Seeking Clarification

[Guest guest]

>

> Can you expand a bit about mithyA being negated in

> three periods of time. I would enjoy hearing some

> more words about that.

 

> Pranams,

> Durga

 

Durgaji - PraNAms

 

A simple of way of looking at it is to ask the question - is there really a pot.

Once I see it is nothing but clay, clay it was, clay it is and clay it shall be

- why do you say there is a pot there? Oh! I see it. What ever you see is

mithyaa!

 

Once my vision is on the clay, even though I call it a pot to differentiate it

from a jug, it is just clay only in different names and forms. Hence from the

point of the cause, effects are just superficial. Pot is negated all the time

since it is only clay all the time. Pot may come and go but clay remains. This

is what Vedanta calls as anvaya-vyatireka logic to dismiss mithyaa at all times.

 

For negation to be done, it has be there to negate. That is, pot should be there

for me to say there is no pot there, right? There is no reason to negate

vandhyaaputraH since such an entity is not even apparent to do justice to the

process of negation.

 

The fact of the matter is understanding that is mithyaa involves negation of its

reality in all the three period. Hence world is mithyaa means it has no

independent existence at any time - then only we can negate.

Jnaani is the one who realizes that world is mithyaa - that is it has no

independent existence other than Brahman - That does not mean it is non existent

either since non-existent things need not be negated. This is the essence of

Madhusuudana's definition too. Hence mithyaa is rightly defined as sat asat

vilakshanam.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri. Shyamji,

 

advaitin , Shyam <shyam_md wrote:

 

> Dear Srinivas-ji

> Look at your sentences carefully -

> " Teachings of jnAni is a " notion " on the part of ajnAni. This notion is mithya

and it is due to ajnAni's avidya. "

>

> Srinivas-ji do you see where is the mix up? The notion of the ajnani is his

ajnanitvam! his self-ignorance alone is his notion - and a very

> cherished one at that.

 

So, are you saying self-ignorance of a ajnAni itself is his " notion " ?

 

Or do you mean this " notion " is due to ignorance (avidya) on the part of ajnAni?

 

Which precedes which? What is kAraNa and what is kArya here?

 

You seems to say (correct me if I misunderstood you here) that you take the

former position –- that " I am ignorant " (self-ignorance) idea itself a " notion "

on the part of ajnAni. If so, why is that notion at all? What causes that notion

in him? If you say it is not caused per se, but anAdi (mUlAvidya), then the next

question would be how do we know that? Somebody has to teach us so, right? If

teaching is your answer, we are back to square one about the validity of such

teachings. You see, you did not address the issue at all!

 

 

>There is really no one who is a ajnani except the one who thinks himself to be

so!

 

Why does he think so?

 

I argue that his such thinking itself is due to avidya. Shankara says in

upadesha sAhasrI, 2.17.20 that

" avidyAprabhavaM sarvam-asat-tasmAdidaM jagat.h " (all this world originates

from avidyA, ignorance, and is therefore unreal)

 

Your understanding that it is other way round is wrong.

 

 

>If I ask you (or anyone), do you know yourself to be Brahman the very

resounding and most ready answer is a " no " - the teaching then, for such >an

entity, that harbors a conviction of self-ignornace is not a notion, nor is the

Guru a notion, nor is the moksha to be attained a notion. The >teaching is real,

the Guru is real, and there is a very real mokshaphalam that is being sought -

because it - the entity's - ignorance is real.

 

Just because they are all " real " for a ajnAni, they do not become real

absolutely. Do they? So why argue on that basis?

 

 

>Then who knows it - all this - to be notional? Only the Wise.

 

But that needs you to posit there are two such things as " Wise men " and " Unwise

men " . From who's perspective is this duality of men? From ajnani's or Jnani's?

 

If jnAni's, then it means jnAni knows the difference between " jnAni " and

" ajnAni " . Is this difference real or mithya? If real, the non-duality is gone.

If mithya, jnAni's knowledge (about the difference) itself is mithya and that

makes jnAni as another ajnAni.

 

If it is from ajnAni's perspective, all your above assertion if yet another case

of ajnAni's assertion and has no validity.

 

>The notionality is in the JnAnis (not the ajnanis) understanding, as a knower

of >Truth, as a knower of Self or Atman - knowing which alone everything has

become known to Him.

 

That means jnAni knows the " difference " between his knowledge (which is real and

true) and ajnAni's notional knowledge (which is not true). This " difference "

exactly is the problem. Do not forget jnAni's perspective is pAramArhika

perspective. Positing any difference in pAramArthika make the reality dual. This

is exactly I was saying your position causes Advaita-hAni.

 

 

 

>Please note that neither the

> jnAni/Guru nor his teachings are notional projections of a ajnani's

ignorance, in which case they would of course assume zero validity! Thankfully

>such is not the case.

>

 

Validity (pramANya) of a pramANa does not depend on who thinks what, but it is

valid on its own. Do not forget the doctrine of pramANya-svathastva upheld by

Advaita.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

Dear Sri.Sadananda-gAru,

 

Please accept my praNAm.

 

Let me clarify upfront that this mail is not to criticize your explanation about

mithyattvam, but to better understand mithyatvam in general as such. In this

sense, please bear with my rhetoric in this process. Any clarification from your

end would help me in understanding the real meaning of mithyattvam as conceived

in the school.

 

Here it goes;

 

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>

> Durgaji - PraNAms

>

> A simple of way of looking at it is to ask the question - is there >really a

pot. Once I see it is nothing but clay, clay it was, clay >it is and clay it

shall be - why do you say there is a pot there? >Oh! I see it. What ever you

see is mithyaa!

 

But, the clay is also " seen " and why not it is considered mithya? Is there any

basis in calling only the pot as mithya here?

 

I know Advaita treats pot also as mithya from pAramArtha, but my question is

more towards when we are trying to understand the concept of mithya from within

this world vyavahAra framework, the pot is mithya and clay is sattya. Because

the pot is seen it is mithya, why can't clay be mithya? If we say clay is not

" seen " per se, then my next question would be how do we know there is such thing

as " clay " ? Devoid of any seeing (perception) of clay, what would be the means of

knowing that there is such thing as " clay " ?

 

I know your position in this regard (while we were discussing some time back)

that it is due to our " experience " we know the substance. Where as attributes

are " seen " and hence our knowledge about attributes are indeterminate.

 

But my question is, can we have any " experience " without involving any

perception at all? If you think we can, I would appreciate an example.

 

>

> Once my vision is on the clay, even though I call it a pot to >differentiate

it from a jug, it is just clay only in different >names and forms. Hence >from

the point of the cause, effects are >just superficial. Pot is negated all the

time since it is only clay >all the time. Pot may come and go but >clay remains.

 

 

So also one could argue – clay come and go but the pot remains in any one of the

material in this world, as in " gold pot " or " steel pot " or " aluminum pot " etc.

 

It is due to sAmAnya (universal) " potness " (not " pot " , pot is vishEsha here)

clay could get to be called " pot " . In this sense potness could be cause and clay

is effect. Hence from the point of the cause, effects are just superficial,

therefore effect " clay " could very well be mithya?

 

The point being, how do we know which is cause and which is effect? Both

" potness " as form and " clay " as material exist in the nature.

 

Any idea why only the material is considered as sattya here?

 

>

> For negation to be done, it has be there to negate. That is, pot should be

there for me to say there is no pot there, right? There is no reason to >negate

vandhyaaputraH since such an entity is not even apparent to do justice to the

process of negation.

But who said vandhyAputra does not need negation?

 

vandhyAputra is considered as " attyanta-asat " (absolute non-existent) and in

that very definition itself there exist a negation of kind " vandhyAputra is

attyanta asat because he DOES NOT exist in all locus " .

 

Even your very assertion " There is no reason to negate vandhyaaputraH.... " is in

itself a statement of negation (negation of reason to be specific)

 

>

> The fact of the matter is understanding that is mithyaa involves negation of

its reality in all the three period. Hence world is mithyaa means it has no

independent existence at any time - then only we can negate.

> Jnaani is the one who realizes that world is mithyaa - that is it has no

independent existence other than Brahman - That does not mean it is non existent

either since non-existent things need not be negated. This is the essence of

Madhusuudana's definition too.

 

I have a question here which is been haunting from long times;

 

When we negate reality to " pot " and hold only clay is sattya; what exactly is

this negation of reality involved here?

 

1. Are we negating reality to existence of pot form itself? or

2. Are we negating reality to the clay having that form called " pot " ?

 

 

>Hence mithyaa is rightly defined as sat asat vilakshanam.

>

 

But this definition " sat-asat-vilakshNam " is sattya or not? If yes, we have two

sattyas – " sat " as sattya and " mithya " also as sattya.

 

On the other hand if that definition itself is another mithyabhUta, as said in

my reply to Shyam-ji, jnAni's knowledge " this world is mithya " itself becomes

mithya and it is as good as saying jnAni is having that mithya-jnAna (ayathArtha

jnAna) and this is self contradiction of saying " jnAni is having ajnAna (mithya

jnAna) " .

 

My understanding is that the definition of " mithya " as sat-asat-vilakshNam is

only for those who know academically that this world is mithya. For such people,

since they are still ajnAnis and exist in this vyavahAra, duality of two sattyas

are tolerated. Where as for jnAni's that definition does not apply at all for

the reason as said above which causes Advaita-hAni.

 

So we have three types of people:

 

1. Those who thinks (wrongly so) this world is sattya.

2. Those who knows " academically " that this world is sat-asat-vilakshNam.

3. Those who knows, neyh… I can't even use notion of " knowledge " in those

jnAnis. For them, there is nothing to say about this world.

 

For type 1 people, it is simple case of ajnAna. For type 2, they know correctly

and at the same time presence of duality of definitions are tolerated because

they are still in this vyavahAra and they are ajnAnis. For type 3, there is no

definition and there is no dualities what so ever.

 

Any comments?

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

 

 

> Hari Om!

> Sadananda

>

[Guest guest]

By the way, before debating jnani's vyavahAra, we have to agree upon what is vyavahAra, right ?

praNAms Sri Rajkumar Nair prabhuji Hare Krishna

That is really very appropriate question...Before putting anything comfortably into the compartments of vyavahAra & pAramArthika we have to have the clear cut idea on what is vyavahArik drushti (transactional view point) and what is paramArtha or shAstra drushit (transcedental view point) :-)) Shankara himself talks about these two different drushti-s at various places in sUtra bhAshya...In 2-1-14 he says the difference between waves & sea is vyAvahArik one of the experiencer and experienced..but from the paramArtha drushti there is no such distinction. and again he talks about lOka drushti & shAstra drushti in sUtra 2-2-3 also while talking about the change in the substance of the milk without an external cause...So, there is nothing new in these two different view points in shankara vedanta.

vyavahAra means thought, expression and also conduct based upon these thoughts & expressions...If I see rajata (silver) in place of shukti (nacre) and proceed towards it to grap the supposed silver..it is called mithya vyavahAra (wrong behaviour) but whereas if I treat nacre as nacre only or silver as silver then it is called samyag vyavahAra..Because this vyavahAra is same for one and the all like sun rise & sun set..As per vedAntic view all our ideas, speech and conduct based upon practical life (vyAvahArik) are really due to ignorance from the paramArthik view/stand point. So, vyAvahArika view is the same as the view of ignorance (avidyaka drushti) or the view that distinguishes the knower and the known (pramAtru-prameya-pramANa vyavahAra)...This vyavahAra is possible only and only when one takes his body and the organs of sense etc. to be real without any warrant and mixes up his real nature i.e. witnessing Atman and the unreal not-self (anAtman). The jnAni who transcends this wrong knowledge cannot have distinctions of pramAtru-prameya vyavahAra...That is the reason why gaudapAda says jnAte, dvaitam na vidyate (1-18) shankara expresses the similar opinion in 2-1-14 : bAdhite cha shAreerAtmatve tadAshrayaH samasta svAbhAvikO vyavahAro bAdhitO bhavati...When everything gets sublated by this samyag jnAna than that jnAna is called absolute non-dual jnAna or paripUrNa jnAna..This saMyag drushti is always 'eka rUpa' and there cannot be an iota of duality...ekarUpeNa hi avasthitO yOrthaH sa paramArthaH says shankara in sutra 2-1-11...So, according to shankara, if anyone says jnAni continues avidyAtmaka vyavahAra even after jnAna, it is as good as saying jnAni still has the avidyAtmaka deha saMbandha & perfectly maintains his association with it...

Hari Hari Hari Bol!!!

bhaskar

[Guest guest]

PraNams

 

What is vyavahaara?

 

Vyavahaara means transaction. Transaction presupposes duality. That requires - the sajaati, vijaati and swagata bhedas - or differences of all the three kinds.

 

From paaramaarthika point there cannot be any vyavahaara since all the three types of distinctions are absent.

 

Only from vyavahaara point there are transactions.

 

avidya involves taking the vyavahaara as real since paaramaarthika is unknown.

 

vidya therefore involves knowing vyavahaara is false and paarmaarthika alone is real.

 

Jnaani is the one who has that jnaanam - hence from his understanding he realizes the paaramarthika satyam - Brahman alone is real and he is that Brahman. Brahma satyam, jovo brahma eva na aparaH.

 

Hence he realizes that the world is mithyaa that is it is neither real not UNREAL. - jagat mithyaa.

 

Mithyaatma jnaanam of the world requires the understanding of what is absolutely real.

 

Hence all the transactions can go on at vyaavahaarika level, jnaani knows that it is mithyaa and ajnaani takes it is satya.That is advaitic doctrin - brahma satyam, jagat mithyaa, jivo brahma eva naaparah. It is as simple as that.

