Guest guest Posted September 4, 2009 Report Share Posted September 4, 2009 Just as an addendum to my last post, here is a simple, short and readable account of the refutation of the 'argument from design' for the existence of a god - http://blogs.salon.com/0001561/stories/2002/11/18/refutationOfThebyDesignArg umentForTheism.html. [Note to all readers just to make it absolutely clear: this does *not* mean that I am denying the existence of Ishvara from the vyAvahArika standpoint.] Best wishes, Dennis Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted September 5, 2009 Report Share Posted September 5, 2009 Dear Dennis-ji Just to clarify, as I guess my earlier message may not have been clear about this - It is the nyaya (purvapakshin) theory that we can logically infer the presence of Ishwara - (and it is his arguments in the BSB that are similar to the design theory arguments). Shankara systematically and categorically dismisses this contention of the nyaya, and establishes that, once again, it is from Shruti alone that one can come to any conclusion about God. Trust this clarifies, Hari OM Shyam --- On Fri, 9/4/09, Dennis Waite <dwaite wrote: Dennis Waite <dwaite RE: Re: Veda-s & its apaurusheyatva advaitin Friday, September 4, 2009, 2:08 PM Dear Shyam-ji, Since you now seem to be opening up the discussion into other areas, I am bound to say that I do not follow one of your main assertions. (In case your logic rests upon the 'argument from design' for the existence of god, I believe this argument has been adequately refuted by western philosophy [at least].) Recent Activity 2 New Members 1 New FilesVisit Your Group Give Back for Good Get inspired by a good cause. Y! Toolbar Get it Free! easy 1-click access to your groups. Start a group in 3 easy steps. Connect with others. .. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted September 5, 2009 Report Share Posted September 5, 2009 advaitin , " maatarishvan " <kots_p wrote: > > Greetings Dennis-ji, > > > Note that I am not saying truth is not non-dual here, but curious to know how can anyone hold `truth is non-dual' and at the same time think such truth can be conveyed? This really is the question of tension between ontology (non-dual truth) and epistemology (to know that ontology). Namaste Srinivas ji, If you are able to solve the puzzle involved in the paratantra Veda that depends on the Swatantra Brahman for its very reality, satyatva, being capable of getting across the knowledge of the Swatantra Adviteeya Brahman, then you would have understood the Advaitic position on the subject. Then you will see, rather appreciate, that the 'tension between ontology (of Swatantra Adviteeya Brahman) and epistemology (of the paratantra Veda that depends on that very Swatantra Brahman for its very reality) to know that Swatantra Ontology' is a 'problem' with Dvaita as well. If it is not a problem with Dvaita, it is neither in Advaita too. Please also note that the role of a pramana, epistemology, is only to remove an obstacle, covering. Brahman does not require a pramana. Brahman is 'hidden' from our vision by avidya, aavarana, as it were. All that Veda does is to help us remove the aavarana, cover, by providing us with the knowledge of the Brahma Lakshana. Where is there any room for 'tension' in this? Aavarana definitely belongs to the vyaavahaaric plane and the Veda that removes this also operates in the vyaavahaaric plane. The Paaramaarthic Real Brahman is left untouched in this exercise. It is unaffected whether someone has avidya or not. Thus there is no 'clash' between two levels as you imagine. If you insist there is a clash, then it is there in equal measure in Dvaita too, as I have shown at the beginning: How can something that depends on something else for its very reality help us know that independent reality? Regards, subbu > > Brahma-sUtra has explicitly denied your position by saying " OM ikshatyE na ashybdham OM " . Note the double negation `na' and `ashyabdham' used here. sUtrakAra is denying some peoples position that Brahman is ashyabdha (indescribable by words). > > > (also there is no one to express it and no one to whom it might be > > expressed). This is what I meant when I said " Such absolute truth is beyond > > authorship and hence is reasonably construed as 'unauthored'. " > > > > Tradition does not mean this way for the notion of `apouruSheyatvam' > > > > > > > Anyone who has realized this truth and has learned or devised a method for > > communicating it to others may set this down in any language, and those who > > understand that language may learn from it. > > Just above you were saying there is no one to express it and no one to whom it be expressed. Now, you are of the opinion that there are some who are `realized' and other are not so; and those realized can communicate the truth to not so lucky ones? > > Regards, > Srinivas > Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted September 11, 2009 Report Share Posted September 11, 2009 