Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge - 33

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Knowledge and the Means of Knowledge – 33

 

Upamaana or Comparison

 

Upamaana or comparison is considered as a separate means of knowledge by

advaitins and meemaasakas. It is considered as distinct from perception and

inference. Here the means of knowledge is the similarity of two different

objects A and B. What is being perceived currently is object B. In the

perception of B, which is somewhat unknown to the perceiver, he notices some

features that are similar to an object A that he is very much familiar. On

examining further he recalls the many attributes of A that he can now notice in

the perception of B. Thus the similarity of B to A is gained by comparing the

observed attributes of B with those attributes of A that he could recall. Since

all objective knowledge is only attributive knowledge, one is gaining the

knowledge of B because of the similarities B has with A.

 

Vedanta ParibhASha provides an example. Consider a person who is very much

familiar with a cow. Familiarity implies he has knowledge of the attributes of a

cow based on which he can recognize or recall it in his mind. When he goes to a

forest he sees a wild animal which looks like the domesticated cow in the town.

The wild animal appears to be similar to a cow, at a first glance. As he

examines further he learns that indeed the wild animal is very much like the cow

that he is familiar since many of the attributes of the wild animal are

comparable to the attributes of cow that he knows. Based on the attributive

knowledge of the cow that he knows and the perceptual knowledge of the wild

animal that he is seeing, he concludes that this wild animal is like the cow he

has. He also sees some dissimilarities between the wild animal and the cow to

conclude that it is not a cow but looks like the cow he has.

 

This is a common experience for everyone – when we look at new person and say

he looks like the person I know. Here we are using comparison between the

features of one with whom we are very much familiar with the new person whom we

are meeting for the first time. When we meet a new baby we want to know how he

looks like. The knowledge of the object in front is gained by comparing the

similarities of the attributes of those with whom we are familiar. We can ask

the question, what new knowledge are we gaining by this comparison? What we are

seeing directly is an unknown person B. What we are familiar is the person A,

whom we know intimately. At a first glance, the new person B seems to have some

features that resemble the person A. Upon closer study, we find that many

attributes of person A are in B. Upamaana as a means of knowledge should reveal

something new that we do not know before. We have full knowledge of A but no

knowledge of B. Upamaana

provides a means of knowledge to know B by comparing and concluding the

existence of many qualities of A in B. Since any object is known only via its

attributes, we now have the attributive knowledge of B, because of Upamaana

pramANa.

 

In the example of the wild animal (gavaya, a wild cow) VP provides a sequence of

thoughts that happen in the seer. The first immediate thought is ‘this animal

looks like my cow’. At this stage it is a proposition in the mind that arises

at the first look due to some semblance of the wild animal with the cow that he

is familiar. Then, he examines further details and concludes that “my cow is

like this animalâ€. Here by process of comparison of the similarities and

dissimilarities one arrives at a conviction regarding the similarities of the

cow that exists in the wild animal. What knowledge are we gaining by this

comparison? It is not the knowledge of the cow, since one already knows the cow.

Right now cow is not available for direct perception. What we do not know is

the nature of the wild animal that is being seen right now. Since at the first

glance, we say, it looks like a cow. At the same time, since there are certain

dissimilarities which

make one not to recognize it as a cow, a further examination is required to

establish the similarities and dissimilarities of the cow that one is familiar

and the wild animal that one is not familiar. Only after detailed comparison,

one learns that ‘the cow looks very much similar to this that I see’. Or

one can say this wild animal is very close the cow that I am familiar with.

 

The great poet Kalidasa is well known as an expert in simile. Simile is the same

as upamaana. All the heroes and heroines in his poetry are described using

similes as she look like this or looks like that, etc. By these similes we come

to know how his heroes and heroines look like, thus we are gaining the knowledge

of them through similes or upamaanas or comparisons. My father describes in

Telugu poetry the features of a lady of the house, whose complexion is very

dark. He says her smile is like “kappum bimbamu lopala uppatilina chadrarekha

mayinâ€, meaning it is like the crescent moon arising in the middle of dark

clouds. Here what we are familiar are dark clouds in the sky and also how white

the crescent moon looks like. Bringing these two together he compares her white

teeth and dark face and also her smile. When she smiles, it is comparable to

sudden appearance of a crescent moon arising in dark clouds. The reader gains

the knowledge of the

features of the lady of the house, besides there is a poetic beauty embedded in

it.

 

Two questions can arise in relation to upamaana as pramANa: Is upamaana any

different from perception? Second, is it not an inferential knowledge, since

some philosophers consider it as part of anumaana only and not a separate

pramANa? These questions are addressed by Vedanta ParibhASha. It is not

perception since the knowledge of the wild animal that one perceives is based on

the similarities of attributes of the cow that one is familiar. One does not

perceive the cow while perceiving the wild animal. During perceptual knowledge,

when I see object cow, based on the attributes of the cow, a recognition that it

is a cow is made by recalling from memory the attributes of the cow jaati that

one has seen and known before. In contrast, here when I see the wild animal for

the first time, there is no image stored in my memory to recall for me to know

this is a wild animal. What I am recalling is not the image of the wild animal,

but image of a similarly looking

animal, the cow that I am familiar. Hence cognitive object, the wild animal, is

different from the recollected object the cow. Hence in this case, upamaana

involves a recollection of a different animal altogether from what one

perceives. The knowledge of the new animal takes place due to similarities in

its attributes with that of different animal that is not being perceived. Hence

upamaana pramANa does not come under direct perception.

 

In fact, whenever we see a new object, the mind goes back into memory to check

if there any image that resembles the one that we are perceiving. If there is no

identical image for us to identify the object that we see as we are seeing this

new object for the first time, we scan through the memory to see any object that

has close resemblance with the new object. Thus similarities and dissimilarities

of new object and old known objects are categorized into families or phylums to

arrive at an expanded version of the classification scheme. This is how the

knowledge grows. Hence upamaana is used extensively in gaining the knowledge of

new objects. It is a separate means of knowledge to know objects that I do not

know before.

 

The next question is if upamaana the same as anumaana or inference. Recall

anumaana pramANa has three components, if not five. We can write artificially

the three components in upamaana, similar to anumaana:

My cow is like this wild animal.

Because it has similar attributes as this wild animal.

Whenever one has similar attributes to another, it will look similar to the

other.

 

Let us compare the above statements with those in the example of anumaana.

The hill has fire.

Because it has smoke.

Whenever there is smoke, there must be fire, as in kitchen.

In the inference of fire where there is smoke there are no similarities between

smoke and fire. What is there is its concomitant relation with smoke, as in

kitchen. This relation between the fire and smoke is deduced by dRiShTAnta or

prior observation in kitchen and is universally applicable.

 

In the knowledge of the wild animal that it is similar to the cow that we know,

we are not really using any universal concomitant relation between any two

objects that are similar. We do not come to the conclusion that this wild animal

is like cow because of the universal relation that whenever one has similar

attributes to another, it must look similar to the other. Without going through

such syllogistic inference one arrives at the cognition that ‘my cow is like

this wild animal’. This is a matter of common experience, says VP. There is a

comparison of two things, not inference of one from the other because of vyaapti

or concomitant relation between hetu and saadhya. We note here that anumaana or

inference has very rigid structure to follow. It involves the knowledge of

something that cannot be known directly by perception following a well

established universal relation between what I see and what I conclude, as in

smoke vs fire. There are no

similarities between smoke and fire. What is there is a concomitant relation or

vyaapti between what is seen or hetu and what is concluded, saadhya. Also we

need to bear in mind that every inference does not directly come under anumaana

pramaaNa, as we noted in the last post that some degree of inference is involved

even in the direct perceptual process. For example, we are gaining the knowledge

of the complete object even though what we perceive is not a perspective vision

but a projected vision of the object.

 

According to advaita, in upamaana or comparison, there is no immediate inference

between two reciprocally related entities that western logic allows. Upamaana

involves mediate knowledge unlike pratyaksha. There is a deliberate examination

of the similarities between the wild animal and the cow before one comes to a

conclusion or an assertion that my cow looks like that. No prior reciprocal

relation between cow and the wild animal is established for immediate knowledge

to take place. Before the knowledge takes place there is an extensive

observation in evaluating the similarities between the cow and the wild animal.

Hence it is mediate and not immediate knowledge.

 

Swami Satprakashananda in his methods of knowledge says advaita does not dissent

the Naiyayikas view that knowledge of dissimilarities can also be attained by

upamaana. In the above example, dissimilarities involve a conclusion this wild

animal is completely unlike my cow. Here, if the wild animal and the cow are

completely dissimilar, the question arises why compare the two, to begin with,

since what is being perceived is the wild animal and cow cannot enter into

picture because it is dissimilar to the wild animal. In fact the wild animal

may be dissimilar to many objects in the world, including the trees, lakes and

human beings. Mind does not go through comparison of each and every animal to

arrive that this wild animal is dissimilar to the all other objects that I know.

 

Hence for comparison to be made there must be some common ground or similarities

between the two to justify further examination and conclusion that they are

dissimilar in many other important aspects. Let us take another example. It is

very common in comparing two twins. John and Harry, who look alike or they may

be even two siblings. We are familiar with John, but we were told that Harry is

completely opposite to him. In this example the dissimilarities are emphasized

to provide the knowledge of Harry in relation to John with whom we are familiar.

Here we are comparing the attributes of Harry in relation to the known

attributes of John. Being twins, there are some similarities to justify

comparison. We obtain knowledge of one from the dissimilar attributes of the

other that we know. Hence Naiyyaayikas ascertain that even the dissimilarities

can come under upamaana pramANa. That is, one gains new knowledge based on the

dissimilarities. Advaita does not

dissent from this assertion.

 

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We will next analyze the application of upamaana in spiritual saadhana.

 

Hari Om!

Sadananda