Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 26

[Guest guest]

PraNAms to all

 

We are discussing the Vedanta ParibhASha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, based on my

understanding.

---------

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge – 26

 

We are discussing the anumaana pramaaNa as the means of knowledge, where the

knowledge follows another knowledge, anumiti. Inferential knowledge takes place

based on perceptual knowledge. The classical example is – I see smoke on the

distant hill, and I infer that the hill on fire, even though I do not see fire.

Here knowledge of smoke and the distant hill occurs by perceptual process.

Hence they are objective knowledge based on attributive content. The knowledge

is immediate and direct as we discussed before. However fire is not immediate

and direct since I do not perceive fire. I infer that the distant hill is on

fire based on the concomitant relation between smoke and fire, which is called

vyaapti. The inference depends on this relation or vyaapti; and if I do not know

the relation, I cannot infer that there is fire on the distant hill.

Technically the terms used in formulating this means of knowledge are: hetu,

linga, mark or middle term -

refers to the smoke on the distant hill; the saadhya, character or major

premise - refers to fire on the distant hill. The hill itself is called paksha,

the minor term. The conclusion or inference however is based on the concomitant

relation between the smoke and the fire and is called vyaapti. Vyaapti in this

case is, wherever there is smoke there is fire, as is observed in the kitchen.

Kitchen example provides a dRiShTanta for establishing the concomitant relation

between smoke and fire. We have mentioned that vyaapti is asama, meaning it is

unidirectional, that is wherever there is smoke there is fire but not the other

way i.e. wherever there is fire there need not be smoke. For example we do not

see smoke with the red-hot iron ball.

 

The invariable concomitance or vyaapti between middle term or hetu (smoke) and

the major term, saadhya (fire) is the back bone of inferential knowledge or

syllogism. It provides a universal proposition showing the connection between

the two. It has to be acquired by observation and generalization. Observation

in a kitchen (in olden days where fire wood is used generally for cooking) that

smoke is there whenever fire is there; and this observation is now generalized

that ‘wherever there is smoke there must be fire’. That forms the vyaapti or

invariable concomitant relation. As per Indian logic, the universal proposition

is supported by at least one observation, if there are no contradictory

observations. Hence inferential knowledge, according to India logic, involves

deductive and inductive reasoning; and there is no separation between the two,

as in western logic. Anumaana or inferential knowledge is therefore, an

inductive generalization with

deductive particularization. Particular observation is, I see smoke when there

is fire in the kitchen. Deductive reasoning is whenever there is smoke in the

kitchen there must be fire there. Generalization of this is to conclude wherever

there is smoke there must be fire – that is independent of any condition. That

generalization is by induction that smoke cannot exist independent of fire.

 

Advaitic position differs from NaiyAyikas in several aspects as outlined by VP.

According NaiyAyikas the inferential knowledge involves several steps. With

reference to the fire example, the steps involved are as follows. First we see

smoke in a kitchen, etc. Second, we recollect that smoke is never without a

fire. Third, we consider that the smoke is on the distant hill where fire has to

be inferred by the process of what is known as paraamarsha. Thus this third step

that involves paraamarsha is instrumental for the inferential knowledge. VP

dismisses these procedural processes. It says we cannot establish that this

paraamarsha required for the inferential knowledge. Paraamarsha involves

brooding over the observations and vyaapti to arrive at the conclusion that the

distant hill is on fire.

 

Then how does the inferential knowledge really takes place? VP says it is by

vyaapaara and not paraamarsha. Vyaapaara is related to vyaapti. It involves

immediate recollection or transaction with the concomitant relation between the

hetu and saadhya. Hence as soon as I see the smoke on the distant hill, I

remember the universal relation that smoke cannot exist without a fire and

therefore infer that there is fire on the distant hill. The vyaapti is already a

universalized relation based on prior particular observation. Hence VP says

when vyaapti is available in the mind, then Vyaapaara (here connecting the smoke

to the fire via the vyaapti) can take place in the mind without any paraamarsha

needed.

 

For the inferential knowledge to take place one should have the knowledge of the

concomitant relation. The knowledge should be available with the person as

latent impression in the mind for its immediate operation or vyaapaara or use

when hetu is observed. Latent impression is not recollection, but is a source

for it. It is similar to saying that when I go to deep sleep state all the

knowledge I have goes into latent form which can be materialized when I wake up.

Hence recollection is not in the sense of what NaiyAyikas to. For the

NaiyAyikas, recollection involves two aspects: its non-existent in the mind

before a thing is recollected and its non-existence later after the operation of

inferential knowledge. That means the recollected information was not there in

the mind before or after. It is produced when it is needed and destroyed when

its function is over. These are called praak abhaava and pradhvamsa abhaava,

that is its

non-existence before and non-existence after. The reason they to

this is due to their belief in asat kaarya vaada that is existence comes from

its non-existence– as the pot case – it came into existence from its

non-existence before and it goes into non-existence when it gets destroyed. Thus

non-existence of a thing forms the cause for its existence later. In the

current example, the recollection of vyaapti involves its coming into existence

in my mind (so that I become aware of) from its non-existence and after the

paraamarsha that is after the inferential knowledge has taken place, its going

back to its non-existent state.

 

VP rejects these arguments. If existence comes from non-existence it violates

the fundamental law that non-existence can never become existence (naasato

vidyate bhaavaH). Besides, there is no particular reason why a specific vyaapti

that is needed can come into existence since any vyaapti can arise from its

non-existence. In addition, there is no reason to have a prior vyaapti to be

established by dRiShTanta or observation. Advaita does not to asat

kaarya vaada. Vyaapti is in potential form or latent form in the mind which

comes into existence when needed. When there are many types of vyaaptis stored

in a latent or potential form only that which is relevant will come for

recollection. In the example, it is the vyaapti that relates the smoke to fire.

Latent impression means it exists as latent, just as pot exists in potential

form in the clay. This is called samskaara or latent impression in the mind

about the concomitant relation.

 

VP discusses how the processes of inferential knowledge take place. There is a

latent impression in the mind formed previously by generalization of the

particular observation that smoke is there only when there is fire. This latent

impression is in unmanifested form However, when I have a perceptual knowledge

of smoke on a distant hill, the latent impression manifests in the form of

vyaapti, providing the concomitant relation between smoke and fire. Hence VP

rules out the NaiyAyikas position that recollection arises from its prior

non-existence state. Latent impression relating to vyaapti exists which forms a

basis for recollection of the vyaapti. Similarly it dismisses their position

that recollection destroys preexisting latent impression. In addition VP says

latent impression has to be awakened to form a basis for recollection. If it is

not awakened by the perception of the hetu and unawakened latent impression

cannot give rise to inferential

knowledge, since vyaapti is not materialized in the mind. Hence one can

consider awakening of the latent impression as an auxiliary cause since it forms

a basis for recollection of vyaapti. Thus VP says, the inferential knowledge –

‘the hill has fire’- arises as soon as I see smoke on the distant hill,

which triggers the latent impression to give rise to recollection of vyaapti.

Vyaapaara takes place and the mind infers that there is a fire on the distant

hill. There is no reason to have a third factor that involves paraamarsha as

discussed above which is only a cumbersome addition not needed to arrive at the

inferential knowledge. In the example, the inferential knowledge is only that

there is a fire in the distant hill because I see smoke there. The smoke and the

hill are objects of perceptual knowledge. The smoke and the hill are therefore

objective knowledge based on their attributive content. The inferential

knowledge that there is fire is

not an objective knowledge with attributive content of fire. This aspect we

have discussed it earlier in relation to perception.

 

The vyaapti or invariable concomitance involves the coexistence of the saadhya,

that is the thing that is inferred, in our fire case it must be valid for all

situations where the existence of hetu (in our example, smoke) is observed. This

concomitant relation between the two has been established by the observation of

both and with out any exceptions, that is without observing any time smoke

without fire. VP says it does not matter whether this coexistence of the two is

observed once or many times as long as no violation of their coexistence is

noted. What counts is observation of the coexistence without any violation.

Other philosophers say that the observations should be more than once, and the

more the better. to establish the universality of the vyaapti, without any

violations. Advaita and Nyaaya agree that one observation is enough since

vyaapti is both deductive and inductive as long as no exceptions are observed.