 

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>

> PraNams

>  

> What is vyavahaara?

>  

> Vyavahaara means transaction. Transaction presupposes duality. That requires -

the sajaati, vijaati and swagata bhedas - or differences of all the three kinds.

>  

> From paaramaarthika point there cannot be any vyavahaara since all the three

types of distinctions are absent.

>  

> Only from vyavahaara point there are transactions.

>  

> avidya involves taking the vyavahaara as real since paaramaarthika is unknown.

>  

> vidya therefore involves knowing vyavahaara is false and paarmaarthika alone

is real.

>  

> Jnaani is the one who has that jnaanam - hence from his understanding he

realizes the paaramarthika satyam - Brahman alone is real and he is that

Brahman. Brahma satyam, jovo brahma eva na aparaH.

>  

> Hence he realizes that the world is mithyaa that is it is neither real not

UNREAL. - jagat mithyaa.

>  

> Mithyaatma jnaanam of the world requires the understanding of what is

absolutely real.

>  

> Hence all the transactions can go on at vyaavahaarika level, jnaani knows that

it is mithyaa and ajnaani takes it is satya.That is advaitic doctrin - brahma

satyam, jagat mithyaa, jivo brahma eva naaparah.  It is as simple as that.

>  

>

>  

> Hari Om!

> Sadananda

>

 

The above explanation is very flowery and scholarly. But coming to the crux of

the matter, the following is what one can make out from it :

 

1. Vyavahara means transaction which presupposes duality is always there both

before and after realization.

 

2. Paramarthika is an imaginary view-point which nobody has seen/can see.

 

3. Ajnani is one who , all through his life experiences duality and understands

it as the real thing.

 

4. Jnani is one who, all through his life experiences duality but insists that

there is a non-dual state which is the only real thing. (like a drunkard who

insists that he is all okay even when lying face down in a road-side gutter).

 

I guess the ajnani is at least practical in dealing with the duality.

 

Regards,

Raj.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri Raj:

 

First what we can make out from any discussion depends primarily on our

understanding, belief and conviction. Consequently we will likely disagree

since the understanding, belief and conviction vary between the seekers. On the

basis of my understanding, I respectfully disagree with your assessment and

summary:

 

Here is my understanding:

 

Sankara's advaita has two reference points – Vyavaharika and Paramarthika

(relative reality)

 

(1) The reference point of Vyavaharika pertains to the presence of mAyA or

mithyA.

 

(2) The reference point of Paramarthika corresponds to the absence of mAyA

(absolute reality)

 

There are two classifications of Jiva – Jnani (with wisdom) and Ajnani (with

ignorance)

 

Our immediate next step is to understand the interrelationship between the above

two classifications of Jeeva and the two reference points of realities. These

interrelationships can be summarized by the following statements:

 

(1) Ajnani's reference point is always Vyavaharika since the Ajnani dwells in

duality and perceives it as real.

 

(2) Jnani's reference point is Paramarthika since Jnani dwells in non-duality

without any influence of mAyA.

 

(3) The world that we live includes two reference points and the two

classifications of Jnani and Ajnani. Both Jnanis and and Ajnanis live in the

world. The Jananis perceive the world with the non-dual frame of reference and

the Ajnani perceives the world within the Vyavaharika frame of reference. We the

Ajnanis can't distinguish between who is a Jnani and who is a Ajnani. Any other

inference that we derive depends purely based on beliefs, understanding and

conviction. Such inferences will likely vary becasue the understanding, beleif

and conviction vary!

 

This is definitely not a scholastic presentation with quotes from the scriptures

and for me this understanding is quite sufficient for how should proceed with my

life. Without wisdom (God-realization), I can't choose and I am forced to be

bounded by the Vyavaharika reality. If want to know the Paramarthika reality, I

should prepare to shred my ignorance and seek the wisdom. This is the subtle

message of Advaita.

 

I hope this clarification helps us to get some insights,

 

With my warmest regards,

 

Ram Chandran

 

 

advaitin , " rajkumarknair " <rajkumarknair wrote:

>

> The above explanation is very flowery and scholarly. But coming to the crux

of the matter, the following is what one can make out from it :

>

> 1. Vyavahara means transaction which presupposes duality is always there both

before and after realization.

>

> 2. Paramarthika is an imaginary view-point which nobody has seen/can see.

>

> 3. Ajnani is one who , all through his life experiences duality and

understands it as the real thing.

>

> 4. Jnani is one who, all through his life experiences duality but insists that

there is a non-dual state which is the only real thing. (like a drunkard who

insists that he is all okay even when lying face down in a road-side gutter).

>

> I guess the ajnani is at least practical in dealing with the duality.

>

> Regards,

> Raj.

>

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri.Ram Chandaran-ji,

 

Thanks for your explanations. I have couple of difficulties in understanding

your view points here. Please see if you can answer them.

 

 

advaitin , " Ram Chandran " <ramvchandran wrote:

>

> Namaste Sri Raj:

>

> First what we can make out from any discussion depends primarily on our

understanding, belief and conviction. Consequently we will likely disagree

since the understanding, belief and conviction vary between the seekers. On the

basis of my understanding, I respectfully disagree with your assessment and

summary:

>

> Here is my understanding:

>

> Sankara's advaita has two reference points – Vyavaharika and Paramarthika

(relative reality)

>

 

 

From whose perspective these two reference points are proposed? From jnAni's or

ajnAni's ? or may be that they are not from subjective perspective but

objectively (from neutral reference point) " AS IS " ?

 

It can't be from jnAni's persepective, because for jnAni there is no duality of

any kind is permitted let alone duality of reference points. Since jnAni's

reference point is suppose to be non-dual, these two point explanantion will not

be from jnAni's point of view.

 

So also it can't be from a neutral point, because we will end up with duality of

two reference points which is objective and which will cause Advaita-hAni.

 

Howevere, it can be from ajnAni, because duality of any kind is tolerated for

ajnAni. In that case, the very proposition of two reference points itself is

another case of ajnAna and begs the question why would Sankara's advaita offer

teaching invoking two fold reference points, which themselves are avidyAtmaka?

We ajnAni's are already derailed with presence of duality in this world and what

is the need to confuse us with one more duality?

 

The only solution is to propose that these two reference points are mutually

excusive. Meaning, as long as we are in vyavahAra, there is no pAramArtha exist.

As soon as we reach pAramArtha there is no vyavahAra. This is the reason

Madhusudhana Sarswati has said that the very negation of vyavahAra itself is

Brahman(which is nothing but pAramArtha). It is not like one will realize

Brahman and then negate this world. But the act of negation itself will lead one

to realize Brahman which is pAramArtha.

 

The above solution of Madhusudhana address the logical difficulty, however it

does not address our current issue about teachings.

 

Let me explain, the mutual exclusivity of existence of vyavahAra and pAramArtha

makes a peculiar either-or situation, where either everybody are ajnAnis in

vyavahAra (this notion of " everybody " itself is the sign of vyavahAra) OR I am

jnAni period, and no question about others at all. As long as I perceive

existence of a single jnAni and a ajnAni in this world, it means I myself is a

ajnAni because " I " still perceiving duality of ajnAni-jnAni bhEda. So, as long

as I perceive a person labeled as " jIvan mukta jnAni " it is 100% sure that I

myself an ajnAni. In that case how on the earth I am going to learn any vEdAnta

from a teacher who supposed to be called " jIvan mukta " and " jnAni " ? So, one who

teaches is not jnAni or jnAni can not be expected to exist and teach!.

 

Another major logical problem is, devoid of real teacher and efficacy of

teachings, how did I even know that duality is ignorance in the first place?!

May be labeling duality as " ignorance " itself could be a case of encapsulating

ignorance, for the duality is very much given and begs explanation?

 

This is the crux of the problem if I can dare to say.

 

 

> (1) The reference point of Vyavaharika pertains to the presence of mAyA or

mithyA.

>

> (2) The reference point of Paramarthika corresponds to the absence of mAyA

(absolute reality)

>

 

As pointed out above, reference point from which these two reference points are

said to exist is problematic one.

 

 

> There are two classifications of Jiva – Jnani (with wisdom) and Ajnani (with

ignorance)

>

 

It is the case of " either-or " , else danger of proposing duality of jIva-s and

causes advaita-hAni.

 

 

> Our immediate next step is to understand the interrelationship between the

above two classifications of Jeeva and the two reference points of realities.

These interrelationships can be summarized by the following statements:

>

> (1) Ajnani's reference point is always Vyavaharika since the Ajnani dwells in

duality and perceives it as real.

>

> (2) Jnani's reference point is Paramarthika since Jnani dwells in non-duality

without any influence of mAyA.

>

> (3) The world that we live includes two reference points and the two

classifications of Jnani and Ajnani. Both Jnanis and and Ajnanis live in the

world.

 

That means we have two-ness " this world " and " jnAni " (in fact three-ness

" jnAni " , " ajnAni " and " this world " )

 

>The Jananis perceive the world with the non-dual frame of reference

 

May be jnAni's attitude is of non-dual framework, but is the " world " same as

jnAni or different ontologically? If same there is no question of perception at

all. If different, then duality of ontological existence and Advaita-hAni.

 

>and the Ajnani perceives the world within the Vyavaharika frame of reference.

We the Ajnanis can't distinguish between who is a Jnani and who is >a Ajnani.

Any other inference that we derive depends purely based on beliefs,

understanding and conviction. Such inferences will likely vary >becasue the

understanding, beleif and conviction vary!

>

 

It looks like with the framework of vyavahAra-pAramArtha reference points, we

did not really solve the current issue on teachings by jnAni teacher.

 

Any disagreements?

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

Namaste Srinivasji:

 

As I have said in the beginning that any understanding totally depends on our

Belief, background and conviction. As for as I know, you have a strong

background in Dwaita philsophy and you have strong conviction to your belief. I

admire your faith and devotion and I fully respect your opinion even though I

may disagree. Everything I have said comes from my background, my belief and

understanding of Sankara's advaita philsophy. I am not an expert and my

understanding is not perfect and that may explain why I actively participate in

the Satsangh.

 

I am not interested in arguing with you and I have no interest in questioning

your belief and your understanding. You shouldn't surprised that the views

expressed in this list by various discussants do not agree with your beliefs and

your understanding.

 

With my warm regards,

 

Ram Chandran

 

 

advaitin , " Srinivas Kotekal " <kots_p wrote:

>

> Namaste Sri.Ram Chandaran-ji,

[Guest guest]

Srinivas - PraNAms

 

First Shyam, Jaishankar and Shastriji have addressed the issue of mithya aspect

in terms of sat asat vilakshanam - and in the process answered your question,

repeatedly.

 

Mithyaa aspect comes from the scripture directly although that specific word is

not used, even much before Madhusuudhana defined. He provides they five

definitions that were in operation.

 

There is no adviata haani if one understands correctly what mithyaa means. That

remains the fundamental problem in your repeated questions, as has been pointed

by Shyamji as well as JaiShankarji.

 

You question from whose prepective the paaramaarthika -I am sure you know it

from whose perspective it is before you present dialectic arguments.

 

vaachaarmabhanam vikaaro naamadehyam - says scriptures taking the example of

cause and its effects - gold and its ornaments or clay and pots - from whose

perspective?

 

Ring is an object but there is no separate padaartham to count

as 1) gold and 2) ring, to have dviata and to have advaita haani. Ring is gold

only with vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam - in hindi naamkevaaste - Ring

does not count as two. That is why mithyaa is not sat.

 

Ring is mithyaa since it is substantively not there - there is padam but not

ringly padaartham. Gold does not undergo any real transformation to become ring

and necklace. These examples are provided before Uddalaka goes into discussion

of creation of many from one - bahasyaam, prajaayeya - Let ME become many and

became many. These are transformationless transformations. Since ring has

transactional utility different from that of bangle - it is called vyaavahaarika

satyam or mityaa. Ring does not violate advaita of gold.

 

Hence ring is neither sat like gold nor asat like vandhyaaputraH since it has

transactional utility or vyaavahaarika satyam. You mentioned before you do not

believe in transactional reality.

 

We do as it is the scientific approach that involves acceptence of two realities

- that is the essence of Advaita too.

 

One is that which is there but which never undergoes a change- like gold

the other is that which is there but undergoes change - like a ring

 

These are example for illustration - gold remains as gold but ring can undergo

change into bangle or bracelet etc - naama and ruupa, while the substantive

remain the same.

 

Hence adviatic understanding requires nitya anitya vastu veveka - those that

does not change during trasformations and those that do change. One is called

paarmaarthika and the other is called vyaavahaarika -

 

Paaramaarthika + vyaavahaarika is not adviata haani - like gold plus ring are

not two - gold itself in the ring form and ring name and also in bangle form and

bangle name; although ring is vyavahaarically different from bangle. jnaani is

the one who knows ring, bangle,the varities of names and forms of gold and also

knows they are substantially nothing but one Au or gold.

 

Putting both nithya and anithya into one basket and counting as two separate

entities is what advaita calls as a-viveka - since viveka involves

discrimination of the two - discriminting gold from ring does not involve

separting gold from ring. It requires understanding that ring is nothing but

gold with name and form. so is the bangle. Understanding of oneness of gold in

the ring, bangle and necklace does not mean destruction of the names and forms -

it is understanding that inspite of apparent duality, the essence is one - gold.

Non-duality inspite of duality.

 

Now go back to your questions and you can answer it yourself if you have

understood what mithya really means.

