counterpositive

[Guest guest]

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

> For a start if we break `counterpositive' down into its elements

we get

> (a) that which is counter to something (b) that something is

positive.

> The implication of this is that the original position is a

negative one.

> Thus the counterpositive of false silver is real silver. The

> counterpositive of silveriness in nacre is silveriness in silver.

What

> you are not denying is silveriness but silveriness with silver as a

> substratum.

>

> What is the value of the concept of the counterpositive? What sort

of

> error does it head off? If not there, what sort of hole would it

leave

> as an entry point for error to make its habitation?

>

> Is it a point about attributes and their substratum? The

attributes do

> not produce the reality of their substratum. Silveriness does not

make

> silver. Silver is a limiting adjunct (upadhi) of pure

consciousness.

> That is its reality.

> Best Wishes,

> Michael.

 

Dear Michael-ji,

1. I have answered this same question from you once before. The

following is the answer I gave:---

 

2. When the presence of a certain object is denied on a certain

substratum, the object whose presence is denied is known

as `pratiyogin' or counter-positive. When it is said, " There is no

pot on this floor " , pot is the pratiyogin and the floor is known as

anuyogin. When the person who thought there was silver discovers

that there is no silver (but only nacre), he says " It is not

silver " . Here silver is the counter-positive of the negation. This

negation is for all periods, past, present and future, because there

was only nacre all the time and there never was any silver. The

objection raised by the opponent is: Since silver was seen

previously, you can only say " Now there is no silver " and cannot

deny the presence of silver even in the past when you saw it and

even tried to take possession of it, thinking it to be genuine

silver. The answer to this is that what is being denied in all the

three periods of time is not the illusory silver, but real

(empirical) silver. That is to say, the fact that he saw silver is

not denied, but he has now discovered that even when he was seeing

it, it was not real silver, that is, the silver which one can use

for making vessels, etc, but only illusory silver. This is the

meaning of the passage on page 62 VP referred to.

 

3. I shall elaborate it further.

You have said::--

Thus the counterpositive of false silver is real silver. The

counterpositive of silveriness in nacre is silveriness in silver.

 

This is not at all the meaning of the word `counterpositive'

(pratiyogin). The meaning is as stated in para 2 above.

 

4. What is stated on p. 62 is the reply to the objection stated on

p. 61. The objection raised is that, since it has been said that

there is silver at the time it is seen, the subsequent denial of

silver cannot be with reference to the time during which it was

seen.

The answer to this, given on p. 62 is:--

What is denied is the existence of vyAvahArika silver. Such silver

was not there even when there appeared to be silver. What was seen

was only illusory silver. But at that time it was taken to be

silver " characterized by conventional reality " , i.e., silver which

can be used for making vessels etc. If the person who saw it had not

believed that it was such `real' silver, he would not have made an

effort to take possession of it. But now he has discovered that

there was no real silver even at that time. So the existence of

vyAvahArika silver is denied in all the three periods of time.

 

The last sentence in this paragraph (on p. 62) is:--

" for we admit that kind of non-existence the counterpositiveness

relating to which is characterized by an attribute abiding in a

different substratum from its own " .

 

Counterpositive or `pratiyogi' is that which is stated to be absent

or non-existent in a particular substratum. Here the counterpositive

is vyAvahArika silver, since that is the thing whose existence is

denied. Counterpositiveness is therefore its attribute, namely,

silverness. Its own substratum is vyAvahArika silver, because

silverness is found only in such silver. There is non-existence of

silverness in any substratum other than silver. When it has been

found that there is only nacre, it is known beyond doubt that there

can be no silverness there.

 

The point about silver being a limiting adjunct of pure

consciousness, though true, is not the subject-matter here.

Regards,

S.N.Sastri

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sastri-ji,

I’m don’t think our understanding of the

concept of the counterpositive differs much. My question about it still

stands:

What is the value of the concept of the counterpositive? What sort of

error does it head off? If not there, what sort of hole would it leave as

an entry point for error to make its habitation?

The counterpositive concept arises both in relation to attributes and to

entities. The attribute silveriness (having the flash of silver) is

superimposed on a substratum which is not actually silver. Silveriness

in its true substratum or actual silver is the counterpositive.

 

A note on page 63 implies that we can use the concept of the

counterpositive in relation to entities which have no points of similarity

- " A cloth does not exist as a jar " , that whose existence is denied is the

cloth, which is therefore the counterpositive of this negation.

 

On page 77 the defininition is offered: " Unreality consists in something

being the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence that abides in

whatever is supposed to be its substratum " . If a jar is " a different

substratum from a cloth " or jarhood/jarness is a property of jars and

clothness/clothood is a property of cloth. It is clear that one cannot be

the other.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

[Guest guest]

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

> I’m don’t think our

understanding of the

> concept of the counterpositive differs much. My question about it

still

> stands:

> Best Wishes,

> Michael.

 

Dear Michael-ji,

There is a lot of difference between your understanding of the

term `pratiyogi' or counterpositive and what I have explained as its

meaning.

You are asking what sort of error it heads off. The concept of

pratiyogi is not intended to head off any error. It only says that

the object, the absence of which in a particular locus is

predicated, is known by the term `pratiyogi'. In the present context

real silver, which was preciously thought to exist, is subsequently

denied. This denial takes the form " There is no silver here " . Since

the absence of silver is declared at this locus, silver is the

pratiyogi of the absence—known as atyanta-abhAva-pratiyogi.

Nowhere in navya nyAya books has it been stated that the

counterpositive of false silver is real silver, as you have stated

in your previous post. The concept of false silver, that is silver

which is later found to be mithyA, is not recognized by nyAya at

all. nyAya does not recognize something that is mithyA, that is,

neither real nor unreal and so pratiyogi, which is a term belonging

to navya nyAya cannot have such a concept. In VP the language of

navya nyAya has been used to expound advaita, but we have to

understand the navya nyAya terms according to their meaning in navya

nyAya.

 

The use of the terms pratiyogi and atyanta-abhAva-pratiogi is only

the navya nyAya way of stating the simple fact that there is no

silver at the particular locus. This has nothing to do with the

advaitic concept of all objects being only limiting adjuncts of pure

consciousness. In this chapter on Perception (pratyakSha pramANa)

the author of VP is dealing only with perception through the five

organs of sense. He is not dealing with the advaitic aspects at all.

This will come when he deals with shruti later on, because it is

only shruti that reveals that every object is brahman.

 

You have asked what sort of hole it would leave. The concept of

pratiyogi is not for plugging any hole at all. The very concept of

pratiyogi belongs to navya nyAya and not to advaita. The author has

only used the language of navya nyAya.

 

Silverness was wrongly attributed to nacre and that is why the

person said " This is silver " . Here the concept of pratiyogi does not

come in. Pratiyogi comes in only when we are speaking of the absence

of something in a locus. That happens only when it is noticed

subsequently that there is no silver there.

When it is said that a cloth does not exist as a jar, what is denied

is the existence if cloth in the locus in which there is a jar. Thus

cloth, whose existence is denied, is the pratiyogi. The question of

similarity or dissimilarity is not relevant to the concept of

pratiyogi. When one says " There is no book on this table'' book is

the pratiyogi of its absence on the table. Book and table have no

similarity. The question of similarity comes in only when one thing

is wrongly taken for another, like rope and snake. The concept of

pratiyogi has nothing to do with such illusions.

 

Regarding the definition on p.77--- " Unreality consists in something

being the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence that abides

in whatever is supposed to be its substratum " .

Here the word `unreality' stands for `mithyAtvam'. This is one of

the five definitions of mithyAtvam taken by Madhusudana Sarasvati

for examination in his work `Advaitasiddhi'. This definition is

means that the silver which was previously seen has no existence at

all in all the three periods of time and is therefore mithyA. Silver

is the counterpositive of its absolute non-existence in the nacre

where it was seen and which was therefore supposed to be its

substratum. `This has nothing at all to do with statements like " The

jar does not exist as cloth " , because there is no question of

mithyAtvam here. The cloth whose existence is denied is not mithyA.

mithyA is what appears in a locus and is found subsequently to be

non-existent in that very locus. That is not the case with the

statement that the jar does not exist as cloth. Cloth was not seen

as existing in that locus and subsequently found to be non-existent.

What is brought out by this statement is mutual difference, known as

anyonya-abhAva, between jar and cloth.

 

It is impossible to understand VP without some knowledge of the

method of expression used by navya nyAya. For a simple statement

such as " There is no pot on this floor " , navya nyAya would say, " Pot

is the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence that abides (or

exists) on this floor " . They speak of non-existence as existing,

which advaitins would consider to be illogical.

Regards,

S.N.Sastri

[Guest guest]

> Namaste Advaitins

> In VP the major citation for the concept of the counterpositive begins

> on page 62. It is by no means easy to follow.

 

praNAms,

 

I think that the following link,

which is a series of articles on Advaita Siddhi

by Madhusudana Saraswathi are relevant to this

topic. The author of the notes is Shri Ananda Hudli.

 

http://www.advaitasiddhi.org/

The same is in the following link too.

http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~vs28/S.Vidyaraman/Advaita%20Vedanta/advaita.htm

 

In particular, I could suggest the chapters on

predicate logic and navya nyAya which are very

useful, and go well with what Shri Sada-ji has

covered in his knowledge series #30.

(Though I should frankly admit that the later

chapters in the notes of Shri Hudli become

pretty unwieldy for me!).

 

Can any of the learned members explain the

chronology and historical aspects of advaita-siddhi

vis-a-vis VP?

 

Sri madhusUdanAya namaH

praNAms to all Advaitins

Ramakrishna

[Guest guest]

--- On Wed, 2/4/09, snsastri <sn.sastri wrote:

 

 

There is a lot of difference between your understanding of the

 

term `pratiyogi' or counterpositive and what I have explained as its

 

meaning. ..

 

It only says that

 

the object, the absence of which in a particular locus is

 

predicated, is known by the term `pratiyogi'. In the present context

 

real silver, which was preciously thought to exist, is subsequently

 

denied.

 

-----------

Sastriji - PraNAms

 

First thanks for pointing to us the need to look at the statements in Vedanta

ParibhASha from point of the Navya Naayaa.

 

I just want to mention for the general readers that in addition to the absential

adjunct that Navya Nyaaya uses as existence of non-existence, pratiyogi is also

used in positive sense also as I tried to point out in the last post. I am

reproducing that part for additional clarification..

.....

In contact (samyoga) relations, adjunct (pratiyogi) is one wherein the relation

is expressed as one is in or on the other. The superstratum is adjunct

(pratiyogi) and the substratum is termed subjunct (anuyogi). In the case of

smoke with fire, smoke is the adjunct (pratiyogi) and fire is the subjunct

(anuyogi). .....

In the case of non-contact relations, the qualificand is adjunct(pratiyogi) and

the qualifier is subjunct (anuyogi). The word pratiyogi is ALSO used for

absence, and since absence cannot be called contact, its meaning in that case

will be different.

........

.....

In the knowledge involving contact relation, ‘Fire is on the mountain’, fire

is adjunct (pratiyogi) and mountain is subjunct, anuyogi. The knowledge can be

expressed in negative format as in ‘there is constant absence of fire in a

lake’ – the fire may be called here as absential adjunct (abhaaviiya

pratiyogi) since fire is not there anytime in the lake – this is in contrast

to presence of fire on the mountain. This constant absential adjunct can be

referred to as antyaataabhaava pratiyogini and can be called as

‘counterpositive adjunct’. Thus absence of fire in a lake is

counterpositive- ness of the fire in the locus, lake. In principle, any entity

which is negated in a locus by the absence x is a counterpositive of absence x

on the locus defined.

--------

Absential part closely follows what you mentioned.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda

<kuntimaddisada wrote:

> First thanks for pointing to us the need to look at the statements

in Vedanta ParibhASha from point of the Navya Naayaa.

>

> I just want to mention for the general readers that in addition to

the absential adjunct that Navya Nyaaya uses as existence of non-

existence, pratiyogi is also used in positive sense also as I tried

to point out in the last post. I am reproducing that part for

additional clarification..

> ....

> In contact (samyoga) relations, adjunct (pratiyogi) is one wherein

the relation is expressed as one is in or on the other. The

superstratum is adjunct (pratiyogi) and the substratum is termed

subjunct (anuyogi). In the case of smoke with fire, smoke is the

adjunct (pratiyogi) and fire is the subjunct (anuyogi). .....

> In the case of non-contact relations, the qualificand is adjunct

(pratiyogi) and the qualifier is subjunct (anuyogi). The word

pratiyogi is ALSO used for absence, and since absence cannot be

called contact, its meaning in that case will be different.

> .......

> ....

> In the knowledge involving contact relation, ‘Fire is on the

mountain’, fire is adjunct (pratiyogi) and mountain is subjunct,

anuyogi. The knowledge can be expressed in negative format as in

‘there is constant absence of fire in a lake’ †" the fire may

be called here as absential adjunct (abhaaviiya pratiyogi) since

fire is not there anytime in the lake †" this is in contrast to

presence of fire on the mountain. This constant absential adjunct

can be referred to as antyaataabhaava pratiyogini and can be called

as ‘counterpositive adjunct’. Thus absence of fire in a lake is

counterpositive- ness of the fire in the locus, lake. In principle,

any entity which is negated in a locus by the absence x is a

counterpositive of absence x on the locus defined.

> --------

> Absential part closely follows what you mentioned.

>

> Hari Om!

> Sadananda

 

Dear Sada-ji,

I entirely agree with you. I confined myself to the use of pratiyogi

in relation to absence because that alone was relevant to the issue

under consideration.

Regards,

S.N.Sastri

[Guest guest]

praNAms Shri Sastri-ji and Sada-ji,

 

My humble saashtaang praNAms for all the explanations.

 

The beauty of advaita taking the post Shankara developments

in science and logic to prove the anirvacaneeyatva of the

nature of the world is indeed unique. This is also why

contemporary advaitic masters take up with relative

ease, the seemingly difficult concepts of duality of

mass/energy, relativity and even Godel's incompleteness

theorem to further " extend " these results.

 

The exhilarating nature of the above reasoning is not

their " extensibility " . It is the unique nature of *this*

vidya, the aatma-vidya, to prove that the shruti is the

unique means of realizing the nature of the

sat-chit-aananda of the Self. That which beyond

which, there exists nothing else to be known, as the

knower-known-knowledge triad too resolves in the Self.

 

praNAms again and praNAms to all Advaitins.

Ramakrishna

[Guest guest]

Dear Michael,

 

advaitin , " ombhurbhuva " <ombhurbhuva

wrote:

>

> Namaste Sastri-ji,

> Thanks for going over that again. Very useful. It all arises out

> of the great puzzle: how do you refer to non-existents?

>

> " Vacaspati puzzled over this problem because, according to the

> Nyaya theory, each negation, in order to be meaningful, must

> negate a real entity and must denote an absence which usually

> behaves as a property occurring in some locus.

 

Yes, that is true.

 

In every negation, the pratiyOgi is *implicitly* accepted as real

and known to be existed elsewhere prior to negation.

 

Why is this so?

 

Let me explain;

 

You just can't negate " There is no xyz on the table " without knowing

whether 'xyz' is real or unreal. If it is known to be real

elsewhere, your negation at this locus makes sense. If it is already

known to be unreal and does not exist at any locus at all, your

negation does not carry any value. If the pratiyOgi `xyz' is known

to be unreal (attyanta-asat) like rabbit's horn, your assertion of

negation is superfluous. Because, by definition, attyanta-asat

entities are non-existing in ALL locations and at ALL times; and by

your negation of type " there is no rabit's horn on the table " you

are saying the most obvious and your negation does not have any

value. In nyAya, this is a fallacy called `siddhAsAdhana' (meaning

establishing the obvious) does not carry any value for your

proposition.

 

Therefore, while real entities are negated at particular locus,

unreal entities are negated at all loci. " There is no book on the

table now " , " There is no Rabit's horn in all places at all times "

are valid negations. " There is no rabit horn on the table now " is

superfluous and invalid.

 

Therefore, it is quite implicit that the reality status pratiyOgi

used in all negations is real and exist elsewhere. Many people

overlook this implicit aspect and basic fact about negations.

 

The " hole " you are concerned about this aspect of pratiyOgi is that,

either say " this world does not exist at all " and stop there or

say " this world does not exist in Brahman " + accept it exist

elsewhere. You just can't club both and say " this world does not

exist in Brahman, therefore this world is unreal " .

 

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

 

> Best Wishes,

> Michael

>