 

Types of inferences according to NaiyAyikas: Based on anvaya and vyatireka

logic, NaiyAyikas propose three different types of vyaaptis or invariable

concomitant relations.

a) anvaya-vyatireka (affirmative-negative)

b) kevala anvaya (purely affirmative)

c) kevala vyatireka (purely negative)

In the first case the concomitant relation between the hetu and saadhya are

related to each other both affirmatively and negatively. This is determined by

observation of their co-presence and co-absence. In the case of smoke and fire

the positive concomitant relation involves ‘smoke is fire is, as in the

kitchen’. The negative concomitant relation involves ‘smoke is not fire is

not, as on the lake’. That is, there is agreement in the presence as positive

or affirmative vyaapti and also there is agreement in their absence as negative

vyaapti. Both establish the relation between smoke and the fire. Advaitin do

not for the requirement of both. They only for the

affirmative and not for the negative. When there is smoke there must be fire is

the affirmative and is sufficient for the inferential knowledge. I see the smoke

on the distant hill and based on the anvaya vyaapti or affirmative invariable

concomitance that whenever

there is smoke there must be fire. Therefore I can infer that there is fire on

the hill. NaiyAyikas say that even the negative concomitance can cause

inferential knowledge. I see the smoke on the distant hill. Now applying the

negative concomitance we have to infer as, ‘if there is no smoke there must

not be fire, as on the lake’. Since there is smoke on the hill there must be

fire. First it is a round about logic. Second, the vyatireka or negative logic

is faulty for many reasons. For one, if three is no smoke on the lake, many

things may not be there along with the absence of fire. Hence co-absence may not

be generic to smoke in relation to fire. Hence the inter relation between smoke

and the fire is not invariable for the concomitance to work. Hence Advaita

rejects this requirement of negative concomitant relation to arrive at the

inferential knowledge. For adviatins, the negative concomitance discussed above

comes under postulation than

vyaapti. In order to establish inferential knowledge between hetu and saadhya,

all we need is positive concomitant relation between the two.

 

Purely affirmative concomitant relation is the second type according to

NaiyAyikas. Purely affirmative concomitance involves saadhya, the thing to be

inferred to be present everywhere or to put it technically, it is not counter

positive to non-existence. Counter positive to non-existence in simple terms is

existence, as it is opposite to non-existence. They give example for purely

affirmative concomitance as – ‘the jar is nameable, because it is

knowable’; because nameability (saadhya or thing that is inferred) is

everywhere, since whatever is knowable is nameable. Since the absence of

knowability and nameability is no where to be observed, the knowledge of

negative concomitance is not possible. Hence NaiyAyikas argue that this is the

case of pure affirmative concomitance. Advaitin obviously reject this. For them

that which is counter positive to non-existence is existence itself, which is

Brahman, and which is non-dual and by definition cannot

have any qualifications what so ever. There is no co-presence of anything else

with Brahman. Hence they do not to kevala anvaya or purely

affirmative concomitance.

 

Similarly there is also purely negative inference or kevala vyatireka,

according to NaiyAyikas, inference is solely based on the negative invariable

concomitance. The example they give is – ‘God is Omnipresent, because He is

the creator’. The vyaapti for this is purely negative invariable concomitance,

‘whoever is not Omnipresent is not the creator’. No knowledge of positive or

affirmative invariable concomitance is possible in this case – if there is it

would read for example as He is Omnipresent, therefore He is the creator’-

such statement is not possible since co-presence of ‘Omniscience’ and

‘creatorship’ is no where to be observed. Advaitins reject the purely

negative concomitance as the basis of inference, since such a knowledge is not

possible.

 

Hence Adviatins reject both purely affirmative (kevala anvaya) and purely

negative (kevala vyatireka) invariable concomitant relationships between two

entities – hetu and saadhya. They only for positive (not purely

positive) or anvaya vyaapti or invariable concomitance. VP establishes this by

rejecting the NaiyAyikas position. For more detailed discussion of the above,

please refer to Methods of Knowledge by Swami Satprakashananda.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda