Knowledge and The Means of Knowledge - 30

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We are re-examining some of the VedantaparibhASha statements,

as was suggested by Shree Sastriji, in the light of Navya Nyaaya. Some

background of Navya-Nyaaya is being provided in the last and this post, based

on my understanding of D.H.H. Ingalls,¡¦ Materials for the study of Navya-Nyaaya

Logic¡¦, published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi.We are back to the series after a gap of several weeks.

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Knowledge and the

Means of Knowledge ¡V 30

 

We are discussing some of the concepts of Navya Nyaaya in

relation to Inferential knowledge. In

the last post several Navya Nyaaya concepts are introduced starting from their

seven fundamental categories (padaartha-s). Of these, descriptions of substances

(dravya), generic character (jaati), ultimate difference (visheSha), and

absence (abhaava) were provided. Jaati is generic abstract qualifier that

inheres with the qualificand to make the qualificand to belong to a genus. For

example, pot-ness in a pot is abstract qualifier qualifying the pot so that the

pot belongs to a family of pots or pot-genus. Similarly, other examples are man-ness

in man, horse-ness in a horse or cow-ness in a cow. In contrast to generic quality, there are

particular abstract qualities qualifying a particular specimen (vyakti) of a

genus. Thus in a statement ¡¥this is Devadatta¡¦ ¡V Devadatta has two qualifiers,

one a generic qualifier that is man-ness since Devadatta is a man, and the

other qualifier is Devadatta-ness. Man-ness will distinguish him to be

different from say animals or inert objects, and Devadatta-ness distinguishes

him from other men, who also have man-ness. The later is called relational qualifier.

The generic characters, man-ness, pot-ness, etc are arrived at after

observation of many men (and also many not-men) and many pots (and also many

non-pots). Similarly Devadatta-ness is also abstract quality arrived observing

him and his qualities in relation to other men who are not-Devadattas.

Particular qualifiers are specific to a given specimen (as in Devadatta-ness) and

require careful consideration in relation to other specimens of the same genus.

We have also discussed that ¡¥absence¡¦ is also one of the fundamental category

of Navya Nyaaya. We have mutual absence

(anyonyaabhaava) where identity is denied as in A ¡Ú B and vice versa, and

relational absence consisting of (a) prior absence (praagaabhaava) involving

absence of a thing before it is created, (b) posterior absence

(pradhvamsaabhaava) involving absence of a thing after it is destroyed and © constant

absence (atyantaabhaava) involving absence of a thing somewhere independent of

time (ex. there is constant absence of fire in the lake). These absences are in relation to others.

 

Relations: Relation

involves two entities. There are many types of relations that can exist between

the two. The most common is ¡¥contact¡¦ relation or samyoga, where A is in

contact with B. Fire or smoke on the

mountain is a contact relation. Here fire or smoke is qualified by its contact

with the mountain which is its locus. It is a fiery or smoky mountain. The

other examples are pot which is on the table or table with a pot on it, where

qualifier and qualificand keep changing depending on the subject. The another

type of relation between two entities can be called samavaaya or relation of

inherence. The generic characters,

jaati, have inherent relations with their loci.

Ex. man-ness in man or horse-ness in horse, etc. These are inherent

characteristics that are not separable from their loci, unlike the case of

smoke and mountain. Taking the example of ¡¥fire on the mountain¡¦ there are

several relations embedded in the statement. We have fire-ness in the fire,

mountain-ness in the mountain which inheres with their loci. In addition fire

and mountain have contact relation since fire is in contact with the mountain;

they do not inhere with each other. Similarly the relation between smoke and

fire, but in this case one is dependent on the other. Existence of smoke

depends on the existence of fire (not the other way), even though smoke does

not inhere with the fire. Every object, being made up of parts, inheres in its

parts. Thus cloth inheres on the threads, threads inhere on the cotton, and

cotton inheres in its molecules, etc. Ultimately, according to Nyaaya, the

atoms are self-dependent, and have ultimate qualities that differ for each

atom.

 

Limiting

relations: Another important

technical terms in Navya Nyaaya are limited (avacchinna) and limiter

(avacchedaka). All relations are limiting relations, because of which one locus

can be differentiated from the other. Consider a generic qualifier, pot-ness.

Obviously pot-ness is present in all pots but it is limited to only pots. Similarly the particular qualifiers like

Devadatta-ness are limited to Devadatta, because of which Devadatta can be

recognized from other men.

 

Adjunct (pratiyogi)

and subjunct (anuyogi): The

relations are expressed in terms these two terms ¡V adjunct (pratiyogi) and

subjunct (anuyogi). Adjunct normally means something addition to substantive.

In contact (samyoga) relations, adjunct is one wherein the relation is

expressed as one is in or on the other. The superstratum is adjunct (pratiyogi)

and the substratum is termed subjunct (anuyogi). In the case of smoke with

fire, smoke is the adjunct and fire is the subjunct. For fiery mountain, fire

is the adjunct and mountain is the subjunct. In the case of non-contact

relations, the qualificand is adjunct and the qualifier is subjunct. The word pratiyogi is also used for absence,

and since absence cannot be called contact, its meaning in that case will be

different. Adjunct and subjunct are used to express relations while

superstratum and substratum are expressed in contacts. The superstratum is

called in Sanskrit as adheya and substratum is called adhaara. In the case of

pot and clay, clay is adhaara and pot is adheya. In this case the relation is

not of contact. Vidyaaranya uses these

terms to denote the ontological difference between the two. Ontologically clay

is more real than pot since pot can change while clay remains as

changeless. In Navya Nyaaya it is expressed

as pot inheres in clay as it is made up of clay. In the analysis of inference

connecting hetu (smoke) to saadhya (fire) Navya Nyaaya is very specific in

terms of the relations between the two. For example, in the conclusion that the

mountain possesses fire because it possesses smoke, it is to be understood that

the relation between smoke and fire is not of inherence but only of contact.

The smoke and fire have limiting relations in term of contact only. Similarly

the relations between the smoke and mountain and fire and the mountain are

limited by contact. On the other hand the relations between smoke-ness to smoke

and fire-ness to fire and mountain-ness to mountain, as well as pot to clay and

cloth to threads, etc are inherent relations.

 

Counterpositive-ness:

We discussed about the use of adjunct, pratiyogi, and subjunct, anuyogi, in

relations involving both contact (samyoga) and inherent (samavaaya) relations.

In the knowledge involving contact relation, ¡¥Fire is on the mountain¡¦, fire is

adjunct and mountain is subjunct, anuyogi. The knowledge can be expressed in

negative format as in ¡¥there is constant absence of fire in a lake¡¦ ¡V the fire

may be called here as absential adjunct (abhaaviiya pratiyogi) since fire is

not there anytime in the lake ¡V this is in contrast to presence of fire on the

mountain. This constant absential

adjunct can be referred to as antyaataabhaava pratiyogini and can be called as

¡¥counterpositive adjunct¡¦. Thus absence of fire in a lake is

counterpositive-ness of the fire in the locus, lake. In principle, any entity

which is negated in a locus by the absence x is a counterpositive of absence x

on the locus defined. We use this example

later to state that absence of silver in nacre is a counterpositive of absence

silver in the locus, nacre that is there. Simply, it means negation of the

presence of silver in the shell in the past, present or future or its constant

absences independent of time, even though momentarily I mistake its presence

when I see from a distance. The mistake, of course, arises due to dominant

quality of silvery-ness present in the nacre since knowledge is based on

attributive content. The silvery-ness is necessary and dominant quality of

silver but that is not sufficient quality to define the silver ¡V just as

sweet-ness is necessary quality of sugar but not sufficient quality to define

sugar. The reason is there are other objects that are not sugar but sweet like

sugar (ex. aspartame). Similarly when I pick up the object thinking that it is

silver based on the dominant attributive knowledge, I now gather other

attributes that are counter to silver, negating the presence of silver in the

object. This absence is counterpositive absence of silver (antyantaabhaava

pratiyogi) since silver was constantly absent (in the past, present and future)

in the locus, nacre.

 

We have used the term ¡¥counterpositive-ness¡¦ as an abstract

quality of fire in a lake or of silver in nacre. In general the

counterpositive-ness could be specific or generic absence of the thing in or on

the locus specified. It could be absence of specific fire or silver in the

locus specified or it could be generic absence of fire or silver in that locus.

Similarly the locus could be specific or generic as in particular lake or

particular nacre or in any lake or in any nacre. Thus counterpositive-ness of absence of

silver-ness in any nacre-ness becomes generic statement that three is absence

of silver in any nacre at all times. The generic absences have the effect of

negating all particulars of given class. Thus the above generic statement

implies that ¡¥for all x, if x is a silver is not in any y, if y is any nacre¡¦.

We should note that it is not the absence of silvery-ness in any nacre, but absence

of silver in any nacre. That is one can have silvery-ness without having silver

since silvery-ness as in sweetness is only one of necessary qualifications of

silver but not sufficient qualification of silver. That is it is not swaruupa

lakshaNa of silver. Thus by changing from specific to generic one can change

the limiting conditions for the counterpositive-ness ¡V that is whether a

specific silver is absent at all times in a specific nacre, or silver in

general is absent in that particular nacre, or silver in general is absent in any

nacre, not necessarily in this particular one.

 

As discussed before the negation of previous knowledge ¡¥that

there is silver¡¦ occurs only after additional attributive knowledge of the

object perceived takes place ¡V that is when I picked up the object thinking

that it is silver, I came to know that it is nacre and there is no silver

there. In fact the silver is counterpositive (absent at any time) in the nacre

and not that the silver that I saw was there before and now it disappeared. Similarly

the snake is counterpositive adjunct or atantaabhaava pratiyogini in the rope

that is there. This knowledge I

recognize when I discover that it is rope. Likewise the world is

counterpositive adjunct on the Brahman as the scripture says, like a ring on

the gold. That is, there is never a world where Brahman is, even though I am

seeing it.

 

With this background of Navya Nyaaya, we can reexamine now

the VedantaparibhASha statement.

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In the VedantaparibhAShA (VP) we are discussing how

inference can be used to prove that the universe is mithyaa that is it is

neither real nor unreal. Whatever that exists other than Brahman, that

includes everything that can be objectified or perceived is mithyaa. We keep

the word mithyaa without translating it as illusion since illusion implies that

it is not real only, while mithyaa is both not real and not unreal. It is not unreal also since it is experienced

unlike that of the son of barren woman. This aspect was discussed before with

the example of the perception of silver where there is nacre.

 

VP defines mithyaa using the language of Navya Nyaaya that

the ¡¥mithyaa consists in something being the counterpositive of the absolute

nonexistence that abides in whatever is supposed to be in its substratum¡¦ ¡V

mithyaatvamca svaashrayatvena abhimata yaavanniShTA athyantaabhAva

pratiyogitvAt. In the case of the example of perception of silver where nacre

is, silver is mithyaa since its counterpositive absence of its existence is in

the place that it is seen, i.e. nacre. That is, there is absolutely no silver

at the locus at any time. When the object was seen for the first time, due to

dominant attributive silvery-ness of the object seen, it was cognized as

silver. It is not the cognition of real silver but it is cognition of false

silver, since cognitions are based on dominant attributive knowledge of

silvery-ness of the object not the substantive of the object. However, the

false or mithyaa silver is taken as real silver. Hence effort was made to pick

up that silver seen. When the object was picked up, the object was recognized

as nacre with the knowledge that ¡¥there is no silver here¡¦. This understanding

involves not the absence of silver ¡¥now¡¦, leaving a doubt that it was silver

before. It is absolute absence of silver all the times in the place where it

was seen. In the terminology of Navya Nyaaya, it involves existence of the

absolute non-existence of silver at all times in the place where nacre is. Hence

it is counterpositive absence involving constant absence independent of time

that includes even when it was originally seen as silver that prompted an

action to pick it up. What is falsified

is the false silver but was taken as real at that time, since there is no real

silver at the locus at any time. This definition for mithyaa is effectively one

of the five definitions of falsity that MadhusUdana Saraswati uses in his Advaita

Siddhi.

 

We can apply now to the world seen. What ever seen is

mithyaa but is taken as real just as silver is taken as real. The existence

part of the world provides the basis for the falsity of the world since 'world

is' meaning world exists ¡V just as the silvery-ness of the object provided the

notion of existence of real silver at the locus. Since

the object exists and therefore world exists. Hence all the worldly

transactions and samsaara or the resulting suffering associated with the notion

of reality to the world follow. When I realize

that I am not ¡¥this that I thought I am¡¦ but I am that Brahman, the substantive

for all, including the world that I see and transact with, the reality associated

with the world is falsified. It is recognized as mithyaa ¡V that is counterpositive

of absolute nonexistence at any time at the locus where it is seen. Hence

reality of the world was not there, is not there and will not be there and what is there

always is Brahman that I am, which is ever present or eternal and never changing and infinite

existence- consciousness. The false world that is seen is falsified or

recognized as false. Just as the silvery-ness of the object nacre still remains

but the wrong notion that there is silver is gone in the understanding that is

nacre. Thus mithyaa attribute of silver remains without assigning substantive

reality to the silver. It is also understood that the absence of silver is

counterpositive absolute absence at all time that includes even in the past

when I thought that it was real silver in the object seen. Similarly when I

realize Brahman, the world is recognized as mithyaa and not real that I thought

it was. Hence mityaatvam (unreality or illusory nature, although not proper

translation) of the world is recognized only when I have the clear

understanding that there is only Brahman and I am that Brahman. Knowledge of

Brahman does not negate the world but negates the reality assigned to the world

just as appearance of silver is not negated in the knowledge of nacre but only

reality that this is silver is negated with the knowledge that there is no

silver here in the object.

 

We will next take the objections also with the background of

Navya-Nyaaya.Hari Om!Sadananda