 

Who says existence alone was there before creation - obviously the one who

knows. Since creation itself is beginningless, that existence alone was there

before the creation has to come from scriptures only. sadeva idam agra aseet -

aatmaa idam agra aseet - tat aikshataa - bahusyaam - etc can come only from

scriptures - and so is the statement - vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadeyam and

aitadaatmyam idagam sarvam tat satyam - tat tvam asi - sarvam khalu idam brahma

and neha naanaasti kicana, brahma vit appnoti param, brahma vit brahma eva

bhavati - etc are all scriptural declarions to see the oneness that is

permeating as the nithya vastu in all the mityaa vastus.

 

You do not have to go to dailectic arguments of Adviata siddhi to understand the

mityaa aspect of advaita.

 

As I mentioned I will definitely address those five definitions of mityaa

presented in the Adviata Siddhi in time.

 

The above answer is not different from what Shyam or Jaishankarji gave. But I do

not think you really want to undersand mithyaa aspect from adviata perspective.

 

From gold-smith's persepctive all are nothing but gold alone - eka eva

advitiiyam - santam shivam advaitam caturtham manyante sa aatmaa sa vijneyaH.

Does he sees the ring is different from bangle and bracelet - of course he does

knowing verywell they are nothing but gold and value depends on their gold

content. Jnaani is the one who knows that Brahma satyam, jagat mithyaa, jivo

brahma eva naaparaH -That is he has adviata jnaanam. Only from jnaani's

perspective the paarmaarthika is different from vyaavahaarika - only from gold

mith knows that gold is different from ring form or bangle form. ajaani might

have heard about brahma but has no knowledge that he is that Brahman.

 

As Ram mentioned I also do not have further interest of discussing Adviata

Siddhi here. I will discuss those definitions in the knowledge series when I am

ready

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

 

 

--- On Wed, 3/11/09, Srinivas Kotekal <kots_p wrote:

 

 

 

From whose perspective these two reference points are proposed? From jnAni's or

ajnAni's ? or may be that they are not from subjective perspective but

objectively (from neutral reference point) " AS IS " ?

[Guest guest]

I personally feel that the vivartavAda analogies - gold & ring, clay &

pot, etc - have been overdone, so much so that some people tend to

equate advaita-vedAnta with vivartavAda, which is certainly not the

intention of the great AchArya-s of yore.

 

All analogies have their limitations and so does the language of

substantative and attribute. If we just stick to one analogy, we only

end up constricting our own understanding.

 

The law of conservation of matter/energy can be a good way of

explaining advaita. Matter/energy cannot be destroyed, it only appears

in one form or the other. So while matter/energy does not have a

specific form, all forms are essentially matter/energy.

 

Likewise, brahman has no nAmarUpa in particular, and yet all

nAmarUpa-s are essentially brahman.

 

A chameleon may appear red, green, blue or yellow or some combination

of all these. What is the colour of the chameleon? It has no colour in

particular and yet all colours belong to it.

 

Ramesh

 

2009/3/12 kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada:

>

>

> vaachaarmabhanam vikaaro naamadehyam - says scriptures taking the example of

> cause and its effects - gold and its ornaments or clay and pots - from whose

> perspective?

>

> Ring is an object but there is no separate padaartham to count

> as 1) gold and 2) ring, to have dviata and to have advaita haani. Ring is

> gold only with vaachaarambhanam vikaaro naamadheyam - in hindi naamkevaaste

> - Ring does not count as two. That is why mithyaa is not sat.

>

[Guest guest]

Namaste all participants in this thread.

 

An analogy is employed to articulate a teaching or thought. The gold-gold

ornaments analogy is thus used to contrast Reality and mithyA. However, it

seems, we often get carried away by the analogy in as much as we apply it in

toto as though it is the very thing against which it is contrasted. Thus,

without any warning, we tend to jump all of a sudden from gold ring to jnAni.

 

If one is to understand the efficacy an analogy, one must also understand its

limited scope. If one wants to go farther than the scope, one should

necessarily stick to the analogy itself and extend it to see how it serves the

purpose of clarification.

 

In gold-gold ornaments analogy, let us, therefore, make the ring self-realize

(instead of going to the jnAni without any warning) and see what happens. The

ring will now *know* that it is nothing other than gold. That *knowledge*

implies a situation where gold cannot exist as other than itself. Ring has

*become* gold which it had always been.

 

If the ring now looks around and sees other ornaments like bangles, chains etc.

as before and say that they are all gold, then one has to assume that the ring

has not self-realized in an advaitic manner; but, it is only mouthing an

understanding. Why? Because if it has *realized* the advaita (the real

secondlessness) of gold that there is nothing but gold, there is no scope left

for it to *see* anything other than gold and then to call it gold. There is no

place in that *realization* for forms like ring, bangle, chain etc. The

erstwhile ring now *sees* nothing but gold. It is self-realized. It is gold.

It is not a self-realized ring. No more any talk of ring.

 

To articulate this point further, please permit me to use another example.

There is a magician performing a trick. He produces a rabbit from nothingness

and nowhere. This can be viewed from three specific view-points:

 

1. You are totally spellbound and really believe that the magician has the

capacity to create something out of nothing and nowhere. You are a stark ajnAni

now.

 

2. A knowledgeable guy passes by and tells you that it is all pure legerdemain.

You take him to be a perfect authority on the subject and have absolute faith in

him. Or else, you have read some authoritative book on magic which says

creating something out of nothing is simply impossible and that the rabbit show

is a trick. You do not, however, yet know how the trick is *actually performed*

and where the previously non-existent rabbit materializes from. You enjoy the

show in spite of your *understanding* that it is all a trick. You may be called

wise now because, on credible authority, you know that what the magician does is

a trick. Yet you are ignorant - ignorant-wise rather - because you don't have

any *actual knowledge of the secret of the trick*. You are now the jnAni of

School 1.

 

3. Now the magician takes kindly to you and he invites you home. He then

confirms that what he performed was actually a sleight of hand. He reveals his

*secret* to you and makes you repeatedly perform the trick. You now *know the

truth* and have the confidence to perform the trick yourself. What are you now?

A magician! You are now the jnAni of School 2. The trick no more interests you

because you now have *realized* that it is a worthless trick. You don't create

anything out of nothing. Only whatever was there before seemed to be created.

From your realized state of a magician, you can now laugh the miraculously

created rabbit, why even the whole trick, away.

 

We have to understand the limitations of this example and avoid asking untenable

questions over it. It is just mundane like any other example and is solely

employed here to articulate the difference between what School 1 and 2 are

saying.

 

Thus, the jnAni of School 2 has no duality to confront because he has *realized*

the *advaitic secret* (Truth) of Himself which seemed before to be a split

spectrum of himself as a limited being and an objectified world of multiplicity.

The vibgyor of the rainbow has returned to permanent rest in its very source -

the monochromatic brilliance of the Sun of Knowledge.

 

Best regards.

 

Madathil Nair

[Guest guest]

PraNams

 

Just for clarification.

 

The example of gold - ornaments and vaachaarambanam vikaaro naamadheyam - and

example of clay and pots and example of iron and its tools are not from any

aacharya. It comes from Shruti itself directly- how eka vijnaanena sarva

vijnaanam bhavati - the relation between cause and its effect - that effect is

nothing but cause itself in different from - knowing the cause all the effects

are 'as well as known'. Udaalaka after proving the point using loukika example,

then only he goes into the cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world

with sat eva soumya idam agra asiit, etc.

 

Shankara uses the scriptural example to drive the point that for every mithyaa,

satya is the basis - again following the scriptural statement - aitadaatmyam

idam sarvam, tat satyam - the essence of all this .. this and this - the entire

world is the sat - which was there before the creation and that satyam is you -

tat tvam asi - swetaketo.

 

Vidyaranya in his Anubuutiprakaaksha Ch. 3 spends considerable discussion of

adhaara and adheya knowledge - knowledge of pot vs knowledge of clay - one the

superficial knowledge and the other substantial knowledge. It is not over

emphasis on pot and clay or gold and ring - it is THE emphasis since it is

scripturally based.

 

The anvaya and vyatireka logic follows closely these example - pot is there clay

is there and pot is not there clay is still there - Pot has dependence existence

and clay has independent existence - pot need not be destroyed to see the clay -

That is the jnaanam. I do not have to destroy the pot to discover the clay or

destroy the ring to discover the gold - since these are names and forms without

substantives - vaachaarambhanam vikaarao naamadheyam.

 

Comes directly from the scriptures not from doctrines. Hence mithyaa is inherent

in scriptural description of the world using the concrete examples - hence we

have shruti, yukti and anubhava to go by to support the doctrine.

 

That is the point I was driving in ascertaining mithyaa aspect of the world for

Shree Srinivas.

 

Any other example and descriptions follows the scriptural examples; as the

scriptural examples are direct and have immediate relevance. Anyway that is my

opinion.

 

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sri,Sadananda-ji,

 

 

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>

>

 

> Comes directly from the scriptures not from doctrines. Hence mithyaa is

inherent in scriptural description of the world using the concrete examples -

hence we have shruti, yukti and anubhava to go by to support the doctrine.

>

 

The concept of " mithyatva " is not inherent in scriptures. Quoted shrutis are not

explicit and are savakasha type and can be rendered in any way. In adviata, the

doctrine of " mithyatva " is derived from logic (anumAna) alone. Why else do you

think Shankara has to establish mithyattva on logic in his commentary on

vaitathya prakaraNa? He explicitly says that this prakaraNa is meant to prove

the mithyattvam of world using anumAna: tatra upapattyA.api dvaitasya vaitathyaM

shakyate.avadhArayituM iti dvitIyaM prakaraNamArabhate

 

He mentions the avayavas of an anumAna while commenting on 2.4:

 

kArikA:

antaHsthAnAttu bhedAnAM tasmAjjAgarite smR^itam.h |

yathA tatra tathA svapne saMvR^itatvena bhidyate || 4||

 

Shankara's bhAShya:

jAgraddR^ishyAnAM bhAvAnAM vaitathyamiti pratij~nA | dR^ishyatvAditi hetuH |

svapnadR^ishyabhAvavaditi dR^iShTAntaH | yathA tatra svapne

dR^ishyAnAM bhAvAnAM vaitathyaM tathA jAgarite.api

dR^ishyatvamavishiShTamiti hetUpanayaH | tasmAjjAgarite.api

vaitathyaM smR^itamiti nigamanam.h |

 

Translation:

 

The objects seen in the waking state are false -- thus is the to-be-proven

statement. 'On the account of it being perceived', thus is the antecedent.

'Similar to the objects seen in the dream' is the analogy. 'The perceptibility

of false objects in dream is indistinguishable from that of the objects in the

waking state', thus is the upanaya (application of antecedent). 'Therefore, the

objects of waking state are also false, thus is known' is the conclusion.

 

Above anumAna employed by Shankara is based on famous syllogism called

" mithyatvAnumAna " or " drishyatvAnumAna " of Advaita. Its general definition as,

 

" vimatam mithyA drishyatvAt, yad drishyam tan mithyA yathA shukti rajatavat " .

 

" As object of knowledge, this world is neither real nor unreal, because, that

which is object of knowledge is mithyA, just as the silver in the silver-shell

illusion is "

 

Here " drishyatva " (observable or being the 'object of knowledge') is used as

hEtu (proof). So your cntension that shruti is proof for mithyatvam is uncalled

for. You have been confused the application of mithyatvam on shruti statement

(to drive its meaning) with the proof of mithyatvam itself. To repeat, shruti is

not the proof for mithyatvam but the logic is the proof. Shruti is just being

applied with this mithya concept and its meaning is declared.

 

Rest of your argument is based on this wrong premise and can be ignored.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

advaitin@ s.com, kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada@ ...>

wrote:

>

>

 

> Comes directly from the scriptures not from doctrines. Hence mithyaa is

inherent in scriptural description of the world using the concrete examples -

hence we have shruti, yukti and anubhava to go by to support the doctrine.

>

 

The concept of " mithyatva " is not inherent in scriptures. Quoted shrutis are not

explicit

 

Srinivas - it is not explicit but implicit - logically there are things that

continuously change and everything that continously change must have that is

changeless - that is the low of conservation very basic for science and vedanta.

The basis of vaacharambhanam vikaro naamadheyam is what so called explicitly

implicit statement for mithyaa.

 

Yes dvaitins' understanding differ. Let us stop our discussion with that.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

Madathil-ji,

 

I am sorry but your description of school-1 is faulty.

 

2009/3/12 Madathil Rajendran Nair <madathilnair:

>

> If the ring now looks around and sees other ornaments like bangles, chains

> etc. as before and say that they are all gold, then one has to assume that

> the ring has not self-realized in an advaitic manner; but, it is only

> mouthing an understanding. Why? Because if it has *realized* the advaita

> (the real secondlessness) of gold that there is nothing but gold, there is

> no scope left for it to *see* anything other than gold and then to call it

> gold. There is no place in that *realization* for forms like ring, bangle,

> chain etc. The erstwhile ring now *sees* nothing but gold. It is

> self-realized. It is gold. It is not a self-realized ring. No more any talk

> of ring.

 

Granted. But from the perspective of other rings, there is still such

a thing as a self-realized ring - an empirical reality. The other

rings enjoy the realized ring's presence, hear its teachings and so

forth. The point that school-1 is trying to make is simply that

**empirically speaking**, the self-realized ring continues to appear

as a ring.

 

The person who realizes transcends his individuality, but the

**empirical processes** of sensual perception, inter-personal

communication, consumption of food, etc continue as before. And

empirically speaking, there can be several such persons. This is the

simple idea of jIvanmukti. After this, whether you refer to such

persons as jnAnI-s or insist that " there is only jnAnI " is just a

matter of semantics.

 

 

>

> 2. A knowledgeable guy passes by and tells you that it is all pure

> legerdemain. You take him to be a perfect authority on the subject and have

> absolute faith in him. Or else, you have read some authoritative book on

> magic which says creating something out of nothing is simply impossible and

> that the rabbit show is a trick. You do not, however, yet know how the trick

> is *actually performed* and where the previously non-existent rabbit

> materializes from. You enjoy the show in spite of your *understanding* that

> it is all a trick. You may be called wise now because, on credible

> authority, you know that what the magician does is a trick. Yet you are

> ignorant - ignorant-wise rather - because you don't have any *actual

> knowledge of the secret of the trick*. You are now the jnAni of School 1.

 

This clearly shows that you have not understood school-1 in the first

place. I am not even remotely suggesting that school-2 is wrong, only

that you are insisting on your kind of semantics and thereby trying to

demolish other expressions by erecting strawmen as above.

 

 

Ramesh

 

--

santoShaH paramo lAbhaH satsa~NgaH paramA gatiH I

vicAraH paramaM j~nAnaM shamo hi paramaM sukham II

- yoga vAsiShTha

[Guest guest]

Sadaji,

 

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>

>> The concept of " mithyatva " is not inherent in scriptures. Quoted shrutis are

not explicit

>

> Srinivas - it is not explicit but implicit –

 

That is mere assumption.

 

>logically there are things that continuously change and everything that

continously change must have that is changeless –

 

Why would that make the " change " as sat-asat-vilaxaNa (mithya)? If entity that

undergoes change is accepted as real, why would the change itself is not real

but called sat-asat-vilaxaNa (mithya)?

 

>that is the low of conservation very basic for science and vedanta.

 

But in Science, both entity and its " change " are real. There is no such thing as

" sat-asat-vilaxaNa " or " mithya " in Science you know!

 

 

>The basis of vaacharambhanam vikaro naamadheyam is what so called explicitly

implicit statement for mithyaa.

>

 

vaacharambhanam vikaro naamadheyam was *interpreted* using mithyatva concept,

but it was never *proof* to establish the doctrine of mithyatvam. This

distinction must not be ignored.

 

 

> Yes dvaitins' understanding differ. Let us stop our discussion with that.

>

 

Sadaji, forget about dvaitins for a moment, but you have not addressed sAkshAta

Shankara's stand on logical proof for mithayatvam. You have conveniently ignored

that part.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

Sadananda-ji,

 

I was not suggesting that the gold-ring or clay-pot analogies are

faulty. Yes the shaastra-s mention them but there is nothing to

suggest that one cannot use other analogies or use the same analogies

more imaginatively.

 

advaita-vedAnta is a living tradition and throughout history, it has

always interacted with various other schools/disciplines and made

intelligent use of their tools/methods. The traditional study of

advaita always included the study of the nyAya, vaisheShika, sAMkhya,

pAtanjala yoga and mImAMsa, besides vyAkaraNa and mantra-shAstra. In

today's context all of this may not be possible or even useful but

surely one needs to make imaginative use of the advances in science &

formal logic and incorporate them into our understanding. Some of the

old pUrvapakSha-s may not be relevant today, but new ones keep arising

and they need to be addressed.

 

Even the shaastra-s are not static. Many great grantha-s have been

composed over the centuries and new ones will keep coming. Certain

issues within the advaita tradition that were relevant centuries ago

are no longer relevant today, but new issues keep coming up. For

example, kramamukti would have been a big issue in the old days, but

in today's context it is hardly worth discussing.

 

I agree that the specifics of the shruti become an important issue

while debating with the dvaitins, but IMO that debate is no longer a

primary concern. This is perhaps a little off-topic for this list, but

one of my pet peeves is that the classical scholarly tradition in

India has become divorced from developments in other fields.

advaita-vedAnta is still chugging along and there are quite a few

people with advanced education in other fields (such as yourself) who

are fairly deep scholars in advaita. But the overall scholastic

tradition is not in the best of health in intellectual terms.

 

 

Ramesh

 

 

2009/3/12 kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada:

>

> PraNams

>

> Just for clarification.

>

> The example of gold - ornaments and vaachaarambanam vikaaro naamadheyam -

> and example of clay and pots and example of iron and its tools are not from

> any aacharya. It comes from Shruti itself directly- how eka vijnaanena sarva

> vijnaanam bhavati -

 

--

santoShaH paramo lAbhaH satsa~NgaH paramA gatiH I

vicAraH paramaM j~nAnaM shamo hi paramaM sukham II

- yoga vAsiShTha

[Guest guest]

Ramesh-ji,

 

Please see within .

______________

 

> Granted. But from the perspective of other rings, there is still such

> a thing as a self-realized ring - an empirical reality. The other

> rings enjoy the realized ring's presence, hear its teachings and so

> forth. The point that school-1 is trying to make is simply that

> **empirically speaking**, the self-realized ring continues to appear

> as a ring.

 

[MN: Will School 1 agree to the above? To my knowledge, School 1 has

consistently ridiculed the idea of transcendence of individuality in

self-realization. I see that you have admitted below that there indeed is

transcendence of inviduality. Your understanding of School 1 is, therefore,

wrong. I have no problem with what you have said above since empirical 'reality'

is the result of adhyAsa.]

__________________________

>

> The person who realizes transcends his individuality, but the

> **empirical processes** of sensual perception, inter-personal

> communication, consumption of food, etc continue as before.

 

[i will read this part of your mail thus: " The person who realizes transcends

his individuality. However, inspite of his transcendence, he would still appear

to the transactional as an individuality capable of perceiving, communicating,

eating, and performing all other empirical functions as before. " ]

___________________________

 

 

> Empirically speaking, there can be several such persons. This is the

> simple idea of jIvanmukti. After this, whether you refer to such

> persons as jnAnI-s or insist that " there is only jnAnI " is just a

> matter of semantics.

 

[MN: Can go with you. Of course, empirically speaking.]

_____________________

 

> This (MN's understanding of School 1, which is No. 2 in the magician example)

clearly shows that you have not understood school-1 in the first

> place. I am not even remotely suggesting that school-2 is wrong, only

> that you are insisting on your kind of semantics and thereby trying to

> demolish other expressions by erecting strawmen as above.

 

[MN: As long as School 1 maintains that there is no transcendence of

individuality, the divergence between Schools 1 and 2 is not a matter of pure

semantics. Thus, there are no strawmen erected or bashed.]

 

Madathil Nair

[Guest guest]

Srinivas-ji,

 

2009/3/12 Srinivas Kotekal <kots_p:

>

> Why would that make the " change " as sat-asat-vilaxaNa (mithya)? If entity

> that undergoes change is accepted as real, why would the change itself is

> not real but called sat-asat-vilaxaNa (mithya)?

>

 

The question of change and continuity is a fundamental philosophical

question and different explications of it are at the heart of

different Indian traditions, not just advaita & dvaita but all the

rest including the bauddha-s and jaina-s.

 

As to the issue of " reality " , in the advaita context " real " is that

which cannot be sublated/negated. At the other extreme are phenomena

such as the hare's horns that cannot be established at all. In the

middle are changeful phenomena categorized as mithyA. This is a

classification with a soteriological intent and so your arguments do

not impact it in any way.

 

Ramesh

--

santoShaH paramo lAbhaH satsa~NgaH paramA gatiH I

vicAraH paramaM j~nAnaM shamo hi paramaM sukham II

- yoga vAsiShTha

[Guest guest]

--- On Thu, 3/12/09, Ramesh Krishnamurthy <rkmurthy wrote:

 

 

I agree that the specifics of the shruti become an important issue

while debating with the dvaitins, but IMO that debate is no longer a

primary concern..

 

Shree Ramesh - praNams

 

Yes your points are well taken. Only shruti statements are pertinent even today

- hence the emphasis. I do take example of fundamental particles as the building

blocks for all object in the universe, even though we distinguish based on the

attributes objects and their utilities.

 

Anyway as long as the cuase-effect relations are clear the truth is clear.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

2009/3/12 Madathil Rajendran Nair <madathilnair:

> [i will read this part of your mail thus: " The person who realizes

> transcends his individuality. However, inspite of his transcendence, he

> would still appear to the transactional as an individuality capable of

> perceiving, communicating, eating, and performing all other empirical

> functions as before. " ]

 

But wasn't Shyam-ji pointing out precisely this in so many of his mails?

 

>

> [MN: As long as School 1 maintains that there is no transcendence of

> individuality, the divergence between Schools 1 and 2 is not a matter of

> pure semantics. Thus, there are no strawmen erected or bashed.]

 

I am pretty sure no advaitin would conceive of a mukti without

transcendence of individuality, i.e. giving up the dehAtmabuddhi or

more generally not identifying with the BMI. I am pretty sure no one

in school-1 was advocating retention of individuality. All of them (at

least Dennis-ji and Sada-ji) were only emphasizing the continuance of

empirical transactions after mukti - which is why I repeatedly said

(even earlier) that the whole debate is occurring only because you are

insisting on using the word jnAnI in a pAramArthika sense, whereas

school-1 is using it in an empirical sense.

 

I hope that provides some samanvaya

 

Ramesh

 

--

santoShaH paramo lAbhaH satsa~NgaH paramA gatiH I

vicAraH paramaM j~nAnaM shamo hi paramaM sukham II

- yoga vAsiShTha

[Guest guest]

Ramesh-ji,

 

advaitin , Ramesh Krishnamurthy <rkmurthy wrote:

>

> As to the issue of " reality " , in the advaita context " real " is that

> which cannot be sublated/negated. At the other extreme are phenomena

> such as the hare's horns that cannot be established at all. In the

> middle are changeful phenomena categorized as mithyA.

 

> This is a

> classification with a soteriological intent and so your arguments do

> not impact it in any way.

>

 

 

The problem is not that simple. Mithya has been said to be sat-ast-vilaxaNa.

This means mithya is *different* (vilaxaNa) from both sat and asat. There are

two differences in the definition of mithyatvam.

 

Now, look at the first vailaxaNa where mithya is *different* from sat. (Forget

about other difference for a moment). What is the reality status of this first

difference itself? Sat, mithya or asat? It can't be asat otherwise mithya would

have to redefine as 'asat-vilaxaNa' only. It can't be another mithya, for that

would run into infinite regress. So, only remaining option for us to say is this

first " difference " is sat only.

 

Now, if some of you from Scholl-1 posit mithyatvam along side with jnAni in

pAramArtha, then it would mean that you need to preserve two differences (one

from sat and other from asat) in pAramArtha. These two difference themselves

have to be sat in order to make meaningful sense of mithyatvam. This multi-sat

in pAramArtha – on one side is jnAni and other side these " real " differences

which never sublated. Difference implies duality. That's the reason I was

alluding to Advaita-hAni dOSha if one were to posit presence of mithyatva from

pAramArthika perspective.

 

For that Sada-ji and Shyam-ji (and Jaishankar-ji also?) saying sat + mithya does

not make two sattya-s. But my contention was not that and it was misunderstood.

Sat + mithya vastu (jagat) does not cause Advaita hAni, no doubt, but sat +

" mithyatvam " does definitely causes Advaita-hAni as explained above. That's the

reason Acharya Shankara says " na cha agneriva AtmA Atmani viShayaH " The Self is

not an object of knowledge for the Self. This is his denial of any knowership in

pAramArtha.

 

I appreciate if you and others can note the difference here, which is difference

between calling something as " mithya " and the concept of mithyatvam itself.

 

Hope this clear now.

 

Regards,

Srinivas.

[Guest guest]

advaitin , Ramesh Krishnamurthy <rkmurthy wrote:

 

> I am pretty sure no advaitin would conceive of a mukti without

> transcendence of individuality, i.e. giving up the dehAtmabuddhi or

> more generally not identifying with the BMI. I am pretty sure no one

> in school-1 was advocating retention of individuality. All of them (at

> least Dennis-ji and Sada-ji) were only emphasizing the continuance of

> empirical transactions after mukti - which is why I repeatedly said

> (even earlier) that the whole debate is occurring only because you are

> insisting on using the word jnAnI in a pAramArthika sense, whereas

> school-1 is using it in an empirical sense.

>

> I hope that provides some samanvaya

>________________

 

[MN: Sorry. This is not samanwaya. We are back to square one. The words

" giving up dehAtmabuddhi or more generally not identifying with the BMI " do not

sound like actual transcendence of individuality. They sound like the actions

of a tight-rope walker, i.e. sort of deliberate. The transendence of jnAni is

so spontaneous and natural that there is no scope for even an iota of

BMI/individuality from his view-point, which actually is a vyAvaharika view

point (advaitic conclusion) of what paramArtha is like. There is no mixing up

here as you seem to imply. From the empirical, what is witnessed as *a* jnAni

is, therefore, only an 'as though refraction of Truth'. If School 1 accepts

this, let us hear it from the horses' mouths.]

 

Madathil Nair

[Guest guest]

H.N.Sreenivasa MurthyPranams to all.advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote:Dear Sri Sadananda, You have stated :"Jnaani is the one who has that jnaanam - hence from his understanding

he realizes the paaramarthika satyam - Brahman alone is real and he is

that Brahman. Brahma satyam, jovo brahma eva na aparaH." Is Jnani in vyavaharic dimension or in paramartic dimension?Are these two standpoints Viz. vyavahara and paramartha distinct and different ones? Clarification in detail and verifiable in one's anubhava is requested.With warm and respectful regards,Sreenivasa murthy