Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 31

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We are discussing the Vedanta ParibhASha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, based on my

understanding- Continuing the series after a long gap. The previous posts can be

obtained from achieves or from the website – www.advaita.org.uk. where the

numbering system in the website is slightly different.

 

Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge – 31

 

In the previous two posts we have reviewed the basic concepts of Navya Nyaaya

that are applied by VedantaparibhAShaa to establish that the world is mithyaa.

Taking the example of silver seen in nacre, and using the language of Navya

Nyaaya, VP says that silver, where nacre is, is mithyaa. Mithyaavtam or

falisity of silver is established by the recognition of its counterpositive

absence at the locus, nacre. It is recognized that silver is absent at any time

or at all times, even though the dominant attribute of silvery-ness perceived

through the senses motivated further action in terms of picking up the object

thinking that there is real silver there. The counterpositive absence of silver

is recognized when the object was examined closely, when along with the

attributive silvery-ness other attributes that are contradictory to the silver

but those belonging to nacre are perceived.

 

Several conclusions are in order. First, objective knowledge is only attributive

and not substantive. If it had been substantive also then senses could have

grasped the substantive nacre along with its attribute of silvery-ness and no

error could have been committed. Errors arise during perception because

knowledge is not substantial knowledge. The dominant attribute, silvery-ness of

the object, alone was perceived and not the substantive nacre or absentee

silver. Therefore theories that depend on perceptual knowledge as substantial

and not just attributive are incorrect.

 

Second, further transaction along with perception of additional attributes

related to nacre established the fact that the object is nacre and not silver.

Thus attributes establishes the knowledge of the existence of the object,

provided the attributes perceived are sufficiently specific to identify the

object without any ambiguity, while subsequent transaction will establish the

transactional reality to the object or vyaavahaarika satyam. Without relevant

transaction or vyavahaara, the attributive knowledge of any object will only

establish a possibility of the existence of an object (ex. that the perceived

object may be silver) but not its transactional reality, since silver is

counterpositive absent at the locus it is perceived. Implication is that both

jnaanedriayas, the sense organs and karmedriyaas, the organs of action, together

are required to establish the transactional reality, as the word itself

indicates. Without the transactional reality,

the object perceived could be a subjective reality, or to be more accurate,

praatibhaasika satyam. Hallucinations also come under the same category.

 

In the perception of an object, there is cognition followed by recognition.

Cognition occurs by sense input that forms the vRitti of the object (form,

color, etc) and recognition occurs by matching from memory objects with similar

attributes. Naming involves knowing. In the past the object must have been known

based on the attributive content, dominant attribute dominating the perception.

In the present example, the objects that have silvery-ness are normally made of

silver has been established by perception and transaction in the past. That is,

the transactional reality that silver has silvery-ness has been established in

the past. Even though silvery-ness is necessary qualification of the silver

(tarnished silver only means the silver is covered by its oxide that does not

have silvery-ness), the attribute silvery-ness alone is not sufficient to define

the silver. When silver is recognized as counterpositive absent in the nacre, it

is also recognized

that silveryness is not sufficient qualification to determine that the object

is silver. That proverb that ‘all that glitters is not gold’ is an outcome

of the same phenomenon.

 

In the case of the example of perception of silver where nacre is, silver is

mithyaa since its counterpositive absence of its existence is in the place that

it is seen, i.e. nacre. That is, there is absolutely no silver at the locus at

any time. When the object was seen for the first time, due to dominant

attributive silvery-ness of the object seen, it was cognized as silver. It is

not the cognition of real silver but it is cognition of false silver, since

cognitions are based on dominant attributive knowledge of silvery-ness of the

object not the substantive of the object. However, the false or mithyaa silver

is taken as real silver. Hence effort was made to pick up that silver seen. When

the object was picked up, the object was recognized as nacre with the knowledge

that ‘there is no silver here’. This understanding involves not the absence

of silver ‘now’, leaving a doubt that it was silver before. It is absolute

absence of silver all the

times in the place where it was seen. In the terminology of Navya Nyaaya, it

involves existence of the absolute non-existence of silver at all times in the

place where nacre is. Hence it is counterpositive absence involving constant

absence independent of time that includes even when it was originally seen as

silver that prompted the action to pick it up. What is falsified is the silver

but was taken as real at that time, since there is no real silver at the locus

at any time. This definition for mithyaa is effectively one of the five

definitions of falsity that MadhusUdana Saraswati uses in his Advaita Siddhi.

 

We can apply now to the world seen. Whatever seen is mithyaa but is taken as

real just as silver is taken as real. The existence part of the world provides

the basis for the falsity of the world since when we say that the ‘world

is’, it means the world exists – just as the silvery-ness of the object

provided the notion of existence of real silver as silver is there at the locus

perceived. Since the object exists at the transactional level and therefore

world exists at that level. Hence all the worldly transactions; and samsaara or

the resulting suffering associated with the notion of reality to the world

follow. Scripture says I am not what I think I am, but I am the very

substantive of both the subject, the perceiver, and the object i.e. the

perceived world. When I realize that I am not ‘this that I thought I am’

but I am that Brahman, the substantive of all, including the world that I see

and transact with, the reality associated with the

world is falsified. It is recognized as mithyaa – that is counterpositive of

absolute nonexistence at any time at the locus where it is seen. Hence reality

of the world is, it is only attributive knowledge as in the case of attributive

silveryness and there is no substantive world just as there is no substantive

silver in the attributive silver that I perceived. Absolutely real is only

Brahman that I am, which is ever present or eternal and never changing and

infinite-existence-consciousness. All perceptions therefore involved existence

expressed in the attributive forms of the objects joining the consciousness of

the subject to establish the consciousness of the existence of the world. This

is the basis of the perceptuality condition stated earlier. Hence, in the very

introduction to perceptual knowledge we pointed out the following:

“….Dharmaraja Advarindra makes a revealing statement that baffles the

intellect. ‘Pratyaksha pramaa ca atra

caitanyam eva’ – atra, meaning in the direct perceptual knowledge, what is

really revealed as the knowledge is the pure consciousness itself. (He used the

word ‘eva’, meaning consciousness alone). We may need to meditate on the

statement to understand the significance, but what the statement says is direct

and immediate perceptual knowledge is the Brahman- Actually we see that there is

really no need to meditate since meditation is mediate and not immediate. This

is a daring statement since Brahman cannot be perceived, yet he says what is

perceived is Brahman.†– Just as what is perceived is actually nacre but it

is mistaken as silver since one gets carried way by the cognized attributive

content of the object perceived i.e. such as silveryness rather than nacre-ness

in our example. Similarly, when we perceive the world, we are getting carried

away by the attributive content of the objective world and not the substantive

content, which is

Brahman; although the existence of the world is perceived by being conscious of

the existence of the world. Thus perceptions really reveal the existence in the

form of the objects and the consciousness in the form of subject, as both

fundamental sat chit aspect of Brahman, justifying the introductory statement of

DA. Thus the perceptuality condition establishes the Vedic statement – sarvam

khalvidam brahma – all this (perceived) is indeed Brahman.

 

The false world that is seen is falsified or recognized as false in the

realization of Brahman. Falsity of the world is established only with the

realization of the reality of the world and its perception, namely it is

existence and consciousness combined in the perceptuality condition. Just as the

silvery-ness of the object-nacre still remains but the wrong notion that there

is silver is gone in the understanding that it is nacre, the perceptual

objective world remains with the attributive content while one recognizes the

substantive sat-chit nature of the world in all perceptions. Thus mithyaa

attribute of silver remains without assigning substantive reality to the silver.

It is also understood that there the absence of silver is counterpositive

absolute absence at all times that includes even in the past, when I thought

that it was real silver in the object seen. Similarly when I realize Brahman,

the world is recognized as mithyaa and not real that I

thought it was. Hence mityaatvam (unreality or illusory nature, although not

proper translation) of the world is recognized only when I have the clear

understanding that there is only Brahman and I am that Brahman. Knowledge of

Brahman does not negate the world but negates the reality assigned to the world

just as appearance of silver is not negated in the knowledge of nacre but only

reality that this is silver is negated with the knowledge that there is no

silver here in the object nacre, now or ever.

 

With this we have completed the discussion of perception as the pramANa.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda