substantive

[Guest guest]

Namaste Sada-ji,

We disagree on this difficult area and I have put my objections to you

before. I think that they have some merit but you will not agree. Anyway

here they are for the record:

 

You wrote:

In the previous two posts we have reviewed the basic concepts of Navya

Nyaaya

that are applied by VedantaparibhAShaa to establish that the world is

mithyaa.

Taking the example of silver seen in nacre, and using the language of Navya

Nyaaya, VP says that silver, where nacre is, is mithyaa. Mithyaavtam or

falsity of silver is established by the recognition of its counterpositive

absence at the locus, nacre. It is recognised that silver is absent at any

time

or at all times, even though the dominant attribute of silvery-ness

perceived

through the senses motivated further action in terms of picking up the

object

thinking that there is real silver there. The counterpositive absence of

silver

is recognised when the object was examined closely, when along with the

attributive silvery-ness other attributes that are contradictory to the

silver

but those belonging to nacre are perceived.

 

Several conclusions are in order. First, objective knowledge is only

attributive

and not substantive. If it had been substantive also then senses could have

grasped the substantive nacre along with its attribute of silvery-ness and

no

error could have been committed. Errors arise during perception because

knowledge is not substantial knowledge. The dominant attribute,

silvery-ness of

the object, alone was perceived and not the substantive nacre or absentee

silver. Therefore theories that depend on perceptual knowledge as

substantial

and not just attributive are incorrect.

 

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Namaste,

 

Is it valid to draw conclusions about the nature of perception from

illusions? Why should the false tell us anything about the true?

Structure you will say is revealed by the sort of errors we make as if

the false were more definitive of the truth than the truth itself. Could

it not also be said that allowing a single quality of an object to be

definative of it is the source of the error i.e. that this construction of

the object as substantive + attributes is the cause of the problem of

illusion and not a reflection of the nature of reality. Qualities lie

within the totality of an object and are not appended to it which is what

we discover when we experience it carefully. In effect we have moved away

from the figment or the illusion which has a structure that reveals only

itself to the reality which has the structure of an object or a totality

which becomes so to speak more and more itself the more we know about it.

 

The question then arises as to what is veridical perception if it is not a

matter of the true knowledge of attributes that gives rise to a true

knowledge of the substantive (object). By the way I am genuinely puzzled

as to where this jargon of substantive and attributes has come from.

Perhaps there is access to some authority that I have not come across.

Leaving that aside in VP we are given an indication of what perceptual

knowledge is on pg. 146(trans).

 

" The validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended.

Spontaneous apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality of

causes that apprehend the substratum of the validity provided no defect is

present. "

 

What does this mean in plain English? Take the paradigm case of being in

front of a tree, a large oak tree, facing it in broad daylight. I remark

to my friend : " That is a fine oak " . The validity of this observation

does not have to be established in any way other that my being there. We

do not have to test for lack of defects because this lack of defects is

the basic condition or default setting if you like of being human. The

structure of true and correct perception is not revealed by anything other

than itself and it seems particularly absurd to suppose that it is

discovered by false perception or illusion. V.P. concurs in this:

 

" For in order that doubt may arise, there must be some defect also in such

a case, and therefore, owing to an absence of the totality of causes of

apprehending the substratum of the validity, which (totality) is bound up

with an absence of defects, there would be no apprehension at all of the

validity of the knowledge. Or spontaneity (self-evidence) is the capacity

of being cognised by all that apprehends the substratum of the validity.

In a case of doubt, although the validity may possess that capacity, yet

it is not apprehended on account of some defect. Hence there is a

reasonable chance for some doubt. " Pg.147,trans.

 

In other words validity is grounded in the proper conditions for

perception. Not having the proper conditions is the basis for error and

illusion. Twilight, distance from a silvery object and so forth are

conditions that should cause us to hesitate to claim validity. The

self-evidence of our senses is compromised in some way and therefore doubt

is reasonable. There is no suggestion in VP that illusion tells us

anything about true and accurate (veridical) perception.

 

Dharmaraja Advarindra the author of VP then goes on to say something which

is directly contrary to the idea that the illusory tells us about the

structure of the veridical.

 

" The invalidity of knowledge, however, is not due to the totality of

causes of knowledge in general, for in that case even valid knowledge

would be invalid; but it is due to some (adventitious) defect. " (pg.148)

 

In other words if all we ever knew were the attributes as the argument

from illusion purports to show then we could never ever be sure whether we

knew the object or not. It would be an inference from its attributes and

thus beyond direct knowledge. Adventitious is a good word for the defect

in that it comes from outside the causes of knowledge as such. There is

an absence of silver because there is an absence of true silveriness. The

inferential is the mark of the non-veridical. Veridical knowledge is

non-inferential, direct and self-evident.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

 

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[Guest guest]

Michael - PraNAms

 

Let me study your post and respond - just rushing to Airport to attend some

non-substantial conference.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

--- On Mon, 6/15/09, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

Namaste Sada-ji,

We disagree on this difficult area and I have put my objections to you

before. I think that they have some merit but you will not agree. Anyway

here they are for the record:

[Guest guest]

Michael - PraNAms

 

Thanks for your input - I am responding in detail for the benefit of everyone

else.

 

--- On Mon, 6/15/09, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

Is it valid to draw conclusions about the nature of perception from

illusions? Why should the false tell us anything about the true?

 

KS:

I am not sure I understand the first question. Assuming your question pertains

about the errors in perception – here is how I would address the issue.

Perception is recognized as false only by the discovering of the substantive or

adhiShTAnam of the false, which has to be more real. In the case of nacre,

transactionally really as when one picks up the silvery-looking object and

finding out that it is not really silver but nacre. Until then false is falsely

taken as real, just as attributive silver in the shell is taken as substantially

true. Substantive of nacre is established only by transaction not by just

perception.

---------------------

Michael:

 

Structure you will say is revealed by the sort of errors we make as if

the false were more definitive of the truth than the truth itself. Could

it not also be said that allowing a single quality of an object to be

definitive of it is the source of the error i.e. that this construction of

the object as substantive + attributes is the cause of the problem of

illusion and not a reflection of the nature of reality.

 

KS: Michael, the fundamental problem lies in the fact that none of the objects

in the universe has swaruupa laxana – that is, in mathematical language, both

necessary and sufficient attribute that defines the object as that object only

and nothing else. The object has attributes, and attributes all together define

the object, and senses can only sense the qualities or attributes. These are the

only available facts that we need to operate in perception.  The perception of

the all the necessary attributes together form complete description of that

perceived object as valid, just as a chemist uses both physical and chemical

properties of a substance to identify that chemical substance. However, each of

the attributes per sec solely cannot form a basis for validation of the

perceived object, unless one uses navya nyaaya category – called jaati - as

necessary and sufficient qualification for an object. For example, chair has the

necessary and sufficient

qualification namely chariness or cowness for cow, horseness of horse, etc.

 

First, advaita does not to jaati as a quality to define the object,

and second, these so-called qualities, chairness or cowness are not uniquely

definable, other than by circular definition that chairness is that what a chair

has or cowness is that what cow has. Chariness or cowness cannot be sensed by

any senses but it is defined only to differentiate from tableness and horseness.

This is part of navya nyaaya classification of its categories.

  

Hence, from perceptual point no one particular quality defines an object

precisely and no substantive is perceived by sense. Hence the errors are

possible – possible is the word here – if the dominant or perceived

attributes cannot uniquely define the object as in the case of silveryness

perceived in the object where nacre is. It might have been real silver perceived

when one sees silveryness but the fact that both nacre and silver have attribute

of silveryness and just by perceiving only that dominant attribute one cannot

uniquely determine whether it is silver or nacre. Since perception does not

include also the substantive, the error in the perception occurred. However at

the time of perception, the silver that is seen where nacre is, is taken as not

false but real. Hence there was an attempt to pick up that silvery looking

object. When the subsequent examination via additional attributes revealed that

there is no silver at any time where the

nacre is. Hence the subsequent operation only revealed the falsity or mityaatva

of silver at the place where nacre is. It is counterpositive since silver is

absent in the object perceived at all times.

 

The point is not only by paaramaarthika point that Brahman is substantive for

the universe which cannot be perceived, even from the point of Vyaavahaarika

perception of the substantive cannot occur by the sense input. Transactional

reality has to be established by transactions, as the very name implies, and its

validity is limited to transactions only, since the very fundamental substantive

is imperceptible.  This is very important to recognize since we give so much

value to perceptual knowledge of the world as real. Taking example of gold and

ornaments, the ornaments ring, necklace etc is perceived objects and upon

analysis we discover there is no substantive for the ring other than gold.

Similarly for pot or any object with form and name. Now if we enquire about

the  gold and clay, again for their perception we have to relay on their

individual attributes to differentiate one from the other. Those attributes are

related to assemblage of more

fundamental substantives, which are the same for both gold and clay. This can

go on  without at arriving any substantive of any object perceived.

Transactionally we can stop at ring and pot or gold and clay, depending on what

level of transaction that we are dealing with.

 

I am writing in detail since we are moving to the next pramANa soon.

 

The rest in my next mail as I have to run for the conference.

 

Hari Om

Sadananda