Matter

March 23, 2009

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

>

> Chaitanya-ji wrote:

>

> Verses VI & VII

>

> AbhArUpasya vishvasya bhAnaM bhAsaMnidhervinA.

> kadAcinnAvakalpeta bhA cAhaM tena sarvagaH..

----------------------

The first sentence is a tautology i.e.

> cognition of the universe would not be possible without cognition. How

> does that show I am omnipresent?

> Best Wishes,

> Michael.

>

Hari Om Shri Michaelji, Pranaams!

Here is the word to word meaning:

AbhArUpasya - acitrUpasya - jadasya - the inert matter's

vishvasya - jagataH - world's

bhAnam - prakAshaH - shine/effulgence

bhAsannidheH - presence of a light

vinA - without

kadAcit - kadAcit api - by any means

na avakalpeta - na sambhavet - does not happen.

The shine/effulgence of an inert world is not possible without the

proximity/presence of a light.

By matter, we mean inert i.e. which cannot shine, and which is seen. (Any other

definition?). The definition itself is self-contradicting. To be seen it should

shine, but the seen, jada is incapable of shining. So the simple logic is, there

should be a light to light up the matter to see it.

That light could not be seen, if becomes seen, becomes inert and incapable of

shine.

So, the conclusion is:

bhA ca aham : I am the light. (I, the subject, which can never be an object to

be seen, and self-effulgent).

Wherever the matter is there(universe/cosmos...), if it is seen, I am the light.

So I should be there so I become,

tena aham sarvagaH - owing to this I am omnipresent.

The world is not there is the declaration.

Even if you preceive, it will disappear is the samAdhAna.

If world is there, let anyone perceive it in deep-sleep is the challenge.

In Shri Guru Smriti,

Br. Pranipata Chaitanya

March 25, 2009

Chaitanya-ji wrote:

If an object exist, it is possible only in two ways - a. as known to me and b.as not known to me. (The third, unknowable object - alIka vastu is straight dismissed).

|||||||||||||||||||||

Namaste Chaitanya-.ji,

There is a third way I think which is perfectly intelligible. An object that exists that nobody knows about. Right this minute there are crores of such objects. Peter-ji refers to astronomical objects that were surely always there. I think the problem arises when you confuse existing in itself and existing for me.

Namaste Dennis-ji,

I am assuming an average room that is pitch dark until I put the light on. Did the objects in that room, if there are such, exist before I put the light on or not? You need to focus on that question before you go on to state - "Existence of an object is ESTABLISHED by knowledge of its existence." I think the ontology in this statement when it is spelled out has nothing to do with the Berkelean immaterialism which threatens to infect the understanding of it.

Namaste Sada-ji,

you write:

Extending Dennis post - if I have no prior knowledge of the existence of theobjects, then any object existence is, as I called as indeterminate - that means we cannot say an object exists or does not exist

||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

comment == If you mean by ‘an object’ some specific object then what you are saying is that it is not known until it is known, which is not informative. If you are confusing the existence of an object with the knowledge of the object then this is questionable. I do not think that this approach adds anything to the unfolding of the advaitic position on subjects and objects. Why not stay with the traditional Shankarite explication?

Best Wishes,

Michael.

March 25, 2009

Namaste all involved in this thread.

Let us look at this issue from another angle.

We all agree that this vyAvahArika of ours is a seeming split of the non-dual

whereby an 'experiencer' comes into being together with a diversity that is

experienced by him. *The vyAvahArika has validity as vyAvahArika* only as long

as his 'experience-ability' lasts.

The 'experiencer' himself is an object in the vyAvahArika as are all the objects

experienced by him. To whom are they objects? To that witnessing principle who

presides over the whole show.

Now the question is: Is there any difference in status between the

'experiencer' and the 'experienced' with reference to that witnessing principle?

There can't be - because both are 'objects'.

The split being only seeming, one then has to assume that both the " experiencer

and the experienced " always exist in the non-dual witnessing principle. All

that we now know of and all that we will come to know of in future are always

there. It is not with reference to this " experiencer " that we say " I am, what I

see is " . It is with reference to the witnessing principle.

I believe Michael was only trying to say this. Advaita Makaranda hasn't said

anything different.

Best regards.

Madathil Nair

March 25, 2009

--- On Tue, 3/24/09, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

Namaste Sada-ji,

you write:

Extending Dennis post - if I have no prior knowledge of the existence of

theobjects, then any object existence is, as I called as indeterminate - that

means we cannot say an object exists or does not exist

|||||||||||| ||||||||| |||||||||

comment == If you mean by â€˜an objectâ€™ some specific object then what you are

saying is that it is not known until it is known, which is not informative. If

you are confusing the existence of an object with the knowledge of the object

then this is questionable. I do not think that this approach adds anything to

the unfolding of the advaitic position on subjects and objects. Why not stay

with the traditional Shankarite explication?

Micheal - PraNAms

Look at this way.

Without the knowledge of existence of an objects, whether galaxies or some

fundamental particles that they are still searching, their existence is

questionable at best. One can establish by deductive and inductive knowledge the

possibilities of the existence of an object but that can be validated or

invalidated only when the conscious entity steps in. It may sound trivial but it

is not - of course the triviality is also established also by logical analysis

by a conscious entity.

I am not confusing with the existence with the knowledge of its existence - its

existence is anirvacaniiyam without the knowledge of its existence - I have no

confusion there. You cannot prove my gaagaabuubu exists or does not exists

without validation or invalidation by a conscious entity.

Now regarding your last statement - Yes, we are indeed sticking with Shankara's

statement only - which of course requires correct understanding -as there are

schools that claim that Shankara bhaashya has been misunderstood by many

aachaaryas that followed him - they may have their own justification for their

claims. Lakshmidharakavi the author of Advaita Makaranada that

Pranipatacaitanyaji quoted is a recognized scholar in the linage of Shankara

only - and as Brahmacariji pointed out that other aachaaryas have also commented

on that text.

This aspect becomes clearer if we leave bhaashyas where analysis is highly

technical requiring correct interpretation, and look at Shankara's prakaraNa

granthaas where his hands are free to express- The very first sloka of

Dakshinamuurthy sloka starts with this aspect and trickles down into the other

slokas that follow- which Shree Subbu has discussed elaborately and which is

stored in the file. Anirvacaniiya or indeterminacy aspect is also ingrained in

the advaita Vedanta. Brahmasuutra bhaashya is highly technical and I would not

recommend for all seekers. Remember we had discussions on 2-2-28 suutra, and

from what point the adhikaraNa itself is addressed - that is the context - also

has to be properly understood. Anyway, the points are made for whatever it is

worth. If you think it is trivial, so be it - but statement it not incorrect,

even if you think it is useless.

Hari Om!

Sadananda

March 25, 2009

Namaste followers of this thread,

Sadanandaji, thanks for your comments.

Michael has already highlighted the issue I had intended to raise next.

When we say " existence of an object is established by knowledge of its

existence " do we not need to ask, 'to whom' it is established. Is the

existence of the object established universally or just established to the

individual perceiver, the individual knower, ie 'me'.

Actually, the 'to whom' is of profound importance, of course, and where

Advaita comes in. It's in reference to establishing the existence of the

object that I feel our above statement does not reveal anything much.

The question I asked by way of the example of objects discovered in space

raises the possibility that objects exist that I/we do not know about. Yes,

of course, as Sadanandaji says " until we have established either

theoretically or experimentally do we know they all existed? "

My question was/is - can we say they have no existence until knowledge of

their existence arises to 'me'? When we say their existence is

indeterminate aren't we simply saying that my knowledge of their existence

is lacking or uncertain? This is more (or just as much) a statement of 'my'

knowledge than about the existence of an object.

For example, do I have to watch an egg boil for the full six or more minutes

in order for it to harden? If I go to another room while the egg is boiling

does its existence come into question until I return. Or is it simply my

knowledge of the state of the egg which is incomplete until I return? I feel

the same question applies to the Schrodinger's Cat scenario, but this may

simply be my ignorance of the main point is meant to be in Schrodinger's

example.

For the dream state experience we may well argue that when the ideation or

experience of " egg boiling " is not present to the subject the boiling egg

is also not present. The dream egg is nothing but the thought of the

dreamer ego. Can we say the same about objects in the waking state

experience? Gaudapada and Sri Ramana appear to say 'yes we can', whereas I

believe Michael has pointed out that Sankara says something slightly

different in BS Bhashya than he does in his commentary on the Mandukya Up.

In Vedanta Paribhasa we have the description of consciousness going out

through the organ of perception (eg the eye) and going to the space occupied

by the object and being modified into the form of that object. The analogy

is given of water flowing out from a tank into a channel in a field, and

forming itself into the shape of the channel. This modification state is

called a vritti. This view appears to pre-suppose the existence of the

object before consciousness flowed out to that space occupied by the object.

Best wishes,

Peter

March 25, 2009

--- On Wed, 3/25/09, Peter <not_2 wrote:

My question was/is - can we say they have no existence until knowledge of

their existence arises to 'me'? When we say their existence is

indeterminate aren't we simply saying that my knowledge of their existence

is lacking or uncertain? This is more (or just as much) a statement of 'my'

knowledge than about the existence of an object.

------------------

Peter - when we say the existence is indeterminate until I know - it is not only

the indeterminacy of the knowledge of the existence - it is indeterminacy of the

existence of the object itself.

I gave an example of gaagaabuubu object - now its existence or lack of existence

- is it deterministic.

I can reduce its determinacy (not sure if such word exists?) by logically

either deductively or inductively establish that it should exist or it should

not exist etc. That is only a theoretical possibility (at my mental level) of

its existence. I have to confirm perceptually that it does or it does not exist.

But in either case the existence of the object itself is indeterminate until I

determine it- not the knowledge of its existence.

If some one has verified in the past or present that it exists or does not

exists, then I can, from my point, believe in his statement and therefore it

becomes 'shabda pramaaNa' - it remains as hear-say.

From what I know, Vedanta paribhaasha does not say anything about the object's

existence - it discusses how knowledge of the existing object takes place -

hence knower, pramaataa and object prameya are existing for the means of

knowledge pramaaNa to operate and that is what Vedanta paribhaasha deals with.

Hence I do not think that is relevant here.