Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 27

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We are discussing the Vedanta ParibhASha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, based on my

understanding.

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Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge – 27

 

Inferential knowledge is classified into two types; inference for one self and

for others. We have discussed so far how the process occurs for oneself. We

have vyaapti that provides the concomitant relation between the hetu, the mark,

and saadhya, the inferred knowledge. The invariable concomitant relationship was

established by observation of co-existence of hetu and saadhya and

non-observation of any violation of their co-existence. It involves both

deductive and inductive logic in generalization as invariable concomitance based

on particular observations. For example an invariable concomitant relation

between the smoke and fire is established that states that ‘wherever there is

smoke there must be fire’ – which is a generalization of particular

observation that whenever there is smoke in the kitchen it is invariably

associated with fire. The knowledge of this relation is stored in the memory as

latent knowledge. When I see smoke on a distant

hill, immediately I remember the concomitant relation between the smoke and

fire and infer that there must be fire on the distant hill. This is the process

is defined as vyaapaara involving mental association between the smoke and the

fire using the vyaapti that has been established.

 

In communicating this inferential knowledge to others and for them to reach the

same inference, a logical sequence of procedure is to be adopted and these

sequential steps are referred to in western logic as Syllogism. According to

Nyaaya School, there are five steps involved in convincing others so they also

arrive at the same inferential knowledge. The steps involved are:

(a)The proposition to be proved – pratijnaa – ex. The hill has fire.

(b)Reason (hetu) for this conclusion --ex. Because I see smoke on the hill.

©Vyaapti – concomitant relation with- -ex. wherever there is smoke there

is supporting example (udaharaNa) fire, as in kitchen.

(d) Application of vyaapti ex. Hill is smoky, smoke is always

with fire.

(e) Conclusion reached (nigamana) ex. Therefore the hill has fire.

 

According to advaita all the five steps are not necessary. In principle, one

can reach the same conclusion by following either the first three steps or the

last three steps. The two additional components are therefore unnecessary, says

VP.

 

Establishment of Unreality (mthyaatvam) of the Universe through Inference:

 

Advaita establishes the unreality of the universe using (a) shaastra pramaaNa,

(b) inference or anumaana based on shaastra called shaastriiya anumaana, and ©

inference based on loukika or worldly examples. For the third case, Advaita

establishes a vyaapti or concomitant relation based on the worldly examples to

arrive at the unreality of the Universe. The discussion of the first two is

postponed to later when we take up the verbal testimony.

 

Vedanta as pramaaNa establishes that Brahman is the absolute truth. The word

Brahman itself means infiniteness, which by its very definition is advitiiyam or

one without a second. If there is a second that is different from Brahman it

would limit Brahman; violating the infinite nature of Brahman. Therefore there

cannot be anything other than Brahman. Hence if one sees any thing or things or

universe of objects, they cannot be real but only apparent. Thus whatever I see,

it cannot be real, as per Vedanta. In addition, Brahman cannot be seen since

Brahman is infinite or limitless, as seeing involves seer-seen duality, which,

being mutually exclusive, limit each other. If there is a universe that I see,

it cannot be different from Brahman, since there cannot be anything other than

Brahman. It cannot be the same as Brahman either since Brahman being infinite is

part-less. In addition, since I am seeing the universe, the substantive of the

universe

cannot be different from Brahman. Vedanta also says that Brahman is the

material cause for the universe that I see. Hence according to Vedanta the

substantive of universe is nothing but Brahman. But my senses which are limited

cannot perceive Brahman, the substantive. Since I do not see the substantive of

the universe, whatever I see and conclude need not be real. In addition, if the

universe really does not exist then I cannot see the universe and transact with

it. Since I am seeing and transacting with it, universe does not come under the

category of non-existence either, like vandhyaa putraH or son of a barren woman.

Hence Universe cannot come under real existent or cannot come under

non-existent; it is called apparently existent or mithyaa.

 

After establishing the nature of inference, in terms of the reason, hetu, the

saadhya, the conclusion and vyaapti the concomitant relation between the hetu

and saadhya, one can use the inference to establish the unreality of the

universe. What is seen as in the case of smoke forms the mark or hetu or reason

for the inference. I see the smoke on the distant hill or I see the silver on

nacre or I see the snake there on the path. Since these are perceptual knowledge

based on the attributes perceived. Similarly I see the universe of objects with

attributive contents. Perception of universe similar to perception of silver or

snake forms the hetu or reason. In relation to perception of silver where there

is nacre, I take silver is real and in relation to perception of snake where

there is rope, I take snake is real. The reason for the error, as we discussed

before is that due to some adventitious cause I am unable to see the reality of

the object there or

the substantive of the object there. In the worldly examples the substantive

of the silver is nacre and substantive of snake is the rope. Thus errors in

perception are recognized only when the reality of the substantive becomes known

that is when the adventitious defects have been removed. Here we have

inferential knowledge with hetu, saadhya and vyaapti – hetu being what I see.

The concomitant relation connecting hetu with saadhya should be universal.

Based on these worldly (loukika) examples we establish a vyaapti that is

universally applicable that ‘whatever the object seen is unreal, when we do

not see or know the substantive, as in silver on nacre or snake on rope’. Thus

we have a concomitant relation between what is seen vs what is real. Brahman is

the absolutely real and is substantive for the universe. But as Brahman cannot

be seen or known (as an object), whatever the object seen or known by perception

cannot be real, using the

vyaapti, that is established.

 

In the perception of snake where there is rope, it is not that I see a snake on

top of rope or I see snake as part of rope. I see the snake where the rope is.

Thus I do not see snake and rope together. This error is called adhyaasa or

error of superimposition. The error arises only because I do not see the rope as

rope. The reason I do not see the rope as a rope, because of some adventitious

cause (poor illumination) I am unable to perceive all the attributes of the

object that define the object precisely as rope and not as a snake. In the case

of nacre also I am unable to see all its attributes but only see its partial

attribute of silvery shining-ness.

 

In the case of Brahman, being infiniteness, there is nothing other than Brahman

to differentiate it from other things. Hence Brahman cannot have any

attributes, since attributes are those that differentiate one object from

others. Vedanta says Brahman is pure existence-consciousness-limitlessness –

these are not attributes but they are its very nature or swaruupam, looking from

the point of attributive universe. When we say Brahman is the material cause of

the universe, it becomes the substantive for all objects in the universe. Since

Brahman cannot be seen or known as an object (adreshyam), the substantive of the

universe cannot be known or seen. Hence when we do not see or know the

substantive and only see the universe of objects, using the vyaapti that

whenever the substantive is not seen, whatever that is seen will be unreal since

it gets sublated when one sees or knows the substantive, just as silver on

nacre. When once we know the

substantive nacre, the silver seen is recognized as not real. Similarly once I

know Brahman as substantive of the universe, I recognize that the universe that

I see is not real. However, based on the vyaapti that whenever the substantive

is not known or seen, the objects that are seen are not real. Since they are

seen, they are not non-existent either since non-existent things cannot be seen.

With this background let us examine VP statements.

 

VP says we can prove the unreality of the universe, which appears to be other

than Brahman. This is because Brahman being infinite and substantive of the

universe, whatever that is seen is unreal and it is like seeing unreal silver in

nacre. The nature of this error has already been discussed and established

before when we were discussing the errors in perception. How can we prove the

universe is unreal? How can we prove that silver is unreal where nacre is? How

can we prove the snake is unreal where there is rope? It is very simple; the

fact that what we see is not what it is proves that what we see is in error.

Similarly Brahman is the substantive for the whole universe. We are not seeing

Brahman but universe with names and forms. That means, we are seeing something

other than what it is. It is obvious then that the universe that we see is not

real since we are seeing something different from what it is. VP says this

argument is a simpler than any

other.

 

VP now provides a definition for unreal (mithyaa). Unreality is something

opposite to absolute non-existence. It appears to abide in whatever is supposed

to be its substratum. VP says, the term ‘supposed to be’ is used to guard

against absence of any true substratum and the term ‘whatever’ is used to

protect any coexistence of the object and the substantive as two entities. When

I see silver where nacre is, ‘silver is supposed to abide in whatever

substantive that is there (nacre)’ as I have no knowledge of nacre when I am

seeing silver. Similarly silver that I see is not separate from nacre for it to

co-exist with nacre. Here there are no two objects silver and nacre for me to

see silver. It is silver alone I see where nacre is. Hence silver is mithyaa

since what is there is not what I see. Hence VP uses the definition provided by

Citsukhaachaarya in Citsukhii (I-7-39) that mithyaa is that which is counter

positive (opposite) to the

absolute non-existence and abides (or appear to exist) in whatever supposed to

be its substratum. In simple terms it is sat asat vilakshaNam, since it is seen

therefore it is not absolute non-existence (asat) but not real (sat) since it is

abiding in something other than itself, like silver in nacre.

 

In the case of seeing the snake where there is rope, we have adhyaasa or error

of taking something other than what it is due to incomplete attributive content

due to adventitious defects. Here the inference involved the vyaapti that

whatever (object) seen is mithyaa if we do not know the substantive of the seen.

Since Brahman, the substantive of the universe is not seen or known, the

universe that we see is mithyaa. VP uses next another vyaapti or concomitant

relation to establish by inference that universe that we see is mithyaa. This

involves establishing a vyaapti that whatever object has parts is mithyaa since

the substantive Brahman has no parts and therefore cannot be broken into parts.

 

Let us examine the cloth that we see. When we say it is a cloth, it appears to

be real, since transactionally at relative level we use it as a cloth. Instead

of cloth, What are there are cotton threads seen as a cloth. Cloth can be parted

into threads that it is made up of. Hence cloth is not a non-existent entity

but an entity that abides in the threads. The cloth is there for us to

experience but the truth of the cloth-experience is that it is nothing other

than threads, which form the substantive for the cloth. If threads are removed,

cloth cannot exist independent of the threads, while threads can exist

independent of cloth. Thus by anvaya logic we have, cloth is thread is, while by

vyatireka, we have cloth is not but thread is. Thus cloth becomes a dependent on

threads while threads become independent of being a cloth. This is true for all

objects that is made of up of parts. All objects that are made up of parts can

be parted or de-assembled into

their constituent entities which are more real than the assembled objects. All

the qualities of the objects also come under the same category – they are not

absolutely non-existent but exist as abiding in something other than themselves.

We cannot say color abides in color; it abides in cloth while cloth itself

abides in threads. One can continue this process. The threads themselves are

not non-existent but they abide in something other than themselves, the finer

molecules, etc. Ultimately all objects in the universe can be parted since they

are made up of parts. That which abides in something other than itself is

mithyaa. Only ‘thing’ that is part-less and abide in itself is Brahman. Here

we are using a loukika anumaana or worldly inference to say that whatever that

has parts is mithyaa. Since it is not absolutely non-existent and at the same

time it exists abiding in something other than itself. Thus using inference or

anumaana we can

establish using worldly examples that the universe is mithyaa or apparently

real but really real.

 

We address next some of the objections to the above inference.