substantive

[Guest guest]

--- On Mon, 6/15/09, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

 

ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva

substantive

advaitin

Monday, June 15, 2009, 8:21 AM

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Namaste Sada-ji,

We disagree on this difficult area and I have put my objections to you

before. I think that they have some merit but you will not agree. Anyway

here they are for the record:

 

You wrote:

In the previous two posts we have reviewed the basic concepts of Navya

Nyaaya

that are applied by VedantaparibhAShaa to establish that the world is

mithyaa.

Taking the example of silver seen in nacre, and using the language of Navya

Nyaaya, VP says that silver, where nacre is, is mithyaa. Mithyaavtam or

falsity of silver is established by the recognition of its counterpositive

absence at the locus, nacre. It is recognised that silver is absent at any

time

or at all times, even though the dominant attribute of silvery-ness

perceived

through the senses motivated further action in terms of picking up the

object

thinking that there is real silver there. The counterpositive absence of

silver

is recognised when the object was examined closely, when along with the

attributive silvery-ness other attributes that are contradictory to the

silver

but those belonging to nacre are perceived.

 

Several conclusions are in order. First, objective knowledge is only

attributive

and not substantive. If it had been substantive also then senses could have

grasped the substantive nacre along with its attribute of silvery-ness and

no

error could have been committed. Errors arise during perception because

knowledge is not substantial knowledge. The dominant attribute,

silvery-ness of

the object, alone was perceived and not the substantive nacre or absentee

silver. Therefore theories that depend on perceptual knowledge as

substantial

and not just attributive are incorrect.

 

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Namaste,

 

Is it valid to draw conclusions about the nature of perception from

illusions? Why should the false tell us anything about the true?

Structure you will say is revealed by the sort of errors we make as if

the false were more definitive of the truth than the truth itself. Could

it not also be said that allowing a single quality of an object to be

definative of it is the source of the error i.e. that this construction of

the object as substantive + attributes is the cause of the problem of

illusion and not a reflection of the nature of reality. Qualities lie

within the totality of an object and are not appended to it which is what

we discover when we experience it carefully. In effect we have moved away

from the figment or the illusion which has a structure that reveals only

itself to the reality which has the structure of an object or a totality

which becomes so to speak more and more itself the more we know about it.

 

The question then arises as to what is veridical perception if it is not a

matter of the true knowledge of attributes that gives rise to a true

knowledge of the substantive (object). By the way I am genuinely puzzled

as to where this jargon of substantive and attributes has come from.

Perhaps there is access to some authority that I have not come across.

Leaving that aside in VP we are given an indication of what perceptual

knowledge is on pg. 146(trans).

 

" The validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended.

Spontaneous apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality of

causes that apprehend the substratum of the validity provided no defect is

present. "

 

What does this mean in plain English? Take the paradigm case of being in

front of a tree, a large oak tree, facing it in broad daylight. I remark

to my friend : " That is a fine oak " . The validity of this observation

does not have to be established in any way other that my being there. We

do not have to test for lack of defects because this lack of defects is

the basic condition or default setting if you like of being human. The

structure of true and correct perception is not revealed by anything other

than itself and it seems particularly absurd to suppose that it is

discovered by false perception or illusion. V.P. concurs in this:

 

" For in order that doubt may arise, there must be some defect also in such

a case, and therefore, owing to an absence of the totality of causes of

apprehending the substratum of the validity, which (totality) is bound up

with an absence of defects, there would be no apprehension at all of the

validity of the knowledge. Or spontaneity (self-evidence) is the capacity

of being cognised by all that apprehends the substratum of the validity.

In a case of doubt, although the validity may possess that capacity, yet

it is not apprehended on account of some defect. Hence there is a

reasonable chance for some doubt. " Pg.147,trans.

 

In other words validity is grounded in the proper conditions for

perception. Not having the proper conditions is the basis for error and

illusion. Twilight, distance from a silvery object and so forth are

conditions that should cause us to hesitate to claim validity. The

self-evidence of our senses is compromised in some way and therefore doubt

is reasonable. There is no suggestion in VP that illusion tells us

anything about true and accurate (veridical) perception.

 

Dharmaraja Advarindra the author of VP then goes on to say something which

is directly contrary to the idea that the illusory tells us about the

structure of the veridical.

 

" The invalidity of knowledge, however, is not due to the totality of

causes of knowledge in general, for in that case even valid knowledge

would be invalid; but it is due to some (adventitious) defect. " (pg.148)

 

In other words if all we ever knew were the attributes as the argument

from illusion purports to show then we could never ever be sure whether we

knew the object or not. It would be an inference from its attributes and

thus beyond direct knowledge. Adventitious is a good word for the defect

in that it comes from outside the causes of knowledge as such. There is

an absence of silver because there is an absence of true silveriness. The

inferential is the mark of the non-veridical. Veridical knowledge is

non-inferential, direct and self-evident.

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

 

----------

 

 

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[Guest guest]

My apologies - the post went inadvertently before I even composed the response

to shree Michael's post. I will respond slowly as I am out of town attending

conference on Fatigue and Stress corrosion of not human mind but mechanically

loaded components without myself getting stressed and corroded.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

--- On Tue, 6/16/09, kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada wrote:

[Guest guest]

Sada-ji wrote:

Since perception does not include also the substantive, the error in the

perception occurred. However at the time of perception, the silver that is

seen where nacre is, is taken as not false but real.

 

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Namaste,

If perception does not include the substantive how does the notion of a

true perception occur, if what perception is true to can never be known?

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

----------

 

 

 

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21:23:00

 

 

 

[Guest guest]

Sadaji,

 

I was saying in the other posts that we need Sruthi pramana to decipher

experience ultimately. For example, in " I am this " , the " this " is varying

always, " I am " appears constant. But to know that " I " is the unchanging

substantive ( not merely a psychological attachment) of " this " or of " I am this "

requires Sruthi pramana. Otherwise logic can suggest both ways, that for

instance, inspite of the constant presence of " I " , we may argue it is merely an

'empty' illusion, and not a pointer to independent Reality - which means, we

will develop our understanding of Reality/Existence solely based on the

experience of " I am this " , and avoid giving a special status to " I " , etc. And so

on.

 

Brahman cannot be found by the senses or mind, so the substantive of illusion is

ever out of reach to these means which belong in vyavahaara. One cannot

establish with logic alone that such a Basis IS, or that to merge in that

Knowledge through pointers like " Aham-Brahmasmi " , etc. will liberate from

ignorance. (Whether other " experience " /insights of Samadhi, Nirvana, etc

following from *other* interpretations can yet lead to complete " liberation " , I

am not sure; but that's a different topic.)

 

I think this is a partial answer to Michaelji's question regarding knowing of

substantive from illusions, although it may not appeal to scientists to bring in

such a pramana.

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

 

 

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>

>

>

> The point is not only by paaramaarthika point that Brahman is substantive for

the universe which cannot be perceived, even from the point of Vyaavahaarika

perception of the substantive cannot occur by the sense input. Transactional

reality has to be established by transactions, as the very name implies, and its

validity is limited to transactions only, since the very fundamental substantive

is imperceptible.  This is very important to recognize since we give so much

value to perceptual knowledge of the world as real. Taking example of gold and

ornaments, the ornaments ring, necklace etc is perceived objects and upon

analysis we discover there is no substantive for the ring other than gold.

Similarly for pot or any object with form and name. Now if we enquire about

the  gold and clay, again for their perception we have to relay on their

individual attributes to differentiate one from the other. Those attributes are

related to assemblage of more

> fundamental substantives, which are the same for both gold and clay. This can

go on  without at arriving any substantive of any object perceived.

Transactionally we can stop at ring and pot or gold and clay, depending on what

level of transaction that we are dealing with.

>  

> I am writing in detail since we are moving to the next pramANa soon.

>  

> The rest in my next mail as I have to run for the conference.

>  

> Hari Om

> Sadananda

>

[Guest guest]

Putramji - PraNAms

 

 

To recongnize that I am an existent and I am a conscious entity - there is no

need for Shruti pramANa. In that sense I am aprameyam, not an object of

knowledge. Recognition of an illusion as illusion or fact presupposes a subject

I, which cannot be objectified. These follow logically too. By process of

rejection any or all ‘this’ as not the subject I, one can arrive that I am

a conscious and existent entity, as residue or subject of of the process

involving negation of I am not this.

 

But what is that I am - the existent consciousness - to know that I need Shruti

pramANa. Since I is aprameyam or cannot be object of knowledge any means of

knowledge, even Shruti is a pointer pointing out the fact that I am Brahman,

unlimited or infinite existence-consciousness, just as the missing 10th man. It

is a positive teaching for ajnaani to recognize or to shift ones attention to

the reflecting consciousness that I am.

 

How can I be that infinite consciousness – to answer that I have to have

convincing shastriiya anumaana. Through perceptual illusion only one can

recognize the original that is getting reflected. Through image in the mirror

only one can see oneself. Without reflecting light, the light cannot be

recognized. Pure light of consciousness that is all pervading need no

realization. Pure inert BMI cannot recognize anything. The product of this

combination is what mithyaa is. Through mithyaa only satyam can be recognized or

realized. This also addresses Shree Micheal's subsequent objection.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

--- On Wed, 6/17/09, putranm <putranm wrote:

I was saying in the other posts that we need Sruthi pramana to decipher

experience ultimately.

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>

>

>

> To recongnize that I am an existent and I am a conscious entity - there is no

need for Shruti pramANa. In that sense I am aprameyam, not an object of

knowledge. Recognition of an illusion as illusion or fact presupposes a subject

I, which cannot be objectified. These follow logically too. By process of

rejection any or all ‘this’ as not the subject I, one can arrive that I am

a conscious and existent entity, as residue or subject of of the process

involving negation of I am not this.

>

 

Sadaji, I think you are referring to the fact that " I am " is inherent Knowledge

as it is Truth, self-revealed in all awareness. It is immediate and undeniable.

However when the mind is running, this Knowledge suffers from superimposition

onto/as " this " . So our knowledge becomes " I am/see/hear/think this " . There is

then the natural doubt whether " I " has reality apart from " this " or whether it

is merely a consequence of " this " (mental processes, etc). Like the chicken or

egg question - which came first? The point here is that the logical process of

" neti " will not convincingly remove the doubt from the person who is thinking

that consciousness is a creation in BMI, that BMI itself is that conscious and

existent entity which will soon die. (Unfortunately this includes practically

many an ajnani

 

Apart from this, I agree that we all feel " I am an existent and conscious

entity " , albeit we may identify that entity as BMI<->world. Then we need Sruthi

to tell us " What am I? " in truth.

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

Putramji - PraNAms

 

You have correctly identified the problem involved in the blind enquiry of who

am I. The inherent problem is not in the enquiry but preconceived notions about

who I am, which prevents the proper discriminative enquiry of who am I - Hence

the sadhana chatuShTaya sampatti requirement for the enquiry as discussed

eloborately by Shankara in his explanation of B.Sutra 1.

 

I am not sure there is really anyonya aasraya of chicken-egg situation here,

since I am has to be there for any inquiry. This interdependency is what Kants

philosophy point out. Although objectification requires subjeect, subject

existence is independent of objectification - this is what anvaya vyatireka

logic used taking deep-sleep experience to shown my existence-consciosness is

independent of the presence or the absence of an object while the presence or

the absence of an object can only be established by the exstent-consciousness

that I am, which Shree Michealji seems to miss the point. Here sastra helps to

examine the anvaya vyatireka logic but one can deduce this aspect logically too.

 

Yes, shruti is required to establish what I am is the pure

existence-consciousness that is limitless and the world that I see is the only

adhyaasa on that absolute undifferentiable existence-consciousness, that I am.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

 

 

--- On Thu, 6/18/09, putranm <putranm wrote:

However when the mind is running, this Knowledge suffers from superimposition

onto/as " this " . So our knowledge becomes " I am/see/hear/ think this " . There is

then the natural doubt whether " I " has reality apart from " this " or whether it

is merely a consequence of " this " (mental processes, etc). Like the chicken or

egg question - which came first? The point here is that the logical process of

" neti " will not convincingly remove the doubt from the person who is thinking

that consciousness is a creation in BMI, that BMI itself is that conscious and

existent entity which will soon die. (Unfortunately this includes practically

many an ajnaani.

 

Yes, sruti is

 

Apart from this, I agree that we all feel " I am an existent and conscious

entity " , albeit we may identify that entity as BMI<->world. Then we need Sruthi

to tell us " What am I? " in truth.

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

 

>

> not sure there is really anyonya aasraya of chicken-egg situation here, since

I am has to be there for any inquiry. This interdependency is what Kants

philosophy point out. Although objectification requires subjeect, subject

existence is independent of objectification - this is what anvaya vyatireka

logic used taking deep-sleep experience to shown my existence-consciosness is

independent of the presence or the absence of an object while the presence or

the absence of an object can only be established by the exstent-consciousness

that I am, which Shree Michealji seems to miss the point. Here sastra helps to

examine the anvaya vyatireka logic but one can deduce this aspect logically too.

>

>

 

Sadaji, just to be theoretical here. This logic seems to have the flaw. To say

there is existent consciousness in deep sleep would also presume that the

objective world also exists in deep sleep and only my individual mind is

inactive - since in truth, there can be no awareness of existent consciousness

in deep sleep, so our discussion is in waking state when both are simultaneously

posited. So positing I in deep sleep also posits the Ishvara's world, inspite of

my non-awareness of it.

 

But it can be said that consciousness is constant though the

awareness/appearances (including disappearance in deep sleep) are ever changing,

and Sruthi tells us how to understand this Consciousness as the fundamental

Reality. I think this is how you mean; but it may involve accepting some Sruthi

guidance as to the right logic to use. (So our logic should follow the foot

steps of the Sruthi.)

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

--- On Thu, 6/18/09, putranm <putranm wrote:

 

 

Sadaji, just to be theoretical here. This logic seems to have the flaw. To say

there is existent consciousness in deep sleep would also presume that the

objective world also exists in deep sleep and only my individual mind is

inactive - since in truth, there can be no awareness of existent consciousness

in deep sleep, so our discussion is in waking state when both are simultaneously

posited. So positing I in deep sleep also posits the Ishvara's world, inspite of

my non-awareness of it.

 

--------------

Putramji - you have zeroed in the problem - in a way yes - there is general

reflection in the deep sleep state, just the mind pool, as what is referred to

as sakshii swaruupam but not particular thoughts in the mind with the vRittis as

attributive type. As long as BMI is there, the conditioned consciousness

operates even in deep sleep state - as the very life principle. Hence deep sleep

is defined as absence of objects - or particular vRittis but not absence of

basic mind that is called saamaanya vRitti, which is the same as akhandaarkaara

vRitti. Hence jnaani also sleeps as jnaani and ajnaani sleep without knowing I

am that general reflected consciousness, hence as ajnaani. All the stored memory

is still there in the deep sleep but active mind is only folded. Hence the

scripture calls as na kincana kaamam kaamayata - no desires for any particular

objects since they are not perceived. However there is experience of the deep

sleep state which is recalled

by the waking mind as I slept very well. Hence sakshii is still there but

saakshyam in terms of objective thoughts is not there. The experience as memory

of deep sleep is there and from that only I have to conclude that I was there to

sleep very well even though I have no concept of space and time.

 

Scripture comes and tells us that I am existent consciousness existing even in

deep sleep state and conscious of the absence of the thoughts. No one is going

to sleep if they think they are not going to be at least existent in the deep

sleep, right? They are conscious but conscious of the absence of every thing

including space and time – similar to conscious of silence – but here

conscious of no thing or nothing.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

-----------------

 

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>

>

> >

> Scripture comes and tells us that I am existent consciousness existing even in

deep sleep state and conscious of the absence of the thoughts. No one is going

to sleep if they think they are not going to be at least existent in the deep

sleep, right? They are conscious but conscious of the absence of every thing

including space and time †" similar to conscious of silence †" but here

conscious of no thing or nothing.

>

 

 

Sadaji, can you explain a bit on what you mean by " existent consciousness " . My

reason for asking is that some others have specified that Brahman should be

identified as " existence " and not as " existent " , that it should not be seen as

" *ontological* reality " , etc. It seems " existent " involves duality such as being

vs non-being. Yet you are consistently using this word here.

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

--- On Thu, 6/18/09, putranm <putranm wrote:

 

can you explain a bit on what you mean by " existent consciousness " . My reason

for asking is that some others have specified that Brahman should be identified

as " existence " and not as " existent " , that it should not be seen as

" *ontological* reality " , etc. It seems " existent " involves duality such as being

vs non-being. Yet you are consistently using this word here.

-------------

Putramji - praNAms

 

Just a subtle point here.

 

satyam Jnaanam anantam are samaanaadhikaraNa - or equal emphasis as swaruupa

lakshaNas of Brahman. Hence Brahman as existence - Brahman as consciousness and

Brahman as infiniteness.

 

Since existence include both as sentient as well as insentient things, and

subject is conscious entity which must be existing - (we can say extent

consciousness since there is no non-existent consciousness) by emphasizing the

consciousness part in the subject, who is the perceiver or knower or jnaani, we

shift our attention more to reflected consciousness or saakshii chaitanyam for

self-realization, and the existence as objects for the world of objects. Hence

perceptuality condition is the existence of the object and the consciousness of

the subject are united to form the consciousness of the existence of the object.

 

In the understanding of I am as Brahman - the samaanaadhikaraNa applies -

existence - consciousness and infiniteness all included in the I am.

 

It is only the emphasis on the knower, I rather than existence I for Jnaanam - a

subtle point.

 

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda

[Guest guest]

advaitin , kuntimaddi sadananda <kuntimaddisada

wrote:

>>

> satyam Jnaanam anantam are samaanaadhikaraNa - or equal emphasis as swaruupa

lakshaNas of Brahman. Hence Brahman as existence - Brahman as consciousness and

Brahman as infiniteness.

>

> Since existence include both as sentient as well as insentient things, and

subject is conscious entity which must be existing - (we can say extent

consciousness since there is no non-existent consciousness) by emphasizing the

consciousness part in the subject, who is the perceiver or knower or jnaani, we

shift our attention more to reflected consciousness or saakshii chaitanyam for

self-realization, and the existence as objects for the world of objects. Hence

perceptuality condition is the existence of the object and the consciousness of

the subject are united to form the consciousness of the existence of the object.

>

 

 

 

Sadaji, thanks for the clarification (although your way of writing does pose

some difficulties in deciphering!). Here is how I have understood. " I am " is

existence but " I am " when seen as the Consciousness that reveals the existence

of " this " , when seen as knower, etc, is referred to as " existent " . This emphasis

on reflected consciousness is made for the sake of guiding the ajnani to

Self-realization.

 

thollmelukaalkizhu

[Guest guest]

--- On Mon, 6/15/09, ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

 

Qualities lie within the totality of an object and are not appended to it which

is what

we discover when we experience it carefully. In effect we have moved away

from the figment or the illusion which has a structure that reveals only

itself to the reality which has the structure of an object or a totality

which becomes so to speak more and more itself the more we know about it.

 

KS: Michael – I am not sure I understand the terminology you have used.  We

get into our own jargon, don’t we? I assume you are referring to inherence of

the attributes with the object.  Here is my understanding - qualities do inhere

with the object – like sweetness of the sugar etc or roundness of the ball –

or shape of the pot. That is true. But what I see through my eyes are the shape

of the object and color of the object. In fact I must say the light reflected

from the object is what the senses gather and by which an object image is

formed. This is simple physics and no metaphysics involved here.  If I stand in

front of the mirror, although my form is inseparable from me, I still see the

form of mine in the visible image in the mirror. The mirror image has no

substantiality of its own since I am standing in front of the mirror and not

inside the mirror.  Form is my attribute that is inseparable from me. Yet I see

my form in the image. My

form is as though ‘mapped’ as the image in the mirror.  The object colors

also follow when all the VIBGOYR colors get absorbed except, say red, if the

object is a red color object.

 

The same thing happens in the mind where image of the object is projected in the

screen of the mind. The structure of the object as perceived through the senses

is what vRitti contents are and the structure perceived depends on how it is

mapped by the senses. It may not necessarily be what the real structure of the

object. One to one correspondence is assumed.  Actual structure and attributes

of the object inhere with the object only just as my form inheres with me

without my form getting separated from me. Yet I see my form in the mirror.

Perception is directly related to the sense input rather than actual attributes

of the object per sec. That is the nature of perceptual knowledge, and does not

depend on our opinions.

 

In fact we can say, because there is no perception of the substantive in

the  image formation or vRitti formation, the world that we perceive is

mithyaa. Just as we are seeing the silver without the substantive of either

silver or nacre, the silver seen is mithyaa. Similarly we cannot see the

substantive of the objects constituting the world; all the objects perceived

though the mind are mithyaa. This is what the last post established – in terms

of errors in perception since the substantive is imperceptible. This is true not

only from the point of paaramaarthika but even from the point of Vyaavahaarika.

 

-------------

Michael:

The question then arises as to what is veridical perception if it is not a

matter of the true knowledge of attributes that gives rise to a true

knowledge of the substantive (object). By the way I am genuinely puzzled

as to where this jargon of substantive and attributes has come from.

Perhaps there is access to some authority that I have not come across.

Leaving that aside in VP we are given an indication of what perceptual

knowledge is on pg. 146(trans).

 

KS: Michael – there is absolutely no jargon here. This is simple science of

perception.  Observation of simple experiment of image formation in a mirror

will tell you that image is projection of the object in front with attributive

content of the object as reflected in the mirror.  The lenses and microscopes

and telescopes operate in the same way – including the lenses in the eyes. Any

ophthalmologist can examine optical vision in the retina and the subsequent

transmission of stereographic image to the mind. That is how the perception

takes place. If this is jargon, let that be; but this is science no metaphysical

jargon either. If you can prove that I am wrong, I am happy to learn. But I can

guarentee that you will have hard time going against basic physical principles.

You have to invoke some metaphysics that cannot be provable, which in my opinion

is unncessary to account for the advaitic understanding that there is no

substantive for the world.

other than Brahman. That there is no substnative even in perceptual knowledge

follows from pure physical principle of image formation.

 

--------------------  

Michael:

" The validity of knowledge is also spontaneously apprehended.

Spontaneous apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality of

causes that apprehend the substratum of the validity provided no defect is

present. "

 

KS: My explanation of the above sentence differs from yours. Perceptual

knowledge is indeed direct and immediate. Also, according to advaita what is

perceived is considered as valid, unless a subsequent knowledge invalidates the

previous perception, as in the case of snake where the rope is or silver where

nacre is. By looking at the image based on the attributes gathered by the

senses, I apprehend the object.  Actual validity of the substratum that is

perceived depends on the attributes that are gathered. If the attributes are

incomplete then the substratum could be a snake rather than a rope or silver

instead of nacre.  Snake or silver is taken as the valid knowledge by the

apprehension of the substratum based on the attributive content of the vRitti

that is formed. I see therefore it is there, is what perceptual knowledge if all

about. Errors are inherent in the perception and in no time I am apprehending

the substratum of the locus of the object

out there. If so there is no possibility for any errors.

 

This I think,  is what the above statement means, in plain Indian English.

-----------

Michael:

What does this mean in plain English? Take the paradigm case of being in front

of a tree, a large oak tree, facing it in broad daylight. I remark to my friend

: " That is a fine oak " . The validity of this observation

does not have to be established in any way other that my being there. We

do not have to test for lack of defects because this lack of defects is

the basic condition or default setting if you like of being human. The

structure of true and correct perception is not revealed by anything other

than itself and it seems particularly absurd to suppose that it is

discovered by false perception or illusion.

 

KS: Michael – since I fail to understand your paradigm, I leave to the readers

to make out the meaning.

----------------

 

V.P. concurs in this:

 

" For in order that doubt may arise, there must be some defect also in such

a case, and therefore, owing to an absence of the totality of causes of

apprehending the substratum of the validity, which (totality) is bound up

with an absence of defects, there would be no apprehension at all of the

validity of the knowledge. Or spontaneity (self-evidence) is the capacity

of being cognized by all that apprehends the substratum of the validity.

In a case of doubt, although the validity may possess that capacity, yet

it is not apprehended on account of some defect. Hence there is a

reasonable chance for some doubt. " Pg.147,trans.

 

------------------------------

Michael – I am happy to know that you feel you are right since you think VP

agrees with you. The page you are referring to comes under non-apprehension.

Since currently we are discussing about apprehension, I will skip this topic

until I come to that.

---------------

The rest of the discussion I feel has already been addressed under errors of

perception due to incorrect or incomplete attributive knowledge due to defects.

All the errors are possible because of the fundamental problem that at no time

we can grasp through the senses the substantive of the object. Mind acts as

image screen with the input from the senses. If senses fail, even if the mind is

active the information is lost and if the mind is absent, even if the senses are

functioning, the image is not formed for knowledge to takes place.  For me it

is a simple science of perception.

 

I stop here since I find ourselves discussing the same things again. 

 

I must say that you have made your point consistently and I am glad the readers

have an alternate explanation to go by.

 

I am sticking to mine until I am convinced that there is error in my

understanding. In my introduction to the series, I have already stated that my

presentation is based on my understanding of the science of perception; and

whenever I deviate from VP, I have made it a point to note for the benefit of

those who are interested. So far my deviation is only from two aspects - the

time concept and the mind going out to grasp the object - both come by the

adoptation of miimasaka's position, which I have noted in the early chapters

that it is not correct. I stand by my understanding.

 

Thank you, Michael. Keep posting since the subject becomes clearer only when we

discuss.  

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda