limiting consciousness* on an inert object here or am I missing something here??...Shankara clearly says it is mutual superimposition of Atma & anAtma vastu..one is vishayi (subject) & another is vishaya (object)...It does not mean, vishayi here is an individual with limiting consciousness...shankara clarifies this further that practically mutual superimposition is NOT possible coz. both are oppose to each other like darkness & light...So, it is Atma anAtha adhyAsa, not limiting consciousness & inert object..AtmAnAtmanOritarEtarAdhyAsaM...nothing more nothing less than this... Could anybody clarify this position further... Hari Hari Hari Bol!!! bhaskar Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 advaitin , Bhaskar YR <bhaskar.yr wrote: > > I am not able to understand the superimposition of *limiting > consciousness* on an inert object here or am I missing something > here??...Shankara clearly says it is mutual superimposition of > Atma & anAtma vastu..one is vishayi (subject) & another is vishaya > (object)...[...]. > > Could anybody clarify this position further... Hari OM! I also find hard to understand superimposition. This is merely sharing few thoughts. And far from any attempt to clarify any thing. Even if Shankara comes and tells himself, I am not sure if I won't superimpose my own (mis)understanding on what is told. Superimposition of snake over rope - #rajju sarpavat# is often told. Thank God, we some times mistake rope to be a snake and shiver. It could be worse and even tragic, if snake is mistaken as rope! Former is at least less damaging and short-lived than latter. I read that studies in Neurology say that our senses sometimes react sooner than even brain tells nerve stimuli how to respond. Like, when a rope is unexpectedly suspended over our peripheral vision, we jerk away instinctively and however briefly, even though we see and recognize only rope, not snake. **** Lord, it is ok if I mistake rope to be snake Help me not mistake a snake to be a rope! Lord, it is ok if I mistake fleeting to be permanent Help me not mistake permanent to be fleeting! Lord, it is ok if I mistake ignorance to be knowledge Help me not mistake knowledge to be ignorance! Lord, it is ok if I mistake misery to be bliss Help me not mistake bliss to be misery! Lord, it is ok if I mistake indifference to be renunciation Help me not mistake renunciation to be indifference! Lord, it is ok if I mistake unreal to be Thou Help me not mistake Thou to be unreal! --------- Hari OM! -Srinivas Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 --- On Fri, 10/17/08, Srinivas Nagulapalli <srini_nagul wrote: I read that studies in Neurology say that our senses sometimes react sooner than even brain tells nerve stimuli how to respond. Like, when a rope is unexpectedly suspended over our peripheral vision, we jerk away instinctively and however briefly, even though we see and recognize only rope, not snake. Srinivas - PraNAms In the analysis of fear, we say advaita is fearless - involves only psychological fear not biological fear. Jnaani will have like ajnaani the biological reactions as you have mentioned - since they are governed by the Iswara sRiShTi. The snake - rope fear at biological reaction is different from psychological fears associated with it. Adhyaasa study is not for understanding the snake-rope - understanding the human psychological fears and that is samsaara. If the child is sick - she cries and sleeps - But parents cannot sleep because of psychological fears, and perhaps financial fears that sickness can cause, and all other nine yards which child is not worried about. That is the adhyaasa that we are concerned where we take one thing for the other. The purpose of studying adhyaasa is only that. We take unreal as real and real as unreal and suffer as a consequence of it. Fear of death is the greatest fear - that brought Giita down for us. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 17, 2008 Report Share Posted October 17, 2008 Dear Sadananda, I think that you may be unnecessarily complicating the issue. We are, after all, using words to try to point to the reality (since it cannot ultimately be described). If we make the issue too complicated to understand, the point has been lost. All I was saying is that, in the rope-snake metaphor, the rope exists whereas the snake does not exist. Therefore, in the moment that we believe we that see the snake, we also believe that the snake exists. Since it does not; since it is the rope only that exists, we have *effectively* superimposed the ‘existence which belongs to the rope’ onto the snake. (I know that this is better described by saying that we are projecting remembered snake attributes onto the rope but I see no problem in describing it the other way. By highlighting the word ‘effectively’, we acknowledge that we know it isn’t quite like this, in the same way as Michael uses the phrase ‘as though’.) Is it, in any case, true that attributes have existence? I would have said that only the adhiShThAna (substrate) has existence, i.e. the rope in this metaphor. The attributes only relate to the form. Best wishes, Dennis (P.S. I may not be able to reply to any follow-up for a while as I will be on holiday.) advaitin [advaitin ] On Behalf Of kuntimaddi sadananda Friday, October 17, 2008 9:41 AM advaitin Re: The Text 2 Dennis - I have a problem with the logic you presented. I do agree with the last statement. That is the definition of adhyaasa. Is-ness is not something that can be borrowed. The is-ness is everywhere. It is indivisible. what is there as a snake is snaky-existence that is existence expressed locally as a snake with its attributes that are different from its surrounding spacey-existence with its own attributes? What are differences between the snaky-existence vs. spacey-existence? - that is only the attributive content. .. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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