Namaste Sri. Subramanian-ji advaitin , " subrahmanian_v " <subrahmanian_v wrote: > > advaitin , " maatarishvan " <kots_p@> wrote: > > > > Greetings Dennis-ji, > > > > > > Note that I am not saying truth is not non-dual here, but curious to know how can anyone hold `truth is non-dual' and at the same time think such truth can be conveyed? This really is the question of tension between ontology (non-dual truth) and epistemology (to know that ontology). > > > Namaste Srinivas ji, > > If you are able to solve the puzzle involved in the paratantra Veda that depends on the Swatantra Brahman for its very reality, satyatva, being capable of getting across the knowledge of the Swatantra Adviteeya Brahman, then you would have understood the Advaitic position on the subject. Then you will see, rather appreciate, that the 'tension between ontology (of Swatantra Adviteeya Brahman) and epistemology (of the paratantra Veda that depends on that very Swatantra Brahman for its very reality) to know that Swatantra Ontology' is a 'problem' with Dvaita as well. If it is not a problem with Dvaita, it is neither in Advaita too. > Your comparison of two systems is not correct. In Dvaita, vEda is paratantra no doubt, but it very much exist and as real as svatntra Brahman Himself. From Brahman's perspective too, the existence of vEda is as much real as Himself. Veda exist eternally. This eternal existence is not on its own, but it is very much depends on Brhamn's Will to keep it eternally so. Thereby Brhamn's Will is also eternal without undergoing any changes to undo veda's existence. That's all the reason Braham is said to be `satya-sankalpa' for this reason. His Will is not something keep changing as the wind blows. In this way there is no contradiction between the ontology (dual existence of Brahman and Veda) and that of epistemology of pratantra but real vEda conveying svatantrya of Brahman. Why do you think paratantra vEda has problem with conveying truth? This is not the same case with Advaita system. Although from vyavahArika point you may accept duality of vEda and Brahman, however from Brahman's point (i.e from Satya point of view) Brahman alone is real and Brahman alone exist, period. There is nothing else to convey that truth. There is nobody else to convey to. Given this, while are in this vyavahAra there is no way to know non-dual reality exist if at all it exist. Note again, I am not denying positively that non-dual reality exist, but rather questioning the proposition that it does. > Please also note that the role of a pramana, epistemology, is only to remove an obstacle, covering. Brahman does not require a pramana. Brahman is 'hidden' from our vision by avidya, aavarana, as it were. To say so you need pramANa. " Brahman " as such is not given in our immediate perception. To posit existence of Brahman itself you need a pramANa to begin with. After establishing existence of such Brahman, in order for you say such Brahman is covered by avidyatmaka avaraNa, you need some more pramANa. You assume that Brahman exist and he/she/it is covered with avarana. This is highly questionable. >All that Veda does is to help us remove the aavarana, cover, by providing us with the knowledge of the Brahma Lakshana. Where is there any room for 'tension' in this? What vEda suppose to do should also come from vEda itself. You cannot superimpose what vEda suppose to tell us even before you let vEda tell us what it is for. Otherwise, one may be accused of channeling one's idea through vEda to make it look authentic. >Aavarana definitely belongs to the vyaavahaaric plane and the Veda that removes this also operates in the vyaavahaaric plane. What is the pramANa for saying all these? Remember you cannot give vyavaharika pramANa, for such division of reality into P-V level is under dispute. Also, does this avaraNa belongs to vyavahArika? Or the very vyahArika is due to the avaraNa? If it is said to be former, then removal of avrana does not mean removal of vyavahArika as such. If it is said to be later, you will end up with duality in pAramArthika, paramArthika itself (which is after negation of vyavahArika) and this avaraNa. > The Paaramaarthic Real Brahman is left untouched in this exercise. It is unaffected whether someone has avidya or not. Thus there is no 'clash' between two levels as you imagine. It does effect. From pAramArthika point-of-view (there is no `view' as such, but for argument sake) it alone exist. From vyavahArika point-of-view you may admit duality of v-p level. Now, what does this means? As long as you are in vyavahArika, you may conceptually accept existence of dual V-P levels. As soon as you realize, the non-existence of v-level is retroactive (it means v-level was never existed in all three point of time). It is not that v-level was existed and does not exist going forward. It was retroactively did not exist. (Note that you may contest this understanding of mine and say world does not sublate for jIvan mukta but continue to be perceived as held by other in this forum. But we have already seen the problem in such position) . This also means that there cannot be some people in P level and some are in V level, for that would admit duality of selves. Therefore, the corollary is either you are in V-level (along with imagined other selves) or you are in P-level. Two levels cannot not coexist, period. Given this, all the teachings is from v-level only without teacher ever experienced P-level. For that matter there is no means of knowing there is such thing as `non-dual p-level'. This exactly is the tension between epistemology and ontology I was speaking. >If you insist there is a clash, then it is there in equal measure in Dvaita too, as I have shown at the beginning: How can something that depends on something else for >its very reality help us know that independent reality? > This clash is not in Dvaita. How can it be? Something that depends on something else for its very reality can able to help us know that independent reality because that dependent reality is `reality' as such and exist eternally without undergoing any sublation. This eternal existence of dependent is again due to that Independent only. What is the problem in this? Some clarification about Dvaita needed here – the dual category of svatantra-paratantra itself (i.e the duality itself, not the entities in such categories) is not due to on its own, but due to the very Will of that Independent One. Non-duality is in the category of `Independent'only, however dual categories of `Independent-Dependent' is DUE TO that Non-Dual-Independent one. Simple and plain. There is no confusion in this at all. Regards, Srinivas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest guest Posted September 13, 2009 Report Share Posted September 13, 2009 advaitin , " maatarishvan " <kots_p wrote: > Namaste Sri. Subramanian-ji > Your comparison of two systems is not correct. > In Dvaita, vEda is paratantra no doubt, but it very much exist and as real as svatntra Brahman Himself. From Brahman's perspective too, the existence of vEda is as much real as Himself. Dear Srinivas ji, My Response: I cannot accept your asserting 'Veda (or for that matter any other thing that is paratantra) to be 'as real as svatantra Brahman Himself'. This is a self-contradiction. You have designated Independent and dependent as Svatantra 'satya' and paratantra 'satya' just like Advaita's pAramArthika satya and vyAvahArika satya. Can Satya be two? If the two are 'equally' real, why do you have two distinct categories in satya? This amounts to positing svagatabheda in Brahman which you have admitted is 'quite unvEdic.' When Vedas go into laya mode both in daily pralaya, sleep (as the Br.Up. mantra '...veda avedaaH' which applies to daily sleep state only and not maha pralaya as you had mistaken earlier. Because, there the discussion between Janaka and Yajnavalkya is about deep sleep state) and maha pralaya, will the Swatantra Brahman consider them (vedas) to be 'as real as Himself'? If you say 'yes', then even Brahman will have to be admitted to be subject to laya, pralaya, srishti (punaH AvirbhAva), just like the Veda. You say: Veda exist eternally. This eternal existence is not on its own, but it is very much depends on Brhamn's Will to keep it eternally so. Thereby Brhamn's Will is also eternal without undergoing any changes to undo veda's existence. That's all the reason Braham is said to be `satya-sankalpa' for this reason. His Will is not something keep changing as the wind blows. In this way there is no contradiction between the ontology (dual existence of Brahman and Veda) and that of epistemology of pratantra but real vEda conveying svatantrya of Brahman. Why do you think paratantra vEda has problem with conveying truth? My response: Most of what you say above is admitted in Advaita too, as it is. For example, in Advaita too, Veda is anAdi, nitya, apaurusheya. You have only depicted the Saguna Brahman of Advaita above. Quoted below is an excerpt from Swami Maheshananda Giri's introduction to the Chandogya Upanishad Bhashya, edited and published by Mahesh Research Institute, Varanasi, 1982: // We have been studying the different commentators, such as Srikantha, Ramanuja, Vallabha, Nimbarka, Baladeva, Srikara, Madhva and the moderners, for over fifty years now. We have seen that apart from the criticism of the Advaita-view, there is little more in the content of their traditional view that is not found in Shankara, or is not just a logical corollary of what he has said. It is our challenge that apart from logic-chipping, not a single spiritual fibre, which has not been either supported or contradicted by Shankara, can be shown in the works of these commentators. All the statements of the other commentators about God, are melted down in the crucible of the concept of Saguna Brahman of Shankara. The concept of Brahman of Srikantha and Ramanuja is practically identical with Shankara's concept of Ishwara, and they rarely try to contradict it. Similarly, Shankara's concept of Virat or Sutratman takes care of Madhva, Vallabha and others. Thus, what they contradict, is the range outside their vision. Had they been true traditionalists, they would have presented different facets of the same Truth which Shankara had presented. When it comes to present a positive aspect of the spiritual Being, they have little to say, though they roar to assert what it is not. This gives the lie to their having received a different unbroken tradition. ......but the traditionalist that Shankara was, he never criticised or disowned the views of Virat, Hiranyagarbha or Ishwara. He rather developed complete harmony between them. Thus, without any fear of contradiction, we can say that Shankara's is THE Hindu tradition. // You say: > This is not the same case with Advaita system. Although from vyavahArika point you may accept duality of vEda and Brahman, however from Brahman's point (i.e from Satya point of view) Brahman alone is real and Brahman alone exist, period. Response: So what? I have already pointed out that, as the Veda itself points out, the operation of Veda is in the realm of bandha. Note that in the Bri.Up. mantra 'vEdaaH avEdaaH', deep sleep is being discussed as an illustration to the state of Moksha. All duality, including the veda, is shown as being absent in deep sleep, thereby implying that such is the case with the state of liberation. You say: There is nothing else to convey that truth. There is nobody else to convey to. Response: When? For whom? In the state of realization, for the aparoksha JnAni, there is in truth, nothing else to convey that truth and there is nobody else, in truth, to convey to. Shankara's Dashashloki verse says: Na shAstram na shAstA na shikshA na shishyaH Na cha tvam, na cha aham, na cha ayam prapanchaH svarUpAvabodho vikalpa-asahiShNuH tadeko avashiShTaH shivaH kevalo'ham [in the state of Realization, which does not tolerate any divisions, there is no scripture, no teacher, no teaching, no aspirant to whom it could be given. There is no `you', no `me', nor this world. I am that residual Auspicious Non-dual Truth.] Says Shankara in the Brahmasutra commentary 2.1.14: http://www.bharatadesam.com/spiritual/brahma_sutra /brahma_sutra_sankara_34153.php // Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, & c., become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their validity depends does not really exist. And further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine? These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, & c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. // So, even the question you have raised is not new to Advaita. You say: Given this, while are in this vyavahAra there is no way to know non-dual reality exist if at all it exist. Note again, I am not denying positively that non-dual reality exist, but rather questioning the proposition that it does. My Response: Again, you are mistaken about the states. Non-duality is the truth underlying all duality, bandha-moksha vyavahara. Yet, while we are in vyavahara, there is definitely a way to know that the Non-dual Truth exists, `asti ityeva upalabdhavyaH' says the Kathopanishad. It continues, as Dr.Shyam ji has already quoted, only for the one who has the vishvAsa, shraddhA, in the very existence of that Non-dual Truth, does the mananam and nididhyAsanam result in `brahma asmi'. So, according to the Upanishad, the journey is from `Brahma asti' (paroksha jnana) to `Brahma asmi' (aparoksha jnAna). Given this, in the state of bondage, when an aspirant after liberation asks for the means to it, there is the Veda to help him. There is also a teacher to guide him. And there is every way to know the Non-dual Truth by this method. No doubt, it would be very difficult for Dvaitins to appreciate this where the Advaitins have no problem at all. Shankara has himself taken up such questions and answered them, not once, but in several places, one instance I have shown above. You say: > > Please also note that the role of a pramana, epistemology, is only to remove an obstacle, covering. Brahman does not require a pramana. Brahman is 'hidden' from our vision by avidya, aavarana, as it were. > To say so you need pramANa.> > " Brahman " as such is not given in our immediate perception. To posit existence of Brahman itself you need a pramANa to begin with. After establishing existence of such Brahman, in order for you say such Brahman is covered by avidyatmaka avaraNa, you need some more pramANa. You assume that Brahman exist and he/she/it is covered with avarana. This is highly questionable. My Response: Advaitins definitely do not 'assume the existence of Brahman'. Show me a sentence from Shankara to substantiate this remark of yours. On the topic of 'Brahman covered by AvaraNa', you may read the Shankara Bhashya, a very lengthy one, on Br.Up. 1.4.10 where the 'aham Brahma asmi' occurs. Shankara has himself, again, taken up the question of yours and answered it. In brief let me say this: The mantra says: It, Brahman, Knew Itself, as 'I am Brahman'. If Brahman was already enlightened, why should it 'know' afresh as 'I am Brahman'? Shankara initiates a discussion on this question and concludes: Since there is no sentient being other than Brahman, we have to conclude that Brahman alone got this realization and attained 'sarvAtma bhAva'. This is the pramana for the Advaitic statement: brahmaiva sva-avidyayaa samsarati iva, sva-vidyayaa muchyata iva. [brahman alone is as though in bondage owing to ignorance of its own nature, and as though gets released owing to gaining knowledge of its own nature.] There is definitely no `assumption' about Brahman's existence by Advaitins. There is the Shruti pramanam that is relied on by advaitins on this matter. You say: > >All that Veda does is to help us remove the aavarana, cover, by providing us with the knowledge of the Brahma Lakshana. Where is there any room for 'tension' in this? > What vEda suppose to do should also come from vEda itself. You cannot superimpose what vEda suppose to tell us even before you let vEda tell us what it is for. Otherwise, one may be accused of channeling one's idea through vEda to make it look authentic. My response: The Veda says that the Veda gives the knowledge about Brahman for the bound jiva to get liberated. The words such as 'I ask of you about that Aupanishada Purusha' of the Veda itself are proof for this. 'Shrotriyam BrahmaniShTham', shows that the Veda itself says that this knowledge comes from the Veda alone. Advaitins have never superimposed the function of the Veda. Where has Shankara said what you are accusing? You say: > >Aavarana definitely belongs to the vyaavahaaric plane and the Veda that removes this also operates in the vyaavahaaric plane.> > What is the pramANa for saying all these? Remember you cannot give vyavaharika pramANa, for such division of reality into P-V level is under dispute. My response: I have long ago shown the Shruti pramana, not vyAvaharika pramana, for the division of P - V levels. Let me repeat: http://atma.sulekha.com/blog/post/2008/09/a-vichara-on-swatantra-and-paratantra-\ independent.htm The Three states/types of Reality (sattaa-traividhyam) While commenting on the mantra ''satyam cha anRtam cha Satyam abhavat' (Taittiriya Up. II.6) Sri Shankaracharya says: //satyam = vyavaharavishayam since this is being mentioned in the context of 'sRishti' of the world. He adds: this is not paramArthasatyam (absolute reality) since Brahman alone indeed is paramArtha satyam. This vyavaharavishayam satyam is only Apekshikam, relative. (He explains) when compared to the water in a mirage, the water (that we actually use for drinking, etc.) is real. This is what is meant by 'vyavaharika satyam'. That which is not thus real is anRtam, unreal. // The above bhashyam brings to the fore that three types of 'reality' are admitted in the Shruti. Commonly these are known as: 1.PAramArthika Satyam which is Brahman alone, 2. vyAvahArika satyam which constitutes the common world experience of samsara and 3. prAtibhAsika satyam which is a seeming reality, actually within the samsaaric experience. This seeming reality of say, the mirage-water or rope-snake, is corrected in the vyavahara itself and does not require Brahma jnanam for this. The vyvahaarika satyam, of course, gets corrected upon the rise of Brahma jnAnam. The Shruti vakyams for this are: Ekameva adviteeyam, neha naanaa asti kinchana, sarvam khalu idam brahma, etc. What is worthy of noting in the above bhashyam is the Shruti pramaanam for the existence of the three types of reality. The Taittiriya shruti we took up above is the pramanam for the three types of reality. It is not the concoction of the advaitins/Bhagavatpada/later Acharyas. The Bhashyam uses the two specific names and the third is only implied. The Upanishad uses two 'satyam' words. Obviously the two cannot be the same. 'Satyam, Brahman, became, in creation, satyam, the vyavaharic objects and anRtam: the illusory objects in vyavahara itself.' I would like to know what is the pramAna for positing two 'orders' of reality: swatantra and paratantra?: The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy says: // Madhva (1238-1317 CE) According to Madhva there are two orders of reality: 1. svatantra, independent reality, which consists of Brahman alone and 2. paratantra, dependent reality, which consists of jivas (souls) and jada (lifeless objects). Although dependent reality would not exist apart from brahman's will, this very dependence creates a fundamental distinction between brahman and all else, implying a dualist view. // The word 'order' means 'ranking'. Obviously, the two ranks cannot be on the same footing/level. So, you too, by force, admit two 'levels' of reality but blissfully ignoring this sva-mata 'dosha', accuse advaita of admitting two levels of reality. This might be of interest to you: That the Dvaita system accepts the two fundamental levels of reality can be appreciated by noting what Shankara has said in a path breaking statement, which is only authenticated by the Scripture, as we have already seen in the Gita verse 2.69: In His Brihadaranyaka Upanishad Bhashya Shankaracharya has made a trendsetting statement: //sarva-vAdinaamapi aparihaaryah paramaartha-samvyavahaarakRto vyavahaarah// (Brihadaranyaka bhashya: 3.v.i). //In fact, all schools must admit the existence or non-existence of the phenomenal world according as it is viewed from the relative or the absolute standpoint.// (translation by Swami Madhavananda, the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad with the commentary of Sri Shankaracharya, published by advaita ashrama, kolkota.) You say: > Also, does this avaraNa belongs to vyavahArika? Or the very vyahArika is due to the avaraNa? If it is said to be former, then removal of avrana does not mean removal of vyavahArika as such. If it is said to be later, you will end up with duality in pAramArthika, paramArthika itself (which is after negation of vyavahArika) and this avaraNa. My response: Neither of the two above possibilities arises in Advaita. Removal of aavaraNa will definitely remove the `satyatva buddhi' pertaining to the vyavaharika. This alone is meant by the word `bAdha' as used by Shankara, even in the above Sutrabhashya quote. `bAdha' does not mean the disappearance of the vyavaharika. Therefore, vyavaharika is rendered ineffective as far as the Jnani is concerned. Since avaraNa is removed, there will be no duality in pAramArthika since the satyatva buddhi in vyavaharika would have been removed. So, Brahmaiva ekam pAramArthikam satyam, in all the three periods of time is not in jeopardy at any time, both in bondage and in moksha. You say: > > The Paaramaarthic Real Brahman is left untouched in this exercise. It is unaffected whether someone has avidya or not. Thus there is no 'clash' between two levels as you imagine. > It does effect. > From pAramArthika point-of-view (there is no `view' as such, but for argument sake) it alone exist. From vyavahArika point-of-view you may admit duality of v-p level. > Now, what does this means? As long as you are in vyavahArika, you may conceptually accept existence of dual V-P levels. As soon as you realize, the non-existence of v-level is retroactive (it means v-level was never existed in all three point of time). It is not that v-level was existed and does not exist going forward. It was retroactively did not exist. (Note that you may contest this understanding of mine and say world does not sublate for jIvan mukta but continue to be perceived as held by other in this forum. But we have already seen the problem in such position). My response: The world does get sublated to the aparoksha Jnani but its perception does not end. This is the decisive position of Shankara and there is no problem in advaita with this position. (You may refer to an article: The Enlightened Eminently Engage in Empirical Endeavours available in the Files Section.) You say: This also means that there cannot be some people in P level and some are in V level, for that would admit duality of selves. Response: When you talk of `people' it is always in V level only. There are no `people' in P level. Only Brahman is always everywhere. Only that the ajnAnis think there are `people' and the JnAni knows from experience that only Brahman is. You say: Therefore, the corollary is either you are in V-level (along with imagined other selves) or you are in P-level. Two levels cannot not coexist, period. Response: Two levels cannot coexist as both real. I am unable to conceive of an example where two levels of reality, both real, co-existing. When one of them is Independently Real and the other is only dependently, seemingly, real, there is no difficulty in their `co-existing'. For example, the substratum rope which is the independently real vastu there and the superimposed snake, the dependently real, that is imagined to be there, `both' co-exist. For the one under the delusion, only the snake exists. For one who knows the truth, only the rope exists. But fortunately, for the one in delusion, there is available an opportunity, a definite possibility, to `learn' the truth from the one who knows that only the rope is there. And equally logically, it is possible for the one who knows the truth to `teach' the one in delusion about the truth. There is no problem here. This is what exactly happens with the Jnani being able to convey the truth to the one in delusion. You say: Given this, all the teachings are from v-level only without teacher ever experienced P-level. For that matter there is no means of knowing there is such thing as `non-dual p-level'. This exactly is the tension between epistemology and ontology I was speaking. Response: This tension is only imagined by you. I have shown how such a tension is not there in the above para. What is the difficulty for the one who knows that only the rope exists to show the one in delusion this truth? In fact this is what happens in every teaching-learning interaction everywhere. The teacher knows the `vastu sthithi' and the student is ignorant of this. In a step by step manner, depending on the adhikAritva of the student, the teacher reveals the truth. Rather, he removes the obstacles that impede the student from seeing the truth. You say: > >If you insist there is a clash, then it is there in equal measure in Dvaita too, as I have shown at the beginning: How can something that depends on something else for >its very reality help us know that independent reality? > > This clash is not in Dvaita. How can it be? > Something that depends on something else for its very reality can able to help us know that independent reality because that dependent reality is `reality' as such and exist eternally without undergoing any sublation. This eternal existence of dependent is again due to that Independent only. What is the problem in this? Response: This explanation is already contained in Advaita. The dependently real, vyavaharika-satya Veda undergoes sublation only to the one who has secured the aproksha jnana and not for the others . Here too, as said earlier, bAdha of Veda is not that the Jnani will forget the vEda vaakyas (or that the Veda vaakyas lose their capacity to teach the truth), that helped him gain the knowledge. Just as a teacher who has mastered mathematics and not in need of further learning in order to teach others happily transmits his understanding to others who are in need of knowing, the Jnani too happily teaches others from the same vEdic resource that he had used. Does the aparoksha jnani in Dvaita need further shravana of the vEdaanta to obtain aparoksha jnana? Will he not be able to use the Veda to teach other mumukshu-s? In advaita too, the vEda is eternally existent, nitya for those who are in ignorance. Thus, sublation of the vEda for a jnani is not a valid reason for positing an impossibility of advaita-jnAna upadesha by an aparoksha jnani. I do not know if all muktas of the Dvaita sampradaya will be able to access, remember/learn/teach the vEda in the state of mukti which is definitely only after the death of the physical body and linga shareera. You say: > Some clarification about Dvaita needed here – the dual category of svatantra-paratantra itself (i.e the duality itself, not the entities in such categories) is not due to on its own, but due to the very Will of that Independent One. Non-duality is in the category of `Independent'only, however dual categories of `Independent-Dependent' is DUE TO that Non-Dual-Independent one. Simple and plain. There is no confusion in this at all. > > Regards, > Srinivas. Response: The above is compatible/comparable with the SaguNa Brahman of Advaita. There is no problem with this. Non-duality is the truth only with the Nirguna Brahman. Jiva-Ishwara bheda, jiva-jiva bheda, jiva-jaDa bheda, jaDa-jaDa bheda and jaDa-Ishwara bheda are accepted in Advaita too in the vyAvaharika level. http://atma.sulekha.com/blog/post/2008/06/a-mananam-on-the-paramopanishat-pancha\ -bheda-prapancha.htm The P –V distinction obtains, due to the PArameshwarI Maya, and is sustained by that very Ishwara's Maya. In Advaita it is this Parameshwara who bestows to the mumukshu the NirguNa Brahma Jnana resulting in MOksha. Just as in Dvaita, it is Ishwara that is instrumental in Jnana-Moksha. Shankara has said in the Sutra bhashya: Tadanugraha-hEtukEnaiva hi jnAnEna mOksha-siddhirbhavitumarhati. [by the JnAna earned through His grace alone Moksha is possible.] The `Will' of Brahman is the Dvaita-way of expressing the Advaitic PArameshwarI Maayaa. That the two terms `icchA' and `mAyA' are synonymous is accepted by Dvaitins: //triguNAtmikArtha-vijnAnam vishNushaktiH tathaiva cha. mAyAshabdena bhaNyate. mahAmAyA iti, avidyA iti, niyatiH, mohini iti cha, prakRitiH, vAsanA iti cha...// from the Brahma sUtra anu bhAshya 3.2.3 of Madhva as quoted in page no. 219 of the kannada book 'mata traya sameekshA' of Dr. Anandatirtha V. NAgasampige, a noted Madhva scholar, Director, Purnaprajna Samshodhana Mandiram (A prestigious research body functioning under the aegis of the Madhva school), Bangalore, under the section: Dvaita darshana. Before quoting this the eminent author writes in kannada: ''upaniShattugaLalli mAyAshabdavu paramAtmana icche, jaDaprakRti, shrihariya shakti, tejassu emba aneka arthagaLalli baLakeyAgide.'' [in the Upanishads the word `mAyaa' has been found to be used in several senses of: the icchA, desire/will of ParamAtma, the inert matter, the power of the Lord, His effulgence, and so on.] The Mandukya Upanishad negates this pancha bhedAtmaka prapancha of the earlier pAda-traya (waking, dream, sleep OR sthUla, sUkshma, kAraNa) in the Turiya by the word `prapanchopashamam'. Your interpretation of this is quite different but that does not affect the Advaitic position. Regards, subbu Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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