the unknown object

[Guest guest]

Subbup-ji wrote:

In his recent files uploaded to the files section of this list(the

shortest commentary):

" Why? It is because all these achievements are in the realm of anAtma, the

non-self. Why is it non-self? Because it requires the subject, the knower,

to say ‘this exists’; they depend on the conscious observer. In the

absence of the knower, the subject - I, the known - the object has no

existence even. Being dependent on me, the conscious observer, the

observed has no independent, swatantra, reality. Like the superimposed

serpent has no independent existence of itself and has only a dependent,

paratantra, existence on the substratum rope...... "

 

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Namaste Subbu-ji:

 

This is a point that Sada-ji often makes so perhaps you are singing off

the same hymn sheet or at least have the same conductor. It would be nice

to know where precisely in the commentaries of Shankaracarya you

discovered the justification for this position as it seems questionable in

the extreme. From one point of view it is a banal tautology viz. I don't

know about things until I know about them. That you will agree joins such

gems of insight as " it is what it is " . Deep but vacuous.

 

From another point of view it brings us into the aery realms of the

immaterialist George Berkeley who held that to be is to be perceived.

This may be true of illusions but to make the illusory the basis for an

ontology is not I think the way of Advaita.

 

The other day I came across this by the learned professor Mohanty author

of many books on Indian Philosophy. An extensive view of the work in

question is available on Google Books. I was cheered to find that the

learned Doctor concurs with me on this point.

 

Quote:

" Empirically real things can have unknown existence (ajnata-satta). The

table on which I am writing exists when no one perceives it. This

possibility of unknown existence belongs to the very sense of empirical

reality. There are, however, objects that, by the very sense of their

being, cannot have unknown existence. According to the Vedantin, such are

pleasure and pain (for them, to be is to be known); illusory objects, for

instance, the snake that is perceived where there is only a rope (this

false snake has no unknown existence); and also ignorance itself (it is

not possible to ignorant of ignorance). Of all these objects, the

Berkeleyan dictum " esse est percipii " holds good - but not of (the

empirically real) material objects such as sticks and stones. " (pg.36:

Classical Indian Philosophy by Jitendrath Mohanty)

 

Best Wishes,

Michael.

 

 

 

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[Guest guest]

advaitin , ombhurbhuva <ombhurbhuva wrote:

>

> Subbup-ji wrote:

> In his recent files uploaded to the files section of this list(the

> shortest commentary):

> " Why? It is because all these achievements are in the realm of anAtma, the

> non-self. Why is it non-self? Because it requires the subject, the knower,

> to say ‘this exists’; they depend on the conscious observer. In the

> absence of the knower, the subject - I, the known - the object has no

> existence even. Being dependent on me, the conscious observer, the

> observed has no independent, swatantra, reality. Like the superimposed

> serpent has no independent existence of itself and has only a dependent,

> paratantra, existence on the substratum rope...... "

>

> ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

>

> Namaste Subbu-ji:

>

> It would be nice to know where precisely in the commentaries of Shankaracarya

you discovered the justification for this position as it seems questionable in

the extreme. From one point of view it is a banal tautology viz. I don't know

about things until I know about them.

 

 

Namaste Michael ji,

 

While the position stated by me in the portion quoted by you is the established

one in Advaita of Shankara, right from the very first sentence of the adhyAsa

Bhashya, here is a specific mention:

 

In the GaudapAda kArikaa II.34, the verse states:

 

// The diversity in the universe does not exist as an entity identical With

Atman, NOR DOES IT EXIST BY ITSELF. Neither is it separate from Brahman nor is

it non—separate. This is the statement of the wise.//

 

In the above translation, the portion in caps is what is relevant for us.

Shankara comments (pl. read the entire commentary in Sw. Gambhirananda's words)

--

 

//This manifold phenomenal world, consisting of Prana, etc., when ascertained

from the standpoint of its ESSENTIAL nature, from the standpoint of Supreme

Reality, does not exist as multifarious, or as a different substance in this

non-dual Self which is the absolute Reality, just as an illusory snake has no

separate existence when it is found out with the help of a light to be identical

with the rope.// (Now comes the reply to your question)--

 

Continues Shankara, // Besides, this world never exists 'in its own nature', in

the form of Prana, etc., verily because of its having been imagined like a snake

on a rope.//

 

This is very clear. Anandagiri, the authoritative commentator says in his gloss

for the above sentence of Shankara:

 

// Shankara rejects the second possibility (of the objective world existing)

(the one that we are now considering) 'in its own nature' = on the ground of

existing independently by itself WITHOUT DEPENDING on ANYONE/ANYTHING ELSE for

its sattaa = existence, and, prateeti = cognition/knowledge -- the dvaita,

duality, cannot be established.//

 

Anandagiri adds: // if the world/duality/objects are admitted to be endowed with

independence, it would be non-different from Atman and would lead to a situation

where the anAtman, non-self, could be deemed to be non-dual. //

 

From the above words of Shankara and Anandagiri it is clear that the objective

world, anAtman, can claim (even) existence ONLY on the authority / observership

of a sentient Atman, that is other than itself.

 

Regards,

subbu

[Guest guest]

Pranams,

 

You are letting the cat out of the bag.

 

This reminds me of a conversation between Shri Chandrasekhara Bharati and a devotee who visited Sringeri. Swamigal was requested to speak on advaita by the devotee.

 

Swamigal maintained grand silence. On being questioned, here was the answer by Swamigal:

 

Since, bahya vishayas is mithya (illusion), it is useless to discuss these issues and since Brahma Tattva is beyong the reach of Speech & Mind, it cannot be expressed in words. So, i maintained the Silence.

 

regs,

sriram

 

On a lighter note: Your note on Gobi Manchuria & icecream was nice. I enjoyed it..

 

--- On Wed, 20/1/10, Bhaskar YR <bhaskar.yr wrote:

Bhaskar YR <bhaskar.yrRe: Re: the unknown objectadvaitin Date: Wednesday, 20 January, 2010, 5:28 PM

 

praNAms Hare Krishna This vyAvahArika satya & pAramArthika satya & their clear cut understanding from vyavahAra is a never ending puzzle is it not?? See, we do accept that there is jeeva-jeeva bedha (there is hell a lot of differece between paripUrNa vedAntins like big four S's of our group, Sri Sastri prabhuji, Sri Subbu prabhuji, Sri Sadananda prabhuji & Sri Sunder prabhuji and lip vedAntins like me :-)) , jeeva-jada bedha, (difference between bhaskar & basket:-), jada-jada bedha (difference between ice cream & gobi manchuri:-), jeeva-Ishwara bedha (difference between bhagavaan bhaskara & mortal bhaskara) etc. etc. and accordingly we have been promptly following these difference to its reality...and at the same time if someone questions paramArthik ONENESS or ultimate nondual reality, which we advaitins tirelessly advocating, we again with all humility say, no, this ultimate ONENESS cannot be

explained in words & it cannot be reached even from the mind ( we quote those famous shruti vAkya-s yato vAcho nirvartante aprApya manasa saha, na tatra chakshurgacchati, na vAggacchati nO manaH etc. in justification. ) Under these circumstances, I have a doubt here, when everything fair and true from the vyAvahArik point of view where is a theory that can be refuted from the advaita perspective? ? I am not able to understand which are the stand points that can be refuted from vyAvahArik point of advaita?? If nothing is wrong in vyavahAra & the bedha is true and pAramArthika is indescribable, what is that we are refuting here & from which standpoint?? My doubts may sound like from the desk of dvaitin but I have these fresh doubts after seeing somany 'comfort' answers in the name of vyAvahArika & pAramArthika :-)) Hari Hari Hari Bol!!! bhaskar

The INTERNET now has a personality. YOURS! See your Homepage.

[Guest guest]

advaitin , Ramesh Krishnamurthy <rkmurthy wrote:

>

> Subbu-ji, what you are saying is true for the universe of objects in

> totality. In other words, it is true from a pAramArthika angle. It is not

valid for all individual objects empirically. If it were so, advaita-vedAnta

would become a theory of subjective idealism, which it is clearly not.

>

> To say that diversity is mithyA is different from saying that a desk exists

only when I see it.

 

 

Namaste.

 

While we generally recognize two standpoints, paaramaarthika and vyaavahaarika,

it would be beneficial to identify in the Shankaran Advaita a standpoint that

the mumukshu, aspirant, has to take. Shankara has no doubt shown the

PAramArthika in unmistakable terms and the vyAvahArika, for instance, while

refuting the Yogachara Buddhist in the Brahma sutra Bhashya. However, Shankara,

now and then, does not miss the opportunity to point out what stand the aspirant

should take, for, he is neither a Jnani to posit himself in the PAramArthika nor

is he benefited by the loukika vyavaharika stand. For him, Shankara, for

example, gives this teaching:

 

// You, O Arjuna, therefore better follow the view of the tattva-darshins,

Truth-seers, shake off grief and delusion, and, being assured that all phenomena

(vikara-s) are really non-existent and are, like the mirage, mere false

appearances, do thou calmly bear heat and cold and other pairs of opposites, of

which some are constant and others inconstant in their nature as productive of

pleasure and pain.// Gita Bhashya II.16 concluding portion.

 

// Just like the denial of an illusory snake on the rope, waking, dream and

sound sleep are to be denied as having any existence in the Self.// Mandukya

Karika bhashya IV.90

 

The above is just representative. Also note that Sri Chandrashekhara Bharati

Swamiji instructed His disciple Sri Abhinava Vidyatirtha Swamiji, at the

commencement, the contemplation on the lines of the Shatashloki verse 12:

 

// When we get up from a seated position and start walking, the feeling should

not be, " we are walking and going somewhere " . In the big ocean, the Atman, a

wave has arisen. That wave is moving forward. This is the supposition. There

is no difference between the wave and the ocean. Yet, because one walks (and

thus moves forward like the wave), one should think of oneself as the

wave.....Whenever some object is seen, the reflection should not be, 'This

object is now visible. " One must think, 'Aha! Objectless consciousness has now

become associated with objects. The Atman was manifest earlier but now its

manifestation has increased. " On receiving a blow, we become markedly aware of

the body, do we not? We normally do have awareness of the body but this

awareness increases when we are beaten. Similar is the case here. Accordingly,

even when perceiving some external object, one should cogitate that apprehension

of the Atman has occurred.// (this is just a condensed version of the elaborate

teaching based on the above verse.)

 

This is the method applicable for the sadhaka. It is off the vyavaharika and

directed at the paaramaarthika but at the same time not paaramArthika per se.

With this background, the following excerpt, from the posts on

Sridakshinamurtistotram available in the Files Section, is presented. Readers

are requested to study the same and assess the relevance of the contents to the

aspirant, sadhaka, and not the loukika.

 

I was prompted to reproduce the material in view of the importance the

discussion has assumed, with many members participating. These views are not

mine, but are of the Advaita Acharyas, pre and post Shankara and Shankara's as

well. The material is given only for cogitation and not for my participation in

any discussion that might ensue:

 

 

Validity of pramaana-s questioned:

It cannot be maintained that the parlance reality is to be posited because of

its being known by means of the instruments of knowledge, pramaana-s, for, this

knowledge which is sublated, be it by Brahman-knowledge, would not be valid

knowledge and hence the so-called pramana-s should not be regarded as pramana-s

at all. The Srutis such as `neha nanaa asti kinchana' (Br.Up. 4.4.19) and mAyAm

tu prakritim vidyAt (Shve.U.4.10) [There is in It, no diversity; know that the

material cause of the world is Maayaa] by the declaration of the unreality of

the whole world, declare the untrustworthiness of perception, inference, etc.,

which are ordinarily accepted as making known the world.

 

Pramaana-s reveal only Sat, Existence:

 

It cannot be said that perception etc., have to be accepted as revealing the

objects of common parlance, e.g., a pot, that are not illusory like the

rope-snake for, this distinction is without a difference. Further, if

perception etc., have to be accepted as pramanas revealing objects (whose

existence is independent of one's knowledge of them), then they should be deemed

to reveal only the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) that is the sattA (Existence) of

each of the objects of parlance like the pot as revealed in the experience, `the

pot is,' for the concealment whose cessation is brought about by the concerned

pramana can pertain only to the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) which is

self-effulgent and not to the inert objects of the world. That is why it is

said:

 

ato'ubhava eva eko viShayo'jnAtalakShaNaH

akshAdInAm svataH siddho yatra teShAm pramANatA (Sambandha VArtika 1002)

[Therefore it is the self-established one Experience alone, and none other which

can be regarded as unknown, that is the object of perception etc., whence they

(perception, etc.,) become valid.]

The `adhishThAna' (Substratum) that is revealed is conditioned by the form,

colour, etc., of the object regarded as perceived and as such, not the

unconditioned `adhishThAna' (Substratum). Further enquiry shows that the

`adhishThAna' (Substratum) is the attributeless Atman as the Shrutis such as

(Kathopanishad 2.5.9) [His form is not to be seen, no one beholds Him with the

eye.] declare. Thus It cannot be revealed by the so-called pramanas that are

outward as alluded to by the Shruti (Kathopanishad 2.4.1) whose real meaning

lies in showing that the Self is not an object for the sense organs, nor can

they be deemed as revealing the objects of the world because of the

consciousness of the co-presence and co-absence of the sense organs and the

items of knowledge as pointed out already. The position is, therefore, that

they are falsely regarded as pramanas in the same way as in a dream. So has it

been said in the Vedanta-siddhAnta-muktAvaLi 14). The unsublatable

self-established Atman Itself is to be accepted as the Substratum of all

illusion.

 

Thus, in the above analysis, we see: (a) In the waking, with regard to the

common objects, the `pramanas' reveal the `adhishThAna' (Substratum) alone; the

`is'ness of the object is what comes to light. (b) In the dream, the pramanas do

not reveal any `real' objects. They, the pramanas, become sublated along with

the objects upon waking. © Even in the case of an illusion like rope-snake,

the pramana that reveals the substratum, the rope, is deemed to be revealing the

Super Substratum, the Atman alone, as in the case of the dream-pramanas which

actually are revealing the Atman alone which are wrongly seen in a dream as the

various objects.

 

Pratyabhijnaa (recognition) reveals only Sat, Existence:

 

If for each cognition there is a separate object as must be the case on the view

which accepts only jnAtasatta, i.e., prAtItika-sattaa,

(pratIti-mAtra-kAlika-sattaa), i.e., the object regarded as having an existence

only when it is cognized), it may be asked as to how the recognition,

pratyabhijnA, of the present object, say a pot or a house, as identical with the

one previously known, is possible. The reply is: the recognition in this

instance, is illusory similar to the recognition of the identity of the illusory

snake perceived severally be ten men, each declaring to the other `I saw the

same snake as you did.' This is pointed out in the VedAnta-siddhAnta-muktAvaLi

12):

dvaita-bhede pratijnAnam pratyabhijnA katham vada |

dashAnAm yugapat-sarpa-bhrame tadvat tathaiva sA ||

(meaning already covered in the above para.)

This same idea is spoken of in the Pratyak-tattva-chintAmaNi 4.32 and 33 as

well.

 

In all these cases, similarity is mistaken for identity. The experience of such

a pratyabhijnA that is had in a dream which is subsequently cancelled with the

entire content, serves to clear the issue.

 

Similarly, when a man passes from waking consciousness into sleep from which

again he awakes, his present consciousness relates to a different world. But

his recognition of the identity of the present and the former worlds is simply

an error due to similarity just like the experience of the continuity of the

same dream after sleep also within the dream. [The idea is this: Supposing a

person is dreaming. In the dream he goes to sleep. He wakes up from this

dream-sleep and goes about his `waking' parlance. What is happening is: one

dream alone is interspersed with a sleep. This analogy serves to convey the

idea that we, in the normal way wake up every day to a waking and continue our

parlance that we had left the previous day. This continuity, this illustration

drives home, is just an illusion.] The pratyabhijnA `sEyam dIpa-jwAlA', or

so'yam nadI-pravAhaH' = This is the same flame, or river as the one seen

previously – illustrates this. Such a pratyabhijnA does not reveal real

identity, or prove it. As a matter of fact, the knowledge of the identity of an

object is, by the very nature of the case, an impossibility as there is no valid

means, apart from our subjective impression, of knowing the objective unity or

identity of what is perceived at different times. There is no recognition of an

inner unity as in the case of the true Self; all objective identity is

fictitious only. The commentary on the MAnasollAsa (II.8) says:

