Guest guest Posted October 29, 2008 Report Share Posted October 29, 2008 Sri Sastri-ji wrote: Dear Michael-ji,When the presence of a certain object is denied on a certainsubstratum, the object whose presence is denied is knownas `pratiyogin' or counter-positive. When it is said, "There is nopot on this floor", pot is the pratiyogin and the floor is known asanuyogin. When the person who thought there was silver discoversthat there is no silver (but only nacre), he says "It is notsilver" . Here silver is the counter-positive of the negation. Thisnegation is for all periods, past, present and future, because therewas only nacre all the time and there never was any silver. Theobjection raised by the opponent is: Since silver was seenpreviously, you can only say "Now there is no silver" and cannotdeny the presence of silver even in the past when you saw it andeven tried to take possession of it, thinking it to be genuinesilver. The answer to this is that what is being denied in all thethree periods of time is not the illusory silver, but real(empirical) silver. That is to say, the fact that he saw silver isnot denied, but he has now discovered that even when he was seeingit, it was not real silver, that is, the silver which one can usefor making vessels, etc, but only illusory silver. This is themeaning of the passage on page 62 VP referred to. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Namaste Sri Sastri-ji and Sri Sada-ji, Thanks for your attention to the counterpositive which is a bit of a puzzle though clearer to me now. It is not helped by the translation which obscures the meaning more than a little. For instance on page 77 we read: "Unreality consists in something being the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence that abides in whatever is supposed to be its substratum". That could be read as saying that the thing that is unreal is the counterpositive and that being the counterpositive constitutes its unreality. The truth is otherwise. Again on pg.78: "The unreality of all things whatsoever consists in their being counterpositives of the absolute non-existence that abides in what is supposed to be their substratum". (from Citsukhi I.vii.) Again this looks like the author is saying that unreality consists in being a counterpositive. Actually I think that a typo is at fault here, ‘their’ should read ‘there’ which restores the correct position. To break it up into formulas. There are unrealities - there are counterpositives - unrealities do not exist in their substratum. Best Wishes, Michael. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 29, 2008 Report Share Posted October 29, 2008 --- On Tue, 10/28/08, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote: .. Again on pg.78: " The unreality of all things whatsoever consists in their being counterpositives of the absolute non-existence that abides in what is supposed to be their substratum " . (from Citsukhi I.vii.) Again this looks like the author is saying that unreality consists in being a counterpositive. Actually I think that a typo is at fault here, ‘their’ should read ‘there’ which restores the correct position. To break it up into formulas. There are unrealities - there are counterpositives - unrealities do not exist in their substratum. Michael - PraNAms Here is my understanding. This is the passage I was explaining in post 27 too. Counter positive to absolute non-existence means it is not absolutely non-existent as in the case of son of a barren woman, since it is experienced. Yet it is not absolutely real either since it gets sublated once we see or know the substantive. That is the essence of the definition of mithyaa. Hence the statement is it is not absolutely non-existent (not unreal) and it is not real since it is abiding in something other than itself - in some substantive - as in silver in nacre. Silver is seen so one cannot say it is absolutely non-existent. No one goes for non-existent silver. Yet it is not in its own substantive since substantive is nacre. Hence it is mithyaa. Unfortunately Sanskrit word mithyaa is translated as 'unreal'. To say it is not 'asat' the explanation is provided as counter positive to absolute non-existence - all that means it is not asat since it is experienced. Hari Om! Sadananda Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 29, 2008 Report Share Posted October 29, 2008 advaitin , " ombhurbhuva " <ombhurbhuva wrote: > > Namaste Sri Sastri-ji and Sri Sada-ji, > > Thanks for your attention to the counterpositive which is a bit of a puzzle though clearer to me now. It is not helped by the translation which obscures the meaning more than a little. For instance on page 77 we read: > > " Unreality consists in something being the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence that abides in whatever is supposed to be its substratum " . > > That could be read as saying that the thing that is unreal is the counterpositive and that being the counterpositive constitutes its unreality. The truth is otherwise. > > Again on pg.78: > > " The unreality of all things whatsoever consists in their being counterpositives of the absolute non-existence that abides in what is supposed to be their substratum " . (from Citsukhi I.vii.) > > Again this looks like the author is saying that unreality consists in being a counterpositive. Actually I think that a typo is at fault here, 'their' should read 'there' which restores the correct position. To break it up into formulas. There are unrealities - there are counterpositives - unrealities do not exist in their substratum. > > Best Wishes, > > Michael. > Dear Michael-ji, As stated in the first paragraph of the Introduction to the English translation by Swami Madhavananda, this work has adopted the method and phraseology of Navya-Nyaya introduced by Gangesa Upadhyaya in the fourteenth century. The Sanskrit itself is difficult to understand unless one has studied the method of expression of Navya- Nyaya. The English translation of Swami Madhavananda follows the Sanskrit original and so it also is difficult to understand. I shall explain the sentences you have referred to in simple language. The first sentence is the following one on p. 77 :-- " Unreality consists in something being the counter-positive of the absolute non-existence that abides in whatever is supposed to be its substratum " . Now, if one makes a statement like this— " There is no pot on this floor " or " A pot does not exist on this floor " , the pot is the counter-positive of its own non-existence and the floor is the substratum. A person sees a rope and thinks it is a snake. Afterwards he finds out that it is only a rope. Then he says, " There never was a snake here " . Another way of saying this is, " There is absolute non-existence of a snake here " . In this sentence the snake, whose non-existence is stated, is the counter-positive. The rope in front is the substratum. So we can say that the snake is the counter- positive of its own absolute non-existence in the rope which was the substratum on which it was seen, i.e., which was supposed to be its substratum. The expression " non-existence that abides in the substratum " means only " the non-existence in the substratum " . Thus what the sentence on p.77 quoted above means is:-- That which appeared to exist at a particular place, but was found later to be non-existent there is mithya. The snake appeared to exist where the rope was, but later on it was found that it did not exist. So the snake is mithya. The other sentence from P. 78 is:-- " The unreality of all things whatsoever consists in their being counter-positives of the absolute non-existence that abides in what is supposed to be their substratum " . The idea conveyed is the same that of the sentence on p.77. The difference is only that here `things' are spoken of in the plural, while in the earlier sentence only one thing was spoken of. The word `their' is correct and there is no typo. It means `of the things which are being described as mithya'. I hope the meaning of the sentences is now clear. Best wishes, S.N.Sastri Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 29, 2008 Report Share Posted October 29, 2008 Dear Michael-ji, In continuation of my prev. post on this subject I wish to add the following explanation about the expression " non-existence abiding in the substratum " . This expression is based on Nyaya philosophy. According to Nyaya, abhAva or non-existence is also a category. So they say " there is non-existence " , or " Non-existence abides here " . Advaita does not accept non-existence as a category. So we say that it is self-contradictory to say that non- existence exists or that there is non-existence. We say only that the thing (snake, silver, etc.,) does not exist at the place where it was seen due to error earlier. VP has used the language of Nyaya and that is why it speaks of " non- existence abiding in the substratum " . What is meant is only that the counter-positive does not exist at all in the place where it appeared. S.N.Sastri Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 29, 2008 Report Share Posted October 29, 2008 Namaste Sri.Shastri-ji, This topic of mithyattva is my favorite and this mail of yours prompted me to respond with couple of points. Although my response looks confrontational to some, but I assure no offence meant in reality. After all what 'looks' confrontational is not really so, for since it is just a `appearance' and therefore not real but a mithya if taken in true Advaitic spirit! advaitin , " snsastri " <sn.sastri wrote: > I have only explained what VP says. Different views may be held on > some of these points by some other Acharyas. > I am very glad that you have made it quite clear the scope of your discussion in this regard. I deeply respect your honesty in this regard. > > > Dear Michael-ji, > > When the presence of a certain object is denied on a certain > substratum, the object whose presence is denied is known > as `pratiyogin' or counter-positive. When it is said, " There is no > pot on this floor " , pot is the pratiyogin and the floor is known as > anuyogin. When the person who thought there was silver discovers > that there is no silver (but only nacre), he says " It is not > silver " . Here silver is the counter-positive of the negation. This > negation is for all periods, past, present and future, because there > was only nacre all the time and there never was any silver. The > objection raised by the opponent is: Since silver was seen > previously, you can only say " Now there is no silver " and cannot > deny the presence of silver even in the past when you saw it and > even tried to take possession of it, thinking it to be genuine > silver. There seems to be some misunderstanding of objection. The objector is not meant what you have articulated above. What he meant was this; When a person who perceive there was silver first and later discovers that there is no silver but only nacre, what exactly is denied? He says " It is not silver " . What exactly meant by this negation? He meant he is negating the silver for all periods, past, present and future (as you have said above) AND ALSO negation in that *specific locus* (locus where the nacre exist). This important aspect about locus was often missed in understanding of mithayattva. In all denials (of anything), both the time and space is implied. When I say " There is no pot on the floor " , what exactly I am denying? I am denying the existence of the pot " now " and " here " on the floor. In cases of brAnti, that temporal aspect is for three times (past, present and future), sure, but nevertheless the spatial aspect of " here " is just " here " only and does not include " everywhere else " too. So, the objector's contention is that, when silver is perceived at a locus and subsequently denied; it does not mean such silver can be denied elsewhere (other than the locus of nacre) too. The objector's reason about " past " is misunderstood in Advaitasiddhi. It is not past at the *same* locus as that of nacre, but past elsewhere. The objector is correct. The reason for this is; the very adhyAsa of silver on the nacre is not possible unless one has memory of silver apriori. In turn, such memory itself is not possible unless one perceive the actual silver elsewhere apriori and also one is sure that such prior perception itself is not another bhrama but a prama back then. Adhyasa is possible only with such valid object of knowledge. For that matter, one will never superimpose vandhyAputra or hare's horn on some adhisTAna and gets a bhrAnti. Any adhyAsa is possible only if one has a knowledge of an object to begin with. But, we also have vandhyAputa as object of our knowledge, so is it possible to have adhyAsa involving vandhyAputa? No, because we have overlooked some other aspects about object-of- knowledge. What is that? When we have a object in our knowledge, we just don't have it barebone, but we also have the knowledge about its reality status too. We might have " vandhyAputra " as object of knowledge just as a " silver " in our knowledge. But the difference is, in one case we know that object is real and in anther case it is unreal. So, both object and its reality status is in our knowledge. There are two types of negations. Negations involving in adhyAsa and negation without involving in any adhyAsa. In general, any object, irrespective of the fact that it is real or unreal, can be a pratiyOgi in a negation. In non-adhyAsa negations , such as " there is no pot here " or " there is no vandhyAputra on the chair " etc, both real and unreal objects can act as pratiyOgin. However, in adhyAsa cases of negations, since we really perceive superimposed anuyOgi object on another object, subsequent negation of such superimposed objects requires that such pratiyOgins *has to be* real and perceived elsewhere apriori. This exactly is Michael's stand on saying pratiyOgin has to be real in order to account for adhyAsa. His position is quite correct and valid. >The answer to this is that what is being denied in all the > three periods of time is not the illusory silver, but real > (empirical) silver. That is to say, the fact that he saw silver is > not denied, but he has now discovered that even when he was seeing > it, it was not real silver, that is, the silver which one can use > for making vessels, etc, Correct. But we should not overlook the spatial aspect of denial. The temporal aspect of denial (denied past, present and future) is correct, but such denial is *at that location* where nacre was there. This is very important point. Just denying temporally does not make the silver non existing everywhere else other than the place of nacre. > > Michael-ji: > > " Similarly, in other cases of erroneous perception also it may be > shown that the general definition of perception is applicable, and > that of a valid perception is inapplicable " . Pg. 65. > > SNS; > Even an erroneous perception (bhrama) is a perception, but it is not > a valid perception (pramA) because it is contradicted subsequently. > A realist would argue, this very distinguishing character between pramA and bhrama is the proof that all perceptions are not bhrama. This distinguishing character was possible because there are other perceptions which are not contradicted subsequently. Had it been otherway, that all are contradicted, there would have been no distinguishing mark between two types of perceptions and we would not have been in a position in labeling one as `prama' and another as `bhrama'. Therefore, a realist would continue, world's unreality can not be concluded based on the anumAna employing the contradiction as an hEtu. The hEtu " drishatvAt " is impotent in its applicability (vyApti) for all perceptions because of above mentioned reasons. Regards, Srinivas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 30, 2008 Report Share Posted October 30, 2008 Srinivas - PraNAms I know you have addressed Shree Sastriji. I am sure he will address the issues you have raised slowly. Here is part of the post 23 in the knowledge series that I think addresses the topic you have raised. Hari Om Sadananda ------------------------- From Knowledge and the Means of knowledge series - post 23. Objection: The objection is again from Naiyaayikas who consider the perception of silver where nacre is due to recollection of real silver existent somewhere and not perception of non-existent silver there. Hence the following question is framed from their perspective. If we admit that the illusory existence for silver during the time that nacre appears as silver, there would never be a subsequent knowledge at any time (past, present or future) that can negate the illusory silver appearance in the form ‘this is not silver’ but only in the form, ‘Now, it is not silver’ – it is like ‘Now, that is after baking, the jar is no more black’. That is blackness of the jar existing before is now removed due to baking. Blackness of the jar was real until it is removed. Hence existence of black before and its non-existence after are of the same order of reality. The objection is that the negation ‘it is not silver’ can be made only if previously the silver that was perceived was real; and now we can dismiss that perception by a realistic statement that there is no real silver. The argument is simple; that there is no silver or the non-existence of silver now – can only be counter positive or opposite to the statement - there was real silver before. The non-existence of silver now is real, since it is nacre and not silver. The objector says the non-existence of silver which is real can only be counter positive to or opposite to existence of real silver before. It cannot be counter positive to existence of imaginary or illusory silver before. ‘Illusory existence’ can be counter positive only to ‘illusory non-existence’. Similarly ‘real non-existence’ can be counter positive to ‘real existence’ and not to ‘illusory -existence’ as implied in the statement ‘it is not silver’ as it negates only the real existence not illusory existence. Reply: That is not so. Here when we say ‘it is not silver’ when nacre is perceived as nacre, we are not negating real or a relative transactional reality, silver, that is characterized by its silvery-ness. Therefore, non-existence that is denied by ‘it is not silver’ does not refer to real (within vyavahaara) silver anywhere, but only to the false silver that is seen in the object. Thus false silver is falsified by the statement ‘this is not silver’ not the real silver that has silvery-ness associated with it. Technically, the counterpositive (pratiyogin) or opposite, of this non-existent ‘real-illusory’ silver, can never exists (if we say it exists, would imply that ‘illusory silver’ exists and that would lead to illusory silver is no more illusory). It is similar to saying that ‘there is no cloth existing as jar’. Here jar-hood property is different from cloth-hood property. What is denied is false attribute of jar-hood in the cloth. Jar-hood is a distinguishing quality that is specific to a jar and not to a cloth. Hence negation of a false ‘jar-hood’ is always satisfied by any cloth, since there is never a jar-hood in any cloth. Similarly the negation of silvery-ness can always be fulfilled in any nacre. It may look like silver from a distance but it is never silver even when I am mistaking it as silver. Hence it is not denial of silver in the nacre when I say that it is not silver when I recognize that it is nacre, but denial of false silver that is attributed to the nacre due to adventitious defect. Hence once I know that it is nacre, even if I see shining attributive silvery-ness in the nacre, it will never be mistaken for silver since there is no ‘silver-hood’ in the silver at any time. VP says false attribute (silvery-ness) abiding in a different substratum (nacre), where there is never an existence of the real object (silver) that always has silvery-ness as its real attribute, is permitted as vyadhikaraNa. When the silvery-ness is denied with the negation that ‘there is no silver here in the nacre that is seen’, the negation applies not to the real silver but to the false silver, which is illusory. It is similar to that there is no jar-hood in the cloth. The absence of silver in the nacre is always met in the past, present and future, and also even when it is mistaken as silver. I can even enjoy the silvery-attribute of nacre, even after denying that there is no silver here but only a nacre. Similarly, I can enjoy the attributive objects in the world, even after knowing that all objects are nothing but Brahman. The false world gets falsified and not that ‘a real world’ is falsified (even though we mistake the false world as real world) in the awakening of the knowledge that everything is nothing but Brahman. In fact only the false world that can get falsified by knowledge and not any real world; and if there is such a real world it will never get falsified since it is real (that is the definition of a real entity). Similarly only the false silver can get falsified when the true nature of the substantive of the object, namely nacre, is known. We can say it is the vibhuuti of the nacre to have a silvery shining-ness without being silver. Similarly it is the vibhuuti of the Iswara or the Lord with attributes of variety of magnificent world of objects without substantially becoming objects or while remaining as attribute-less and part-less Brahman. That is the essence of vibhuuti yoga in Bhagawat Gita (Ch.10). Objection: The next objection becomes little bit more technical here. The objector gives two choices. The objector asks that when one perceives the illusory silver in the nacre, whether the absolute existence as substratum of the illusory silver is known or unknown. As per Vedanta, when we say an object ‘is’, the Brahman, the absolute reality expresses as existence in the ‘is-ness’ of the object, as its substantive. In the form of ‘is-ness’ the absolute reality (as though) lends its existence or relative reality to the object. Hence the objector asks, in the perception of the illusory silver, does one have the knowledge of its absolute existence. If the answer is no, then it means that the absolute existence of illusory silver that has silvery-ness as its attributive content is not known (since existence of an object is established by the knowledge of its existence). If so, then the absence of or non-existence of illusory silver cannot be perceived either. It means, if the existence is not perceived then its non-existence also cannot be perceived. Hence, one cannot make a statement that there is no illusory silver here. The objection is similar to saying that if the existence of gaagaabuu is never known, then the statement that there is no gaagaabuu here also has no meaning, since absence of a non-existent object can never be perceived. Taking the second alternative, if the absolute existence of the illusory silver is known with the attribute of silveryness, since the perception depends on the existence (perceptuality condition involves the existence of the object is united with the subject consciousness), then it is not an illusory silver any more, since it exists like nacre and is perceived by its silveryness. Therefore silver that has silveryness will have to exist in the nacre or with the nacre. Therefore its existence cannot be denied by the statement ‘there is no silver here’, as it is perceived and its existence is already known. Reply: The above arguments are not correct from advaitic perspective. The pure existence manifests in the nacre as ‘nacre is’. The ‘is-ness’ or the absolute existence forms the substantive for the nacre. This possibility comes from the scriptural statement that every thing is Brahman and Brahman is pure existence without a second. If that possibility forms a basis for the existence of the apparent nacre (first order) within vyavahaara, which is not absolutely real, then the same possibility forms the basis for (the second order) appearance of the illusory silver. We do not admit the first order silver (the real silver) in the nacre since there is no silver-hood present in the nacre. Thus the pure existence in the form of ‘silver-hood is’ in the nacre is not admitted since it is not there. Here we need to differentiate the vyavahaara silver (relative reality that ‘silver is’) and illusory silver (prAtibhAsika ‘silver is’ as the mental projection). Nacre forms the substantive for the prAtibhAsika and for nacre, in turn, pure existence forms the substantive. Hence indirectly pure existence also forms the substantive for the illusory silver or prAtibhAsika silver. The above objection is due to not clearly appreciating the vyaavahaarika and prAtibhAsika relative realities and their relative ontological status. We do, however, admit ‘transfer’ of attributes of one to the other (both of the same order of reality) constituting an error, where the thing that is superimposed is not directly connected to the thing on which it is superimposed. That means they are relatively independent within the same order of reality. For example, we can perceive the redness associated with hibiscus flower on the clear crystal since redness of the flower is connected to the argon of the vision. That is, I can see the redness of the hibiscus of the flower as it is getting reflected by the crystal nearby. I may mistake that the crystal is red without realizing that the superimposed attribute of redness of the crystal comes from the nearby hibiscus flower. There is no origin of some imaginary redness or unaccountable redness or illusory redness in the crystal. Objection: Now the objector pushes the limit of the above example. The objector says, in the above example where redness associated with the clear crystal is known to arise from the nearby hibiscus flower by the sense of vision. Hence the connection between the redness in the crystal and the redness due to nearby flower is established by the sense organ of vision. Hence redness in the crystal is not created. Now suppose, if I cannot see the hibiscus flower due to some obstruction, and therefore do not know that the redness is coming from a nearby flower, then if I can still perceive or cognize the redness in the crystal then one has to admit that the redness in the crystal is not real but is illusory (since we are ignorant of the source of redness). Reply: There is no problem. We can accept that until the obstruction to perceive the flower is removed. We accept that it is illusory when we gain the knowledge or have the knowledge that crystal is always clear and all the colors that are seen are superimposition of attributes arising from objects elsewhere. The bottom line is the knowledge is taken as real until we have a contradictory experience to negate that knowledge. This forms the general definition for validity of all perceptions. Valid knowledge is that which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge or experience. Absolute knowledge is that which remains absolutely real and never gets contradicted. Any other knowledge is relatively real until it is negated. Vedanta says the knowledge of the relative world is only relative since from the absolute point they are nothing other than Brahman. Since the world is experience it is not unreal. Since it is neither real nor unreal, it is mithyaa. The prAtibhAsika is also comes under mithyaa like the silver that is experienced in the nacre. It is not taken as illusory silver until one goes and pickup the object and examines. No one goes after illusory silver, knowing that it is illusory. When silver is seen in the nacre, the silver seen is taken as real or valid until subsequent knowledge negates the reality assumed for the illusory silver. Similarly the world appears to be real but gets negated only when we have the knowledge of Brahman, the substantive of the world. Then the apparent world becomes apparent like the silver is apparent in the nacre. Hence we have paaramaarthika satyam, vyaavahaarika satyam and praatibhaasika satyam. Perceptions at these three levels have to be understood. --- On Wed, 10/29/08, Srinivas Kotekal <kots_p wrote: Namaste Sri.Shastri- ji, This topic of mithyattva is my favorite and this mail of yours prompted me to respond with couple of points. Although my response looks confrontational to some, but I assure no offence meant in reality. After all what 'looks' confrontational is not really so, for since it is just a `appearance' and therefore not real but a mithya if taken in true Advaitic spirit! Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted October 30, 2008 Report Share Posted October 30, 2008 advaitin , " Srinivas Kotekal " <kots_p wrote: > There seems to be some misunderstanding of objection. The objector > is not meant what you have articulated above. What he meant was > this; > > When a person who perceive there was silver first and later > discovers that there is no silver but only nacre, what exactly is > denied? He says " It is not silver " . What exactly meant by this > negation? He meant he is negating the silver for all periods, past, > present and future (as you have said above) AND ALSO negation in > that *specific locus* (locus where the nacre exist). This important > aspect about locus was often missed in understanding of > mithayattva. In all denials (of anything), both the time and space > is implied. When I say " There is no pot on the floor " , what exactly > I am denying? I am denying the existence of the pot " now " and " here " > on the floor. In cases of brAnti, that temporal aspect is for three > times (past, present and future), sure, but nevertheless the spatial > aspect of " here " is just " here " only and does not > include " everywhere else " too. > > So, the objector's contention is that, when silver is perceived at > a locus and subsequently denied; it does not mean such silver can be > denied elsewhere (other than the locus of nacre) too. The > objector's reason about " past " is misunderstood in Advaitasiddhi. It > is not past at the *same* locus as that of nacre, but past > elsewhere. The objector is correct. The reason for this is; the very > adhyAsa of silver on the nacre is not possible unless one has memory > of silver apriori. In turn, such memory itself is not possible > unless one perceive the actual silver elsewhere apriori and also one > is sure that such prior perception itself is not another bhrama but > a prama back then. Adhyasa is possible only with such valid object > of knowledge. For that matter, one will never superimpose > vandhyAputra or hare's horn on some adhisTAna and gets a bhrAnti. Dear Srinivas-ji, The question of locus did not arise in the above post of mine. In that I answered only the question about whether the denial was for all time or not. Please see my next message No. 42134 which was in answer to further points raised by Michael-ji on the interpretation of a sentence on Pages 77 and 78 of the book. I do not understand how you say that my denial is not in that specific locus alone. The sentence from page 77 which was what I had explained specifically says that the denial is in " whatever is supposed to be the substratum " . It is obvious that when the snake is denied in the rope it does not mean that the existence of snake is denied everywhere in the world. Moreover, when it has been clearly stated in the sentence referred to that the denial is in the substratum, I do not understand how such an objection arises at all. It is true, as you say, that there can be superimposition only of a thing that the person has seen elsewhere. A man who has never seen a snake cannot mistake a rope or anything else for a snake. But it is not necessary that he should have seen a real live snake. If he has seen a snake in a picture and knows what it looks like, there is every possibility of his mistaking a rope for a snake under certain conditions. This mistaking is super-imposition. Your next point is:-- > Any adhyAsa is possible only if one has a knowledge of an object to > begin with. But, we also have vandhyAputa as object of our > knowledge, so is it possible to have adhyAsa involving vandhyAputa? > No, because we have overlooked some other aspects about object-of- > knowledge. What is that? When we have a object in our knowledge, we > just don't have it barebone, but we also have the knowledge about > its reality status too. We might have " vandhyAputra " as object of > knowledge just as a " silver " in our knowledge. But the difference > is, in one case we know that object is real and in anther case it > is unreal. So, both object and its reality status is in our > knowledge. My answer:-- I agree with this. Have I said anything to the contrary in my previous post? Let me however make it clear that from the advaita point of view the reality of silver in the world is only vyAvahArika. When nacre appears as silver, that silver is only prAtibhAsika. Your next point:-- > There are two types of negations. Negations involving in adhyAsa > and negation without involving in any adhyAsa. In general, any > object, irrespective of the fact that it is real or unreal, can be > a pratiyOgi in a negation. In non-adhyAsa negations , such > as " there is no pot here " or " there is no vandhyAputra on the chair " > etc, both real and unreal objects can act as pratiyOgin. However, in > adhyAsa cases of negations, since we really perceive superimposed > anuyOgi object on another object, subsequent negation of such > superimposed objects requires that such pratiyOgins *has to be* real > and perceived elsewhere apriori. This exactly is Michael's stand on > saying pratiyOgin has to be real in order to account for adhyAsa. > His position is quite correct and valid. My answer:-- I have already stated above that the pratiyogi in a superimposition need not be real. It is enough if he has seen it in a picture and knows what it looks like. This is the view accepted by all advaitins. Even in negations without superimposition knowledge of the real object is not necessary. If I have never seen a TV set, but I am shown the picture of a TV and asked whether there is that TV in the room in which I am standing, can I not know whether it is there or not? Your next point:-- > Correct. But we should not overlook the spatial aspect of denial. > The temporal aspect of denial (denied past, present and future) is > correct, but such denial is *at that location* where nacre was > there. This is very important point. Just denying temporally does > not make the silver non existing everywhere else other than the > place of nacre. My answer:-- This has already been answered above. The definition of mithyatva refers to the particular substratum where the superimposed object appeared. Does that not make it clear that it not denied everywhere? When silver is denied in a particular piece of nacre, will anybody think that the existence of silver is denied in the whole world? Perhaps I have not understood your objection. Your next point:-- > A realist would argue, this very distinguishing character between > pramA and bhrama is the proof that all perceptions are not bhrama. > This distinguishing character was possible because there are other > perceptions which are not contradicted subsequently. Had it been > otherway, that all are contradicted, there would have been no > distinguishing mark between two types of perceptions and we would > not have been in a position in labeling one as `prama' and another > as `bhrama'. Therefore, a realist would continue, world's unreality > can not be concluded based on the anumAna employing the > contradiction as an hEtu. The hEtu " drishatvAt " is impotent in its > applicability (vyApti) for all perceptions because of above > mentioned reasons. My answer:-- This is the dvaitin's view. The reasons for holding that the world is mithya are dealt with elaborately in advaitic works. All the objections raised in Nyayamrita have been answered in Advaitasiddhi. What you are saying about drishyatva has already been answered there. This is too vast a subject to be dealt with in e-mails like this. Moreover this is a forum for discussing advaita only. I am sure you have studied Avaitasiddhi and you know the arguments of both sides. Here we have to leave it at that Best wishes, S.N.Sastri Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted November 18, 2008 Report Share Posted November 18, 2008 Dear Shastri-ji, Thanks for the reference to msg 42134. Now I stand clarified about your position. However, I do see some issues remaining and this long mail. Please bare with me. advaitin , " snsastri " <sn.sastri wrote: > > Dear Srinivas-ji, > The question of locus did not arise in the above post of mine. In > that I answered only the question about whether the denial was for > all time or not. Please see my next message No. 42134 which was in > answer to further points raised by Michael-ji on the interpretation > of a sentence on Pages 77 and 78 of the book. > I do not understand how you say that my denial is not in that > specific locus alone. The sentence from page 77 which was what I had > explained specifically says that the denial is in " whatever is > supposed to be the substratum " . It is obvious that when the snake is > denied in the rope it does not mean that the existence of snake is > denied everywhere in the world. Moreover, when it has been clearly > stated in the sentence referred to that the denial is in the > substratum, I do not understand how such an objection arises at all. > If I can restate your position, the counter-positive is negated only at the substratum and not anywhere else as for as silver-nacre analogy goes. This addresses my original contention about locus, however unfortunately the issue of jagat mithyattva, which is being derived from that analogy remains intact. If the silver is not negated at places other than the substratum as you have agreed above, then, may I ask why do world is considered mithya in loci other than Brahman in Advaita vEdAnta? My question is triggered because of your reference in your msg 42116: /* Quote SNS: This is one of the five definitions of mithyAtva (unreality) considered by Madhusudana Sarasvati in his work known as Advaitasiddhi. The meaning put in simple language is: That which does not exist at all in the substratum on which it appears. The snake appears on the substratum, rope, but it is not there in all the three periods of time. Similarly, this world appears on Brahman, but it has no real existence at any time in the past, present or future. /*Unquote From above it seems Madhusudana Sarsvati is saying world is perceived on Brahman (locus) and then saying such world is mithya and can be negated. This is very analogues to silver-nacre example, however I see some difficulties in using that analogy to convey the point. It is like this; First of all, how do we know that the world we are seeing now is in fact being perceived on Brahman as locus? It could be world in its own locus. The silver can be negated at substratum only if we know that such silver was perceived on a substratum nacre. This negation is after realization of substratum but not before. Even for that matter, apart from negation, the very knowledge that " we were seeing silver on nacre " is after the realization. Much before such realization, there is no basis in assuming that we are perceiving the silver on nacre and then proceed to negate such silver. Granting that we know `somehow' (either by anumAna or aagama) that it is a superimposition, can you then negate the existence of world elsewhere other than Brahman as you have agreed above? If yes, then my original argument stands. If not, then do you accept reality of world? It seems the reason why Advaita vEdAnta holds the view that this world is superimposition on Brahman, is because since Brahman is said to be aparichinna (unlimited), holding a real world elsewhere (other than the locus where it is cognized) will render such aparichinna Brahman to limited. Saying jagat is real `elsewhere' will make Brahman not existing in that location where world is real. Since Brahman can not be said to be localized is specific locus, and since Brahman exist in all loci, therefore this differentiated world can not be said to exist in *any* loci at all. Therefore, whatever we see this differentiated jagat is indeed a superimposition on Brahman only and hence negated in the very locus of its cognition, which is nothing but Brahman only. This way shruti `nEha-nAnAsti kiMchana' has met in Advaita vedanata. The issues with super-imposition theory of this world is several fold; 1. There is no logic/anumAna to uphold this differentiated world is in fact a super-imposition on Brahman. There is no vyApti to say so. If Shruti is brought to support this theory (citing nEha-nAnAsti kiMchana), the same shruti can be summoned to show exactly the opposite view. RgVeda quite unmistakably asserts `vishwaM satya maghAvAna'. Br. Up. assert the relationship between Brahman and this world as `vishwa-srijO' (creator of world) as in `yasyaanuvittah pratibuddha AtmA yasmin sandOhE gahanE pravishTaha | sa vishwa-krit sa hi sarvasya-kartA tasya lOkaha sa u lOka Eva " - Br. Up. (6.4.13 ). Therefore, shruti's `nEha-nAnAsti kiMchana' can not be understood as basis for holding super- imposition of this world. Then how exactly `nEha-nAnAsti kiMchana' to be understood? All that shruti is saying in `nEha-nAnAsti kiMchana' is that there is no bhinattva what so ever *in* Brahman. Here `in' to be underscored. Here shruti is rejecting notion of difference *with in* Brahman (such as higher and lower prakriti etc etc). Every aspect of Brahman such as Its jnyAna, kriya, Iccha, rUpa, avatAra etc etc are not different but indeed Brahman in their entirety. As for as existence of world limiting existence of Brahman is concerned, there is no basis to concern about. The existence of world will not limit aparichinnatva of Brahman what so ever. It would have been the case if existence of world is posited from a neutral point of view and beyond the control of Brahman. However, shruti is saying the very existence of world is due to the very Will of Brahman. With that, the existence of world can not be imagined to limit the existence of Brahman. An example would help here ; bringing a tool at work place will *limit* my existence in a sense that tool can do I can't do. This is so because existence of such tool is beyond my control. However in another scenario, if I were to create such tool myself and its every existence and capabilities is under my control and if I use it to get the job done, such tool will not limit my existence at all, instead depicts my " glory " and " creativeness " . More over, existence of world and existence of Brahman is not like existence of two entities in time-space continuum as seen in worldly objects. One is prakrita and another is aprakrita. 2. If `drishayatvAt' is to be considered a hEtu in deriving mithyattva of this world based on the analogy of silver-nacre, it leads to many problems. In that silver-nacre analogy, the very nacre has to be `seen' in order for us to deny the silver there. Without it being seen, there is no denial of silver either. Then, does it boils to the fact that even nacre has to be mithya because it is also `seen' ? The biggest issue with this drishayatvAt as an hEtu is that even Veda is also a `seen' entity, because Vedic Rishi is said to be `seen' the mantra-s (hence the name `mantra drSTa'), and therefore Veda is also considered a case of superimposition and mithya?. If it is held that Veda is also a mithyAbhUta vastu, then the very notion of apourushEyatva of Veda is lost along with its pramANya. This is because, apourushEyatva is synonym with anAditva or `uncreatedness'. Saying texts are apourushEya is synonymous to saying texts are never created at all (or what we call `anAdi'). If such vEda-s are said to be super-imposition by a deluded jIva and hence in a sense `created' by that jIva (though unknowingly), then in what way we suppose to say vEda is unauthored? As a result of all these implications (in holding Vedas are also mithya vastu), drishayatvAt can not be logically a hEtu in such anumAna. It seems that this whole analogy of silver-on-nacre is misunderstood in its scope of " negation-at-locus-only " concept and over applied to negation of the world entirely at all places including locus on Brahman. > It is true, as you say, that there can be superimposition only of a > thing that the person has seen elsewhere. A man who has never seen > a snake cannot mistake a rope or anything else for a snake. But it > is not necessary that he should have seen a real live snake. If he > has seen a snake in a picture and knows what it looks like, there is > every possibility of his mistaking a rope for a snake under certain > conditions. This mistaking is super-imposition. > Do such picture really exist or not? Picture and its very cognition indeed are all prama and real. What all need for adhyAsa is a prototype of arOpita vastu. Such arOpita vastu need not be living/dead /poisonous/non-poisonous etc etc type. What all needed is such prototype is real and must be perceived apriori. Had such fellow never seen any snakes or its representation at all, can there be a superimposition? This is true for attyanta-asat objects as well, such as Sci-Fi monster characters such. Children seeing such characters in comics pictures, scare hell all the time by superimposing them on shadows in dark. Here such Sci-Fi monsters are not factual reality, but their representation is very much real and therefore cases of adhyAsa by childeren. On this basis, the contention of other Acharyas is – if this world is said to be superimposed on Brahman, what is that prototype of the world and where did we see it before? > Your next point is:-- > > Any adhyAsa is possible only if one has a knowledge of an object > to > > begin with. But, we also have vandhyAputa as object of our > > knowledge, so is it possible to have adhyAsa involving > vandhyAputa? > > No, because we have overlooked some other aspects about object- of- > > knowledge. What is that? When we have a object in our knowledge, > we > > just don't have it barebone, but we also have the knowledge about > > its reality status too. We might have " vandhyAputra " as object of > > knowledge just as a " silver " in our knowledge. But the difference > > is, in one case we know that object is real and in anther case it > > is unreal. So, both object and its reality status is in our > > knowledge. > > My answer:-- > I agree with this. Have I said anything to the contrary in my > previous post? Let me however make it clear that from the advaita > point of view the reality of silver in the world is only > vyAvahArika. When nacre appears as silver, that silver is only > prAtibhAsika. > Yes, I understand that reality of such silver is called " vyAvahArika " in advaita siddhAnta. I am not concerned about the names as such, but rather try to understand the concepts. Is this three fold classification a conclusion of adhyAsa prakriya? or adhyAsa prakriya itself is understood in satta-trividya context? Which precedes which? > Your next point:-- > > There are two types of negations. Negations involving in adhyAsa > > and negation without involving in any adhyAsa. In general, any > > object, irrespective of the fact that it is real or unreal, can > be > > a pratiyOgi in a negation. In non-adhyAsa negations , such > > as " there is no pot here " or " there is no vandhyAputra on the > chair " > > etc, both real and unreal objects can act as pratiyOgin. However, > in > > adhyAsa cases of negations, since we really perceive superimposed > > anuyOgi object on another object, subsequent negation of such > > superimposed objects requires that such pratiyOgins *has to be* > real > > and perceived elsewhere apriori. This exactly is Michael's stand > on > > saying pratiyOgin has to be real in order to account for > adhyAsa. > > His position is quite correct and valid. > > My answer:-- > I have already stated above that the pratiyogi in a superimposition > need not be real. It is enough if he has seen it in a picture and > knows what it looks like. This is the view accepted by all > advaitins. Even in negations without superimposition knowledge of > the real object is not necessary. If I have never seen a TV set, but > I am shown the picture of a TV and asked whether there is that TV in > the room in which I am standing, can I not know whether it is there > or not? > I have addressed above your point about negation based on pictures. > Your next point:-- > > Correct. But we should not overlook the spatial aspect of denial. > > The temporal aspect of denial (denied past, present and future) is > > correct, but such denial is *at that location* where nacre was > > there. This is very important point. Just denying temporally does > > not make the silver non existing everywhere else other than the > > place of nacre. > > My answer:-- > This has already been answered above. The definition of mithyatva > refers to the particular substratum where the superimposed object > appeared. Does that not make it clear that it not denied everywhere? > When silver is denied in a particular piece of nacre, will anybody > think that the existence of silver is denied in the whole world? > Perhaps I have not understood your objection. > Please see my above reply w.r.t Madhusudana Sarsvati's position of world as mithya. > Your next point:-- > > A realist would argue, this very distinguishing character between > > pramA and bhrama is the proof that all perceptions are not bhrama. > > This distinguishing character was possible because there are other > > perceptions which are not contradicted subsequently. Had it been > > otherway, that all are contradicted, there would have been no > > distinguishing mark between two types of perceptions and we would > > not have been in a position in labeling one as `prama' and another > > as `bhrama'. Therefore, a realist would continue, world's > unreality > > can not be concluded based on the anumAna employing the > > contradiction as an hEtu. The hEtu " drishatvAt " is impotent in > its > > applicability (vyApti) for all perceptions because of above > > mentioned reasons. > > My answer:-- > This is the dvaitin's view. The reasons for holding that the world > is mithya are dealt with elaborately in advaitic works. All the > objections raised in Nyayamrita have been answered in Advaitasiddhi. > What you are saying about drishyatva has already been answered > there. This is too vast a subject to be dealt with in e-mails like > this. Moreover this is a forum for discussing advaita only. I am > sure you have studied Avaitasiddhi and you know the arguments of > both sides. Here we have to leave it at that As I am aware, the objections are not answered in Advaitasiddhi. Instead, Advaitasiddhi took alternate route (deviated from traditional explanations of prior scholars) and opened up fresh difficulties. For example : One of the analysis and subsequent objection in Nyayamrita is about from which point the negation world happens? Is it from vyavahArika point or from pAramArthika point? Historically speaking, some of the pre-MadhusUdhana scholars and most of the new age exponents holds one view, MadhusUdhana holds altogether a different one. 1.Negation of mithyatva from pAramArtha (held by some old scholars and many neo-vEdAntins) This view holds that negation of the world as contemplated by `mithyAtva' is from pAramarhika point of view or officially what is coined as `pAramArthikatvAkAreNa niShEdhaH' . Sri.Vyasa Tirtha counters this position in his nyAyAmruta on the grounds of anyOnyAshrya involved. One can not reach to pAramArtha unless one negates this vyavahArika world. On the other hand, one can not negate this world while in vyavahAra as defined by pAramArthikatvAkAreNa niShEdhaH. To avoid above difficulty raised by Sri.Vyasa Tirtha, Sri.MadhusUdhana takes a different (and quite new) position in the tradition . He argues that negation of mithyatvam happens on its very essence or what is called `svarUpENaiva niShEdha'. According to this position, negation of mithyatvam is negation of " suchness of negated " or negation on the very svarUpa of negated. Please read Advaitasiddhi: nApi dwitIyaH : - abhAdhyatvarUpa pAramArthikatvasya bhAdhyatvarupa mithyAtvaniruNyatvEna, anyOnyAShrayat | pAramArthikatva-syApi svarUpeNa niSEdhE, prathamapaxOkthadOshapthi: athaH: tasyApi pAramArthikatvAkAreNa niShEdhaE anavastA iti chEt – myvam – svarUpENaiva trikAlikaniShEdhasya, prapanchE sukthi rUpyAdau cha angikArAth | But, this acceptance of negation of svarUpa of this world, will render the world to null and reduced to utter non-existence (asat). Then, that invalidates the very definition of mithaytva as asad- vilaxaNa. Another place where Sri.Madhusudana is saying other than what you have been saying is this; In your previous mail, you have said what is being denied (in all the three periods of time) is not the illusory silver, but real (empirical) silver. However, Madhusudana refuting to the objection of nyAmrita (that both the pratiyogin of a negation and the negation itself must necessarily belong to the same order of reality) says that pratiyogin and its negation need not necessarily be in the same order of reality. He quotes the exact silver-nacre example to support his point that what is being negated is the illusory silver (not the real silver). This exactly is opposite to your position. Please see part 13 in advaitasiddhi website (http://www.advaitasiddhi.org/part13). With kind permission of Sri.Anand, let me quote here ; /Quote advaita-siddhi text: prapaJNchanishhedha-adhikaraNIbhUta-brahmAbhinnatvAnnishhedhasya tAtvikatve .api na-advaitahAnikaratvam.h | na cha tAtvikAbhAva- pratiyoginaH prapaJNchasya tAtvikApattiH, tAtvikAbhAvapratiyogini shuktirajatAdau kalpite vyabhichArAt.h | Translation: (If we hold that) the negation (of the world) is non-different from Brahman which is the substratum of the negation of the world, then there is no damage done to the non-duality principle. And the world as the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absolutely real (pAramArthika) negation cannot be (forced to be) absolutely real (based on an erroneous rule that the pratiyogin of a negation and the negation itself must necessarily belong to the same order of reality.) An exception (to this rule which proves the rule to be erroneous) is the silver-in-nacre that is (illusory only) and its negation (at the end of illusion) which is real. /*Endquote Also on the point raised in nyAyAmruta that such negation from pAramArtha will result in advaita hAni (because there will be two things in pAramArtha – Brahman and the negation of world), Sri.madhusudana will take the position saying the very negation of this world is *identical* to Brahman. In this way, there is no loss of non-duality. However, because this position raises fresh difficulties, in subsequent rejoinders, Dvaitins raises new issues. In summary it is like this; If negation (of world) is to be considered as *identical* to Brahman, then it amounts to saying Brahman does not exist as long as one is vyavahAra. As long as one is not negating successfully and such negation does not exist, Brahman can not said to be existing. Therefore in what way Brahman is said to be not mithya (sattya), for such Brahman itself can be negated while one is in vyavahAra. Speaking of Sri.Madhusudana's some what unusual position, I would like to bring a point for discussion with respect to another thread " Conflicting statements " . In the message 42272, you are of the opinion that falsity of the world has been established by inference and knowledge about Brahman is known only from shruti and therefore there is no contradiction in two statements of Acharya. However, with Sri.Madhusudana's position of equating " Falsity of world = Brahman " , the two statements being discussed in fact a contradiction. Have you thought about this? There are many more points on Advaita Siddhi and I do not think we can discuss in this forum. May be we should open up private channel for these dialogs. Regards, Srinivas Kotekal Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted November 19, 2008 Report Share Posted November 19, 2008 advaitin , " Srinivas Kotekal " <kots_p wrote: > > Dear Shastri-ji, > > Thanks for the reference to msg 42134. Now I stand clarified about > your position. However, I do see some issues remaining and this long > mail. Please bare with me. > There are many more points on Advaita Siddhi and I do not think we > can discuss in this forum. May be we should open up private channel > for these dialogs. > > Regards, > Srinivas Kotekal Dear Srinivas-ji, You have taken a lot of trouble and raised a very large number of questions. All the points raised by you are intended to prove that advaita vedanta is not tenable. This forum is meant for persons who have accepted advaita and wish to understand its tenets better and seek the ultimate goal of life through its teachings. The points raised by you do not therefore fall within the scope of this Group. Regards, S.N.Sastri Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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