Brahman cannot be described by any word whatsoever

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Namaste

to all.

 

taitt

up. 2.9.1 says that words turn back along with the mind, failing to reach

Brahman (yato vAco nivartante aprApya manasA saha). Shri Shankara points out in

shloka 10 of his dashashlokI that none of the words such as ‘one’, ‘absolute’ ,

etc., can be used to denote brahman. The shloka is as below:--

    “It is not one; how can there be a second

different from it? It has neither absoluteness nor non-absoluteness. It is

neither void nor non-void since it is devoid of duality. How can I describe

that which is established by the entire Vedanta!”

 

In

his commentary on this shloka in siddhAntabindu, madhusUdana sarasvati says:--

One

is what is capable of being counted as one. A second is what is capable of

giving rise to the cognition of a second relative to it. When there is no one,

how can there be a second? A second is what implies a third, etc.

 Objection: But by the sruti “One only,

without a second” (Cha.Up. 6.2.1), oneness is postulated.

Answer:

No. It is said (in the above shloka)—nor even absoluteness. Absoluteness is

oneness. That statement in the sruti—one only, without a second--  is also due to avidyA. (When the sruti says

“One only, without a second”, it is only repeating the general notion in the

world which is due to avidyA. Even absoluteness cannot be postulated in respect

of the AtmA because that is also a relative term). Then can it be said that if

the sruti does not really declare the oneness of the AtmA, it follows, on the

basis of the means of knowledge such as perception, that there is definitely

multiplicity?

 The answer is—No. Not even non-absoluteness.

Non-absoluteness is ‘being many’. This follows from the sruti statements such

as, “There is no diversity whatsoever here” (Br. Up. 4.4.19), “One only,

without a second” (Cha. 6.2.1), “Now therefore the instruction, not this, not

this” (Br. Up. 2.3.6).

 Obj: In that case, since everything is

denied, there is only void.

 The answer is, no. It is not a void. “If any

one considers Brahman as non-existent, then he himself becomes non-existent.

(Because Brahman is none other than his own real nature). If any one knows

Brahman as existing, then they (the knowers of Brahman) consider him as

existing” (tai. Up. 2.6.1), Brahman is Reality, Consciousness and Infinite”

(tai. Up. 2.1.1), By the shrutis starting from “O dear boy, this was only

existence in the beginning” (Cha. 6.2.1), and up to “All this world has this as

the self, it is the realty, it is the AtmA, that thou art” (Cha. Up. 6.8.7) the

reality of the AtmA is declared; it is the substratum of all illusions, and it

is where all negation culminates (it cannot be negated at all).

 Obj: Then it would mean that the AtmA has the

qualities of reality, knowledge, etc.

 The answer is, no, because it has been said

that it is not non-void. (Non-void means ‘not empty’ i.e.  there is some thing on it such as a quality.

Or in other words, it has some quality. So by the double negative ‘not

non-void’ it is meant that it does not have any quality). While by the two

terms ‘one’ and ‘without a second’ the existence of any thing else of the same

species or a different species is denied, by the term ‘only’ (eva) all

differences such as the difference between a quality and the possessor of a

quality are denied. The reason for all these is given as—‘because of being

devoid of duality’. What is divided into two is ‘dual’. The state of being dual

is duality. It has been said in the VArtika: “What is divided into two is said

to be ‘dual’ and such a state is called ‘duality’ (Br. up. VArtika. 4.3.186) .

Where there is no duality or the state of being divided into two, that is

non-duality. This is the literal meaning. As the sruti says, “Like water, one,

the seer and free from duality” (Br. Up. 4.3.32). Since it is only the

knowledge of the counter-correlative that is the cause of easily becoming aware

of the absence of some thing, and since duality has been accepted as

indeterminable, denial is quite logical because the objects are knowable

through the means of knowledge such as perception. (This sentence is explained

in the note below).

(Note. The last sentence is

in refutation of an earlier objection that, as a rule it is only a thing that

is known by some valid means of knowledge to exist somewhere that can be denied

somewhere else. In order to deny the existence of a snake in a particular place

the person denying must know what a snake is. But it is not necessary that he

should have seen a real snake. It is enough if he has seen the picture of a

snake somewhere.  The objection raised

is that the world is non-existent according to advaita and there is no point in

denying the presence of a non-existent thing like the horn of a hare. The

answer is that the world is not totally non-existent. The advaita view is that

the world is neither real nor unreal. Moreover, it has been accepted as having

empirical reality. The objects in the world can be known through the means of

knowledge such as perception, inference, etc. Only their absolute reality is

denied. So the denial is quite justified.)  

 

Obj:

In that case please indicate such an AtmA by pointing it out with the finger.

Answer:

It is not possible; it has been said, “How can I describe”. ‘How’ indicates

impossibility. Being non-dual it cannot become an object of speech. The srutis,

“He explained without words” (Nr.Uttara Tapani Up. 7), “That from which words

return without attaining it, along with the mind” (tai. Up.  2.4.1), “You cannot know the knower of

knowledge” (Br. Up. 3.4.2), indicate this. If it is asked, how can vedAnta be

the valid means of knowledge if the AtmA cannot become the object of speech,

the answer is: Even though the AtmA is not an object, ignorance about it is

destroyed by a mere vRitti of the mind of the form of the AtmA. This is

expressed by the term ‘That which is established by the entire Vedanta’. The

shrutis such as, “It is known to him to whom it is not an object of knowledge;

he who thinks he knows it does not know. It is unknown to those who think they

know it well, and known to those who know that they do not know it (as an

object)” (Kena. 2.3), “That which is not comprehended by the mind, but that by

which the mind is said to comprehend, know that alone to be Brahman and not

that which is worshipped” (Kena. 1.6), show that the AtmA is not an object.

Thus it is established that when avidyA is destroyed by the vRitti in the form

of the indivisible Atman generated by the statements of vedAnta, all the

sufferings that are imagined because of avidyA come to an end, and one remains

as supreme bliss, having attained the ultimate aim.  

 

S.N.Sastri