// In the case of all particularities pertaining to objects presented in

cause-effect relationship etc., capable of being referred to as `this, that'

etc., that which is Pure Existence, constant in all cases without exception is

Itself the content of everything, and that is Brahman alone and none other.//

 

`Common world', pratikarma-vyavasthA:

 

The belief that there is a common world independent of what the individuals

themselves create, the experience that nature is governed by some kind of law,

regularity, and uniformity – the cause of which cannot be changed at will by any

individual, may all be said to militate against the viewpoint that has been put

forward in the above paragraph. But if it is recognized that all these do

pertain to the dream world as well, all such objections would not in the least

be valid. So also in connection with the objection based on the so-called

`Common world', `pratikarma-vyavasthA' of the srishti-drishti-vAda which is

enunciated in: For any individual, at a time, only one thing can be an objetof

knowledge, not all objects for all people at all times. The NArAyaNI gloss on

the SiddhAntabindu on shloka 1 of the Dashashloki gives:

 

//What is imagined in himself is verily illumined by the jiva in his aspect as

the Witness Self as in a dream and there is no necessity for prolix postulations

such as concealment of the object and the modification of the mind for

destroying the concealment (that is `revealing' an unknown object through the

operation of the sense organ and the mental vritti). The co-presence and the

co-absence of the sense organs and the knowledge are to be understood as in the

case of a dream.//

 

(The idea is this: In a dream, I `see' an object with the eye. If the eye is

not there, no seeing takes place. The ear cannot see the object. It can

accomplish sound cognition alone. Thus, in the dream there is an arrangement,

an order. But this order is no longer true when the dream ends. All the sense

organs and their one-to-one function, the order, etc. are all part of the one

whole unreal dream. So it must be seen with the case of the waking order, etc.

as well.)

 

Fate of (a) Vedic injunctions and (b) Permenance of sky etc.:

 

There might be an objection: the Vedic injunctions in respect of

karma and jnana are rendered invalid, if objects have existence only

when cognized. This objection is not to the point for, the purport

of the injunctive Srutis also is in BrahmajnAna with which even

the `realist' agrees. The SiddhAnta-lesha-sangraha 2 points out:

 

//The purport of the injunctive Srutis which prescribe jyotiShToma

etc., is in securing Brahman Knowledge through the purification of

the mind.//

 

The idea is that this Supreme Brahman Knowledge arises only

be `falsifying' all the objective world and as such considering the

Sruti as part of the objective universe that is unreal would not be

wrong.

 

The other objection is like this: The Srutis like the one, for eg.

the Rg. Veda 8.8.31.2 speak of the permenance of sky, the earth, the

mountains, the universe and this world. How then is the above view

justified? In answer to this, it may be pointed out that the

permenance spoken of here is necessarily to be constrained to mean

at best relative permanence till the next dissolution (pralaya), for

otherwise, there will be no way of understanding the subsequent

sentence: The King is permanent. From the present standpoint, the

Sruti must be regarded as alluding to the relative permanence based

upon the illusory pratyabhijnA as in the case of a flame. The sky

etc., are concocted at the moment of experience as permanent just as

some of the objects are concocted as permanent in a dream.

 

Some more aspects of this higher standpoint may be considered in the

next part.

(to be continued)

(end of part IX- f)

(posted on Nov.6.2006)

 

 

From Sridakshinamurtistotram Part IX – I (p.201 in advaitin posting)

 

Further embellishment of Drishti-srishti-vAda – drishtireva srishtiH

 

A more detailed consideration of the above may now be undertaken. The

VedAnta-siddhAnta-muktAvalI (17) says:

//If by the view expounded thus far that existence is contemporaneous with

cognition, is meant that existence is merely cognition, it is acceptable to me

as well, as not opposed to mine. If it is held that there is a difference

(between the cognition and the cognized) pray, declare the proof thereof.//

 

Is the proof, if it exists, perception, inference, Shruti or presumptive

evidence? Of the two, viz., the knowledge and its object, the `object' is

commonly regarded as being revealed by the knowledge of it. The difference,

however, of the object from the knowledge is not tenable. There is no object

which carries with itself any mark that it is different from the knowledge of

it. A knowledge of the object is not a knowledge of its difference from the

object or vice versa, nor is the difference given as the object of any special

knowledge; even if it were, that special knowledge will not be evidenced as

different from the knowledge of it. Another knowledge would be required to

cognize the difference between that and its object and so on ad infinitum. Thus

perception is not a proof of this difference.

 

If an inference – such as `All knowledge, qua knowledge is different from its

object, like any one or two accepted cases of such difference' – is advanced as

a proof, it may be asked as to whether this very inference, as a case of

knowledge, is different from its object. This is to ask whether the `All'

contains the very statement itself. If not, nothing is achieved, as one is

confronted with the same regress. If included, it will be a palpable case of

knowledge being at once its own subject and object, which cannot be accepted.

 

The Shruti which has its purport in non-difference only, can never be supposed

to teach difference.

 

It might be said that presumption (arthApatti) adduces the evidence for the

difference between the knowledge and the object. The object changes; and for

the perception of change, a stationary consciousness is indispensable. If, of

two things, one changes and the other is immutable, the things in question are

essentially different: the change of the one and the immutability of the other

are untenable without their being different. This presumption would be

acceptable if it were not concerned with knowledge, for at each stage it demands

an apprehension of the togetherness of the object with the knowledge of it.

Togetherness can only mean objective toetherness; and since knowledge is not an

object, this apprehension of togetherness is not available; without this the

presumption is inapplicable. Thus the independence of object cannot, with any

plausibility, be upheld.

The bhashya on the Mandukyakaarika (IV.67), read with the gloss of Anandagiri

clarifies:

// One cannot experience a jar without the cognition of the jar, nor can one

have cognition of a jar without the jar. In the case of the jar and the

cognition of the jar, it is not possible to conceive the distinction between the

instrument of knowledge and the object of knowledge. If it be asked as to what

the proof is in respect of the jar, the answer cannot be that it is `knowledge'

as it is unwarranted. Nor can the answer be that it is the `knowledge of the

jar' because of the reciprocal dependence involved. Therefore there is no

possibility of the relationship of `the revealed and the revealer' between the

(so-called) jar and cognition thereof.//

 

There being no proof whatsoever in support of the difference between the

cognition and the cognized, this universe, animate and inanimate, which appeared

in consciousness is nothing but cognition.

This puts it in line with the common experience in respect of illusions. In the

case of shell-silver, for example, there is merely cognition `as silver'

although there is no silver, as the Sutra bhashya IV.i.5 points out. Further,

there is experience of wild imagination of the cognition of objects that are not

there. The Panchadashi (XIII.96, 98) says:

 

//96. Different mental creations are formed every moment, while those which pass

are lost for ever. The objects of the practical world should be looked upon

similarly.

 

98. How do the objects of the practical world, which are destroyed every moment,

differ from the forms created by the mind in imagination? Though they appear,

the idea of their reality should be given up.//

Considering the case of dream, the Vivekachudamani states:

//170. In dreams, when there is no actual contact with the external world, the

mind alone creates the whole universe consisting of the experiencer etc.

Similarly in the waking state also; there is no difference. Therefore all this

(phenomenal universe) is the projection of the mind.

171. In dreamless sleep, when the mind is reduced to its causal state, there

exists nothing (for the person asleep), as is evident from universal experience.

Hence man's relative existence is simply the creation of his mind, and has no

objective reality.//

The term manas, mind, occurring in these lines must be taken to be the creative

power i.e., vikshepashakti of Avidya as has been already pointed out.

The Mandukya bhashya (4) points out that the waking consciousness, being

associated with many means (such as subject-object relationship, agency,

instrumentality etc.,) and appearing as revealing external objects, as it were,

is nothing but states of mind.

Thus, the so-called existence of objects accepted in parlance, when analysed,

turns out to be a case of mere appearance.

 

Om Tat Sat